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 At the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, Britain had acquired a vast empire that 
included territories in Asia, Africa, North America, and Europe that numbered more than a 
quarter of the earth’s population.  Britain also possessed the largest army that the state had ever 
fielded, employing nearly 250,000 troops on station throughout this empire and on fighting 
fronts in Spain, southern France, the Low Countries, and North America.  However, the peace of 
1815 and the end of nearly twenty-five years of war with France brought with it significant 
problems for Britain.  Years of war had saddled the state with a massive debt of nearly £745,000; 
a threefold increase from its total debt in 1793, the year war with the French began.  
Furthermore, the rapid economic changes brought on by a the state that had transitioned from a 
wartime economy to one of peacetime caused widespread unemployment and financial 
dislocation among the British population including the thousands of officers and soldiers who 
had fought in the Napoleonic Wars and were now demobilized and back into the civilian sector.  
Lastly, the significant imperial growth had stretched the colonial administrative and bureaucratic 
infrastructure to the breaking point prompting the Colonial Office and the ruling elites to adopt 
short-term measures in running its empire.   
 The solution adopted by the Colonial Office in the twenty-five years that followed the 
Napoleonic Wars was the employment of proconsular despotism.  Proconsular despotism is the 
practice of governing distant territories and provinces by politically safe individuals, most often 
military men, who identified with and were sympathetic to the aims of the parent state and the 
ruling elites.  The employment of this form of colonial governance helped to alleviate a number 
of problems that plagued the Crown and Parliament.  First, the practice found suitable 
employment for deserving military officers during a period of army demobilization and sizeable 
reduction of armed forces.  The appointment of military officers to high colonial administrative 
positions was viewed by Parliament as a reward for distinguished service to the state.  Second, 
the practice enabled Colonial Office to employ officials who had both previous administrative 
and military experience and who were accustomed to make critical decisions that they believed 
coincided with British strategic and national interests.  Third, the employment of knowledgeable 
and experienced army officers in colonial posts fulfilled the Parliamentary mandates of curtailing 
military spending while maintaining security for the colonies.  
 Military officers of all ranks clamored for the opportunities of serving in the colonies.  
General and field grade officers viewed service in the colonies as a means of maintaining their 
status and financially supporting their lifestyles.  Company grade officers, who primarily came 
from the emerging middle class, saw colonial service as a means of swift promotion in a 
peacetime army and of rising socially.  Competition for overseas administrative positions was 
intense and officers frequently employed an intricate and complex pattern of patronage 
networking.   
 The proconsular system of governing Britain’s vast network of colonies flourished in the 
quarter century following the Battle of Waterloo.  In the immediate aftermath of the Napoleonic 
Wars the British officer corps contributed men who became the principal source for trained 
colonial administrators enabling Britain to effectively manage its immense empire. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 The career of the ancient Egyptian official, Amenhotep Huy, who lived nearly 3,500 
years ago, is chronicled in the wall paintings of his tomb.  Tomb inscriptions and accompanying 
art reveal that Huy began work as a civil official serving as “royal messenger in all foreign 
lands.”  This position essentially was that of an official letter carrier, who conveyed important 
dispatches and documents throughout the empire.  These bureaucrats thus gained an intimate 
knowledge of the empire as thoroughly seasoned and well-traveled military officials.  As time 
passed, Huy worked his way up both the administrative and military ladders, eventually 
becoming the modern equivalent of a lieutenant general in the Pharaoh’s chariot forces.  
Historians of Bronze Age cultures have noted that Huy’s military/administrative position was not 
unique to Egypt’s New Kingdom polity, and that Huy’s appointment heralded a trend toward 
viceroys who worked in both a military as well as a civilian administrative capacity.  As Huy’s 
ability improved, the Pharaoh bestowed greater responsibilities on his servant, entrusting him 
with the important position of “Overseer of all the gold lands Amun.”1  As an overseer, Huy’s 
duties included not only supervising gold production, but also protecting these vital resources 
against hostile neighbors.  Egyptologists conjecture that Huy governed his province from the 
fortified city of Faras, ruling the native Nubian population in the name of the pharaoh.  John 
Coleman Darnell and Colleen Manassa argue that fortresses on the edge of the empire functioned 
not only as administrative centers similar to those of the Roman Empire 1,300 years later, but 
also as core bureaucratic centers.  Huy, like subsequent administrators of Nubia, had two deputy 
administrators assisting him in governing the province.  One deputy, Penniut, oversaw affairs in 
Wawat, the northern half of the province; and the other governed Kush to the south.  
                                                 
1 John Coleman Darnell and Colleen Manassa, Tutankhamun’s Armies: Battle and Conquest During 
Ancient Egypt’s Late 18th Dynasty (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2007), 107.  
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Furthermore, each deputy also supervised ministers of agriculture, treasury, military forces, and a 
host of scribes who recorded the day-to-day details of the colony’s administration.2  As chief 
military officer in the territory, Huy was expected to fulfill many duties and responsibilities that 
were both military and civic.  Indeed, research by Andrea Gnirs, John Darnell, and Colleen 
Manassa note that New Kingdom Egyptian generals, while spending their entire careers in the 
military, were routinely called upon to work in both civil and military administrations.3   
 The practice of proconsular despotism appears to be as old as statecraft itself.  New 
Kingdom Egyptians, the Romans, the Ghaznavid Empire around Lahore in the Middle Ages, the 
early Mughals of the Delhi Sultanate, the Spanish maritime empire of the sixteenth-century, as 
well as the British, practiced this form of colonial administration in their empires’ distant 
provinces.4 Proconsular despotism is the political practice of governing colonies and provinces 
by selected elites, frequently military men, who identified with and were sensitive to the strategic 
aims of the parent state.  As Ronald Hyam observes, the British proconsular phenomenon of the 
nineteenth century attracted a distinct type of individuals usually drawn from ruling elites.  
Furthermore, these elites, because of the constraints imposed by time and distance, routinely 
                                                 
2 The ancient Egyptian province of Nubia can indeed be characterized as a colony.  Famed nineteenth-
century Egyptologist, Adolf Erman noted that Egyptian penetration and settlement in Nubia during the Twelfth 
Dynasty constituted colonization of the region. See Adolf Erman, Life in Ancient Egypt, trans. H. M. Tirard (New 
York: Dover Publications, 1971), 499-505.   
3 Andrea Gnirs, Militär und Gesellschaft: Ein Beitrag zur Sozialgeschichte des Neuen Reiches (Heidelberg: 
Heidelberger Orientverlag, 1996), 10-11; John Coleman Darnell and Colleen Manassa, Tutankhamun’s Armies, 61. 
4 S. M. Ikram argues that the early Mughals adopted the practice of combining civil and military offices 
from the Ghaznavids.  The first Mughal emperors, those before the reign of Balban, permitted their provincial 
governors to act in a semi-independent fashion as the central government was primarily concerned with military 
control and revenue collection.  However, later Mughal emperors were careful not to let their provincial governors 
assume so much power that they would become a rival for the throne.  See S. M. Ikram, Muslim Civilization in India 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), 92 and 103-106.  J. H. Parry and J. H. Elliot note that, initially, the 
Spanish Hapsburgs employed colonial governors, who for the most part were impoverished Castilian hildalgos with 
prior military experience.  Once these individuals conquered a territory, Spanish emperors allowed the conquerors to 
enjoy the fruits of their victory.  However, the rule of these conquistadores was frequently quarrelsome and brief, 
and with their departure the highly centralized and bureaucratized Hapsburg Empire imposed controllable viceroys.  
See J. H. Elliott, Imperial Spain, 1469-1716 (London: Penguin Books, 1970), 62-66; and J. H. Parry, The Spanish 
Seaborne Empire (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990), 98 and 204-211. 
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exercised unfettered freedom of action from the metropole.5   Indeed, in the early decades of the 
nineteenth century, in an age before steam locomotion, travel between Europe and the rest of the 
globe frequently took months and even years.  For example, in 1800, traveling from Europe to 
India required at least three months of travel time.6  Furthermore, individuals who made the 
voyage to Peru might spend weeks crossing the Atlantic to Buenos Aires, then sailing down the 
coast of South America, rounding the Straits of Magellan eventually reaching Callao, the port for 
Lima many months later.7  Australian historian, Geoffrey Blainey observes that the voyage from 
Britain to Australia could take as long as eighteen months.8  Zoë Laidlaw elaborates by noting 
that the issue of distance “led governors to modify their actions according to not only their 
instructions, inclinations and the colonial situation, but also their perceptions of how decisions 
would be received by the (frequently changing) imperial administration.”9 Normally, 
imperial/colonial administrators of the pre-telegraphic nineteenth century were strong- willed 
individuals accustomed to making critical decisions that they perceived coincided with British 
security and national interests.   
 It is the intent of this study to examine the motives of the Colonial Office as to why it 
chose to adopt proconsular governance as the preferred method of administration in its colonies 
in the decades after 1815.  This work will also delineate those factors that made members of the 
British officer corps clamor for overseas administrative posts and the reasons why the practice 
was London’s best solution in filling senior colonial administrative offices.  Subsequent chapters 
                                                 
5 Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Imperial Century, 1815-1914: A Study of Empire and Expansion (London: B.T. 
Batsford, 1976), 148-50. 
6 Olivier Bernier, The World in 1800 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2000), 376. 
7 Ibid., 270-71. 
8 Geoffrey Blainey, The Tyranny of Distance: How Distance Shaped Australia’s History (Sydney: The 
MacMillan Company of Australia, 1975), 32. 
9 Zoë Laidlaw, Colonial Connections, 1815-45: Patronage, the Information Revolution, and Colonial 
Government  Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 61. 
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investigate the transformation of the British Army in the years immediately following the end of 
the Napoleonic Wars and examine why the British state embarked on a massive demobilization 
almost immediately after victory had been attained.  Also scrutinized is the composition and 
structure of the post-1815 British Empire and the state of the Colonial Office that managed this 
immense entity. 
 This study examines the social backgrounds of more than three hundred British officers 
who served in the Napoleonic Wars and then went on to serve Britannia’s massive overseas 
empire.  The accounts of these men who managed the empire for nearly forty years make a 
fascinating story.  Many senior colonial administrators were chosen from Britain’s traditional 
elites: the aristocracy and the landed gentry.  This first generation of administrator was gradually 
replaced by a remarkable number of middle class officers.  This second generation obtained 
positions of employment through an intricate and interlocking web of networks developed from 
relationships that included the shared experience of campaign and combat, regimental affiliation, 
patronage, religion, and family ties.  The work concludes with an examination of the life and 
career of Harry W. Smith, a member of a nascent middle class who, during his career, without 
the benefit of title, birth, or income achieved high military rank and social stature.  His story is 
typical of the second generation of colonial administrators.  Smith, like his contemporaries, was 
educated, skilled in staff work, competent in command, and as a result profited handsomely from 
patronage and influential connections. 
 The proconsular period that flourished in the early decades of the nineteenth century was 
the sensible solution because it fulfilled a basic need by the British state in governing large 
swaths of the earth with a minimum amount of money and manpower.  Moreover, proconsul rule 
alleviated a considerable amount of the burden on a small and overworked Colonial Office.  
 5
Certain conditions must exist for this practice of proconsular despotism to be practical.  The state 
must have a sufficiently large manpower pool of qualified individuals who are politically reliable 
and who are willing, if necessary, to maintain the ruling elite’s position of power within the state.  
This form of imperial control mandates that the individuals chosen to administer far-flung 
provinces be able to anticipate the goals of the parent state without the benefit of constant 
supervision.  These colonial/imperial administrators, often separated by long distances, needed 
not only to understand their government’s strategic aims, but also to shape them to fit their 
particular circumstances without the need for prior consultation with the home government. 
 In the wake of the defeat of Napoleon, Britain had acquired an empire of significant size 
and scope.  By 1815, the empire consisted of Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, St. Christopher, St. 
Vincent, Trinidad, Tobago, Berbice, Demarara, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Bahamas, Grenada, Malta, 
Gibraltar, Sierra Leone, the Cape of Good Hope, Upper Canada, Lower Canada, Nova Scotia, 
New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland, Bermuda, New South Wales, Ban 
Diemen’s, Ceylon, Mauritius, and Honduras.  Most of the territories acquired during the nearly 
twenty-five year war with France were by conquest and had few traditional, historical, religious, 
racial, or ethnic ties with the parent country.  Alfred LeRoy Burt observed that the possessions 
Britain had acquired in the first decade of the nineteenth century had little in common with that 
of their parent country.10  Ian K. Steele notes that the non-Anglophone nature of these acquired 
colonies encouraged authoritarian rule rather than the local legislative experiments that had been 
the norm with those colonies established in the eighteenth century.11   In almost every situation 
these new colonies were beset with enemies both within and without.  Faced with this condition, 
                                                 
10 Alfred LeRoy Burt, The Evolution of the British Empire and Commonwealth from the American 
Revolution (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1956), 185-86. 
11 Ian K. Steele, “The Anointed, the Appointed, and the Elected: Governance of the British Empire, 1689-
1784,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998), 121. 
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Henry Bathurst, the Secretary of War and the Colonies, with the approval of a Tory dominated 
Parliament, adopted a policy of the garrison state in governing these new colonies.12  The 
garrison state as defined by Douglas Peers was a highly militarized administration put in place 
by the East India Company to govern its holdings in India.13 Peers argues that Indian 
administrators such as Richard Wellesley, Thomas Munro, and Charles Metcalf believed that 
Indian society was inherently militarized and that the only sound basis for authority in the state 
rested on a coercive administration resting on military power.14  Among the East India Company 
directors this plan received wide acceptance in that it had the dual benefit of controlling 
bureaucratic appointments while keeping costs under control.  It was long understood by the East 
India Company that employing military officers in administrative tasks saved substantial 
amounts of money, as officers’ salaries were much less than those of civilians working in 
comparable positions.  This method of governance had the added benefit of having trained 
military leaders located throughout the state, on call and available to react to any threat.  In 
essence, the garrison state allowed the East India Company to govern India in the most cost 
conscious means possible.  
In the immediate aftermath of Waterloo, Britain inherited not only a significant empire, 
but also a massive national debt.  In 1815, British debt amounted to nearly £745,000, an almost 
three-fold increase from the total debt in 1793, the year war with the French began.15   Parliament 
recognized that financial retrenchment was imperative and instituted policies that included 
                                                 
12 The notion of the garrison state was largely determined by actual conditions that existed in India in the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.  These circumstances led to highly militarized East India Company 
administration whose officers were both military leaders and civilian bureaucrats. 
13 Douglas M. Peers, Between Mars and Mammon: Colonial Armies and the Garrison State in Early 
Nineteenth Century India; International Library of Historical Studies Vol. 1 (London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1995), 
44-67. 
14 Ibid., 45.  
15 B. R. Mitchell and Phyllis Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1962), 402. 
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significant army demobilization and substantial budgetary cuts in military spending.  As Peter 
Burroughs observes, “in the decades after 1815 a passion for economy raged in Parliament” 
affecting all aspects of government spending in all of the ministries.16   Significant reductions 
occurred within the army, whose budget declined from £43 million in 1815 to £10.7 million in 
1820.17  Concurrent with the budgetary cutbacks were significant manpower reductions as the 
army’s establishment shrank from 233,952 in 1815 to 102,539 in 1828.18   This abrupt drop in 
strength created hardship for the thousands of professional officers who had served during the 
Napoleonic Wars.  Career officers who had served with distinction suddenly found themselves 
out of work and in a precarious financial position with scant hope of finding suitable re-
employment.  As J. W. Fortescue pointed out in his monumental history of the British Army, a 
substantial majority of the officers of the period were not rich men and could scarcely endure the 
prospect of surviving for years on their half-pay.19  As a result, many officers clamored for duty 
within the imperial/colonial system.  An illustrative example was the emotional plea made by 
Major Harry G. W. Smith in a letter to his former commander Colonel John Colborne, to use his 
influence with the Duke of Wellington or with Lord Fitzroy Somerset, the Military Secretary of 
the Horse Guards, to obtain an appointment for him as an inspecting field officer in the Ionian 
Islands: “I am a most needy man” desperately seeking a colonial posting.20 Furthermore, officers 
who had served honorably during the Napoleonic Wars expected some sort of compensation for 
their sacrifices.  Parliament readily acknowledged their service and made some attempt to place 
                                                 
16 Peter Burroughs, “An Unreformed Army?: 1815-1868” in Oxford History of the British Army (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), 163.  
17 Ibid.  
18 Ibid, 164.  
19 J. W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army, Vol. XI: 1815-1838 (London: Macmillian and Co. Ltd., 
1923), 30-32. 
20 Joseph H. Lehmann, Remember You Are An Englishman: A Biography of Sir Harry Smith, 1787-1860 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1977), 126. 
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these men in the imperial/colonial system.  In an 1833 appearance before a Parliamentary 
committee, Somerset recognized that imperial/colonial assignments were a possible way of 
rewarding officers for prior service.21   
It is the aim of this study to examine British proconsular colonial administration in the 
thirty-five years that followed the end of the Napoleonic Wars.  Proconsular governance was a 
particular form of colonial administration widely practiced by London metropole and never fully 
studied by imperial scholars.  In the immediate aftermath of the Battle of Waterloo, the Colonial 
Office, along with the Tory ministry of Lord Liverpool and with the acquiescence of Parliament, 
instituted a decades long policy of employing military personnel as chief administrators 
throughout the empire.  The British practice of employing military men as colonial 
administrators was not new and examples exist throughout the eighteenth century.  A few of the 
most notable of these were the colonial administrations of Thomas Handasyd, governor of 
Jamaica, Thomas Gage, governor of Massachusetts, Guy Carleton, governor of Nova Scotia, 
New Brunswick, and Quebec, and Charles, 1
st
 Marquess Cornwallis, Governor General of India 
and Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.  However, at the end of the Napoleonic Wars the proconsular 
practice of colonial administration became widespread and employed with great frequency.  This 
practice, born of financial necessity, military expediency, and political practicality, satisfied 
Britain’s immediate requirement for fiscal retrenchment; the army’s need for a mission in the 
post-Napoleonic world; and the Tories objective to preserve the aristocratic system both at home 
and abroad at a time when the status quo was threatened.  This study notes that a policy 
established and perpetuated by an aristocracy and a gentry who wished to maintain the traditional 
                                                 
21 United Kingdom, British Parliamentary Papers: Report from the Select Committee on the Establishment 
of the Garrisons and On the Pay and Emoluments of Army and Naval Officers with Minutes of Evidence and 
Appendix, Military and Naval 2 (Shannon, Ireland: Irish University Press, 1969), Testimony of Lord FitzRoy 
Somerset,  12 June 1833, 1676. 
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social structure provided an opportunity for thousands of the “middling sort” officers to assume 
powerful roles throughout the empire.  By the end of the 1840s, when this study concludes, a 
significant number of the imperial/colonial military proconsuls were self-made men of modest 
origins.  These were men, who through long service, merit, patronage, competency, and 
education had acquired positions of influence and power in an ever-expanding and sophisticated 
empire.  Frequently these new proconsuls eschewed the aristocratic dictates of their 
predecessors, preferring instead a Whig ideology that included adopting and adapting each 
colony’s indigenous cultures into the fabric of their governance.   
 While this work focuses on the development and practice of the proconsular phenomenon 
of the post-Napoleonic British imperial/colonial empire, it is also a prosopographical study of the 
men who filled the myriad of positions in Britain’s global web of colonies and domains.  By 
focusing on their careers and those of their subordinates, this work seeks to understand the 
evolution of British Empire in the early decades of the nineteenth century.  It is evident that 
Britain was woefully unprepared to govern effectively the significant territorial acquisitions it 
had gained at the end of the Napoleonic Wars.  This new accumulation of empire, styled “the 
Second British Empire” by nineteenth-century writers, included territories on six of the seven 
continents.22  The minuscule Colonial Office, recently an appendage to the Office of the 
Secretary of State for War, was overwhelmed by the size and complexity of its empire.  The 
office’s small staff of bureaucrats had little knowledge of the lands and indigenous peoples they 
                                                 
22 P. J. Marshall’s examination of Imperial History notes that historians in the nineteenth century 
recognized distinct differences between the First and the Second British Empire. George Cornewall Lewis and 
Herman Merivale made comparisons between the “old system” eighteenth century colonies that comprised an 
Atlantic Empire, based on North America and the West Indies.  The British acquisition of territories in Asia, Africa, 
and Australasia indicated to these historians that the first Empire was evolving into a more global second Empire.  J. 
R. Seely’s Expansion of England published in 1883 clearly differentiates between the two empires.  See P.J. 
Marshall, “The First British Empire” in The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. V: Historiography (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 43-53. 
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governed.23  A Colonial Office clerk responsible for overseeing the colony of New Brunswick 
expressed the fear that many in his office felt, “the Empire is so vast, and we are so distant…”24 
Moreover, Colonial Office’s concerns focused on broad issues such as slavery and immigration; 
the office had little time and even less inclination to devote resources to the narrower concerns 
and needs of specific colonies.  Indeed, the Colonial Office frequently failed to realize many of 
the newly acquired colonies had non-British institutions that needed to be adapted or modified to 
conform to the laws, jurisdictions, customs, and traditions of the mother country.  For example, 
in Ceylon, local British administrators worked not only within a framework of ancient Sinhalese 
institutions, but also within the existing laws and customs of earlier Portuguese and Dutch 
administrations.  Likewise, Cape Colony governors struggled with making Dutch land policy, 
taxation, and law conform to British practice, a situation that never completely satisfied the 
colonists or the bureaucrats.25 
      Into this system beset by confusion and indecision stepped the proconsul administrator 
who ruled rather than governed.  The empire of the early nineteenth century bore little 
resemblance to the ordered empire envisioned by later imperialists such as J. A. Froude and 
Joseph Chamberlain.26   Norman McCord noted that there was “no symmetry in character or 
                                                 
23 In 1816, the Colonial Office staff consisted of eight clerks, a librarian, and a translator.  See J. C. Sainty, 
comp., Office-Holders in Modern Britain, VI: Colonial Office Officials (London: University of London Press, 
1976), 2, 12-14.  
24 Quoted in “Graeme Wynn, “On the Margins of Empire (1760-1840),” in The Illustrated History of 
Canada, ed Craig Brown (Toronto, Ontario: Key Porter Books Ltd., 2002), 200. 
25 For a discussion of the vicissitudes of South African land reform policy that confronted early Cape 
Colony governors see Leslie Clement Duly, British Land Policy at the Cape, 1795-1844: A Study of Administrative 
Procedures in the Empire (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1968). 
26 On April 1,1895, Chamberlain spoke at a banquet of the Birmingham Jewelers and Silversmiths.  In his 
remarks he noted it was “not enough to occupy certain great spaces of the world’s surface unless you can make the 
best of them, unless you are willing to develop them.  We [Britain] are the landlords of a great estate; it is the duty 
of the landlord to develop his estate….” The Times, April 1, 1895 quoted in Robert V. Kubicek, The Administration 
of Imperialism: Joseph Chamberlain at the Colonial Office, Duke University Commonwealth Studies Center No. 37 
(Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1969), 68. 
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function in the British overseas possessions after 1815.”27 Each administrator governed his 
colony or presidency in a fashion similar to that of an English squire managing his home estate.28  
For nearly four decades, this ad hoc system of administration lurched along in the absence of a 
systemic plan or template formulated by the Colonial Office.  Neither the Colonial Office nor 
Parliament offered much direction, except when it came to the receipt or expenditure of overseas 
revenue, or to the strategic movement of military forces.  As Hyam correctly observes, the 
British colonial system of the first half of the nineteenth century was not unified by any coherent 
philosophy, but by a collection of strong-willed individuals who only dimly perceived the intent 
of Parliament and the Colonial Office.29  The track records of these individuals were as varied as 
the personalities who ruled the colonies.  Lord Charles Somerset, the second son of the Duke of 
Beaufort and a conservative Tory, who administered the Cape Colony between the years 1814 
and 1826, was frequently characterized as an ineffectual governor.  During his tenure, he spent 
£28,000 of public money on his country residence of Newlands and systematized the rules for 
fox hunting in the colony.30  Lord William Bentinck, the second son of the Duke of Portland, a 
Whig and a Benthamite utilitarian, governed India for nearly seven years from 1828 to 1835.  
His administration was characterized by enlightened rule that included opening India to foreign 
capital and raising a middle class of native gentlemen who acted as agents of political, economic, 
and social development.31  South Asian scholars have also recognized Bentinck’s 
accomplishments.  Isaiah Azariah notes that Bentinck reoriented India toward a progressive 
                                                 
27 Norman McCord, British History, 1805-1906 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 56. 
28 David Cannadine argues that in both the settled and conquered colonies Britain sought to impose a 
system of governance that replicated a social structure modeled on that, which was thought to exist in Britain.  See 
David Canadine, Oranamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 13.  
29 Ronald Hyman, Britain’s Imperial Century, 1815-1914: A Study of Empire and Expansion (London: B. 
T. Batsford, Ltd., 1976), 16. 
30 Leonard Thompson, A History of South Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 54. 
31 P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2000, 2nd ed.  (London: Pearson Education Ltd., 
2001),  283. 
 12
future that included reforming Indian education, improving the status of women, and curbing 
Thugee-inspired crime.32  James Kempt, who held a number of administrative posts, was without 
title or birth.  These included that of lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia, governor of Canada, 
and Master General of Ordnance.  Kempt was a friend of the Duke of Wellington, had Whig 
sympathies, and was well regarded as a quiet, fair, and unassuming man responsible for many 
positive achievements in British North America.  Among his accomplishments were the reform 
of inequities in the system of representation in the Lower Canadian legislature, the heading a 
commission of inquiry concerning the construction costs of the Rideau Canal in Upper Canada, 
and an enthusiastic penchant for road building.  Kempt is most notable for his even-handedness 
and for preserving a measure of harmony in the colonies he governed.  Even William Lyon 
Mackenzie, a passionate critic of British rule in Canada, said of Kempt, “this illustrious person, 
governed in all his public actions by the principles of equal justice, which in the end ever proved 
the wisest policy…. ”33    
 The proconsular governors and administrators were a varied group.  “Church and King” 
Tories, along with Wellington’s coterie of divisional and brigade commanders from the 
Peninsular War, dominated the initial cadre.  Individuals from this group came primarily from 
aristocratic and gentry backgrounds.  However, by the third decade of the nineteenth century, 
this “Old Guard” of combat officers from the Peninsula War were being replaced by younger 
staff officers who were more comfortable managing logistical issues such as equipment, 
discipline, quartering of troops, and other organizational tasks.  These new generations of 
                                                 
32 Isaiah Azariah, Lord Bentinck and Indian Education, Crime, and the Status of Women (Washington, 
D.C.: University Press of America, 1978), x, 2.  
33 William Lyon Mackenzie, Sketches of Canada and the United States (London: Effingham, Wilson, 
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technocrats were much better equipped to handle a more elaborate and sophisticated 
imperial/colonial administration.  
 Thousands of books have been written about the British Empire.  Andrew Porter has 
noted that the scope and content of imperial/colonial history is so extensive and vast that 
scholars, teachers, and students have found it virtually impossible to keep up with all of the 
available material.34  Indeed, Porter’s exhaustive bibliography lists nearly 24,000 books, articles, 
and other published materials concerning various facets of Britain’s imperial holdings.  Despite 
Porter’s and his colleagues’ collective efforts, an estimated additional 16,000 works have yet to 
be catalogued into a comprehensive bibliography of British imperial and colonial publications.35  
In addition to the thousands of works dealing with British imperial/colonial history, scholars who 
wish to study post-Napoleonic proconsular officers also need to consult scholarly works 
concerning the British military forces of the period.  It is therefore necessary to consult John 
Holding’s listing of 447 publications dealing with the eighteenth-century British Army, Albert 
Tucker’s compilation of fifty-nine books concerning the army of the nineteenth century, and 
Ronald Haycock’s listing of 619 works examining the British army in India, Canada, and South 
Africa.36   Historiographical sources for British military figures who became proconsuls can also 
be found in two significant bibliographical sources, Donald Horward’s Napoleonic Military 
History: A Bibliography and Ronald J. Caldwell’s two- volume work, The Era of Napoleon: A 
Bibliography of the History of Western Civilization, 1799-1815.37  However, within this 
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extensive body of scholarship relatively few books have been published examining proconsular 
imperial/colonial administrations and their individual administrators in the decades following the 
Napoleonic Wars. 
 Professor Stephen Saunders Webb examines proconsular governance in his book, The 
Governors-General: The English Army and the Definition of the Empire, 1569-1681.  Webb 
identifies proconsular rule by employing the term “garrison government” in his study of the 
genesis of colonial governance by military officers within England and the occupied territories of 
Scotland and Ireland and its transition to newly settled English colonies in the western 
hemisphere.  Webb argues that from the outset, early English colonization was “as much military 
as it was commercial.”38  Furthermore, the author notes that throughout the seventeenth century 
England’s colonial administrators were comprised almost exclusively of military men.39  Like the 
military officers who served 150 years later in the Peninsula, these officers gained administrative 
experience garrisoning outposts during Cromwell’s interregnum and Charles II’s restoration.  
Under this form of rule, colonial government remained authoritarian and centralized even when 
faced with resistance by local populations that were by tradition libertarian and mercantilist.  
Webb argues that military officers remained in firm control of colonial populations until 1681 
when a compromise was reached between the Crown and the colonies that gave limited authority 
to colonial legislatures.  Although imperial authority remained paramount in the colonies, the 
compromise of 1681 began a trend that diminished the Crown’s authority in the colonies while 
strengthening that of the local legislatures.   
                                                                                                                                                             
and Ronald J. Caldwell, The Era of Napoleon: A Bibliography of the History of Western Civilization, 1799-1815, 2 
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39 Webb’s research notes that nearly 90 percent of colonial governors were serving military officers.  See 
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 While similarities exist between professor Webb’s thesis and this study, there are 
significant differences.  In the decades that followed the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the British 
Colonial office employed proconsular administration on a significantly larger scale.  The size 
and scope of the British Empire in 1815 dwarfed that of the colonial holdings of England in the 
seventeenth century.  Furthermore, Webb downplays the role commerce exerted on determining 
colonial policy by military administrators.  Overseas administrators of the post-Napoleonic 
period were keenly aware that the commercial wellbeing of their colonies ensured their 
continued employment.  During the period of financial retrenchment that followed the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars, Colonial Secretary Lord Bathurst stipulated that colonial governments become 
self-sufficient as not to present too great of a burden on the metropole.  
   A substantial number of scholars such as Ronald Hyam, Douglas M. Peers, John Benyon, 
John W. Cell, Peter Burroughs, and David Cannadine all recognize that the proconsuls governed 
imperial possessions in the nineteenth century.  However, all of these scholars have limited their 
observations to specific aspects and not to an examination of the process as a whole.  All note the 
existence of the practice, but none of them analyze it or offer an explanation on the origin and 
evolution of the practice.  Professor Hyam seeks to understand the character of Britons who 
sought overseas service, noting that a substantial number of them found that they could exercise 
their talents and indulge their eccentricities in a manner that would normally not be tolerated in 
Britain.40  Peers comes closest to discussing this practice.  He examines proconsularism in India 
and how this form of administration adapted to the subcontinent’s long established practice of 
governance.41   Peers argues that traditional Indian society was inherently militarized and that the 
blending of civil and military spheres insured continuity while offering the British a cost-
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effective means of administration.42  John Benyon scrutinizes the development of the office of 
the British high commissioner in South Africa, initially a minor functionary who became a 
central influence in shaping and controlling British, Boer, and Bantu societies.43  Although the 
role of the high commissioner is capably defined and examined, Benyon assumes that readers 
understand the proconsular practice along with its functions and duties.  Cell examines the 
occupational backgrounds of administrators, commenting that thirteen of the thirty-seven mid-
nineteenth century governors had military experience.  But he fails to note why military men 
were chosen.44   Burroughs, well known as a leading imperial historian and co-editor of the 
prestigious Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, likewise observes that the 
proconsular system existed; but he prefers to emphasize that the constraints of time and distance 
created a multiplicity of competing centers of authority in each colony that contributed to a less 
than uniform pattern of colonial rule.45  To Burroughs, these imperial/colonial agents played a 
mediating role in the governance of the empire, comparing them to “pointsmen on the railway” 
who interpreted Colonial Office directives by modifying them to suit their specific colonial 
situation.46  Burroughs notes that far from being subordinates, proconsuls acted on their own 
agendas by formulating policy that they, and not the Colonial Office, thought to be beneficial.  
As the Colonial Office Legal Advisor James Stephen observed in 1830, “Though not perhaps 
men of very large capacity, their proximity to the scene of action is an advantage which in this 
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case would more than compensate for every other incompentency.”47 Cannadine observes that the 
practice existed and mentions the most prominent of the proconsuls, yet he pays scant attention 
to their careers and their methods of governance.48  In short, imperial/colonial historians are well 
aware that until the mid-nineteenth century British overseas administration relied heavily on the 
practice of proconsularism, but few scholars acknowledge its importance.   
 Only recently have scholars shown an interest in examining the proconsular phenomenon, 
in part because of the new interest in the formation of governmental institutions and their 
operations within the Second British Empire.  Zoë Laidlaw observed that for many decades 
historians of the British Empire have preferred to concentrate primarily on social, economic, and 
political issues in the individual colonies and paid little attention to the mechanics of 
administration between the metropole and the colonies.49 Andrew Porter’s Bibliography of 
Imperial, Colonial and Commonwealth History Since 1600 lists only twenty-two works 
applicable to colonial/imperial administration in the early nineteenth century.50  One reason for 
this may be that the bureaucratic organization in the minuscule Colonial Office and throughout 
the empire was largely an ad hoc process.  Proconsuls and administrators in the colonies, the 
“man on the spot,” of the early decades of the nineteenth century were frequently the principal 
determinants of policy within their provinces.  The Colonial Office’s apparent lack of interest in 
formulating a homogeneous policy may have been a recognition of the constraints of time and 
distance.  However, another prevailing dynamic at the time was Secretary of War and the 
                                                 
47 Ibid.  
48 David Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire, 15-16. 
49 Zoë Laidlow, Colonial Connections, 1815-45: Patronage, the Information Revolution and Colonial 
Government (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 2. 
50 Porter lists only 182 books and articles that deal with constitutional, administrative, and legal subjects for 
the years 1815 to 1931.  It is from this list that the twenty-two most applicable books were chosen.  To put this issue 
in greater context, Porter’s bibliography lists nearly 24,000 works that pertain to British Imperial/Colonial history.  
See Andrew Porter, Bibliography of Imperial, Colonial, and Commonwealth History Since 1600, The Royal 
Historical Society Bibliography: The History of Britain, Ireland, and the British Overseas, 536-542. 
 18
Colonies Lord Bathurst and Counsel for Colonial Business James Stephen’s preoccupation with 
the slavery issue.  It is well documented that Stephen and many in the Colonial Office were 
members of the Clapham Sect and sympathetic to humanitarian issues such as the suppression 
and eventual eradication of slavery in the empire.51  
 The historiographical traditions of the British Second Empire are subject to a wide 
variety of models.52  Since the American Revolution, British historians, journalists, writers, and 
independent scholars have debated the nature of the empire, staking out a number of positions 
and viewpoints.  Among the first to contribute to this rich historiographical tradition were the 
Whigs and the Tories who championed their respective visions of empire.  Nevertheless, these 
were not the only people who supplied opinions as to the nature of the empire.  Radical thinkers, 
utilitarians, and evangelical Christians as well used the power of the press to disseminate their 
views.  As C. A. Bayly notes, all of these diverse groups agreed that Britain was morally 
obligated to improve through the means of enlightened government and industry the states they 
inherited upon the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars.53  All of these critics acknowledged that 
in the past the Crown had badly mismanaged the empire, culminating with the loss of the 
American colonies in 1783.  Indeed, one of the first to decry previous colonial mismanagement 
was Paul Colquhoun, who argued in his 1815 work, A Treatise on the Wealth, Power, and 
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Resources, of the British Empire in Every Quarter of the World, Including the East Indies, that 
the blood and treasure expended, especially in the West Indies and New South Wales, was 
squandered by ineffectual Crown policies and inept administrators.54  Moreover, Colquhoun 
singles out New South Wales as a fitting example of unrestrained expansion without any 
compensation to the home country observing, “It appears only necessary to state this simple fact, 
in order to shew the impolicy of establishing a settlement in this distant region of the world, and 
the slender expectation from the facts which have been disclosed of its ever proving otherwise 
than a heavy expense to this country, without any hope of remuneration from its trade or any 
other advantage. . ..”55  Faced with this sort of criticism, it is not surprising that the first 
historiographical trend to emerge was that of a series of biographies of earlier successful imperial 
proconsuls such as Warren Hastings, Lord Cornwallis, Richard Wellesley, and Stanford Raffles 
who prudently managed their colonies.56  Interestingly, all of these works emerged in the 1820s 
and 1830s, when the practice of colonial proconsular administration was at its height.  
 In the mid-nineteenth century, colonial/imperial writers begin to change their focus by 
publishing patriotic colonial histories, especially those of the settler colonies.  This 
historiographical trend coincided with a period of Parlimentary retrenchment in which Imperial 
garrisons were being withdrawn.57  Instead of concentrating on metropolitan administration, 
historians, scholars, and writers began to look at the possibility of colonial self-government 
within the institutions of empire.  Peter Burroughs argues that during the decades of the mid-
nineteenth century, successive British ministries adopted a trusteeship and paternalist stance 
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toward the colonies that best served Britain’s economic, political, and strategic interests.58  
Histories praising the hard work, determination, and resourcefulness of the settler colonies of 
Canada, Australia, and South Africa replaced the earlier proconsular biographies.  One of the 
most significant and influential authors of this period was John Dunmore Lang, a Scottish 
Evangelical Presbyterian clergyman, politician, and educationalist, who published a series of 
historical, geographical, political, and religious works on the Australasian settlements.  Among 
his better-known writings were An Historical and Statistical Account of New South Wales 
published in 1837, and Freedom and Independence for the Golden Lands of Australia: The Right 
of the Colonies and the Interest of Britain and the World written fifteen years later.59  In the latter 
work, Lang argued for the necessity of self-government because government from a distance 
frequently meant bad government.  Furthermore, Lang disliked the aristocratic influences in 
British society and politics and believed that republicanism better reflected the nature of 
Australian society.  
 Canadian administrators and military men Joseph Gubbins and Walter Henry also 
contributed to this historiographical trend.  Gubbins, a lieutenant colonel and inspecting field 
officer of militia in New Brunswick, published an account of his service describing the full 
spectrum of life in the colony.60  His duties that included traveling widely through the territory 
prompted him to write a descriptive account of the colonists whom he met.  Gubbins noted that 
they were “decidedly American in habit and attitude and had lost British customs in religion, 
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neatness, frugality, husbandry and cooking.”61  Henry’s experiences as a surgeon and officer in 
the 66
th
 Regiment also offered a glimpse of life in the Canadian colonies.  In June 1827, Henry 
sailed to Canada with his regiment.  He remained there, eventually becoming Inspector General 
of the Army Medical Services of Canada in 1852.  While stationed with his regiment, he 
published his memoirs in 1839.  Henry devoted considerable space to his time there, praising the 
Irish settlers and Canada’s governor, James Kempt.62 
 Besides applauding the industriousness of the settlement colonies, a significant number of 
imperial historians of the first half of the nineteenth century were also some of the empire’s 
harshest critics.  Many argued that the overseas empire “had provided the instruments of their 
own destruction. ” 63 Writers such as Henry Brougham and John Arthur Roebuck argued that the 
empire polluted the British constitution, stifling the nation’s economic growth encouraging 
monopolies.”64  Brougham, a noted Whig, observed in his 1803 treatise, An Inquiry into the 
Colonial Policy of the European Powers, that the “mother country” sent out young men who 
when they returned were consumed by avarice and voluptuousness, characteristics that had been 
acquired from overseas service that now infected the citizenry of their home country, damaging 
the morals of the state.65  Likewise, John Arthur Roebuck argued in his 1849 book, The Colonies 
of England: A Plan for Government of Some Portion of Our Colonial Possessions, that because 
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the colonies had never been governed in a systematic manner, benefits derived from them aided 
only the metropole.66  The home country, concerned only with commerce and trade, failed to 
appreciate the almost limitless potential of its colonies.  Roebuck, citing the United States as an 
example, contended that if all of Britain’s colonies were allowed self-government, both the 
colonies and the metropole would benefit by yielding significant financial returns and lowering 
maintenance costs.67   
 The scholarly debate concerning the relevance and value of a colonial empire continued 
for decades.  Radical critics contended that continued expansion of the empire increased the 
power of the executive, endangered traditional English liberties, and quashed the independence 
of formerly free people, especially in Asia.68  By the end of the nineteenth century, however, new 
and significant intellectual trends began to influence imperial historiography.  Social Darwinism, 
nationalism, and capitalism provided scholars with justifications for their analysis.  In the last 
years of the nineteenth century, proponents of the theory of Social Darwinism saw the world 
divided into two major blocs, strong nation states and weaker ones, or as Eric Hobsbawn 
characterized the world, “the advanced and the backward.”69  In 1898, Lord Salisbury bifurcated 
the political state of the world through the prism of Social Darwinism when he divided the world 
into two groups, powers that were dying and those living and vibrant.70 Paul Kennedy observes 
that Salisbury’s description of his world was correct when scrutinized in the context of the 
period.  China had been recently defeated by Japan during the short 1894-1895 war, the United 
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States had humiliated Spain in the Spanish American War, and France had retreated before 
Britain over the Fashoda incident.71  This notion was not lost on late Victorian and Edwardian 
British historians who were well aware of the challenges posed by competing continental 
powers, the United States and Japan, in acquiring overseas empires.72   
The subject of nationalism also colored the perspective of historians.  Nationalism both 
encouraged imperialist historians and strengthened nationalist identity among native colonial 
populations.  For example, British historian George McCall Theal’s multi-volume History of 
South Africa, written just after the conclusion of the Boer War, provided an elaborate 
justification for British occupation of the Cape colonies.73  Theal argued that British government 
and commerce contributed significantly to the development of a stable and prosperous South 
Africa.  The work was also intended as a rebuttal to a strengthening Afrikaner consciousness 
brought about by their successes in the late war with the British.  Rising nationalist identity 
among native non-European colonial populations also found a voice in nationalist 
historiography.   
Early Australian historians characterized their development as a process of adopting 
British institutions, technology, and culture to a new setting that fit their unique situation.74  
Much of this early historiography consisted of journals, scientific accounts, and life in the 
strangely alien antipodes intended for a curious British public.  Most notable among these 
accounts were William Wentworth’s A Statistical, Historical and Political Description of the 
Colony of New South Wales and Its Dependent Settlements, written in 1819, and James 
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Macarthur’s New South Wales: Its Present State and Future Prospects: Being a Statement with 
Documentary Evidence published nearly twenty years later.  Macarthur’s work is notable in that 
he championed the industriousness and ingenuity of the primarily convict population despite 
their hard life under prejudiced and autocratic proconsuls.75   Yet even in these works there is 
evidence of a nascent sense of uniqueness and separateness among the Australian population.  
Robert Hughes argues that Australia’s origins as a penal colony produced a distinctive type of 
colonist.  The transported prisoner, or “assigned man,” worked within a rigid framework of laws 
and rights.  As a result, under the Australian penal system, the convicts became self–reliant, 
learned an occupation, and were rewarded for doing right.76  Moreover, the social background of 
its settlers and the harshness of the land engendered a society very different from that of the 
mother country.  
 Imperial scholars have long held a fascination with the question of the benefits of 
imperial growth and its relationship to capitalism.  Ever since the publication of J. A. Hobson’s 
Imperialism in 1902 and Vladimir Lenin’s Marxist elaboration of the thesis some fourteen years 
later, imperial historians have focused a substantial amount of attention to the relationship 
between the nineteenth-century British economy and its effect on the rest of the globe, especially 
in its colonies.  As P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins have pointed out, studies of this nature have 
frequently led historians to adopt a stereotypical view of what Immanuel Wallerstein 
characterized as the “exploiting metropole.”77  According to both Hobson and Lenin, capitalist 
states such as Britain required overseas possessions in order to acquire raw materials to 
manufacture finished goods that would in turn be sold overseas to emerging and expanding 
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markets creating surplus funds for future investment.78 Lenin takes Hobson’s thesis one step 
further by arguing that monopolistic cartels of manufacturers, bankers, and financiers had to 
move beyond their own borders in order to dominate the more significant and larger global 
markets, thus dividing the world into state-sponsored capitalist spheres of influence.79  After 
Hobson and Lenin, historians and scholars have devoted a great deal of time and effort in 
discussing the merits or fallacies of these two thinkers.  It may be argued that this debate has 
attracted significant attention among Imperial historians.  Indeed, J. M. Mackenzie has observed 
that studies of working class resistance to imperialism, the nature of the Boer War, and Hobson’s 
significance have influenced subsequent historians and the nature of their research.80  Throughout 
the twentieth century, Hobson’s controversial thesis has significantly affected the nature of 
imperial historiography.  In 1919, Joseph Schumpeter built upon Hobson’s implications by 
observing that capitalism, along with Britain’s nineteenth-century social structure produced a 
unique form of imperialism.81  Schumpeter stressed that cooperation between the British 
aristocracy and an emerging bourgeoisie was a significant force behind Britain’s accumulation of 
colonies overseas.82   Schumpeter defines imperialism as “the objectless disposition on the part of 
the state to unlimited forcible expansion.”83  Professor Schumpeter elaborates on his thesis by 
noting that in order to retain its power base, Britain’s warrior class required the support of the 
bourgeoisie in championing “expansion for the sake of expanding, war for the sake of fighting, 
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victory for the sake of winning, dominion for the sake of ruling.”84   Elie Halévy, George 
Bennett, and John S. Galbraith have argued that even though Hobson’s and Lenin’s theses are 
significant, imperial history cannot be limited to a solely economic explanation, as other 
important and relevant issues were involved.  For example, Professor Halévy argues that the 
emergence of nineteenth- century evangelicals and the rise of mass journalism were significant 
forces in promoting imperialism.85  Likewise, Bennett and Galbraith each maintain that 
imperialism flourished because of a rise in public humanitarianism, which promoted a 
widespread belief that Western values, Christianity, and good government would be beneficial to 
“the backward races” of the colonies.86    
 Forty years ago, J. Gallagher and R. Robinson contributed another dimension to the 
Imperial historiographical tradition.  It is from the work of these two that the distinction between 
formal and informal empire was defined.87   Gallagher and Robinson noted that imperial systems 
could exist as either a formal empire bound to the home country by legal control, or as an 
informal entity bound to the metropole through influence.  Throughout history, imperial regimes 
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have frequently ruled large blocs of territory informally and without the necessity of political 
formalities.  A noteworthy example of an informal empire would be that of ancient Athens and 
their establishment of the Delian League in fifth century B.C.E.  Athenian industry and 
commerce benefited from the expansion of seaborne trade in the aftermath of the Persian Wars.88  
As a result, Athens was able to exert leadership over a number of smaller, less powerful states in 
the Aegean Sea that were anxious to partake in the commercial and military benefits that a more 
powerful state offered.  Gallagher and Robinson argued that Britain in the nineteenth and 
twentieth century controlled a far larger informal empire than their formal overseas possessions 
would indicate.  Hobsbawn notes that in the last third of the nineteenth century, a substantial 
portion of Britain’s foreign investment went to Argentina and Uruguay, which gave the British 
Foreign Office considerable influence with those states.89   Indeed, Paul Kennedy’s research 
reveals that, in the nineteenth century, British surplus capital funded overseas investment in new 
railways, ports, utilities, and agricultural enterprises throughout the world, especially in Latin 
and South America.90  For example, Argentina discovered a market for exporting its beef and 
grain to Britain, allowing it to pay not only for imported manufactured items, but also to repay 
long-term loans thus keeping its credit high for future borrowing.  Alan Knight notes that Latin 
and South American markets, which comprised some 10 percent of Britain’s exports between 
1860 and 1913, enabled the island kingdom to exert significant cultural and political influence 
over the region.91   
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 Although Gallagher and Robinson’s views have garnered a considerable amount of 
attention, there recently has been a renewed interest among imperial historians in examining the 
structure and administration of empire during the proconsular era.  In the last thirty years a small 
number of historians have began to revisit this important period of British administration.  Peter 
Burroughs, John Cell, Douglas M. Peers, Hew Strachan, and Zoë Laidlaw have made notable 
contributions to the study of post-Napoleonic British proconsuls and their method of 
governance.92 Burrough’s article, “Imperial Institutions and the Government of Empire,” notes 
that the Second British Empire, unlike the earlier Spanish and French empires, was not 
controlled by an authoritarian metropole.  Rather, governance of the empire was based on 
devolved authority and the metropole’s awareness of local centers of power in each colony.  
Leadership relied on a “continuous interplay between mother country and colonial 
communities,” or in other words, constant negotiations between the center and the periphery 
concerning the imposition of rule and the acceptance of that rule.93 Proconsuls who governed 
within the imperial/colonial administration frequently played a mediating role between the 
directives of the Colonial Office and the desires of the colonial elites.  Burroughs argues that 
imperial/colonial administrators, the “men on the spot,” were key in playing a mediating role 
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between London’s directives and actual conditions on the periphery.94  Because of their unique 
positions, imperial/colonial proconsuls were extraordinarily difficult to control. 
 Much of John Cell’s work, British Colonial Administration in the Mid-Nineteenth 
Century: The Policy Making Process, is outside the range of this study; however, his first 
chapters offer a perspective on the environment in which imperial/colonial proconsuls worked.  
Cell argues that the Colonial Office in the first half of the nineteenth century was overburdened 
with work, precluding any possibility of implementing a coherent policy.  He observes that in the 
absence of an established and enforced policy, imperial/colonial administrators and their staffs 
worked toward an efficient and good form of imperial government, which most administrators 
realized was a prerequisite for self-government.  Cell notes that many of top administrators 
viewed their appointments as a confirmation of their ability and worked hard to be responsible 
professional administrators.  Furthermore, Cell believes that the Colonial Office operated an 
efficient meritocracy that recruited competent, occasionally brilliant administrators, refuting the 
popular belief fostered by authors such as Thackeray and Trollope that those who occupied top 
colonial/imperial positions were corrupt job seekers.95  However, it should be noted that 
Professor Cell’s research considers only those later proconsuls, men who received their 
administrative positions in the late 1830s and 1840s, men who, according to this dissertation, 
were the more competent and better-trained individuals.  
 Douglas Peers’ Between Mars and Mammon: Colonial Armies and the Garrison State in 
India focuses primarily on the administrative structure of the East India Company in India in the 
years following Waterloo.  Peers examines the proconsular rule of Hastings, Amherst, and 
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Bentinck and notes that because the army was the central institution in India’s colonial regime, it 
received first claim to available resources.96   Moreover, the author argues that British officials 
within the East India Company assumed that Indian society would best accept a militaristic form 
of rule, as past forms of governance on the subcontinent were inherently militarized.97  By 
exercising their power in an authoritarian and arbitrary manner, many of the early nineteenth-
century proconsuls in India ran afoul of the East India Company elites, who attempted—
frequently unsuccessfully—to restrain their officials.  or example, Peers notes that William 
Amherst embarked on the First Burmese War despite East India Company instructions.  
Precarious Company finances and a problematic Company Army militated against engaging in 
any conflict.  evertheless, Amherst instigated a war that proved to be the costliest and most 
controversial of the early nineteenth century’s colonial wars without securing any tangible 
benefits.98   
 Peers’ work is a valuable addition to the study of British imperial proconsularism.  India, 
while not technically a colony at this time, was Britain’s most important overseas possession.  As 
such, both the East India Company and the Crown closely monitored any experimentation in 
political administration.  Furthermore, the significant role played by the British Army both 
domestically in Britain and overseas in the colonies in the period following its victory at 
Waterloo cannot be underestimated.  Linda Colley observes that Britain’s 130 year-long 
succession of wars with France was instrumental in forging a national British consciousness 
from the ethnically diverse kingdoms of England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland.  he singular 
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importance of the military was significant enough to preserve the proconsular method of 
administration despite the reform movements that swept Britain in the 1820s and 1830s.  As 
Peers contends, Britain’s dependence on the sword for maintaining control in India had a 
significant influence in how other imperial possessions were governed.99 
 Hew Strachan discusses the demographics of the eighteenth- and nineteenth- century 
British officer corps in the opening chapters of his work, The Politics of the British Army.  
Strachan, supplementing his research with that of scholars such as P. E. Razzell, J. A. Houlding, 
Louis Namier, John Brooke, Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, John Childs, and Alan Guy creates a useful, 
albeit incomplete profile, of the officers who led the army during the French Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars.100 Armed with this research, Strachan argues that the British army that fought 
Napoleon was essentially comprised of “middling sorts” who were, for the most part, career-
oriented officers.101  Likewise, the officers who did not demobilize and accepted half-pay went 
on to sharpen their professional skills in the incessant colonial campaigning that took place after 
1815.  trachan acknowledges that the burden of colonial administration rested on this group, 
creating a mutually beneficial relationship for the officers and the state.  While it was not 
Strachan’s intent to examine the proconsular phenomenon, he recognizes that this situation did 
indeed exist.   
 Zoë Laidlaw is the most recent contributor to the scholarly discussion of the proconsular 
phenomenon.  aidlaw’s Colonial Connections, 1815-45: Patronage, the Information Revolution, 
and Colonial Government examines both the official and unofficial lines of communication 
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available to the imperial/colonial proconsuls and their superiors at the Colonial Office during the 
first decades of the nineteenth century.  However, her work also considers the operation of 
colonial rule in the settler colonies before the inauguration of self-government and the 
subsequent changes to colonial governance in the thirty years after the Battle of Waterloo.102  
During this period, proconsular rule overseas was the prevailing method of colonial governance.  
Furthermore, this was the period in which fundamental social, political, and religious reforms 
were occurring both in Britain and in the colonies.  As Linda Colley notes, in Britain significant 
social and political reforms were delayed because of the state’s preoccupation with nearly 
twenty-five years of war with the French.103  Long neglected issues such as Irish Emancipation 
and Parliamentary reform were again raised with the onset of peace in 1815.  verseas, Britain’s 
colonies struggled with the issues of slavery, migration, wars, rebellion, and the demands for 
self-government.  ritish elites, the Crown, Parliament, and the landed aristocracy, all recognized 
that the American colonies were lost to mishandling colonial governance and had little desire to 
repeat this mistake.  
Laidlaw’s study brings together the intricate maze of official and unofficial connections 
employed by both the metropole and the colonies in governing the post-Waterloo empire.  She 
examines how these links shaped colonial administration, especially in three areas: how 
administrators functioned as mediators between the metropolitan government and their colonial 
subjects; how colonial officials executed their duty in an effort to assure job security; and how 
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those outside the government influenced colonial policy and administration.104   As the empire 
grew in size and administrative sophistication, the Colonial Office began to reevaluate the role of 
personal communications in colonial governance.  Consequently, substantial changes occurred in 
the way traditional networks of communication functioned.105  In the 1830s, the Colonial Office 
began to exert greater control over its overseas proconsuls, significantly diminishing their 
authority.  The emergence of local colonial officials who had few personal ties with the 
metropole further weakened the personal lines of communication that existed between the colony 
and the mother country.106  
This dissertation also owes a debt of gratitude to historian William R. Skelton, whose 
book, The American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861 provided the 
inspiration for this study.  This book, which is in part a prosopographical study of the antebellum 
United States Army’s officer corps, provided the template for creating the social and 
demographic profiles that figure prominently in this work.  uring the first half of the nineteenth 
century, British and American societies, and the armies they fostered, were significantly 
dissimilar.  By examining the collective biographies of the American officer corps, Skelton 
raises significant fundamental questions applicable to both armies, answering queries such as the 
social composition, parents’ occupations, education, patron-client relations, and career 
motivations that were essential in creating a complete profile of individuals who embarked on 
military careers.  oreover, his skillful discussion of career motivations, group values, and internal 
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cohesion within the American officer corps was most valuable and useful in helping understand 
the officer ethos and applying it to a new model.   
Conclusion  
 Proconsular administration governing an empire’s colonies and territories is   nearly as 
old as recorded history.  Britain, long familiar with the proconsular practice, employed this 
method of governance in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries but allowed it to fall into to 
disuse as colonial legislatures became more powerful.  However, with the end of the Napoleonic 
Wars and the subsequent territorial acquisitions won by Britain at the Congress of Vienna, 
Britain substantially increased her overseas colonial empire.  This fact coupled with the 
smallness of Colonial Office necessitated a practical and financially cost effective solution in 
administering Britannia’s global empire.  Lord Liverpool’s Tory administration found such a 
solution by employing experienced veteran command and staff military officers for key colonial 
administrative positions.  This cost effective policy provided the far-flung territories with trained 
administrators who were politically reliable and militarily competent to protect the colony from 
internal and external threats.   
 The historiography of the early nineteenth-century era of proconsular British Imperialism 
is minimal.  A few scholars such as Peter Burroughs, John Cell, Douglas Peers, Hew Strachan, 
and Zoë Laidlaw have made reference to the proconsular practice.   
A minimal number of historians, however, have endeavored to make a detailed study of the 
practice as it was employed in the post-Napoleonic British Empire or of the men who served 
during the period as proconsuls.  his study endeavors to fill this gap by explaining some of the 
essential questions associated with British colonial proconsularism of the early nineteenth 
century.  This work will examine the root causes as to why the proconsular practice was 
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employed at the end of the Napoleonic Wars; why military officers were selected as colonial 
administrators; the ethnicity and social backgrounds of the officers selected for colonial 
administrative posts; the networks they employed in achieving coveted colonial postings; and 
their ability to function in these colonial postings.  
 36
CHAPTER TWO: AN ARMY IN SEARCH OF A MISSION: THE POST-NAPOLEONIC 
BRITISH ARMY 
 
By mid-evening of June 18, 1815, the great and terrible battle of Waterloo ended with the 
defeat of Napoleon.  The battle had raged all through the unseasonably damp and overcast day as 
more than 200,000 soldiers and 537 cannons fought over less than six kilometers of Belgian 
countryside.  At stake was the fate of Europe.  One hundred days before, Napoleon Bonaparte 
returned from an allied-imposed exile, attempting to reestablish French domination on 
continental Europe.  The human cost of the battle was horrific; French losses numbered 42,000, 
Prussians: 6,698, assorted allied troops: 9,400, and British casualties amounted to 7,460 men, or 
29.9 percent of all of their troops engaged.1  Waterloo, as Arthur Wellesley the Duke of 
Wellington proclaimed, “…was the most desperate business I was ever in.  I never took so much 
trouble about any Battle & never was so near being beat.  Our loss is immense particularly in that 
best of all Instruments, British Infantry.  I never saw the Infantry behave so well.”2  
The British military had beaten the finest forces Napoleon had ever assembled.  By 
defeating “Boney,”3 Wellington and the Army awed Europe and the British public with their 
martial prowess.  The navy that protected Britain for centuries momentarily vanished from the 
British public’s imagination.  By 1815 the public’s memory of the Battle of Trafalgar was as 
cold as Nelson’s body in its tomb in St. Paul’s Cathedral.4  Since 1805, the navy’s exploits were 
less than enviable.  Recently, the navy had fought a lackluster war against the fledgling 
American Navy in 1812.  An 1814 debate in the House of Commons analyzed the reasons why 
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the Royal Navy fared so poorly against the Americans and suggested that the Admiralty supply 
an account of the naval actions between January 1812 and November 1813.5  The British Army 
and Wellington, on the other hand, defeated Napoleon and now led a coalition of allies in the 
occupation of France.  As Linda Colley observes, “Waterloo had made the world safe for 
gentlemen again.  A British army led by a duke, and officered overwhelmingly by men of landed 
background who had purchased their commissions, helped destroy a self-made emperor and his 
legions.”6  In the process, the army had regained its prominence after a humiliating defeat in 
America, defeated French republicanism, destroyed Napoleon’s military dominance in 
Continental Europe, and dramatically enlarged its global empire.7  
Scholars view the Waterloo Campaign as a footnote to the whole Napoleonic Era.  Owen 
Connelly characterizes the episode as the “glorious irrelevance” noting that Napoleon’s exit from 
the European stage was appropriately glorious and dramatic.8   Bonaparte’s final attempt to 
regain power in France and exert some influence in European affairs was a nearly impossible 
task.  His odds of succeeding were at best slim.  Domestically, Napoleon had to reestablish his 
legitimacy; form a new national government that encompassed all shades of the French political 
spectrum including   Jacobins, liberals, republicans, and even a few royalists who did not flee 
with Louis XVIII; finance, recruit, and equip an army; and reinvent himself as peacemaker to a 
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war- weary state.  Outside of France Napoleon faced even greater difficulties than those that he 
confronted domestically.  Less than one week after Napoleon’s escape from Elba, the Allies 
meeting in Vienna declared to Louis XVIII that he would receive the assistance necessary to 
reestablish public tranquility, and proclaimed that Napoleon was an international outlaw and 
disturber of continental peace.9  To accomplish this task the major allies assembled more than 
864,000 men in nine separate armies under the supreme command of Austrian Fieldmarshal 
Prince Karl Philip Schwarzenberg.10  Napoleon, at the same time, could only muster 210,000 
reliable troops divided into eight different armies.11  In mid-June 1815 Napoleon allocated more 
than 128,000 men in northeastern France to launch a strike against Anglo-Allied-Prussian forces 
in Belgium.  The short campaign culminated with Napoleon’s defeat at the Battle of Waterloo.  
That defeat effectively ended Bonaparte’s bid to reclaim France. 
Waterloo may have ended one legend but it also created a new one.  Napoleon’s falling 
star heralded the dramatic rise of Wellington’s.  In 1815, Wellington was Britain’s most 
successful military commander.  At the outset of the campaign, Wellington was only one of 
many army commanders who participated in the coalition against Napoleon.  After Waterloo, the 
Duke became the arbitrator of the allies and kingmaker for the French.12  In the uncertain and 
volatile period following Napoleon’s downfall, Wellington’s authority and moderation enabled a 
second peaceful restoration of the Bourbons.  Louis XVIII, in following the Duke’s advice, 
demonstrated to the fractious allies that the resumption of the king’s rule was the best solution in 
the aftermath of Napoleon’s defeat.  Charles Kingsley Webster observes that Louis’ swift and 
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peaceful restoration was due largely to Wellington’s political shrewdness and military 
decisiveness.13  With Louis back on the throne of France it was imperative that the Allies frame a 
second peace treaty.  Wellington again was instrumental in drafting an equitable treaty more 
intent on pacifying than punishing France.  The Duke after observing six years of harsh French 
occupation policies in Spain was anxious to avoid punitive measures.  Such means, Wellington 
noted, “impaired the efficiency of every [occupying] army … and rallied the French nation 
against the invaders.”14    
Keeping France stable and quiescent enabled Louis’ return.  Extensive discussions by the 
Allies in the early summer of 1815 determined the future fate of France: Prussia, the 
Netherlands, and to a lesser extent Bavaria and Würtemburg favored some dismemberment of 
their former enemy.  In a secret memorandum of July 24, 1815, British Foreign Secretary Robert 
Stewart Lord Castlereagh outlined to Prime Minister Robert Jenkinson Lord Liverpool the views 
of each of the Allies toward France.15  Prussia and the major German states desired a weakened 
France while Russia agreed with Britain that France remain strong to act as a counterpoise to 
growing Prussian influence in western Europe.  The Austrians leaned toward the Russian 
position but were wary of France and Russia developing “too close a connexion.”16  Britain had 
hoped that a lenient policy of returning Louis to the throne and making few territorial demands 
on France would be the best policy to create a stable France and offer the Allies long-term 
security in a carefully constructed continental balance of power.  France sensed the disparity of 
positions and played a skillful game of brinksmanship.  French foreign minister Charles Maurice 
Talleyrand-Périgord made it clear to Castlereagh that Louis was prepared to pay reparations but 
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would resist any further territorial demands made by the Allies.  The foreign minister also hinted 
that a France without Louis would make the country susceptible to a new Jacobin strongman 
intent on reclaiming France’s place as a major power.  Wellington’s active endorsement of a 
moderate policy of returning Louis made him the most acceptable choice to administer and 
command the Allied occupation forces.  Austria, Russia, and France found the alternative of 
turning military and administrative command of the Allied occupation forces over to Marshal 
Gerherd Blucher and the Prussians unacceptable.  Blucher, as commander of the Prussian forces, 
intended to exact punitive measures on the French populace and, as an example, planned to blow 
up the Pont de Jena on the Seine, in retribution for Napoleon’s victories in 1806.   
The Second Treaty of Paris, signed in November 1815 by the Allies, was harsh but not 
vindictive.  Under the terms, the Allies agreed to allow Louis to remain on the throne, set up 
zones of Allied occupation, leveled an indemnity 700 million francs on the French to be paid 
within five years of the signing, and established a consensus among the Allies to prevent any 
further French aggression.17  According to Article VI of the treaty, an allied army of 150,000 
would occupy the northern and eastern departments of France for seven years with all costs for 
maintenance paid by France.18  Britain’s contribution to this force numbered 35,000, and like the 
Allied occupation of Germany following the Second World War, Wellington’s troops received a 
specific area of control.19  The British cantonments, located from Calais to just south of Cambrai, 
consisted of a mix of infantry, cavalry, and artillery units.  However, like all of the occupying 
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contingents, the British force contained a disproportionate number of cavalry units that provided 
Wellington with a fast mobile striking force that could quickly react to any emergency.  
 Under the terms of the treaty, Wellington was designated commander of the multinational 
occupation force replacing Schwarzenberg who commanded the wartime coalition forces.  The 
Duke was the obvious choice for this assignment for a number of reasons.  All of the allied 
states, including Prussia, acknowledged that he had decisively beaten Napoleon at Waterloo.20  
Moreover, Wellington got along well with Tsar Alexander of Russia.  Lord Castlereagh made it 
known to Lord Liverpool that Tsar Alexander had made Wellington’s overall command a 
precondition for Russian participation in the Allied occupation.21  All of the coalition’s 
participants recognized Wellington’s moderation in handling the French populace following the 
Battle of Waterloo.  His lenient policies toward France discouraged civil war and eased the way 
for the restoration of Louis XVIII to the throne.  There was a calculated reasoning to 
Wellington’s policy of reconciliation.  His chivalry toward the French state and its populace after 
the fall of Bonaparte ensured a quiet and peaceful restoration.  In the summer of 1815 the Duke 
observed, “if one shot is fired in Paris, the whole country will rise against us.”22  Overall, 
Wellington’s command of the situation in the summer of 1815 earned him the admiration of the 
collective sovereigns of Europe.  It was primarily Wellington’s prestige that merited him the 
overall Allied command, as none of the coalition military commanders could match his 
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diplomatic and military ability.  As Wellington biographer, Philip Guedalla, noted, “The Allied 
policy of moderation in 1815 owed its main driving-force to Wellington.”23   
 The British victory at Waterloo and the nearly three-year occupation of France enhanced 
not only Wellington’s reputation but also that of the British Army.  European perceptions of the 
British Army changed significantly during the Napoleonic Wars in part because of Wellington’s 
success at Waterloo.  Elizabeth Longford, in her comprehensive biography of Wellington, 
observes that Napoleon may have outmaneuvered Wellington during the Waterloo Campaign but 
notes that the Duke and his army in the end defeated the emperor of the French in the climactic 
battle.  “At Waterloo, Wellington’s fire-power served him better than Napoleon’s, his lines better 
than Napoleon’s columns, his generals better Napoleon’s marshals, even though he had not 
selected or welcomed all of them; indeed it was Napoleon’s own fault that the army’s idol, 
Michel Ney, was not at the head of his troops until the eve of Quatre Bras, that a great cavalry 
commander, Grouchy, was weighed down with the cares of the infantry, and that a great 
manoeuvrer of armies, Soult, was employed to interpret, if not manoeuvre, nothing but the 
Emperor’s thoughts.”24   Adjutant John Kincaid of the 95
th
 Regiment of Foot (the Rifles) wrote, 
that Wellington described his army at Waterloo as an “infamous army,” with the worst 
equipment and the worst staff that he had ever commanded.25  Yet this untried force, incapable of 
maneuver, stood in “dumb patient agony” throughout the day of June 18, 1815, fending off what 
were arguably the finest troops in Europe.26  All of the allied continental powers of Europe were 
aware that Napoleon’s troops had consistently beaten them and had occupied their capitals.  
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Wellington and the British, on the other hand, repeatedly defeated the French earning the respect 
of their enemies and allies.  One of the participants of Waterloo, William Gibney, regimental 
surgeon for the 15
th
 Hussars, remarked on the spirit of the British “the engagement showed 
skilful [sic] generalship on both sides, and brought out prominently the bulldog courage and 
obstinacy of the Briton.  The result proved the invincibility of natural courage, a good cause, and 
an experienced general.”27  As Lawrence James observed, “success in war generates self-
admiration… and is a vindication of the nation’s collective will and institutions.”28   
 Wellington and the British Army that had won at Waterloo perceived themselves as 
exceptional and dissimilar from their continental allies.  Unlike the Prussians, Netherlanders, 
Würtemburgers, and Bavarians, the British troops under Wellington’s command did not exact 
retribution from the French as they advanced on Paris in the summer of 1815.  In a July 14, 1815 
memorandum from Castlereagh to Liverpool, Castlereagh noted that if the Allies kept up their 
depredations on the French populace they would “find themselves circumstanced in France as 
the French were in Spain, if the system pursued [pillaging] by the Prussians and now imitated by 
the Bavarians, shall not be effectively checked.”29  British officers who participated in the 
advance voiced similar sentiments in their unofficial correspondence.  Gibney noted that there 
was substantial looting and destruction by their allies as they marched on Paris:  
 That we were following the track of the Allies was only too evident, for it was truly 
pitiable to observe how the country round had suffered by their march.  Whole fields of 
corn destroyed by the passage through of cavalry, artillery, waggons [sic], and troops of 
all sorts.  The inhabitants were very few and seemed to be scared out of their lives.  Their 
horses, carts, waggons [sic], etc. etc., and in despair believed that they were lost to them, 
and that now for a long time to come all the miseries of war would be felt in their own 
country.  Many of the houses had been plundered, and wanton destruction pursued; but it 
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was pleasant to hear that the owners attributed this conduct to the Prussians and Belgians, 
extolling the English for discipline and order.  It may be so; at any rate I feel assured that 
no British soldier would have dared to plunder valuables, or attempt to carry them away 
with him.  Death would have been the penalty for his folly.30   
 
Three years earlier Wellington had witnessed the excesses committed by his troops at Ciudad 
Rodrigo and Badajoz in the Peninsula and was determined that such incidents recur.  From a 
practical standpoint, Wellington could not afford a breakdown of discipline within his army.  Ill-
discipline within his own army would be viewed as contempt for his authority and weaken his 
stature among the allies.  Likewise, the political state of France just after the Battle of Waterloo 
was too delicate to risk alienating the French populace.  Castlereagh and Wellington realized that 
Allied depredations could turn French popular opinion away from Louis XVIII, perceiving his 
return as dans fourgons de l’ennemi.31  Wellington, wishing to avoid further hostilities, desired a 
quiet resumption of Bourbon rule.32  
 From Wellington’s and the British Army’s firsthand experience in the Peninsula they 
understood well how destructive a guerilla war could be on the occupying force.  For nearly six 
years they had witnessed the atrocities perpetrated by both the Spanish and the French.  The 
brutal reprisals and subsequent oppression by the French turned normally passive local 
populations into enemies.  As Charles Esdaile notes “Wherever the French went… their presence 
provoked considerable irregular resistance.”33   The British, as allies of the Spanish, learned 
important lessons on how to manage restive populations.  As a result of their Peninsular 
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experience, the British Army gained valuable experience in conducting police actions.  They 
better than any other continental army were best equipped in seeing that France remained quiet 
and pacified despite the enmity harbored by the other occupying forces.  This experience proved 
to be beneficial in the coming years when the British Army would be tasked to police their 
colonial empire.  
 Other considerations made Britain the natural choice as the leading ally in the occupation 
of France.  For nearly twenty-five years Britain subsidized and equipped all of its major coalition 
partners as well as many of the minor ones.  British subsidies to allied powers during their nearly 
twenty-five years of continuous war with France totaled £65.8 million.  These subsidies enabled 
the allies to buy British goods to equip their armies.34  In 1805 William Pitt’s government signed 
an agreement with Austria and Russia to grant  £1.75 million for every 100,000 men they put 
into the field against the French.35 Four years later Britain promised to pay financial subsidies to 
Austria in the amount of  £750,000 in specie and £4 million in bills of exchange if the Emperor 
Francis II would open a second front against the French in Bavaria and in northern Italy.36  In 
accord with the spirit of the 1813 Teplitz Treaty, Britain agreed one year later to subsidize 
equally the three major allies: Austria, Russia, and Prussia a total of £5 million per annum if each 
state provided 150,000 troops.37  British money was not the only commodity supplied in large 
quantities to the allies during the Napoleonic Wars.  British weaponry, accoutrements, and 
uniforms equipped and outfitted the armies of Prussia, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, 
and many minor German states.  In the spring and summer of 1813 transports from Britain 
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traveled to Baltic ports delivering 100,000 muskets with powder, accoutrements and flints to 
Prussia, 100,000 muskets and 116 field pieces to Russia, and 40,000 muskets and cloth for 
uniforms to Sweden.38  Later that same year, British fabric clothed the nearly naked Austrian 
troops who were preparing to participate in the fall campaign that culminated in the Battle of 
Leipzig.39  The allies became so dependent on British goods and subsidies that when Napoleon 
was finally defeated at Waterloo the allied sovereigns received from Britain “return money” that 
defrayed the expenses of marching home and their subsequent demobilization costs.40  
 In addition to supplying the Allied Powers with subsidies and war materials, the 
gathering momentum of the British Industrial Revolution sought out new overseas markets that 
were unable to trade with mainland Europe because of Napoleon’s Continental System.41  Paul 
Kennedy attributes Britain’s nineteenth century global preeminence to the kingdom’s ability to 
trade with the rest of the world while the continental powers contended with Napoleon.  Unlike 
the states of the European mainland, Britain’s insular geographic position allowed it to remain 
untouched by the ravages of war.  The novels of Jane Austen, which explore the lives of the 
English “middling sort” during the wartime period, reveal that the daily affairs of Britons were 
little affected by the conflict.  Elizabeth and her sisters, from Pride and Prejudice, are more 
concerned with making their daily rounds, drinking tea, and finding suitable husbands than 
defeating Bonaparte.  A Britain free from the ravages of war was, therefore free to develop a 
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solid industrial base.  During this generation, of war British overseas trade grew from £27.5 
million in 1797 to £51.6 million in 1815 with much of this trade reaching markets in America, 
Asia, Africa, the West Indies, Latin America, and the Near East.42  By 1815 Britain, with its 
industrial base firmly emplaced, clearly led the world in the production and transportation of 
goods. 
 Providing protection to this economically vital trade was the Royal Navy.  Traditionally, 
the navy was the first line of defense for Britain and since the Elizabethan Era, had protected its 
shores against continental enemies that included Spain, the Netherlands, and France.  During the 
eighteenth century the navy’s mission expanded to protect the sea-lanes between the home 
islands and Britain’s growing colonial empire.  Throughout the eighteenth century and into the 
Napoleonic Wars the strength of the Royal Navy grew exponentially.  Michael Duffy, in his 
research on the role the Royal Navy played in British overseas expansion after the War of 
American Independence, notes that Britain’s warship tonnage grew from 458.9 million tons in 
1790 to 609.3 million tons in 1815, making it stronger than the combined total of all of its 
rivals.43  In 1790 Britain’s overseas possessions included Canada, Caribbean islands, Australia, 
and India.  By 1811, Britain had captured all French colonies and its dependents.  Britain’s 
colonial empire increased with the military acquisitions of the Cape Colony, Malta, Mauritius, 
the Isle of Bourbon, and Les Saintes.  These territories became strategic outposts in protecting 
Britain’s sea-borne lifeline to India.44  In 1815, Britain had achieved global preeminence through 
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a combination of naval might, economic expertise, and available capital.  No other continental 
power could match this powerful combination.  Of the five European powers that comprised the 
“Pentarchy” at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, all of the other allied states acknowledged 
Britain as the most dominant and powerful of the allied powers.   
British domestic perceptions of the victory at Waterloo were a curious mixture of 
national pride, relief, uncertainty, and longing for tax relief.  Initial reaction by the British public 
was one of national pride.  Four days after the Battle of Waterloo, the Times declared: “Such is 
the great and glorious result of those masterly movements by which the Hero of Britain 
prevented the audacious attempt of the Rebel Chief.  Glory to Wellington, to our gallant Soldiers, 
and our brave Allies!”45  Wellington, in his battlefield dispatch to the Secretary at War, Henry 
Bathurst, lauded the army that he had weeks earlier disparaged, “It gives me the greatest 
satisfaction to assure your Lordship, that the army never upon any occasion, conducted itself 
better.”46  The public responded almost immediately to this affirmation of national pride.  Within 
ten days of the battle, bankers, merchants, and traders voted to adopt the necessary means to 
offer some sort of compensation to “those who had been wounded in the late splendid and 
important victory.”47  Subscriptions for the Waterloo fund poured in from all parts of the 
kingdom.  Donations even came from British subjects residing in Calcutta.  For nearly a year 
victory celebrations place took place throughout the empire.  The House of Commons voted, 
amid loud cheering from its members, “the thanks of the house to Field Marshal the Duke of 
Wellington, for the consuremate [sic] abilities, unexampled exertion, and irresistible ardour, 
displayed by him on the 18
th
 of June, on which day a splendid and decisive victory was gained 
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over the French army, commanded by Buonaparte in person, whereby the glory of the British 
nation was exalted, and the territiories of our all….”48 The Chancellor of the Exchequer offered 
its thanks by granting £200,000 for the building and furnishing of a house suitable to the Duke’s 
station.  Fireworks were set off in London on the evening of November 25, 1815, with embassies 
and government buildings displaying the inscriptions “Glory to God,” “To Our Heroes Thanks,” 
and “Peace.”49  In January 1816, churches throughout the kingdom offered up prayers of 
thanksgiving for the reestablishment of peace in Europe.  At one service the Bishop of London 
preached the sermon based on Psalms 20: 7-8, “Some trust in chariots and some in horses: but 
we will remember the name of the Lord our God.  They are brought down and fallen: but we are 
risen and stand upright.”50  The ultimate accolade awarded to the British soldiers of Waterloo by 
a grateful nation was the distribution of the Waterloo Medal to all who had participated in the 
campaign.51 
The majority of Britons, on hearing the news of Wellington’s victory, experienced a 
sense of dull relief.  Colley notes that after living through nearly a quarter of a century of war 
many of the poor and even moderately prosperous had little to reason to celebrate.52  The 
resulting peace brought unemployment, a depressed economy, high taxes, and a general sense 
that the nation, after years of warfare with an identifiable enemy, was now sailing into uncharted 
waters.  For centuries a predominantly Protestant Britain had fought France, the foremost Roman 
Catholic state in Europe.  As Colley brilliantly points out, the incessant conflict with France was 
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the glue that bound the United Kingdom’s social classes and ethnicities together.53  With Europe 
finally at peace, Britain needed to turn its attention to long neglected domestic questions.  Frank 
O’Gorman observes that the militarization of Britain during the Napoleonic Wars did much to 
dissolve national loyalties.54  Based on statistics compiled by John Cookson, the ethnic 
composition of the British Army of 1813 consisted of one-half English, one-third Irish, and one-
sixth Scots.55  The effect of the Napoleonic Wars on the British Army resulted in an assimilation 
of nationalities into a single institution, which in turn drew traditionally competing ethnicities 
together.  One tangible result of the long war with France was that Irish Catholics and Scots 
began to identify with, and take pride, in the British state.  Polite English society turned away 
from ethnic exclusivity and fully accepted the Scots and Irish into the British state.  Some 
noticeable trends were the union of Ireland’s Parliament with that of England in 1800 and the 
nation-wide accolades and honors bestowed on King George III during the last two decades of 
his reign.  There was, however, a definite recognition by the Whigs and some moderate Tory 
lawmakers that the issues of Catholic Emancipation, voting reform, and fiscal retrenchment 
needed immediate attention once peace returned to Europe. 
 British lawmakers and the general populace viewed the army with some suspicion even 
though the army had been a unifying force for the kingdom.  Eight months after the Battle of 
Waterloo members of the House of Commons began to question the constitutional and fiscal 
necessity of maintaining a large standing army.  During the February 27, 1816, parliamentary 
debates on Army Estimates Lord John Russell, a Whig, argued that an army of 150,000 men 
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“must alarm every friend to his country and its constitution.”56  Russell worried aloud that 
continental powers maintained large military forces for their own security, but Britain, if forced 
to adopt continental practices by keeping an immense regular force would bid farewell to “to that 
freedom which they had so long and so anxiously preserved” against Bonaparte.57  Ever since the 
restoration of the monarchy in 1661, members of parliament had shown a marked hostility to the 
idea of a sizeable standing army during peacetime.  A sizeable majority of the British public 
perceived the Army’s domestic functions as protecting sources of revenue, preserving public 
order, and preventing insurrection.  The army’s highly visible role in carrying out these duties 
frequently incurred the scorn of their countrymen.58  Richard Holmes notes that, while the army 
remained unpopular, a significant number of the British populace viewed the Royal Navy 
positively because it was the instrument that protected commerce and was the traditional first 
line of defense against invasion.59  It is therefore not surprising that the majority of the British 
people would agree with Russell and his fellow lawmakers who preferred to place the security of 
the kingdom into the hands of the navy that Russell had characterized as “the true bulwark of the 
island.”60  
  Despite Parliament’s deep-rooted suspicion of a large standing army the cost of 
maintaining a sizeable land force caused even greater concern.  J. W. Fortescue observes that 
Parliament at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars reverted to its long-standing practice of 
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slashing the size of its military forces in the name of economy.61  One particular group, the 
Radicals, suggested that the size of the military establishment just before the French 
Revolutionary Wars was sufficient in holding the empire.62  In 1780, near the conclusion of the 
American War for Independence, the cost of sustaining an army of 40,000 men required an 
expenditure of £12.2 million.63  From an 1816 perspective the costs incurred during the conflict 
consumed a little more than 12 percent of the national income.  To Parliament this sum was 
significant but manageable.  However, projected costs for sustaining Britain’s military at 1816 
levels was alarming.  In the Parliamentary debates of 1816 Whig economics expert, Frankland 
Lewis, pointed out that the realm’s current tax revenues could not continue funding the military 
at its present strength of 166,865 troops.64  Lewis noted that “the interest upon the [national] debt 
increased to 40 million; the [military] establishment required 23 million, and altogether more 
than 65 million were to be procured by taxes, which sum was to be deducted from a revenue on 
land and capital, amounting yearly to 130 or 140 million, so that it was obvious that nearly half 
that revenue was annually consumed; and was there not considerable danger that we might soon 
arrive at the end of our resources.”65  In 1817, Nicholas Vansittart the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer reported that state’s income amounted to £51 million with expenses calculated at £69 
million producing a deficit of £18 million.66  Lord Althorp, in the 1818 Parliamentary debates 
over Army Estimates, voiced concerns that Exchequer bills in the first quarter of the year had 
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already reached  £56 million.67  If the government was to avoid incurring another large deficit it 
was necessary to either pass a new tax on the people or reduce the size of the army.   
 Levying new taxes on an economically distressed society was clearly out of the question.  
The sudden transition from a wartime economy to that of peace had thrown the economy into a 
depression as revenues shrank and expenses remained high.  Because of public pressure, the 
Liverpool ministry abolished the emergency wartime income tax in 1816.  Annual revenue fell to 
a mere £58.7 million in 1818, half of revenue received just three years before.68  The cost of more 
than two decades of war amounted to £860 million with nearly 80 percent of tax revenues paying 
the interest on the national debt and another 8 percent swallowed up in war pensions and retired 
service pay.69   
 Along with these difficulties were the postwar problems of currency stability, agricultural 
prices, and labor unrest.70  Despite the Tories’ best efforts at containing domestic disorder and 
attempting to alleviate local suffering there was a real fear that domestic disorder or even 
revolution might ensue.  The depression affected all segments of British society.  A writer in 
Lancashire reported that in the autumn of 1818 the populace of the Manchester District feared 
the police and the troops more than they did the workers.  As many as 1,200 workers paraded 
through the streets stopping to listen to labor leaders call for higher wages, an end to the 
mechanization of the cloth industry, and Parliamentary reform.  Workers were not the only ones 
affected by the nation’s economic woes.  Parliament’s implementation of the Corn Laws in 1815 
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caused the price of bread to skyrocket, prompting widespread protests.  Indeed, the population 
found the legislation so repugnant that the government found it necessary to protect the Houses 
of Parliament with a detachment of troops.71  Willcox and Arnstein note that the price of bread 
contributed to a domino effect on domestic prices.  “The high price of grain, hence bread, would 
inflate wages and thereby raise the cost of production and the price of finished goods, which 
businessmen had to market abroad in competition with foreign products.”72  
  Letters to the Times in the post-war period reveal Parliament’s need to lessen the 
suffering caused by the economic crisis.  Chief among the writers’ concerns were the prohibitive 
costs incurred by the military, which many Britons perceived as outright waste.  Writers 
suggested a series of measures that included reducing the number of inspectors of the militia; 
cutting the rate of pay for general officers with the rank of major general and above; and 
curtailing allowances and perks received by the Master-General of Ordinances.  Others 
suggested the cessation of half-pay to cornets and ensigns who received commissions without 
purchase after January 1816; the reduction of the number of junior students enrolled at the 
Military College; and the abolition of separate riding schools for cavalry regiments.73  
Apparently, the most poignant letter concerning the plight of English society was written by 
“J.B.” and addressed to Lord Liverpool that appeared in the December 1, 1821 edition of the 
Times.  In the letter, the writer appealed to Liverpool as “both a politician and as a Christian” to 
alleviate the suffering of thousands of their countrymen that was “sweeping with rapidity so 
many honest and industrious men into the gulps of ruin and misery.”74  In part, the letter reads: 
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I entreat your attention to the statements of facts which appear in The Times 
newspaper of this day.  What a picture of extravagance on the part of Ministers does it lay 
before the nation? Whilst the Tax Collectors are dragging the beds and bedding from 
under the unfortunate poor people of this country, and taking their furniture in execution 
for payment of the King’s taxes, regardless of the fate of the families dependent upon 
them for subsistence, how can you tolerate the granting the money, so wrung from the 
heart’s blood of these sufferers, to be wasted in pensions under the form of commissions 
in the army without purchase, to those whom your Gazette denominate gentlemen.  .   
 
Good Heavens! my Lord, whilst the industrious artisans, the small shopkeeper, 
and the laborious labourer, are starving from the excessive taxation under which they 
live, how can you sanction their hard earned and last shillings to be torn from them to 
pamper in pensions the sons of gentlemen in this manner?  
 
Let an inquiry be made as to the claims which these eight gentlemen [listed in the 
Times as having been granted the commission of Ensign without purchase] have to 
become pensioners on the people of England [at £438 per annum]; and it will be found 
that the grossest abuse exists in the selection of young men of family to be stuck to the 
backs of the starving people of England, like leeches to extract the little remains of blood. 
 
. . . My Lord, the miseries of taxation at the present moment are only known to 
the suffers, and those who witness the daily warrants of distress and scenes of misery.  By 
all that is dear, do not drive the people of this country to desperation.  Do not insult them, 
by pensioning from day to day the sons of gentlemen, by adding their names to the army 
list, whilst you have 10, 000 idle officers, anxious for employment, and which you 
cannot, thank God, give. 
 
Do not squander the public taxes in this open and barefaced manner, whilst the 
people are suffering such distress.  I would call you Lordship’s attention to the fact, that 
pensions to the amount of £1, 600, 019 a-year have been granted in the army since the 
peace, which, at 16 years’ purchase, a more correct valuation than 12 years will amount 
to the enormous sum of £1, 600, 304, the value of commissions without purchase. 
 
If this sum of taxes had been remitted to those whose property has been taken by 
the tax-gatherers, what scenes of distress would have been prevented?  What misery to 
hundreds of families would thereby have been avoided? 
 
Can you talk of economy, my Lord, when such extravagance and profusion is 
permitted in the army for useless officers whilst you are reducing the hard working and 
useful clerks in public offices.75 
  
Members of Parliament, mindful of public sentiment expressed both in the press and in 
the streets, wondered aloud if the cost of keeping such a large worldwide military force was 
necessary during a period of peace.  The public consistently argued that because France was no 
longer a threat Britain should substantially reduce its military establishment.  As early as 1816, 
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Whig and radical parliamentarians proposed reductions that would cut troop numbers without 
compromising their global commitments.  They argued that the 11,000 men stationed in 
Mediterranean appeared to be excessive.  The kingdom would benefit from a substantial savings 
if Britain reduced their strength in the region by 3000 men.  Lawmakers proposed posting 4,500 
troops at Gibraltar and another 3,500 at Malta.  These numbers would be sufficient to retain their 
influence in the area.  In the East Indies, competition with France had ended and the only 
probable enemies appeared to be on the frontiers of Nepal and Tibet.  The East India Company’s 
military forces supplemented with Royal troops were thought to be sufficient to garrison the 
frontier.  Current troop numbers in the West Indies also seemed excessive as the British held all 
of the key sugar islands.76  Only in Canada was troop strength considered by Parliament to be 
less than adequate.  Because of the increased power of the United States during the late war, a 
further study on acceptable troop levels would be required.  In the meantime, Canada’s vastness 
and difficult terrain sufficed to deter any invasion from its southern neighbors.   
A more powerful argument for troop reduction surfaced one year later when members of 
the Whig and radical opposition proposed a plan based on British troop levels in 1792.  There 
was, however, a fundamental flaw in opposition lawmakers’ calculations as they had failed to 
appreciate the need for substantial garrisons in the Cape Colony, Mauritius, and Ceylon; all of 
which were strategic victualling stations for the Royal Navy.  As British trade interests expanded 
in the early decades of the nineteenth century, the importance of secure sea-lanes to India and to 
important overseas trading partners were critical to the Liverpool government’s strategic vision.  
Table A.1 indicates that British troop strengths in all overseas localities had grown substantially 
during the Napoleonic Wars.  Rows two and six reveal that the numbers of soldiers stationed in 
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colonial garrisons sustained a two-fold increase by 1817.  The conservative estimates of the 
opposition had failed to appreciate that the world had changed markedly since 1789.   
Likewise, opposition members noted that the military establishment in India experienced 
significant growth since the peace with France.  Furthermore, they pointedly observed that 
neither the Earl of Cornwallis nor Wellington, who had to contend with hostile French troops, 
required the number of soldiers that were currently on station in India.  Whigs argued that the 
present Tory administration permitted this situation because every additional Crown regiment 
sent to India increased the ministry’s patronage and influence on the East India Company and 
justified keeping a large pool of reserves at home to “afford necessary reliefs” [sic] for the troops 
overseas.  Opposition members proposed that by employing the yeomanry and volunteer cavalry 
they could preserve domestic order and significantly reduce the current Army strength totals, 
thus incurring a substantial savings for the state.  They further argued that the yeomanry 
combined with ordinance troops, marines, militia staff, the military college, and military asylum 
would provide a sufficient number of troops to handle domestic emergencies.  It is worthwhile to 
note that the Tories adopted part of the opposition’s proposal by augmenting yeomanry forces 
with those of the regular Army to handle domestic disorders.  Edward P. Thompson observes 
that the commingling of the aristocracy and the middle class in the yeomanry solidified the union 
of the two groups against the working class thus influencing the direction of English history in 
the nineteenth century.  “A common understanding grew up between the aristocracy and the 
middle class, forming that esprit de corps which was later to carry the day on the field of 
Peterloo; while at the balls their sisters selected husbands who facilitated that cross-fertilization 
of landed and commercial wealth which distinguished the English Industrial Revolution.”77  
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  Indeed, in the first six months of 1817, troop strength had dropped significantly as the 
government and Parliament bowed to public and fiscal pressure.  A January 1, 1817 official 
military troop returns reveal that the army’s effective strength was 9,017 officers, 9,614 
sergeants, 3,852 drummers and trumpeters, 339 farriers, and 143,479 rank and file for a total of 
157, 284 troops.78  Just four months later, the number dwindled to an effective army strength of 
7,623 officers, 8,811 sergeants, 3, 561 drummers and trumpeters, 338 farriers, and 134, 699 rank 
and file for a total of 155, 032.79  One year later, the army had shrunk even further as the military 
carried out a plan of reducing the number of soldiers in companies.  The 1818 plan cut ten men 
per troop in the regiments of Dragoons, sixteen “boys” in the Guards’ cavalry regiments, ten men 
per company in the Foot Guards, 800 men in eight battalions of infantry, and 15 privates per 
company in every regiment of infantry, exclusive of India.  All of these reductions resulted in a 
decrease of nearly 31, 500 men in the army.80  The army’s estimated costs to the state for the year 
would amount to £6, 494, 290 down, from the £18 million for the previous year.81  
 Lord Liverpool’s Tory government agreed that troop cuts were necessary but disagreed 
with the opposition on the size, scope, and pace of the reductions.  In a March 3, 1818 report to 
the House of Commons, Lord Palmerston argued the government’s position indicated that 
reductions were indeed taking place but Britain’s global commitments necessitated the presence 
of sufficient numbers of troops to garrison the empire.  Since the signing of the 1815 treaty with 
France, Britain’s military establishment declined by 21,000 men and that in 1818 the army 
numbered 113,640 men.82  Accompanying costs for the military had also declined by £418,000.83  
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Public records of expense indicate that in 1818 the government’s gross income amounted to 
£57.6 million, down £21.5 million from just two years before with army expenses calculated as 
1.1 million for the year.84  Parliament’s calls for overseas troop reductions had diminished 
somewhat because of the Pindari and Kandian conflicts.  However, critics of the War Office’s 
troops numbers and their concurrent expenses were primarily troubled by the size of the forces 
maintained on the home islands.  On March 13, 1818, Lord Althorp argued before the House of 
Commons that there was little need for garrisoning large numbers of troops in England and 
Ireland.  Since the defeat of France mandated an occupation force, there was scant danger to 
Britain from a foreign invasion.  The government countered by arguing that the troops were still 
needed as a precaution against social unrest caused by the severe postwar economic depression.  
Thomas Dwight Veve’s research on the British occupation force in France notes that in 1817 an 
estimated 3,600 infantrymen returned from the continental Army of Occupation to garrison 
England.85  In his autobiography, Harry Smith comments that when his regiment returned to 
England in 1818, he, along with many of his troops, was assigned to assist local authorities in 
quelling labor unrest in the manufacturing districts.86  Parliamentary backbenchers dismissed this 
argument as nonsense and an affront to constitutional sensibilities.  Lord Althorp observed  “It 
had been our pride and triumph that when the despotic governments were obliged to maintain 
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themselves by a military force, we, with all our privileges, were not molested in their enjoyment 
by an army.” 87   
 In the immediate post-Waterloo period, Liverpool’s government faced grave economic 
and social problems.  Tories feared that if domestic violence should become endemic it would be 
necessary for the army to restore order.  Because of this danger troop numbers in England and 
Ireland remained unusually high.  In 1818 the number of British troops garrisoned in Britain 
numbered nearly 29,000 men.  The Whigs found this number unacceptable and argued that a 
reduction to something nearer to the 1793 troop totals would yield an annual savings of £180,000 
for the country.88  However, domestic troop levels continued to remain high. 
 In 1819, the Liverpool government continued the practice of reducing the number of 
active regiments within the regular army.  By the beginning of the year, all regiments had lost 
their second and any additional battalions they had gained during the wars of the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries.89  Officers in these disbanded battalions received half-pay and 
were released from the service.90 Career officers who had served throughout the Napoleonic 
Wars found themselves in a precarious financial position with scant hope of finding suitable re-
employment.91  Charles Messenger cites the case of William Humbley, a first lieutenant who 
served in the 95
th
 Regiment of Foot.  Humbley, commissioned in 1807, served in all of the major 
British actions of the Napoleonic Wars including the Danish, Peninsular, Walcheren, and 
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Waterloo campaigns.  In 1818 Humbley’s 3rd Battalion was disbanded and all officers went on 
half pay.  Thirty-six years later, at the age of 62, he was called back to serve in the Crimean 
War.92  Lord Palmerston reported to Parliament in the early summer of 1819 that savings 
attributed to the regimental cuts in manpower amounted to an estimated £132,000 in an Army 
and Ordinance budget of £9.1 million, the lowest expenditure on the military since 1793.93  The 
Times reported that critics both inside and outside the government were not satisfied with the 
government’s cuts on military spending and requested additional pruning of the budget.  Further 
proposals included the abolition of recruiting districts, the limiting of expenditures at the Royal 
Military College to no more than £12,000 per annum, a severe reduction of staff positions during 
peacetime, and the cessation of half-pay to 264 ensigns and cornets who became officers after 
1815 and who had not purchased their commissions.  All of these cost cutting measures would 
yield a savings of £250,000.94  
 For the next four years, Liverpool’s ministry wrestled with the twin dilemmas of cutting 
military spending while maintaining an adequate home defense force and a strong military 
presence in the colonies.  Military spending for the years 1820 to 1822 rose slightly averaging 
£10.2 million per year with global troop strength numbering around 90,000 men and officers.95  
Beginning in 1823, and continuing into 1824 Army expenditures declined to around £8.7 million 
per year.96  In 1823, Lord Bathurst reported the worldwide distribution of troops as follows: 
20,522 troops stationed in Great Britain, 20,522 in garrisons abroad, excepting India, and 28,196 
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in Ireland.  An additional 19,977 men assisted the East India Company’s military forces in India; 
however, they were excluded from the rolls and the budget as the company paid their 
maintenance.97  In a further effort to cut costs, Lord Bathurst enjoined colonial governors who 
commanded military forces to avoid costly military operations either on their frontiers or within 
the colony.98  In July 6, 1822 members of the House of Commons debated whether colonial 
revenues should be used to pay overseas defense costs.99  Stated policy and reality hardly ever 
coincide and a series of crisis that included the First Burmese War that began in early 1824, the 
1825 Bharatpur Campaign in Jat, and the threat of insurrection in the West Indies thwarted the 
War Office’s attempts to reduce troop level reductions and the subsequent costs.  In 1824, the 
army raised six new regiments, the 94
th
 to the 99
th
, an augmentation that amounted to nearly 
5,000 men.100  Early in 1825, the Times announced that army strength would increase because of 
a new levy of 10,000 men of which 5,000 were bound for Ireland and 5,000 for the East Indies.101  
In 1828, army strength increased to 102,539 men primarily because of the need for additional 
troops in Southeast Asia.102 Additionally, army expenditures that had fallen for two straight years 
again began to again rise. (Table A.2) 
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Despite their success in significantly lowering the state’s military budgets, the Tories, in 
response to almost a decade of criticism from the Whig opposition, instituted programs that 
would further control overseas military spending.  Wellington, who had become Master-general 
of Ordnance after his return to England in 1818, made substantial reductions in his department.  
In an August 1822 letter to George Ramsay, the ninth Earl of Dalhousie, Wellington outlined the 
current sentiments of the government.  
You are aware that the government has been for some time occupied in the 
reduction of all departments of the state, a duty which they have been called upon 
to perform not less by the voice of Parliament than by their own sense of their 
duty to the publick.  [sic]  [T]he interests of individuals may render it expedient to 
keep up large establishments of officers in the civil departments of the 
government at a period when the army and all its military departments have been 
reduced so low as to render it scarcely possible to perform the required duties.  
But the well-understood interests of the state require a different policy.  The 
Parliament and the people must be made to feel that nothing but a view of the 
publick [sic] interest will occasion the keeping up any employment not absolutely 
necessary for the transaction of the publick [sic] business.”103  
 
 Wellington attacked waste and mismanagement in the Ordnance Department.  The 
Department was the military’s largest office, encompassing a number of ancillary branches 
including artillery, ordnance, engineering, topography, education, and scientific research.  The 
Department also boasted the largest budget of any governmental office.  Corruption, abuse, and 
waste plagued the branch for years, frequently prompting its Parliamentary critics to attack the 
behemoth department.  A January 1819 letter to Wellington by Colonel Philip Riou of the Royal 
Artillery noted the many abuses he had witnessed.  Among Riou’s allegations were the excessive 
salaries paid to principal commanders that included Colonel George Phipps, the Inspector of 
Ordnance; Colonel Wiltshire Wilson, the commander at Woolwich; and Lieutenant Colonel 
Edward Vaughan, commander of artillery at Gibraltar.  Riou further complained that 
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unscrupulous contractors sold military stores at inflated prices.104  Wellington soon brought 
reform to his department.  By the middle of the decade, the Duke had abolished sixty-eight 
offices, saving the government £14,000 a year in salaries.105  Wellington also eliminated the 
corps of artillery drivers, incorporating them into the artillery.  To further curb spending, the 
Bathurst ministry, in January 1826, issued a directive to the following British possessions:  
Ceylon, Mauritius, New South Wales, Van Diemans Land, the Cape of Good Hope, Malta, 
Gibraltar, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, Trinidad, Demerara, Essequibo, Bervice, St. Lucia, 
Heligoland, Honduras, and Newfoundland, placing all military defenses and military buildings 
under the direction of the Ordnance Department.106  Colonies with local assemblies such as 
Upper and Lower Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Barbados, and Jamaica were exempt 
for the moment.  Under this new directive, the previously mentioned colonial governors were to 
turn over the management and upkeep of all military buildings and instillations to the Ordnance 
Department.  It prohibited colonial governors and commanding officers from beginning or 
engaging in any new construction without the combined approval of the Treasury and the 
Secretary of State.  Only Ordnance officers could carry out repairs.  This directive effectively 
took a major portion of colonial discretionary military spending out of the hands of the governors 
and colonial officials whom, in the past, had been profligate in their spending and careless in 
their accounting.107 
   Colonial governors who administered colonies that had representative assemblies were 
also encouraged to be frugal in their defense spending.  Attempts at making the colonists share 
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some of the financial burden for defense after 1763 had ended in failure with the whole weight of 
military expenditure falling on the shoulders of the British taxpayer.108  Moreover, since the 
American War for Independence, many colonial and treasury officials were reluctant in requiring 
overseas colonies to contribute toward their own defense.  In the decades that followed the 
American War for Independence, Parliament, the Crown, and the British taxpayer paid a 
considerable portion of colonial defense costs.  Consequently, many governors looked for ways 
to help defray defense expenses.  Methods employed by Lower Canada’s Governor Sir Peregrine 
Maitland illustrate the measures colonial administrators employed.  Maitland in a May 16, 1820 
letter to Lord Bathurst, the governor recounted his compliance with a Treasury Directive 
concerning the financing of a new barracks in Quebec City.  
My Lord, 
Referring to the latter paragraphs of the 13
th
 December last, respecting the most 
advantageous mode of complying with the Instructions of the Lords Councilors of His 
Majesty’s Treasury, to obtain if possible by Exchange Such Lands as were Considered 
most immediately interfering with the defence of Quebec, I have the honour to inform 
your Lordship that in pursuance of the plan to be adopted by his Grace the Late 
Commander of the Forces I directed a piece of ground in the St. Roc’s suburbs of about 
an acre in extent, and which was reported to me as not required for Government Purposes 
to be laid out in Building Lots and sold in Public Auction, which has been done this day, 
and I am happy to say, has produced about three thousand pounds and with the ground 
already sold for the same purpose, amounting to two thousand three hundred pounds, will 
go far towards reimbursing His Majesty’s Government for the important acquisition of 
property purchased in July last from Mr. Ferguson.  The remaining sum, three thousand 
seven hundred pounds can be, I am informed, easily liquidated in like manner.  
I have the honour to be  
My Lord 
Your Lordships Most Obedient Servant 
P. Maitland.109    
 
In a follow up letter, the next month, Maitland continues to construct new barracks using 
the same financial arrangements.   
 
  22 June 1820 
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My Lord, 
Referring to that part of my Letters to Secretary Lushington of the 18
th
 of 
November last, of which I had the honor to transmit your Lordship a Copy on the 24
th
 the 
same Month, and in which I expressed my hopes, that the sale of the Ground on which 
the Old Barracks in the town of Kingston were situated, would go far to reimburse the 
expense of those of stone, which were constructed last year at Point Henry, I have the 
honor to state that having directed a small proportion of the ground alluded to, to be laid 
out in Building Lots, it was sold at Public Auction on the 1
st
 Instant, and Produced 
upwards of £2300, Two thousand three hundred,  which sum very nearly covers the 
expense of the new Barracks____ and I have every reason to believe, that by bringing 
occasionally into the market, small portions of the ground, which the Projected 
Arrangements enable us to give up in the town of Kingston, the completion of the 
Barrack and the repair of the works at that place may be executed at a trifling expense to 
the Mother Country. 
I have the honour to be  
My Lord 
Your Lordships Most Obedient Servant 
P. Maitland.110 
    
Even these actions were not enough to satisfy Parliamentary critics, who continued throughout 
the 1820s, to attack the military spending of the Tory ministry.   
 Parliament’s substantial reduction of the military numbers and budget in the decade 
following Waterloo created severe hardships for many career soldiers.  As regiments lost their 
additional battalions, the first men released from the military were those who were invalids or 
those on limited military service.  In 1816, the 10
th
 Regiment garrisoned the island of Corfu in 
compliance with the terms of the Treaty of Paris.  While stationed on the island, mandated 
Parliamentary military reductions eliminated the unit’s 2
nd
 battalion, reducing its overall strength 
to 1,093 men.  Other regiments experienced the same fate as the 10
th
.111  Colonel Archibald 
Campbell’s 6
th
 Regiment of Foot, the Royal Warwickshire Regiment, after the amalgamation of 
its 1
st
 and 2
nd
 battalions numbered only 760 men while serving with the Army of Occupation in 
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France.112  The official history of the 4
th
 Regiment of Foot, “the King’s Own,” reports that the 2
nd
 
battalion of the regiment was disbanded on Christmas Day 1815.  Officers of the 2
nd
 battalion 
received two months full pay before being placed on half-pay list, and all were given “the option 
of taking any vacancies in the 1
st
 battalion that might occur during those two months.”113  During 
the first year of demobilization, the army reduced its complement by 26,000.114  In addition to the 
disbanding of the additional wartime battalions, the complements of regimental 1
st
 battalions 
were also slowly reduced.  The 1
st
 Battalion of the 93
rd
 Regiment of Foot, the Sutherland 
Highlanders, reported in January 1817 a total of fifty-five sergeants, twenty-two drummers, and 
1000 rank and file.  One year later, the unit contained thirty-five sergeants, twenty-two 
drummers, and 650 rank and file.115  Additionally, the annual strength reports for the 91st 
Regiment of Foot, the Argyllshire Highlanders, also reflect a slow diminution of its strength 
between 1815-1830.116 (See Table A.3).  Besides reducing the compliments within regiments, 
further reductions come about by demobilizing entire regiments.  The Times reported in October 
1818, that the Army intended to disband of all infantry regiments numbered above the 80
th
 
Regiment along with those cavalry regiments numbered above the 16th Light Dragoons.  
Moreover, “the whole of the Royal Artillery Drivers, together with the Horse Artillery, two 
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battalions of the Foot Artillery, and one of Artillery Invalids, will also fall under the necessary 
pruning hand of Economy.”117   
 Like their civilian counterparts, a significant number of half-pay officers experienced 
severe economic hardships following the end of the Napoleonic Wars.  Arguing that they had 
served honorably throughout the war with France, demobilized officers on half-pay claimed that 
the state had turned its back on them during peacetime.  Writing in early March 1820, Harry 
Smith pleads with Colonel Colborne of the Horse Guards that an active military posting would 
significantly ease his economic plight.  “I shall not expatiate, but upon my pecuniary necessities 
I could very -----.  I have been living this last year on my regimental pay.  The smallness of 
which has given me such a lesson of adversity I shall be more careful for the future, and am now 
a most needy …Pray my dear colonel, do for me what you can and let me hear from you.”118  
Additionally, Wellington’s correspondence is filled with former officers soliciting his 
assistance in securing them any form of military employment.  A sampling of Wellington’s 
1819-1822 correspondence reveals that the Duke received solicitations to use his influence in 
securing posts such as governorships, staff positions, an assistantship in the royal laboratory, 
Inspector of Fisheries, employment with the Irish Police and a host of general petitions for any 
available civil and military positions.119  The plight of these officers is also apparent in their 
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responses to the War Office questionnaire, Statements of Service for Retired Officers.120  A few 
examples will illustrate the hardships they faced while on half-pay.  Major Sackville Hamilton 
Berkley notes that he entered the army in May 1800 at the age of eighteen and served nearly 
twenty-five years in various regiments, including the 46
th
 Regiment, the 16
th
 Regiment, the 2
nd
 
West Indian Regiment, and the 6
th
 West Indian Regiment.  Throughout his military career, 
Berkley served in the West Indies, and was present at the capture of St. Thomas, St. John, St. 
Croix, and Martinique.121  In 1819, Berkley was serving as Deputy Adjutant General to the 
Governor of Barbados, Lieutenant General Sir Stapleton Cotton Baron Combermere.122  We 
know that Berkley had a close relationship with his commanding officer as he named his first-
born son Combermere George William Berkley.  Because of the postwar reductions, Berkley’s 
battalion demobilized February 21, 1825, and he was placed on half-pay and had to support a 
wife and four children.  In a final comment on his situation Berkley observes that he is “ready to 
serve” in any regiment immediately available.123   
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 The case of Lieutenant Colonel H.C.E. Vernon Graham is also helpful in understanding 
the hardships demobilization created for long-serving veteran officers.  Graham was born in 
1779, the son of Henry Vernon of Hilton Park.  He entered the army at the age of nineteen as a 
Cornet in the 10
th
 Light Dragoons in late 1798.  Serving in a variety of infantry and cavalry 
regiments during the Revolutionary and Consular periods, he was placed on half-pay in 1802, 
“by reduction of the additional Troops of Cavalry, after the Treaty of Amiens.”124  Reappointed 
to the cavalry when hostilities resumed, he transferred to the 26
th
 Regiment in 1806 where he 
served in Ireland and England in various staff positions.  In 1808, Graham volunteered for more 
active service and received a posting as Deputy Assistant Adjutant General to Sir John Moore’s 
army in Spain.  After Moore’s death, he served in a number of combat units participating in the 
battles of Talavera, Aroyo Molinos, Badajos, and Salamanca, where he was severely wounded.  
However, Graham did not receive any pension for his wound.  Sent home to recuperate, he 
subsequently received an appointment as Inspecting Field Officer of Militia in Nova Scotia with 
the rank of lieutenant colonel.  In 1815, Graham left Nova Scotia to command of the 2
nd
 
Regiment in the West Indies,  “where [he] experienced two attacks of yellow Fever.”125  After 
Napoleon’s defeat, Graham became an Inspecting Field Officer posted in the Ionian Islands.  In 
February 1828, he was placed on half-pay.  At the time of his reduction, Graham was a widower 
supporting four children.  Graham subsequently found employment as Justice of the Peace in the 
County of Stafford.   
Many officers and men who faced reduction because of demobilization chose to leave 
Britain and make their fortunes overseas.  For these officers there were three viable options.  
They could leave their homeland and settle in a colony hoping to find employment working as a 
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civilian in a vocation or skill they had learned while serving in the military.  They could offer 
their military services as mercenaries or acquire commissions in the service of a foreign power, 
private army, or revolutionary force.  Finally, they could remain in the army until they found 
employment in one of the many regiments garrisoning the overseas empire.  A significant 
number of officers found employment while remaining in the military working in either royal or 
colonial administrative positions such as judicial and legal branches, adjutant positions, 
inspectors, superintendents, or government agents.   
An interesting example of an officer who chose the first option was Lieutenant Colonel 
Henry Bulteel Harris, who served twenty-two years in the army purchasing all of his grade ranks.  
At the age of sixteen, Harris graduated from the Royal Military College receiving his Ensigns 
commission in the 57
th
 Regiment.126  In 1807, he purchased a captaincy in the Seventy-second 
Foot.  In 1807, the 1
st
 Battalion of the 72
nd
 Regiment was posted at the Cape of Good Hope while 
the 2
nd
 Battalion remained at home.  Since Harris’ records do not indicate any service overseas at 
this particular time, it can be conjectured that he was posted with the 2
nd
 Battalion.  Promoted to 
the rank of brevet Major, Harris received an appointment of Deputy Adjutant General for British 
forces in Nova Scotia.  In late 1814, his regiment suffered reduction and he was put on half-pay.  
Harris chose to remain with his wife and one child in Halifax, fulfilling the military and civilian 
position of Adjutant General to the Governor of Nova Scotia.  Hart’s Army Lists reveal that 
Harris remained at this post until 1834.  
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Throughout the Napoleonic period, it was common for British officers to serve as 
mercenaries commanding non-British soldiers.  During the Napoleonic Wars, British officers 
commanded soldiers in over 120 foreign regiments of varying quality including Greeks, Swiss, 
Albanians, Corsicans Serbs, and Bulgarians.127  Indeed, during the Napoleonic Peninsular 
campaigns Britain recruited, trained, equipped, and supplied officers to the Portuguese Army and 
the King’s German Legion that was, in fact, the Hanoverian Army in exile.  Moreover, after 
Napoleon’s final defeat at Waterloo, a substantial number of demobilized officers chose to offer 
their services as mercenaries in Símon Bolívar’s and José San Martín’s armies that operated 
against the Spanish in South America.  Between 1817 and 1819, when Parliament enacted the 
Foreign Enlistment Act forbidding service in foreign armies, it is estimated that some 4,000 to 
6,000 former British troops and officers served in the insurrectionist armies.128  From existent 
records, more than 1,000 British officers served Bolivar in distinctive all-European units such as 
the Albion (British) Legion, 1
st
 Battalion Venezuelan Rifles, the Venezuelan Hussars (1
st
 and 2
nd
 
regiments), and the Artillery Brigade.  Bolivar’s London representative, Luis Lopez Mendez, 
assisted by three British soldiers of fortune, Gregor MacGregor, John d’Evereaux, and Colonel 
James England were responsible in raising and equipping this mercenary force.129  Lopez knew 
that demobilization had created a large pool of trained and battle-hardened officers who were 
desperate for employment.  Moreover, British contractors were willing to sell large amounts of 
surplus military equipment at low prices.  Half-pay officers found Mendez’s offer particularly 
attractive.  Every officer who signed on received a higher rank than the one he had held during 
the Napoleonic Wars.  Furthermore, all officers were promised a pension if they were wounded, 
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they could not be transferred out of their unit without their permission, and each officer received 
£40 to outfit his kit.130  Response to Mendez’s proposition netted a substantial number of soldiers 
even though Liverpool’s government sought to downplay their involvement.  However, 
newspapers like the Times of London and the Kentish Gazette reported the success of the South 
American’s recruiting drives.  The Times reported that in the fall of 1818, General Gregory 
MacGregor recruited nearly 1500 troops from Britain and Ireland sending them by chartered 
vessels to the South American port of Margaritta.131  
Junior officers, like Gustavus Mathias Hippisley, J. A. Gillmore, Henry Wilson, Charles 
Smith, Samuel Collins, Charles Chamberlain, Daniel Florence O’Leary, Belford Hinton Wilson, 
Charles Brown, and James Rooke were especially attracted to this service because they saw little 
chance of advancement in Britain’s substantially reduced army.  Their professionalism, training, 
and combat experience changed the nature of the wars for independence in South America by 
significantly improving the insurgent’s chance for victory.132  Robert Harvey describes the 
majority of British officers who served in Bolivar’s army as a collection of stoics, idealists, and 
adventurers who provided a vital bulwark to the his officer corps.133  Illustrative of this type of 
officer was Lieutenant James Rooke.  Rooke came from a renowned family of military officers.  
His father was General James Rooke, Colonel in Chief of the 38
th
 Regiment and Member of 
Parliament for the county of Monmouth.  Through his father’s influence, the younger Rooke 
received an appointment serving as a Deputy-Assistant Adjutant General in Wellington’s Anglo-
Dutch/Belgian-German Army of 1815.  Just before the Battle of Waterloo, Rooke was attached 
to the Prince of Orange’s staff and served in this capacity until August 1815 when he received an 
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appointment as a lieutenant in the staff corps of the cavalry.134  With demobilization in 1816, the 
young lieutenant went on half-pay and subsequently joined the Venezuelan Independent Army, 
recruited by Mendez in London.  Rooke sailed to South America in late 1817.  It is likely that he 
paused long enough in St. Kitts to woo and marry his second wife, whom contemporaries 
described as a beautiful mulatto woman.  After Rooke’s arrival in Angostura in late 1817, 
Bolivar immediately placed him on his staff as an aide-de-camp.135  Rooke served with Bolivar 
during his epic crossing of the Andes in June 1819.  In the fighting that followed, Rooke 
received a mortal wound while leading the Albion Legion in skirmishes that preceded the critical 
Battle of Boyaca.  
Another significant group of officers employed overseas in the aftermath of Waterloo 
were the men who commanded units of the Honourable East India Company’s Army.  The East 
India Company was a privately held commercial company that administered, in conjunction with 
Parliament, large tracts of the Indian subcontinent.  To protect its territory and interests, the 
Company maintained three separate military forces headquartered at the administrative centers of 
Madras, Bombay, and Bengal.  Douglas M. Peers observes that the maintenance of three separate 
forces on the subcontinent was a safety measure employed by the company to forestall any 
“dangerous pan-Indian combinations.”136  Company officials believed that in the event of a 
mutiny one force could quell the other.  Nonetheless, tensions existed between the military forces 
of the three presidencies, as each offered varying rates of pay scale and promotion.  For example, 
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in the Bengal Presidency, officers often received commands that were more lucrative and given 
additional field pay while posted in their cantonments.137    
Each presidency force contained two exclusively European regiments, an artillery 
regiment, and several native infantry or sepoy regiments officered by Europeans.  Officers who 
generally entered the Company’s service came from backgrounds socially inferior to those who 
entered the regular army.  Douglas Peer’s research work on the social backgrounds of Company 
officers who served in the early decades of the nineteenth century reveals that four percent came 
from aristocracy, nineteen percent from the landed gentry, and the remainder from middling and 
professional sectors of British society.138  Furthermore, Peer’s study also indicates that many 
Company officers tended to perpetuate family tradition by following in their father and 
grandfather’s footsteps of military service.  One such military dynasty of this period was the Van 
Cortlandt-Anderson families, who had officer family members stationed in India, Canada, and 
the Cape Colony.  This military dynasty will be examined in detail in Chapter Five. 
Two other groups of officers who practiced their military craft overseas were the foreign 
military advisors and Inspecting Field Officers of Militia.  Britain supplied a small force of 
military advisors to Portugal to advise and train the Portuguese Army.  These officers fulfilled 
functions similar to today’s Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).  During the 
Peninsular campaigns 359 British officers were posted to the Portuguese Army in an advisory 
and combat capacity.139  In 1815-1816, twenty-eight British officers without regimental 
commissions remained in Portugal as advisors.140   
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One of these officers was George Henry Zühleke who served in the regular army for 
sixteen years before transferring to Portuguese service.  He achieved the rank of lieutenant 
colonel before being placed on half-pay in 1817, when Britain ended its military assistance 
program to Portugal.  Desiring military employment, Zühleke remained on the half-pay list for 
twelve years supporting a wife and one child.  His comments in his 1829 Statement for Retired 
Officers lead one to believe Zühleke had to leave Britain for Germany in order to support his 
family.141   
Inspectors of Militia were posted in Canada and the Ionian Islands at the conclusion of 
the Napoleonic Wars.  It was the duty of these officers to advise locals in the command and 
administration of their militia forces.  Canadian inspectors remained in the colony only as long as 
there was a perceived threat from the United States and by 1816, many of these officers were 
withdrawn to Britain.  The Ionian Islands, on the other hand, employed a significant contingent 
of officers from 1818 to 1830.142  During their twelve-year tenure in the Adriatic, some thirty-
four officers served as inspectors of militia.143 
The King’s Regulations and Orders for the Army 1837 does not enumerate the duties of 
the Inspector of Militia.  However, late eighteenth century inspector’s commissions note that a 
militia inspector’s principal duties consisted of forming the locals into standard military 
formations of companies and battalions.  Militiamen also received instruction in military 
discipline, regulations, and orders.  In addition to the inspecting officers, the Horse Guards 
frequently detached regimental sergeants to assist the commissioned inspectors with their 
training duties.  Lieutenant Colonel Charles Napier, who served as an Inspector of Militia in the 
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Ionian Islands for eleven years, observed to his mother that as an inspector he had few duties.  “I 
have nothing to do,” he wrote at the beginning of his posting.144   
However, military Governors often employed Inspectors of Militia to carry out additional 
military and civilian administrative duties.  During Napier’s tenure along the Adriatic coast, 
General Sir Thomas Maitland, Chief Commissioner of the Ionian Islands, utilized his 
subordinate’s talents numerous times.  In 1820, Napier operated as a military advisor to Ali 
Pasha, an insurgent on the Greek mainland fighting the Ottomans.  Napier’s plans for Ali Pasha’s 
army included the formation of “a complete artillery corps of fifty pieces, which were, with all 
appurtenances, in his magazine; and also drill and organize his troops...” which supposedly 
numbered 30,000.145  In 1822, Maitland appointed Napier as Military Resident of Cephalonia, a 
civilian/military administrative position akin to a minor governorship.  Napier described his role 
in Cephalonia as a “despotic lieutenant of a lord high commissioner.”146  In essence, the 
assignment conferred almost absolute power over the population and protected them against the 
long-established feudal oppression.147  During his six-year tenure as the Crown’s resident, Napier 
was responsible for significant improvements to the island’s infrastructure and fiscal health.  In 
his autobiography, Napier cited some of his achievements in Cephalonia:  the building of two 
market places, the construction of 100 miles of roads, 40 miles of which were blasted out of solid 
rock; a number of bridges; the founding of a girl’s school; the construction of a new prison; and 
numerous improvements to administrative buildings in local towns and villages.148  In addition to 
his construction projects, Napier also improved the fiscal health of the island reporting that 
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between 1820 and 1827 the yearly revenues averaged £32,111 with average annual expenses 
totaling £13,385.149  With great satisfaction Napier reported that each year he was able to pay into 
the general treasury at Corfu nearly £19,000. 
At the conclusion of the Napoleonic era, Britain had substantially enlarged its overseas 
empire.  For the next three decades, Britain’s military largely ignored the affairs of Europe, 
preferring to concentrate on its communication and logistic lifelines to India.  As Correlli Barnett 
observes, “the key to British foreign policy and grand strategy after 1815 was not Flanders but 
India.”150  Between 1816 and 1837, the British Army participated in thirteen major campaigns.  
Only two of these campaigns, the Portuguese Expedition, 1827-28 and the First Carlist War 
1836-1837 occurred in Europe.  Seven of the campaigns were fought in India and peripheral 
territories, three in Africa, and one each in Canada and the Persian Gulf.  The London Times 
reported that in 1823 of the  
89,426 troops under arms over one half or 48,173 were located in the colonies.151  Two years 
later the number increased significantly as Britain assembled its largest military force between 
the Waterloo and the Crimean War.152  In 1825, of the 100 regular line regiments sixty-eight were 
located in the colonies.  As such, Britain’s active and non-active military officers gravitated 
away from the traditional locus of power in Britain to colonies on the fringes of empire.  There 
they served in many capacities both military and civilian; a topic that will be examined in detail 
in later chapters. 
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Conclusion 
 The end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 brought to a close to nearly twenty-five years of 
warfare.  Although Britain was one of the principal victors, the arrival of peace created a whole 
host of new problems for the state.  Britain’s sudden shift from a wartime to a peacetime 
economy caused considerable economic distress that resulted in substantial shortfalls in revenue 
that had a significant impact on the army.  Parliament’s subsequent fiscal retrenchment mandated 
that the substantial military forces that had defeated Napoleon be immediately demobilized.  In 
the five years following the Battle of Waterloo, Parliament cut wartime troop levels by more than 
half from 1813’s wartime high of approximately 280,000 men to just under 90,000 in 1823.  
Reductions in army strength placed thousands of out of work officers and soldiers into Britain’s 
already glutted manpower pool.   
 Officers who had served with distinction during the Napoleonic Wars were particularly 
hard pressed and clamored for relief.  The Colonial Office, with the approval of Parliament, 
employed many of these officers in overseas administrative positions.  Years of campaigning in 
the Peninsular had made British Army not only a formidable military force but also a military 
experienced in policing and pacifying restive populations.  For the next three decades, British 
Army who at the end of the Napoleonic Wars was in search of a mission found one in governing 
and administering significant portions of Britain’s empire.   
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CHAPTER THREE: THE COLONIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 
 
In 1814, Patrick Colquhoun, a noted authority on statistics and criminal jurisprudence, 
published A Treatise on the Population, Wealth, Power, and Resources of the British Empire, In 
Every Quarter of the World Including the East Indies.  Like many men of his age, Colquhoun 
was self-educated and had spent his later years investigating methods to better public services.  
In fact, it was Colquhoun who suggested improvements to the London police force in methods of 
detection and arrest.1  His contemporaries characterized him as a pompous and domineering 
individual, always believing that his opinion was correct.  Colquhoun firmly believed that 
England functioned best when its subjects understood their proper place in the social hierarchy.  
During his retirement, Colquhoun endeavored to examine the British state and the future 
direction of its empire that had grown dramatically in the wake of the French wars.  In his 
treatise, Colquhoun argued that the empire offered limitless possibilities for Britain’s “redundant 
Population” of unemployed and destitute, as it provided distant prisons for banished criminals, 
guaranteed strategic interests, and, supported by a powerful marine, laid the foundations of 
global markets and trade for the century to come.2  Moreover, he noted that with prudent 
administration this empire could yield incalculable resources and wealth for the home country.   
Colquhoun specifically argued that Britain’s colonial empire offered the home country 
significant financial benefits.  In the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, Britain became the 
world’s principle provider of manufactured goods yielding enormous profits to the home 
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country.3  As evidence, Colquhoun pointed to the £15,516,605 in revenue Britain had acquired 
from colonial trade in 1812.  Moreover, the gadfly Scotsman noted that the size and scope of 
Britain’s colonial empire could easily augment any shortfalls in manufactures or resources the 
home country failed to produce.  He boasted that “the supplies to foreign countries must 
therefore be to a certain extent furnished though the medium of Great Britain….”4 
  In 1814, the extent of the global British Empire was impressive.  Eschewing continental 
territorial acquisitions at the Congress of Vienna, Britain instead collected its share of the spoils 
of war by acquiring a host of overseas French and Dutch colonies.  Colonial Office records and 
Hart’s Army Lists for the three decades following the 1814-1815 Congress of Vienna record the 
following colonies, possessions, territories, and garrison outposts administered by Britain: 
Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, St. Christopher, St. Vincent, Trinidad, Tobago, Berbice, 
Demarara, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Bahamas, Grenada, Malta, Gibraltar, Sierra Leone, the Cape of 
Good Hope, Upper Canada, Lower Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, 
Newfoundland, Bermuda, New South Wales, Van Diemen’s Land, Ceylon, Mauritius, and 
Honduras.  Although the East India Company administered India, Parliament and the Crown 
closely supervised the company’s activities.  Britain in the 1820s exerted authority over some 
200 million humans, more than one quarter of the world’s population.5   
By 1815, many influential Britons, like Colquhoun, had diverse but well-defined 
perceptions of the empire, and its place in the world.  Among the aristocracy, the gentry, and 
influential persons, service to the empire was perceived as a duty.  Colley, in her examination of 
British elites noted that headmasters and instructors inculcated public school boys with the 
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notion that they comprised a select few predestined for service to the state in either military or in 
the colonies.6  Because of their special role in society, generations of aristocratic and gentry 
males were initiated into a Spartan life that included long separations from their families in 
boarding schools, participation in exclusively male sports, and an immersion in classical 
literature that emphasized martial virtues and virile traits.  John Colborne Lord Seaton observed 
that while a student at Winchester School, he took part in a “rebellion” that included holding 
some schoolmasters hostage, barricading the building, and “hurling down stones from the 
battlements—the beginning of his military career and love of battles.”7   
British merchants and early industrialists viewed their burgeoning empire as an 
exploitable resource, both as a source of almost limitless raw materials and an almost 
inexhaustible market for finished goods.  Eric J. Evans, in his examination of Britain’s early 
industrial growth, argues that British territorial acquisitions at the Congress of Vienna were of 
enormous value when measured against the budding Industrial Revolution’s need for global 
markets.  The overseas possessions of Malta in the Mediterranean; Ghana, Tobago, and St. Lucia 
in the West; and the Cape of Good Hope in Africa took on strategic importance in protecting 
avenues of commerce for British goods.8  As early as 1793, Prime Minister William Pitt the 
Younger noted that the strategic importance of the Cape Colony in securing the trade route to 
India was as important as Gibraltar in protecting British commerce in the Mediterranean.9  In 
addition to the important Indian routes the commercial ties to South America were vital.  Eric 
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Hobsbawm observes that during the Napoleonic period, Latin America depended entirely on 
British imports and after those Spanish and Portuguese colonies broke with the home country, 
they “became an almost total economic dependency to Britain.”10  By 1820, South America 
imported more than a quarter more of English textiles than that of Europe.11  The importance of 
British overseas trade and the protection of their commercial sea-lanes were evident in the Royal 
Navy’s fleet distribution and force allocation in the early nineteenth century.  In  1808, the East 
India/Cape squadron consisted of forty-six ships including ten ships of the line, nineteen frigates, 
and seventeen smaller craft; the West-Indies squadron boasted forty-one ships consisting of six 
ships of the line, thirteen frigates, and a like number of sloops: while in comparison, the 
Mediterranean Fleet consisted of twenty-nine ships of the line, twenty-six frigates, and twenty-
nine smaller vessels.12  Indeed, in 1814, Colquhoun recognized the importance of British produce 
and manufactures arguing that exported goods to areas of the world excluding Europe accounted 
for newly two thirds of all exported goods.13  British products exported abroad amounted to 
£34.2 millions in 1814 and £42.9 millions in 1815.  In 1836, Whig member of Parliament and 
author, William Wolryche Whitmore, testified before a Parliamentary committee that England 
enjoyed an “industrious and pretty well employed” labor force largely because of its 
manufactures and commerce.  Moreover, he continued, that “Since the peace of 1815, … 
manufactures and commerce of the nation have made unexampled strides.”14  The state actively 
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encouraged these entrepreneurs recognizing that flourishing economies in both the home country 
and the colonies sustained employment and assured the financial independence of the British 
treasury and the taxpayer alike.15   
Humanitarians and devout Christians viewed the empire as fertile ground for acquiring 
new souls for Christ.  Missionaries were the principal agents who spread the faith but emigrants, 
merchants, officials, and military personnel as well acted as proselytizers.  William Wilberforce, 
a member of Parliament, declared in 1813 that Christian missionary in work in India was “the 
greatest of all causes” because “our religion is sublime, pure and beneficent [and] theirs is mean, 
licentious and cruel.”16  Some three decades earlier, in 1786, William Knox, a member of the 
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel and Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies regarded 
the role of missionaries in the colonies in a more pragmatic secular light noting that Christianity 
served as “the best Security that Great Britain can have for their Fidelity and attachment to her 
Constitution and Interests.”17   Many influential elites agreed that Christianity was an essential 
element in binding the diverse populations to the empire by reinforcing authority and promoting 
social order.18  Moreover, the disorganized measures of conversion common in the eighteenth 
century were discontinued by fresh newer methodical means in the colonies.  Chief among the 
proponents of these changed policies were British Evangelicals who contributed substantially to 
the propagation and growth of a number of missionary societies.  These included William 
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Carey’s Baptist Missionary Society, the Church of Scotland’s Church Missionary Society, the 
London Missionary Society, and a revitalized Wesleyan Missionary Society.   
Missionaries, however, made uneven progress in Christianizing colonial populations.  
Beginning in the eighteenth century, the accepted belief in the free trade of goods within the 
empire led to a similar conviction about the importance of a free trade in religious beliefs and 
practices.19  Competition was considerable among Christian denominations for converts in the 
colonies.  Anglicans, Methodists, and Baptists made significant inroads among the largely black 
population in the West Indies, gathering major followings.  Both Jamaica and Trinidad boasted 
substantial Protestant congregations.  In the Cape Colony, from 1799 on, the London Missionary 
Society, whose sole concern was “to spread the knowledge of Christ among heathen and 
unenlightened nations,” concentrated its efforts there.20  Under the three-decade leadership of Dr. 
John Philip, superintendent of the London Missionary Society in South Africa, successive Cape 
Colony governors either damned him or praised him for his work among the Hottentots and 
Griquas.21  It was not until the Cape Colony’s administration of Governor Benjamin D’Urban’s 
that significant missionary activity took place among the Xhosas.  Colonial officials and 
missionaries alike discovered that Christianizing the native populations of South Africa was not 
an easily accomplished task.  As John Galbraith points out, Europeans were only partially 
successful in converting the various tribes of the Cape Colony.  Tribesmen and chiefs alike only 
adopted Christianity for the short-term temporal benefits and frequently reverted back to their 
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traditional beliefs once the missionaries moved on.22  For the most part, the various tribal people 
of South Africa viewed the theology of the western missionaries as an alien and unwelcome 
doctrine that sought to subvert their traditional way of life.  The situation in Australia was similar 
to that of South Africa.  Missionaries embarked to work in the colony, but their primary task was 
ministering to the needs of the transported convicts.  The first governor of New South Wales, 
Arthur Philip was instructed not to Christianize the Aborigines.23  As a result, in the first decades 
of the nineteenth century, missionary activity in the colony was limited solely to the European 
population.  It was not until the 1820s that the Wesleyan Missionary Society undertook a 
significant effort to evangelize the Aborigine population.  However, Christianizing efforts among 
the Aborigines, like those of Wesleyan William Walker and William Shelly, were ambivalent.  
While the successes of these men were severely limited, the attempts at conversion were another 
instance of British missionaries who believed  that Christianity was also a civilizing force.   
British middle and working classes had mixed perceptions of the empire.  On the one 
hand, the scope and extent of the empire evoked pride, but with this sentiment came a measure of 
uncertainty.  Colley argues that a significant portion of the British populace debated the status of 
the empire’s recently acquired inhabitants.  Their primary concern centered on the rights of the 
colonists and responsibilities the home islands had toward their colonial dependents.  Were these 
newly acquired populations to be accorded the same rights and privileges as freeborn Britons?24  
Involved in this issue were a whole host of supplementary and complex questions that included 
the ethics of economic dependency, the principles of equal rights, and the question of racial 
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differences.25  Edmund Burke, a member of the emerging middle class, argued in Parliament that 
Providence bestowed on Britain a trusteeship of a considerable portion of the globe.26  Moreover, 
he argued that it was imperative that all Britons had a moral obligation toward the well being of 
its dependent populations.  Burke’s viewpoint was rooted in his belief that England’s greatness 
and power came from the patriarchal benevolence of the distinguished landed families who had 
been the kingdom’s source of authority and prosperity for centuries.  Just as the gentry had taken 
care of their tenants now Britain must take care of their colonial populations.   
While philosophical and ethical questions concerning empire occupied the debates of 
educated Britons, the ordinary citizen was well aware of the benefits they accrued from the 
colonies.  For more than a century, the political and commercial union of Scotland, England, and 
Wales gave all of the kingdoms equitable trading rights with the colonies.  Now goods 
transshipped from the colonies to Britain would require only one payment of customs duties.  
Trade and Navigation Accounts from the early nineteenth century Financial Accounts reveal that 
Britons imported substantial quantities of coffee, tea, sugar, wine, raw cotton, timber, and silk 
from their colonial possessions.  In the 1820s, the British imported nearly £29 millions in coffee, 
more than £31 millions in tea, and £61 and a half millions in sugar.27  Briton’s passion for tea 
was so great that in 1784, it prompted a French visitor to write “throughout the whole of England 
the drinking of tea is general ….The humblest peasant has his tea twice a day just like the rich 
man; the total consumption is immense.”28   
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However, tea was not the only consumer good in high demand by the British population.  
The spice trade of the east was highly prized by the Dutch and the British, and competition for 
these culinary treasures was intense.  Cinnamon in particular, found primarily in Ceylon, 
Malabar, Java, Sumatra, and other East Indian locales was greatly sought after by westerners.29  
However, only Ceylon produced the spice in any quantity.  Colquhoun noted in his 1815 treatise 
that the cultivation of cinnamon appeared to be confined to Ceylon because attempts at growing 
it in Malabar, Batavia, and the Isle of France had failed.30  Eighteenth-century physicians 
believed cinnamon to have both internal and external curative properties.  In 1729, noted 
Amsterdam druggist Albertus Seba wrote of the spice’s medicinal qualities, observing that it 
“expels wind, and hath been found of great Use in arthritick [sic] and gouty Disorders: It is also a 
Diuretick [sic].”31  Some twenty-five years after Seba’s pronouncements, Taylor White, a Fellow 
of the Royal Society, noted that the increased demand for cinnamon by Britons had caused the 
price to rise significantly.32  In 1783, French foreign minister, Vergennes noted that British 
designs on Ceylon were linked primarily to breaking the Netherlands’s lucrative Indian Ocean 
cinnamon trade.33 Geoffrey Powell argues that the richness of the Ceylonese soil and the efficient 
[farm] management by the Dutch became an alluring target for British acquisition during the 
American War of Independence.34  The cinnamon trade remained important to the island until the 
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mid-nineteenth century, when demand for coffee caused many planters to switch to the 
production of that crop.   
Britons derived significant economic and political benefits from their global empire.  The 
empire, however, was not a homogeneous entity.  Modern scholars, such as Vincent T. Harlow, 
Mark Nadis, John Bowle, and Alfred Leroy Burt have divided the empire into two entities based 
on chronology, geography, political institutions, race, and ethnicity.  The original colonies, or 
First British Empire, comprised lands acquired prior to the American War of Independence and 
consisted primarily of possessions in the western hemisphere.  These colonies consisted of the 
thirteen North American colonies, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, the Island of St. John or Prince 
Edward Island, Rupert’s Land, the Province of Quebec, the West Indian islands of Jamaica, 
Barbados, most of the Leeward Islands with the most important consisting of Antigua, Dominica, 
and St. Christopher (better known as St. Kitts), Bermuda, a foothold in India, and some small 
trading stations in West Africa.  The English settled many of these lands in the second and third 
quarter of the seventeenth century.35  Only Jamaica, some of the smaller West Indian islands, the 
West African stations, and territory in India became English possessions by conquest.  Helen 
Taft Manning divides the First Colonial Empire into four classes: the Old West Indies and 
Bermuda; the Ceded Islands of the West Indies; Nova Scotia and its dependencies, New 
Brunswick, and Bermuda; and the Province of Quebec.36 While these colonies were a diverse 
group, they displayed certain commonalities.  During the seventeenth century, Western European 
Christians settled in all of the colonies located in the Western Hemisphere.  Indeed, the Old West 
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Indies contained a substantial Anglo-Saxon population.37  Many of these colonies enjoyed a 
considerable measure of self-government.  Even those colonies ceded by France in the Treaty of 
1763 received assembly-like legislatures similar to those in the Old West Indies.  Manning notes 
that by 1784, existing colonial governments had assumed a fixed form with a constitution that 
provided for a governor, an appointed council, and a representative assembly who shared the 
power of taxation and legislation.38  Traditional common law precedence and constitutional 
guarantees similar to that of England’s 1689 Settlement were bestowed on each of these colonies 
allowing their legislatures wide latitude in their ability to tax and dispense funds.  Moreover, 
time and distance from the home islands limited the extent of the Crown’s prerogative powers 
over these colonies.  
Through conquest and treaty, the Second British Empire was born at the conclusion of 
the Napoleonic Wars.  Most of the newly acquired territories were located in the Eastern 
Hemisphere.  In addition to this increase in territory and population came what Mark Nadis 
called “a changing Imperial climate.”39  By this, he meant that there occurred a noteworthy 
bifurcation of the empire, which consisted of a group of long held self-governing European 
settlements and new collection of mostly non-white dependencies.40  The lone exceptions to non-
European territories of the British Second Empire were the penal colonies of the Antipodes, 
Malta, and the Ionian Islands.  Britain obtained many of these new territories as strategic 
waypoints to protect its vital sea links to India.  During the first half of the nineteenth century, a 
substantial number of these strategic waypoints grew in size as fear of foreign invasion caused 
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Britain to annex adjacent lands creating buffer zones.41  Some notable examples of turbulent 
frontiers that required pacification were Robert Brownrigg’s Second Kandyan War (1814-1816), 
Charles McCarthy’s First Ashanti War (1824-1831), Charles Metcalf’s First Burmese War 
(1823-1826), Harry Smith’s Xhosa Campaign (1835), and Charles Napier’s conquest of Sind 
(1843).  These wars of security caused the unplanned expansion of Britain’s imperial domain.   
Also problematic was incorporation of British cultural and institutional practices with the 
long-standing social, religious, and political patterns of the captive state.  With their well-
developed sense of national identity and purpose Britons frequently sought to wipe away existing 
institutions in their Asian and African domains with little forethought for the subsequent 
consequences and difficulties that soon arose in the colonies of South Africa, Ceylon, and the 
Indian Presidencies.  Colonial administrators faced a Gordian Knot of problems in each of these 
colonies by attempting to replace traditional Dutch institutions with newly inaugurated British 
ones.  For example, in 1806, the British administrative authority in the Cape Colony was forced 
to grapple with two particularly nettlesome problems.  The first was the question of land tenure 
and the second was an economy based on the inconvertible rixdollar.42  Both of these issues 
would take generations before they were resolved.  It was not until Sir John Francis Cradock’s 
land regulations of 1813, and the Rippon land regulations of 1832 that the issues of land sales 
and distribution were ultimately solved.43  The question of converting currency use from 
rixdollars to British pounds was also thorny.  Since the seventeenth century, the colony’s 
monetary system was linked to that of the greater Dutch global empire.  As a consequence, a 
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large variety of coins, all in silver and all easily convertible, were in circulation.  In 1782, during 
the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, a disruption in the silver supply caused the Cape Colonists to 
abandon the metallic basis of their currency and issue unsecured paper money.  When Britain 
acquired the colony in 1806, the rixdollar remained the currency of the colony.  However, the 
steady devaluation of the currency and whose inability to be integrated into their world wide 
empire caused London, in 1825, to make South Africa, along with all other British territories 
dependent on the pound sterling.  Foreign currency, however, remained in circulation within the 
empire for a considerable length of time.  The army used much of this coinage to stock their 
overseas military chests.  A January 24, 1834 Colonial Office circular advised all colonies to 
send supplies of coins, especially those of the new South American states, to the treasury to be 
assayed for “gross weight, purity of metal, and degree of fineness” in order to standardize public 
outlays by the home country.44   
India and Ceylon also presented a myriad of difficulties for the British imperial 
administrators as they attempted to replace traditional ways of life and methods of governance 
with western institutions.  Initially, the East India Company and its bureaucrats coexisted with 
the native population, rarely interfering with local traditions and customs.  For most of the 
eighteenth century, the Company directors located in Leadenhall Street in the City of London 
were primarily interested in domestic tranquility and procuring an unending stream of revenues.  
John Keay observes that Company men of the eighteenth century displayed a genuine respect for 
Indian traditions and institutions, which they regarded as time-tested and superior to that of their 
own society.45  This notion, however, changed during the post-Napoleonic period markedly with 
the growth of utilitarianism, evangelicalism, and responsible government.  Noteworthy changes 
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that negated previous policies included the 1813 amendment to Company’s charter to allow 
Christian missionaries to establish themselves in Company territories, the official British policy 
to disparage Hinduism, and Lord William Bentinck’s replacement of Indian social, educational, 
and political institutions with those of the west.   
Ceylon was another territory that had a British administration grafted onto an ancient 
non-western culture.  Portions of the island were conquered and occupied by both the Portuguese 
and the Dutch and contained vestiges of these states’ administrations.  The unsuccessful 
management by the Madras Presidency compelled the Colonial Office to take control of colonial 
administration in 1802.  The chief executive office of the colony was a Crown appointed 
governor who held his office for an undetermined amount of time.  In 1828, a term of six years 
was set, as it was determined that the climate was unhealthy for a lengthy tenure.  Ceylon’s 
governors held a variety of wide ranging and absolute powers in both the Legislative and 
Executive branches, or as directions from the Colonial Office noted that the colony’s governance 
was “vested in the Governor alone, subject to revision and confirmation or rejection at Home.”46   
The governor received advice and assistance in governing from an advisory council consisting of 
the Chief Justice, the commanding officer of troops, the Principal Secretary to Government, and 
two other officials nominated by the Governor.47   A Ceylonese Civil Service, modeled after the 
Indian Civil Service, assisted this hierarchy.  Although specifically banned by the Colonial 
Office, a number of British military officers frequently filled vacancies in Civil Service 
                                                 
46 PRO, C.O. 54.5; Mar. 13; C.O.55, 61: North’s Commission and Instructions, dated 1801; quoted in 
Lennox A. Mills, Ceylon Under British Rule, 1795-1932; With An Account of the East India Company’s Embassies 
to Kandy, 1762-1795 (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1964), 41. 
47 Conflicts between the colony’s first Governor Frederick North and the military commander Major 
General David D. Wemyss prompted the Colonial Office to combine the duties of Governor and commander in 
chief. With the appointment of the colony’s second governor General, Sir Thomas Maitland, the Colonial Office 
began a trend that continued in the colony into the 1840s.  See E.F.C. Ludowyk, A Short History of Ceylon (New 
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), 135-169; and Lennox A. Mills, Ceylon Under British Rule, 41-58. 
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positions.  Many of these posts were located in the recently pacified province of Kandy.  The 
correspondence of Lieutenant General Sir Robert Brownrigg, Governor of Ceylon between 1811 
and 1820, disclose the myriad of duties and issues administrators faced.  Brownrigg, as both 
chief executive and military commander, faced issues as diverse as waging a quasi-guerrilla war 
against the Kandyans, allocating funds for the half-pay of retiring officers, preparing monthly 
returns for garrisoned troops, building and maintaining a road system, overseeing the postal 
system, the collection of revenue, dispensing justice, treating with local chiefs, and determining 
the facing colors of the 2
nd
 Ceylonese Regiment.48  In many instances, British governors and 
administrative personnel often were unacquainted with the traditions and ways of life and 
frequently displayed an insensitivity that offended the local populations.  Doctor John Davy, a 
physician posted to Ceylon and a chronicler of Brownrigg’s tenure, noted that the Ceylonese: 
…now … were inferior to every civilian in our service—to every officer in the army.  
Though officially treated with respect, it was only officially; a common soldier passed a 
proud Kandyan chief with as little attention as he would a fellow of the lowest caste.  
Thus they considered themselves degraded and shorn of their splendor.
49
  
 
British rule on the island remained autocratic until 1848, when Governor George Byng, seventh 
Viscount Torrington, set in motion a series of reforms that enlarged the franchise.   
Despite the apparent difficulties of administering the non-western colonies, British 
military men clamored for colonial positions upon the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars.  The 
pool of eligible and qualified officers was substantial and competition for positions was fierce.  
The Colonial Office established that only general officers were entitled to colonial 
governorships.  However, there were exceptions for some of the smaller minor and unhealthy 
                                                 
48 PRO, C.O. Public Dispatches upon Military Subjects.  
49 John Davy, An Account of the Interior of Ceylon, 2 Vols. London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and 
Brown, 1821), 326-27. 
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stations.50  An 1825 letter from Robert W. Hay, Permanent Under Secretary of State for War and 
the Colonies, to Lord Fitzroy, James Henry Somerset, military secretary at the Horse Guards 
acknowledges Lieutenant Colonel Dixon Denham’s appointment as lieutenant governor of Sierra 
Leone.  Denham’s career record indicates that he joined the service as a lieutenant in the 23
rd
 
Royal Welsh Fusiliers in 1811.  He served with distinction with the Welsh Fusiliers during the 
Peninsular War and later with the 54
th
 Regiment at Waterloo.51  After the war, he transferred to 
the 64
th
 Regiment in 1819 and with the subsequent army reductions found himself on half-pay 
with the 3
rd
 Regiment in fall of 1821.  One month later Denham received the promotion to the 
rank of major when he volunteered to lead an expedition to Africa with naval officer Captain 
Hugh Clapperton and navy surgeon Dr. Walter Oudney.  Between 1822-1824, Denham’s 
expedition explored and mapped areas of Africa south of the Sahara Desert near Lake Chad and 
along the Waube, Logone, and Shari Rivers.  From extant correspondence, it is known that 
Denham was acquainted with Wellington.  In the summer of 1825, Denham shot and killed 
several lions and other African wildlife, the skins of which he sent to the Duke of Wellington.52  
In 1828, as a reward for his African service, Denham received a lieutenant colonel’s commission 
and an appointment as lieutenant governor of Sierra Leone.  He held the position for five weeks 
before dying of fever.   
                                                 
50 Information on British settlements located o the west coast of Africa was extremely limited as evidenced 
by a note written on the back of Lieutenant Colonel Dixon Denham’s letter of appointment.  Lord Fitzroy Somerset 
made the notation “Has the Quartermaster General any map of our settlements on the coast of Africa.  If not, I think 
we borrowed one a short time ago from the Colonial Office.  What became of that?  If it was sent back, get again 
and collect such papers as may enable the Commander in Chief to draw instructions for Lieutenant Colonel 
Lumley.”  See WP1/505/1/2 Letter from R.W. Hay to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, December 4, 1827. 
51 Charles Dalton, The Waterloo Roll Call (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1971), 239-41. 
52 WP 1/821/5 Letter from Major Denham to Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington, sending a copy of 
the route he traveled in Africa and describing the skins of a lion and other animals he has for the Duke, June 20, 
1825. 
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Another colonel who received a senior colonial administrative position was Sir Charles 
Macarthy who, in 1822, administered all of the British settlements on the west coast of Africa.  J. 
W. Fortescue notes that Macarthy descended from an old Irish family that had taken refuge in 
France.53  When the revolution broke out, Macarthy fled France and offered his services to 
Britain.  The young officer first served in the West Indies, and then attained a captaincy in the 
52
nd
 under Sir John Moore at Shorncliffe.  In 1804, Macarthy became a major in the New 
Brunswick Fencibles, a Canadian unit that recruited backwoodsmen from New Brunswick, Nova 
Scotia, and Lower Canada.  He transferred to African service in 1811, receiving a lieutenant 
colonelcy in the Royal African Corps.  For the rest of his life he remained in Africa 
administering Crown territories and assisting in the suppression of the slave trade.  As a reward 
for his services, Macarthy received a knighthood.  In January 1824, he was killed along with 177 
men in his command while attempting to stem an Ashanti attack on Crown territory.  With the 
death of Macarthy, the Crown transferred its powers back to a mercantile corporation who 
administered the Gold Coast until 1843, when the government again regained control.54 
In the years following Waterloo, Colonial Secretary Henry Bathurst established an 
official policy that considered only general officers for senior colonial administrative positions.55  
In 1821, Colonel John Cameron applied to the Colonial Office for an overseas appointment to 
administer one of the islands in the West Indies.  Bathurst denied his request because he 
considered the applicant’s rank was not commensurate with the available position.  Parliament 
reaffirmed Bathurst’s policy in 1830 when it directed that only military men holding the rank of 
                                                 
53 J. W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army, Vol. XI, 1815-1838 (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 
1923), 373. 
54 James Marshall, “On the Natives of the Gold Coast,” in  The Journal of the Anthropological Institute of 
Great Britain and Ireland, Vol. 16 (1887), 180-182. 
55  WP1/677/6, Copy of a letter from Lord Fitzroy Somerset to Henry Goulburn, asking for him once again 
to draw the name of Major General John Cameron to the attention of Lord Bathurst for consideration for the 
command of one of the islands in the West Indies,” 16 August 1821. 
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major general or lieutenant general were eligible to administer or serve as governors for all of the 
major colonies.56 Bathurst and a majority of the members in Parliament believed that awarding 
important colonial administrative positions to deserving general officers was a means of 
rewarding them for their long and distinguished service.  In 1815, there were 550 general officers 
on active service.57  Eighteen years later, in 1833, the number stood at 417, because of death, 
retirement, and resignation.58  Hart’s A List of the Officers of the Army and Royal Marines on 
Full, Half-Pay, and Retired with Index for the decade of the 1820s notes eighteen territories and 
colonies that required military postings.59 An August 1827 memorandum from Sir Herbert 
Taylor, Deputy Secretary at War to the Duke of Wellington on British forces serving in foreign 
stations, exclusive of India, notes that British troops garrisoned fifteen locations worldwide.60  
Moreover, an 1833 Parliamentary index of garrisons on foreign stations lists thirty-three overseas 
posts that included governorships, lieutenant governorships, and substantial military garrisons.  
The Colonial Office, for the period 1820 to 1835, lists twenty-seven territories under colonial 
jurisdiction excluding the East India Company’s presidencies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay.61   
                                                 
56  Ibid. 
57 House of Commons, “Report from the Select Committee on Army and Navy Appointments with Minutes 
of Evidence,” British Parliamentary Papers, 1833 (650) Vol. VII, Minutes of Evidence, June 24, 1833, 2552. 
58 Ibid., 2553.  
59 Territories and colonies with military commands administered by Great Britain include Ireland, the 
Mediterranean, the Ionian Islands, Gibraltar, North America, Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, St. John’s 
Newfoundland, West Indies, Jamaica, Bahamas, the East Indies, Madras, the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, Isle of 
France or Mauritius, and St. Helena.  
60 Territories and colonies with substantial military garrisons mentioned in the memorandum consisted of 
Gibraltar, the Leeward Islands, Jamaica, the Bahamas, Honduras, Canada, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, Bermuda, 
New South Wales, the Ionian Island, Malta, Sierra Leone and dependencies, Mauritius, and Ceylon. See WP1/895/4 
Letter from Sir Herbert Taylor to Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington, sending a paper on the British forces 
serving in foreign stations, 4 August 1827. 
61 Territories and colonies as listed in the 1820s Colonial Appointments (PRO:C.O. 325/20) consisting of 
Gibraltar, Malta, the Ionian Islands, the Cape of Good Hope, Sierra Leone, Ceylon, New South Wales, Van Diemens 
Land, Lower Canada, Upper Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward’s Island, Newfoundland, 
Bermuda, Jamaica, Honduras,  Bahamas, Barbados, Grenada, St. Vincent, Tobago, Antigua, Montserrat, St. Lucia, 
Mauritius, and the Seychelles.  
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Regardless of the variation in numbers, there were a finite number of colonial positions 
available.  Moreover, more than 400 general officers had the high rank that the colonial office 
required for senior administrative positions.  Sir Willoughby Gordon’s June 19, 1833 testimony 
before a Parlimentary committee is revealing.  When the committee posed this question: 
“Although the number of general officers in the British army appears to exceed 400, are there not 
a considerable proportion of those general officers who are merely receiving the regimental pay 
of lieutenant colonel or some inferior pay, with the title of major general?”  Gordon answered, “I 
understand that the very large proportion of the general officers of the army are in fact lieutenant 
colonels of regiments, and as lieutenant colonels and upon the establishment of their regiments, 
and in order to make those regiments more effective, they were removed from them with the pay 
of lieutenant colonel, and on that pay they now stand.”62  Gordon then produced a detailed 
accounting of general officers that received reduced pay that read: 
 
Number of General Officers receiving on the Amount of the Pay of their Regimental Rank, when 
promoted to the Rank of General Officer, c. 1833. 
1 General, 
3 Lieutenant-generals, 
10 Major-generals  
33 Major-generals, as lieutenant-colonels of infantry. 
  1 Major-generals, as lieutenant-colonels of cavalry. 
72 Major-generals, who were on half pay, when promoted. 
____ 
120 
13 Major-generals, who were removed from the Foot Guards [in 1821,1825 and 1830] 
____ 
13363 
 
Along with the competition for a colonial position was the intense lobbying by general 
officer applicants for the particularly prestigious and well-paying colonial posts.  While the 
Colonial Office never published a ranking of colonial positions it was common knowledge that 
                                                 
62 Sir Willoughby Gordon, June 19, 1836, “Report from the Select Committee on  the Establishment of the 
Garrisons and On the Pay and Emoluments of  Army and Navy Officers with Minutes of Evidence and Appendix , 
Military and Naval (Irish University Press Series), (Shannon, Ireland: Irish University Press, 1969), 184. 
63 Ibid. June 19, 1836, 2203. 
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posts in West Africa and some of the smaller islands in the West Indies, that were inherently 
unhealthy places, ranked near the bottom of the colonial posting pecking order.  Ireland, while 
not technically a colony, and India under the direction of the East India Company ranked at the 
top of the most sought after colonial postings.  Strategically important and economically valuable 
colonies paid significantly larger salaries.  Noteworthy was the colony of Jamaica that offered a 
generous salary.  Jamaica, however, was an extremely unhealthy colony but the center of 
Britain’s lucrative sugar industry.  The governor received £ 8,000 to £10,000 annually, the chief 
justice £5,810.3, principal secretary £3,000, and the provost marshal  £2,100, for the period 1828 
to 1831.64   
Comparisons of the two yearly columns in Table A.4 disclose a number of revealing 
points.  However, both columns are incomplete; Colonial Office marginalia note that salary 
accounts received late were not included in the published form.  For example, column three does 
not list salaries for Jamaica, the Bahamas, Tobago, Montserrat, St. Lucia, the Ionian Islands, and 
the Seychelles, while column four does not list the administrator’s salaries for Dominica, St. 
Christopher, Trinidad, Demarara, or for the lieutenant governor of Lower Canada.  In addition, 
salaries fluctuated relative to their financial and strategic value to the empire.  Sierra Leone, for 
example, paid its lieutenant governor a modest £2000 annually.  Located on the margins of the 
empire, Sierra Leone had little to commend itself.  Expenses in maintaining a colony of the west 
coast of Africa frequently outweighed economic benefits.  Even the Duke of Wellington realized 
this when he noted in August 1828, that government expenses in Sierra Leone exceeded its worth 
to the mother country.65  The Colonial Office paid the lieutenant governor of New Brunswick 
                                                 
64 PRO, C.O. 325/20. 
65 WP1/951/42, Copy of a letter from Arthur Wellesley, to W. Allen setting out the reasons why it would be 
impossible to institute the economies suggested by Allen in Sierra Leone, August 26, 1828. 
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£1500 annually, a salary barely adequate given governors’ expenses that included providing food 
for his staff and guests.  The governor was also expected to personally pay the living expenses of 
his aides 
Also notable was the diminution of governor’s salary at the Cape Colony.  The 
excessiveness and profligacy of the administration of Lord Charles Henry Somerset, Governor of 
the Cape Colony, may have played a role in the Colonial Office’s desire to tighten its purse 
strings.  Somerset, appointed to the governorship in 1814, was a high-Tory favorite of the Prince 
of Wales who learned habits of extravagance while carousing with his royal friend at Brighton.66  
Somerset, a military man, advanced largely because of his birth and royal patronage.  He 
received his governorship because his prior post as Joint Paymaster at the Horse Guards had 
been eliminated.  Somerset’s notable achievements as governor of the Cape Colony were 
formalizing a system of fox hunting and spending £28,000 of public money renovating his estate 
at Newlands.  Moreover, the Colonial Office expected its colonies to help shoulder the burden of 
its upkeep; in the Cape Colony as in Sierra Leone expenses frequently exceeded income.  Robert 
Ross notes that, between 1807 and 1835 there were only three years when Cape Colony exports 
exceeded imports making the colony’s deficit larger than the volume exports itself.67  
Despite the excessive expenses, physical hardships, and unhealthy climates of many of 
the colonies, military men fortunate enough to secure a colonial appointment were often assured 
prestige and financial security if they carried out their duties professionally and competently.  
Years of honorable military and colonial service frequently culminated in a governorship of a 
strategically or economically important colony.  As the salaries on Table A.4 reveal, many of the 
                                                 
66 J.B. Peires, “The British and the Cape, 1814-1834,” in The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-
1840; Richard Elphick and Hermann Giliomee, eds. ((Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1988), 
473. 
67 Robert Ross, “The Cape of Good Hope and the World Economy, 1652-1835,” in The Shaping of South 
African Society, 257. 
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major colonies paid handsome salaries.  Attainment of this goal required administrators to climb 
the hierarchical ladder that often meant working many years in minor colonies.  Throughout its 
existence, the Colonial Office never issued a formal table of rank among the colonies.  However, 
from existing correspondence all involved in the process understood that a hierarchy of colonies 
existed.   
From July to November 1819, correspondence between Lieutenant General Sir Stapleton 
Cotton Lord Combermere and the Duke of Wellington reveal that this hierarchy existed.  In July 
1819, Combermere, the governor and commander-in-chief of British forces in Barbados, 
reported to Wellington that he would accept the proffered governorship of Ceylon, should that 
position become vacant noting “as in the first place the climate, society, as well as the 
respectability of Ceylon are much before Barbadoes [sic], and in the second place there may be 
less difficulty in my getting (with your assistance) the government of Madras upon Mr. Elliott’s 
retiring.”68  One week later, Combermere wrote to the Duke requesting his advice on the Ceylon 
appointment observing “the distance certainly is very great, and I shall be thrown on one side if I 
go there, but the question whether I am likely to be employed in the event of anything happening 
nearer home (which does not seem probable) and whether by refusing the government and 
command now offered to me I shall not forfeit my claim to any other.”  Furthermore, later in this 
same letter, Combermere points out that the governorship of Ceylon is worth £12000 a year, 
which is considerably more than his present post, and feels that it would be wrong to refuse the 
position unless he receives a more lucrative offer.69  When Combermere’s Ceylon appointment 
did not immediately materialize, he wrote to Wellington requesting an alternate posting as 
                                                 
68 WP1/628/9. Letter from Lord Combermere to Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington, reporting his 
acceptance of the governorship and command at Ceylon, should it become vacant, as a first step towards a post at 
Madras, July 15, 1819. 
69  WP1/628/15, Letter from Lord Combermere to Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington, about his 
appointment to the governorship and command of the army in Ceylon, July 24, 1819. 
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Governor of the Cape of Good Hope or in Canada where the death of the Duke of Richmond 
created a vacancy.  Combermere ends his letter writing “Either of these governments would be 
preferable to that of Ceylon.”70  Two years later, in November 1821 Combermere again wrote to 
Wellington asking that he again use his influence in securing him either a position in Ireland or a 
colonial governorship.71  
Besides correspondence and salaries, other important considerations assist the researcher 
in gauging the relative importance of each colony.  One of these indicators was worldwide 
distribution of the Royal Navy’s assets and the British Army’s allocation of troops overseas, 
revealing the comparative strategic and economic importance of the colonies to Britain.  During 
the Napoleonic Wars, the Royal Navy was tasked with three specific missions: making the 
country safe from invasion, protecting its trade routes, and defending the colonies.72  For most of 
the period, the Royal Navy’s primary mission was to contain and defeat the formidable French 
navy and its sometime cobelligerents Spain, Denmark, and the United States.  Concurrent with 
this task was the protection of its logistical and communication sea-lanes with its colonies.  C. J. 
Bartlett points out that the Royal Navy, unlike any other navy, needed to construct a fleet to meet 
any number of contingencies.73   In order to defeat France, the bulk of Britain’s navy was 
concentrated primarily in the English Channel and the Mediterranean with smaller contingents 
protecting the colonial lifelines.  When the wars with France ended in 1815, the Royal Navy’s 
priorities changed markedly; thereafter they emphasized stationing British ships in distant waters 
                                                 
70  WP1/634/9, Letter from Lord Combermere to Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington, about the 
possibility of Combermere’s appointment as Governor of Ceylon or of the Cape of Good Hope or in Canada, 
November 6, 1819. 
71 WP1/685/11, Letter from Lord Combermere to Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington, concerning 
the likelihood of his appointment to the staff in Ireland, and, in his absence, asking the Duke to put his name forward 
to Lord Bathurst for any possibility of a colonial governorship, November 12, 1821.  
72 T. O. Lloyd, The British Empire, 1558-1983 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 138. 
73 C. J. Bartlett, Great Britain and Sea Power, 1815-1853 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 34. 
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such as the Cape of Good Hope, South American stations, and the Pacific (See Table A.5).  
Related to this development was the diminution of naval strength in the English Channel and the 
Mediterranean.  For example, in Malta, the number of British engineer officers posted there can 
measure the relative importance of post as a strategic base.74 In 1814, Malta had five engineering 
officers working on the harbor and its surrounding defenses, the number increased to seven in 
1818, and by 1830 the number assigned to the harbor facilities was reduced to four.75   
  After 1815, the Royal Navy established permanent naval bases throughout the world 
that included Bermuda, Jamaica, Trinidad, Tobago, St. Lucia, Corfu, the Ionian Islands, the Cape 
of Good Hope, Trincomalee, the Seychelles, Singapore, and the Chagos Archipelago.  In 1792, 
there were fifty-four ships of various types serving in foreign stations; in 1817 there were sixty-
three, and in 1836 there were 104.76  Moreover, the construction records of the Royal Navy in the 
decades following the Napoleonic Wars indicate that there was a significant increase in the 
building of smaller classes of ships, which were better suited for long-term patrolling on foreign 
station.  In the decades of the 1820s and 30s, Britain tended to build ships generally of the third 
and fifth rate.77 For example, between 1815 and 1825, the Royal Navy constructed twenty-six 
new ships of the line, sixteen of which were the smaller third rates.78  During the same period, 
twenty-two fifth-rates that were generally configured as large frigates were launched compared 
                                                 
74 Quentin Hughes, Britain in the Mediterranean & the Defence of Her Naval Stations (Liverpool, England: 
Quentin Hughes, 1981), 130. 
75 Ibid.  
76 Ibid., 55. 
77 Royal Navy ships were classified on a rating system.  First rates were three-deckers of 100 guns or more.  
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78 Ibid., 33. 
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with only six fourth rates.79 By 1846, British shipyards had turned out forty-five fifth rates, more 
than any other capital ship constructed.  Additionally, naval actions during the post-Napoleonic 
era such as the bombardment of Algiers in 1816, the 1824 defense of Cape Coast Castle, 
operations in the Burmese delta in 1824, the suppression of West Indies slave trade in 1829, and 
river actions around Canton in 1833 were all fought by British squadrons that consisted mainly 
of ships of frigate class or smaller.80  Light craft with shallow drafts operated well in these 
mainly coastal actions, and Parliament during the period of fiscal retrenchment that followed the 
French wars was content to build the small less expensive ships.  Global strategic considerations, 
the absence of a major European or American naval power, and budgetary constraints all 
operated to reduce the need for the Trafalgar era ship of the line. 
Worldwide army dispositions also revealed a measure of colonial importance.  An 
August 1827 memorandum from Lieutenant General Sir Herbert Taylor, Deputy Secretary at 
War, concerning British force strength on foreign stations offers some insight into the 
comparative value of each colony.  Troop garrison totals supplied by Taylor (see Table A.6) 
indicate the importance of the West Indian sugar islands that, in 1827, garrison 7,356 British 
troops or nearly 24 percent of the overall overseas British force total.  Furthermore, 1833 
Parliamentary testimony revealed that British Army dispositions of brigade strength or larger 
                                                 
79 Ibid.  
80 Lord Exmouth’s squadron at Algiers consisted of five ships of the line, six frigates, and nine smaller 
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were stationed in the colonies of Barbados, Jamaica, Ceylon, Mauritius, the Cape Colonies, 
Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick.81    
Another barometer of colonial worth was the economic value of each colony within the 
empire.  Contemporaries frequently measured colonial significance by assessing the annual value 
of exports to the home islands.  Colquhoun employed this criterion in judging their relative 
importance.  Likewise, in 1826, the Edinburgh printing house of Bell & Bradfute published a 
treatise A Brief Sketch of the Political Importance of the British Colonies that also used the 
economic worth of each colony to assess its importance.  The treatise argued that worldwide 
colonies afforded Britain strategic outposts required to protect vital commercial sea-lanes.  
Colonial maintenance, the author argued, cost the state £1,600,000 while the total value of 
exports yields £60,000,000 and imports more than £40,000,000.82  Colonies considered of great 
importance to the empire include those in the West Indies, the East Indies, and the territories of 
Canada.83  In the 1820s, it was estimated that annually the West Indies produced £3,000,000, the 
East Indies, primarily that of the East India Company’s presidencies £6,000,000, and the 
Canadian territories calculated at nearly £8,000,000.  Table A.7 delineates the value of products 
raised annually in the colonies. . 
One additional document provides evidence as to the economic value of the colonies to 
the home islands.  Although written in 1872, well outside the chronological parameters of this 
study, the statistics presented in the paper offer insight into the economic worth of the empire, 
and specifically, the value of particular colonies.  Archibald Hamilton’s economic examination 
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of the empire presented before the Statistical Society acknowledged that Britain’s global empire 
was the source of its economic prosperity and prestige.  Gathered more than three decades after 
Colquhoun’s, Hamilton’s statistics indicate that while the economic importance of colonies may 
have shifted, as these dependencies remained vital to the economic well being of the mother 
country.  Noteworthy in Hamilton’s study is the increased economic importance of Canada, 
Australia, and the Cape Colonies in the 1840s and 1850s, while during the same period, the 
financial significance of the West Indies, Mauritius, and Ceylon decreased.84   Indeed, Canadian 
imports of British goods during the decade 1840-1850 jumped 11 percent, Australia 26 percent, 
and the Cape Colonies a substantial 42 percent.85  Moreover, along with the economic growth 
Canada, Australia, and the Cape Colonies came a concomitant increase in their populations.  The 
populations of the West Indies, Mauritius, and Ceylon grew at an unimpressive and slower rate.  
As for the case of the West Indies, the decline can be attributed to Lord John Russell’s Whig 
government enacting the 1846 Sugar Duties Act that ended preferential tariffs on sugar produced 
in the British West Indian colonies.86   This legislation forced West Indian sugar planters to 
compete with cheaper slave produced Cuban and Brazilian sugar.  The advent of steamship 
travel lessened the dependency of the navy and merchant marine on Mauritius and Ceylon as 
victualling stations.  Furthermore, in 1839, colonial authorities ended transportation of 
indentured Indian labor to Mauritius when it bowed to humanitarian pressure noting that such 
endeavors wasted human life and prolonged misery.87 
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A hierarchy of colonial worth within the empire can therefore be inferred from the data.  
It appears that the Colonial Office determined the salaries of their chief administrators in much 
the same fashion as that of a large commercial corporation.  The salary scale was indexed to the 
territorial extent of the colony, the magnitude of the colony’s administration, the size of its 
population, its strategic value, and most importantly, to its profitability to the mother country.  
For example, Patrick Colquhoun reported that in 1812, the colony of Jamaica contained 390,000 
souls and had an economic worth of £11,169,339.  The total value of its imports and exports 
amounted to a substantial £19,117,048.  Moreover, Jamaica boasted a substantial colonial 
administration with each of the island’s twenty parishes having a chief magistrate and a bench of 
justices.  Jamaica also had twenty-eight churches and chapels under the supervision of the 
governor and each had a rector and several assistant churchmen.  The vestries consisted of a 
Custos or chief magistrate, two magistrates, ten vestrymen (elected by the freeholders), and a 
rector.  The vestry held considerable local influence in that it had the power to assess and collect 
local taxes, allot laborers for the repair of roadways, appoint way-wardens, and regulate the 
activities of their local constables.  The governor carried out his duties from the capital, Spanish 
Town, and was the chief judicial official of the colony.  The governor also worked closely with 
the colonial legislature that consisted of a council of twelve gentlemen nominated by the crown 
and a “house of assembly” consisting of forty-three members chosen by the freeholders.88 
  The governor of Jamaica, if he also possessed a military commission, commanded all 
the military forces in the colony.  In such cases, these governors wielded considerable 
authority.89   In 1812, the island was the homeport to a naval squadron of nineteen ships 
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including one ship of the line and eight frigates.  In the 1820s and 1830s, Jamaica figured 
prominently in the Royal Navy’s mixed success against slavers and pirates in the Caribbean.  
Jamaica also accommodated a substantial garrison that in 1827 numbered more than 2,500 
British troops.90   Until the West Indian slave emancipation of 1832 significant numbers of 
soldiers were required to guard against slave disturbances.  Indeed, the significant slave uprising 
on the island in 1830 required substantial efforts by the British Army.  Fortescue reports that six 
regiments were needed to keep order in the West Indies because of “continued talk of 
emancipation and the imprudent discourse of missionaries on the spot.”91      
The bureaucratic structure and administrative duties varied from colony to colony.  It is 
not the intention of this study to offer a comprehensive review of each colony’s bureaucratic 
apparatus and administrative composition, but it is necessary to examine briefly the chief duties 
of colonial administrators in the post-Napoleonic British Empire.  As previously noted, the 
nineteenth-century imperial domains were administratively divided into three distinct groups.  
The “settlement colonies” were primarily located in the Western Hemisphere and consisted of 
core of inhabitants that were ethnically Western European and Christian by faith.  In what P. J. 
Cain and A. G. Hopkins labeled  “exportation of the Revolutionary Settlement of 1688” these 
colonies were imbued with English political traditions had “something of” a constitution that 
provided for a Crown appointed governor who worked in conjunction with an appointed council 
and a representative assembly.92  These colonies included the islands in the West Indies, Nova 
Scotia, Newfoundland, Prince Edward’s Island, the Canadian territories, and New South Wales.   
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In form and theory, the constitutions and administration in the “settlement colonies” were 
similar to that of the Westminster model.  However, as Philip Buckner has pointed out, there was 
a great difference between constitutional theory and political realities in these colonies.93  In 
Canada, the fluctuation of property among the population inhibited the establishment of a 
leisured aristocracy who would normally occupy a House of Lords.  It appears that in Nevis and 
the Virgin Islands, the absence of a resident governor allowed the local assemblies greater 
autonomy than that generally permitted by a sitting governor.  In all of the settled colonies, the 
governor was a Crown appointed official and chief executive and held a significant amount of 
power.  They controlled extensive revenues; were given the authority to summon, prorogue, and 
dissolve the assembly; to create courts; to commission magistrates; to issue writs; to grant 
pardons and reprieves; to make appointments to colonial offices; to dispense money through 
warrants from the public treasury; to grant land; to summon the militia; to proclaim martial law; 
and to dismiss officials for malfeasance.94 Yet governors in the “settlement colonies” were 
attuned to the desires of their respective legislatures and worked conscientiously to accommodate 
them.  Governors also worked closely with their council, a chosen body of locals who advised 
the chief executive on local issues and kept him apprised of popular opinion. 
Military men who held governorships in the “settlement colonies” also commanded that 
colony’s military establishments.  A circular letter issued in November 1824 by the Colonial 
Office mandated that military commands superseded civilian authority.95  However, when 
civilian administrators were present, the military commanders were encouraged to work 
cooperatively with their civilian counterparts.  Military governors, in addition to their civilian 
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administrations, oversaw a parallel military establishment that included an adjutant general and 
deputies, a quartermaster general and assistants, a number of inspectors of militia, a judge 
advocate and his staff, barracks masters, and various support staffs.  As a result, military 
governors were required to incur the expense of maintaining two separate staffs, supplying them 
with food and drink.   
 The second collection of colonies frequently characterized and classified as  “the 
conquered or ceded colonies” by imperial scholars consisted of the Sierra Leone, Cape Colony, 
Mauritius, the Seychelles, and Ceylon.96  India, administered by the East India Company while 
not technically considered a colony, received its charter from Parliament, which tied it closely to 
the Crown.  For the purpose of this study, India will be considered a colony within the Imperial 
orbit.  During the nineteenth century, Britain made a conscious effort to govern these colonies 
but not settle them.97   As such, each of these territories had a small number of bureaucrats 
administering to large indigenous populations.  Moreover, this group of colonies had long 
standing political and bureaucratic traditions that were frequently incompatible to Western 
political models.  Imperial administrations in Africa and Asia were initially not based on 
Western practices similar to those of the “settlement colonies” but were rather a collection of  
“on the spot” individuals who imposed their authoritarian will on their non-Western 
populations.98  This practice often permitted the proconsul to rule his colony unilaterally with 
only minimal interference by the home government.  Nearly one hundred years after Britain’s 
Asian and African acquisitions, Lord Milner observed that these territories lacked a “rational 
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system” of administration.99   As the nineteenth century progressed, the initially authoritarian 
governors in the conquered and ceded territories began to work collectively with advisory 
councils and then later with nominated Executive and Legislative councils.100   Specifically, the 
Cape Colony and Mauritius adopted this system.  In New South Wales, Sir Thomas Brisbane 
introduced the institutions of a legislative assembly and a Supreme Court during his tenure as 
governor.  Although the governor appointed all of the legislators, the act was a responsive first 
step in limiting the governor’s complete autocracy.  This small step in legislative deliberation 
culminated in 1842, when a democratically elected legislative body was given the right to debate 
local issues publicly.  In Ceylon, the successful conclusion of the Kandyan Wars that resulted in 
the pacification and control of the entire island prompted British authorities to reform the 
colony’s governmental apparatus.  The governor’s authority on the island was supreme, as the 
war had broken the power of regional chiefs.  In each province, a government agent was 
established who replaced the power of the local chief.101  These governmental agents, all British 
civil servants, were autocrats in their provinces holding wide-ranging powers and answerable 
only to the governor.  Their substantial salary of £750 a year reveals the power and importance 
of their position.102   
British administration of the Cape Colony was not only highly autocratic but also 
intrusive and extremely efficient.  However, significant differences with the other conquered 
colonies existed as the British grafted their colonial administration on an already extant Western 
European administrative structure.  The Dutch, who had held the colony since 1652, employed 
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an administrative system that consisted of an appointed governor, Council of Policy, Council of 
Justice, and Civil Defense Council, who comprised of appointed officials answerable to the 
Council of Seventeen in the Netherlands.103  The British, acquiring the territory in 1806, made 
only minor and incremental changes in the administration during the hostilities with France.  In 
the decades following the Vienna settlement of 1814-1815, the British solidified their control by 
making their administration more intrusive and encouraging significant British settlement.  Zoë 
Laidlaw’s research indicates that in 1820, 4,000 British settled in the eastern portion of the Cape 
Colony to establish a farming community that replicated English society.104  Substantial numbers 
of British immigrants prompted the annexation in 1838 of Queen Adelaide’s Province, and, in 
1847 the acquisition of remaining Xhosa territory in the eastern Cape.  The Britons’ fondness for 
efficient government down to the most mundane of services is reflected in the exchange of 
memorandums in December 1835 between Cape Colony Governor Benjamin D’Urban and his 
military adjutant, Colonel Harry George Smith concerning the dispatch and delivery of mail 
between Graham’s Town and King William’s Town105  
The third group consisted of dependencies within Europe that, for the most part, were 
acquired during the Napoleonic Wars.106 These strategic locations administered as colonial 
territories were primarily located in the Mediterranean, and included the Ionian Islands, and 
Malta.  In these locations, Britain extended most or all of the privileges afforded to its own 
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citizens.  By the middle of the nineteenth century, Malta embraced an administration similar in 
form to those established in Mauritius and the Cape Colony.  In Gibraltar, the administrative 
apparatus consisted principally of military officers who occupied the positions of governor, 
lieutenant governor, royal engineer, surveyor, and port serjeant.  Civilians held positions in the 
revenue, town major’s, pratique, and judicial departments, but these positions answered to 
military authority.107  Likewise, Malta contained a mixed establishment of both military and 
civilian administrators.  Malta, like Gibraltar, was first and foremost a military post.  Malta was 
arguably strategically more important than Gibraltar in that its central location made it an ideal 
post to strike anywhere in the Mediterranean.  If the navy suffered a serious reverse, the fleet 
could safely withdraw westward if its position became untenable.108  However, all of these 
outposts were considered vital to British strategic interests and, in the first half of the nineteenth 
century they were administered autocratically by military men.   
Conclusion 
 By the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Britain had conquered or annexed an empire that 
comprised more than one quarter of the world’s population.  An empire of such size and scope 
offered immense new opportunities for many groups of Britons.  The aristocracy and gentry 
perceived the colonies as a place to extend and strengthen their established leadership roles in 
British society at a time when the traditional societal hierarchy was being challenged by up and 
coming industrialists and manufacturers.  Merchants and industrialists viewed the empire as an 
exploitable source of raw materials and as a immense market for finished goods.  Humanitarians 
and Christians saw the empire as fertile soil for converting souls to Christ.   
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 The British Empire, however, was not a monolithic entity, but rather two separate and 
distinct bodies.  The First Empire consisted of colonies and territories acquired in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and were mainly located in the Western Hemisphere with 
many having local representative assemblies modeled on the English example.  The Second 
Empire comprised colonies and territories that were captured during the Napoleonic Wars and 
were primarily a collection of dependencies located in Asia and Africa that possessed non-
western cultures and traditions.  Administrators and governors frequently moved between 
assignments amid these two empires.  Governors posted to the west consistently grappled with 
colonial legislatures on questions of taxation and local autonomy.  Administrators assigned to the 
east had greater authority but were often faced with the problems of reconciling western forms of 
governance with long established local traditions.   
 The British military officers of the post-Napoleonic era enthusiastically embraced the 
role of colonial administrator despite the bewildering array of cultures and institutions that 
constituted the empire.  Their ability in command and staff responsibilities suited them ideally to 
manage an empire that was woefully short of experienced administrators.  Moreover, the British 
military had gained valuable experience in both the Peninsula and France in policing occupied 
restive populations.  Chapter Four examines the force pool from which these administrators were 
drawn.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE GLOBAL WEB OF BRITISH COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION 
 
In 241 B.C. after nearly twenty-three years of conflict, Roman Consul Gaius Lutatius 
concluded a peace treaty with the great Carthaginian general Hamilcar Barca that ended the First 
Punic War.  The Roman historian Polybius commented that this struggle was “the longest, the 
most continuous, and most severely contested war known to us in history.”1  During the war, 
ancient authorities noted that the Romans lost 700 quinqueremes, large seagoing vessels 
employing 300 rowers working four banks of oars, and many hundreds of thousands of soldiers 
and sailors.2  Lutatius dictated the terms of the peace to the Carthaginians without consulting the 
Senate.  Arthur M. Eckstein, in his brilliant work Senate and General: Individual Decision 
Making and Roman Foreign Relations, 264-194 B.C., argues that the Roman Republic’s foreign 
policy and provincial administrative authority rested largely in the hands of military leaders and 
governors who frequently ruled overseas territories without senatorial authority or oversight.  
The First Punic War with Carthage, fought principally in Sicily, was one of the first recorded 
instances of this practice. The actions of Lutatius in prosecuting a war and negotiating a peace 
with the Carthaginians were analogous to the power wielded by British colonial proconsuls two 
millennia later.   
Eckstein argues that the Senate normally accepted the decisions and policies of their 
generals because these individuals also held civil positions as magistrates or consuls, and thus 
had the authority to govern.  Additionally, the Roman Senate of the republican period implicitly 
trusted the pronouncements of their overseas military commanders, as they were part of the same 
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senatorial patrician aristocracy.  Commanders’ interests coincided with those of the Senate and 
the state.  All members of the patrician aristocracy desired that the rest of the ancient world 
perceive Rome and its territories to be robust and strong.  Only a capable and strong military 
could accomplish these aims.  Roman strategic policy also mandated that surrounding the empire 
were client states that acted as buffers against potential adversaries.  Rome treated these client 
states as fides or friends of the Republic who would protect them when they were threatened.  It 
was because of the fides system that Rome fought many wars in the third and second centuries, 
further expanding its influence and territory.  The administration of these newly conquered 
territories rested in the hands of qualified military leaders who were empowered to make ad hoc 
decisions concerning the management of their province.   
Adrian Goldsworthy endorses Eckstein’s research noting that Roman military 
commanders were uniquely qualified in assuming both civil and military roles.  Because they 
engaged in the dual roles of political administrator and military leader, Roman commanders 
knew the political aims of any conflict in which they were involved.3  Roman generals of the 
Republic and Empire were frequently members of the senatorial patrician elite who pursued a 
career or cursus that included “holding a succession of roles, some essentially civilian in nature 
and others with the army.”4  Almost without exception, Roman military commanders governed 
foreign provinces during both the Republican and Imperial periods.  Frequently they were young 
men in their early forties who learned their skills while on active duty.  Roman commanders 
resembled their later British counterparts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in that they 
were amateurs who received no formal training as officers, nor did they attend any military 
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college to learn their trade.  Additionally, Roman and later the British gained their administrative 
expertise while serving as subordinates to governors in foreign stations.  
 For the British ruling elites and senior military officers, the classical Roman Republic 
provided a model for the formation, governance, and maintenance of Britain’s colonial empire.  
While this researcher has discovered no contemporary official directives mandating the 
proconsular administration in the colonies, there is an abundance of circumstantial evidence 
indicating that the educated were aware of this ancient practice.  Ira D. Gruber has analyzed the 
reading lists of British officers of the eighteenth century and found that these men exhibited a 
substantial and constant interest in the military literature of Classical Antiquity, especially 
Rome.5  Furthermore, Mark Danley’s research has revealed that Bladen’s 1705 edition of 
Caesar’s Commentaries interested non-military readers as well as army officers.6  Awareness and 
interest in Ancient Rome continued into the nineteenth century as architecture, art, fashion, 
literature, and military science borrowed from the classical models.  Wellington prepared for the 
long sea voyage to India by stocking his sea trunk with a library that included Plutarch’s Lives 
and Caesar’s Commentaries.7  Later in life, Wellington, as the victor of Waterloo and as the 
Master General of Ordnance, would exert significant influence in the selection and appointment 
of senior colonial officials.  
 This method of governance, known as proconsular despotism, fulfilled an important 
function for both Roman and British polities in the administration of their ethnically diverse and 
vast territorial empires.  Proconsular despotism was a means of governance by selected elites 
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who identified with and were sympathetic to the strategic aims of the parent state.  
Administrators, frequently separated by long distances, interpreted their government’s strategic 
aims, molding them to fit their particular circumstances without consulting the home 
government.  Both the Romans and post-Napoleonic Britons engaged in this simple non-
sophisticated form of overseas supervision because the home government lacked a consistent 
colonial policy.  Neither the ancient Romans nor the early nineteenth century British civil 
services possessed the sizeable and competent trained staffs of bureaucrats necessary to manage 
their overseas empires.  Eckstein observes that, in the Roman case, this administrative situation 
subsisted when the supportive machinery necessary “for the making of coherent, consistent, and 
centralized policies” failed to exist.8   
Post-Napoleonic Britain’s colonial administration was remarkably similar to the Roman 
model.  Imperial growth during the Napoleonic Wars had stretched the administrative 
infrastructure and bureaucratic apparatus to the breaking point causing the Colonial Office to 
adopt ad hoc short-term solutions in running its empire.  Indeed, even the physical establishment 
that directed an empire of millions was lilliputian in size consisting of two seventeenth-century 
houses at 13 and 14 Downing Street in London.  Within these decrepit buildings deemed  
“unworthy of repair,” the Secretary of War and the Colonies and his assistants, an 
undersecretary, a chief clerk, clerks, librarians, bookbinders, housekeepers, office-keepers and 
servants labored to keep the empire running.9  The number of civil servants working in the 
Colonial Office was also indeed small.  In 1816, budgetary cutbacks forced the layoff of four 
clerks reducing the number of permanent clerks from twelve to eight.  Moreover, Parliament 
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abolished the positions of Under-Secretary for War and Précis Writer.10  In 1822, additional cost 
cutting measures took place when the Colonial Office underwent a complete reorganization.  
Because of administrative restructuring and fiscal austerity, the office discontinued periodic 
salary increases for seniority and time of service and replaced them with a system of employee 
pay grades and merit increases.  Under these provisions, the Under-Secretary received £2000 
annually, while the chief clerk earned between £1,000 and £1,250 per year.  Additional clerks, 
divided into six categories, received annual salaries ranging from £900 to £150 depending on 
seniority and experience.11  The number of employees remained static for two years until 1824 
when the office reinstated the position of Précis Writer along with that of Registrar and Assistant 
Librarian.  Further reforms resulted in a significant reorganization of the clerks’ office with the 
reduction of two Senior Clerks and the addition of one extra clerk to the offices of Assistant and 
Junior Clerk.  Moreover, during this period clerks received specific geographical regions to 
manage reflecting the substantial growth of the Empire and the subsequent need for specialized 
knowledge of the area.  
Throughout the 1830s, the Colonial Office began to add employees to cope with the 
empire’s growing sophistication and complexity.  However, as the Colonial Office increased the 
number of civil servants their salaries continually declined.  Like Dickens’s Bob Cratchit, 
Colonial Office employees worked long hours for pitiable pay.  In 1831, the Secretary of State’s 
generous salary decreased from £6,000 per annum to £5,000.12  The Chief Clerk received an 
annual salary of £650 with the other clerks pay set at £450, £300, £200, and £150 respectively.13  
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Like other agencies and offices of the Crown, the Colonial Office in the post-Napoleonic period 
keenly felt the fiscal economies imposed by Parliament.  The Colonial Office’s situation was 
similar to that of the army’s outlined in Chapter One, as each bureaucracy was expected to 
accomplish more with less money.  Parliament demanded that the Colonial Office efficiently 
administer its domains as cheaply as possible.  
Long-serving senior bureaucrats formulated the bulk of the Colonial Office’s policies.  
During the first half of the nineteenth century, two tireless workaholics occupied this important 
post, Sir James Stephen and Sir Federic Rogers.  Of the two gentlemen, Sir James Stephen had 
considerable influence in directing colonial policy.  Stephen’s first post in the Colonial Office 
was that of legal counsel, a position that gave him enormous power and prestige.  His substantial 
knowledge of constitutional law, his extraordinary administrative skill, and his impeccable 
integrity won him respect from both subordinates and superiors.  For much of his career at the 
Colonial Office, Stephen in fact ruled Britain’s overseas empire.14  His reputation was such that 
his contemporaries nicknamed him “King Stephen” and “Mr. Over-secretary Stephen.”15  
Stephen was one of the first colonial officials to realize the difficulty of directing policy to 
numerous colonies thousands of miles from the mother country.  He advised his superiors that 
the best method of governing colonies was to let local governors and administrators make on-
the-spot decisions observing “The wisest Governor may judge erroneously but the wisest 
stranger to the Country must guess erroneously—at least the chance of guessing right is so slight 
to be evanescent.”16  As a Colonial Office bureaucrat, Stephen served under twelve secretaries of 
state, noting in his journal that only two were worthy of their office, William Huskisson and 
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Lord John Russell.17  Andrew Porter has observed that during the period of Stephen’s tenure, the 
Colonial Office attracted few able secretaries as the position had little political prestige.18  
Because of office’s poor reputation, Colonial Secretaries left day-to-day colonial business and 
policy decisions in the hands of the long-term professionals. 
  The Colonial Secretary determined all senior overseas administrative appointments.  
Patronage played a significant role in the decision making process.  In the decades following 
Waterloo, Wellington’s influence wielded considerable weight in the selection process.  This 
researcher’s findings indicate that Lord Bathurst rarely ignored the Duke’s recommendations.  In 
March 1830, Wellington explained to Sir Henry Cooke the system of colonial appointments 
noting that overseas appointments were the gift of the government to worthy individuals.19  In the 
letter, Wellington acknowledges that the Colonial Secretary allowed him to recommend 
individuals to fill overseas posts.  Between 1818 and 1830, Wellington received hundreds of 
letters requesting recommendations for government employment.20  Job seekers varied from 
Lieutenant General George Sir Townshend Walker who in 1826 asked for the post of 
Commander-in-Chief of the army in India to Sir R. B. P. Phillips who in 1828 sought the 
collectorship of the Customs in Barbados.21 
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Stephen took a keen interest in the administration and colonial management of the West 
Indian colonies, leaving the direction to other colonies in the imperial orbit to the onsite 
governors.  Paul Knapland notes that one of the principle reasons Stephen joined the Colonial 
Office in 1813 was for the expressed purpose of improving the lot of the West Indian plantation 
slaves.22  Scholars such as Bebbington and Cell attribute Stephen’s Evangelical beliefs as the 
principle reason for his overriding concern for the abolition of slavery.  Stephen’s father, James, 
who had practiced law in St. Kitts from 1783 and 1794, had seen first hand the horrors of 
slavery, and imparted to his son a hatred for the institution.  The younger Stephen was also 
influenced by his father’s close friendship and collaboration with William Wilberforce, the great 
evangelical member of Parliament.  Indeed, his ties to Wilberforce were strengthened further in 
1800 when Stephen’s father married Wilberforce’s sister after the death of his first wife, Anne 
Stent.23  The elder Stephen and Wilberforce were also members of the Clapham Sect, a group of 
influential Church of England evangelicals who felt compelled to act on the humanitarian issues 
of the day.  The group derived its name from a small collective of families who spent time 
together socializing, worshiping, and working on humanitarian causes at the estates they owned 
south of London near Clapham Green.24  During his childhood and adolescence, his father’s close 
association with the Clapham families significantly influenced his life’s mission.   
James Stephen received his education at Trinity Hall, Cambridge and was admitted to the 
bar in either 1811 or 1813.25  What is certain is that in 1813, the new lawyer joined the Colonial 
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Office as its legal advisor working on a case specific fee basis.  In 1825, he gave up his private 
law practice when he joined the Colonial Office and Board of Trade, as the institution’s legal 
advisor.  In December 1814, Stephen married Jane Catherine Venn, the daughter of Rev. John 
Venn, another prominent member of the Clapham Sect.  Generations of the Venn family had 
served as Anglican clergymen.  Jane’s brother, Rev. Henry Venn, was Secretary of the Church 
Missionary Society during the mid-decades of the nineteenth century and notable for his strict 
lifestyle.  Knapland argues that Stephen’s record of service at the Colonial Office as both the 
chief legal officer and then as Under Secretary reflected his evangelical humanitarian 
viewpoints.  As an evangelical it was his duty to “rid the British Empire of the blot of slavery.  
[He] sought to bring the Christian evangel of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man 
to the farthest corners of the earth.”26  Stephen’s motivations were driven by an Evangelical 
belief in that his conversion to Christ gave his life meaning and purpose by working for the 
betterment of humankind.27  Consequently, Stephen’s service to others fulfilled an Evangelical 
view that in making the world a better place others would emulate his example.  During his 
tenure, Stephen assisted in strengthening existing laws governing the 1807 prohibition against 
the slave trade by establishing uniform slave registries in the West Indies.  In the 1820s, the 
Under Secretary worked tirelessly to eradicate incrementally the institution of slavery despite 
resistance from planters, restiveness from local assemblies, the expectations of the slaves, the 
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combativeness of the Colonial Church, the impatience of the Baptists, and the apprehension of 
the local governors.   
In the early 1830s, British governors posted in the West Indies found the slavery issue to 
be particularly nettlesome.  On one hand, they had to contend with an elite planter society and 
local assemblies determined to preserve their traditional autonomy and on the other, an activist 
abolitionist movement in the Colonial Office assisted by reformist Whigs in Parliament imbued 
with a righteous sense of paternalistic humanitarianism.  The Jamaican slave revolt of 1830, 
followed by severe retribution and the persecution of missionaries thought to have assisted the 
slaves, contributed to a public backlash by Briton’s educated elites against the institution of 
slavery in the empire.  Led by the Colonial Office’s Under Secretary Henry Grey, the 
humanitarian reformist movement in Parliament proposed a bill that would end slavery in the 
colonies.  The 1832 Emancipation Bill, subsequently passed the next summer, was curiously one 
of the few instances that the Colonial Office interfered with proconsular governance.  It may 
appear simplistic to infer sole credit to the Colonial Office for the end of slavery in the West 
Indies, but the influence of the Clapham Sect centered on Howick, Stephen, and like-minded 
clerks in the Colonial Office is significant and unmistakable.  The apparent preoccupation with 
the slavery issue by leading figures within the office coupled with the small size of the staff 
permitted other colonial proconsuls a relatively free hand in administering their colonies.   
 In need of a short-term and fiscally economic solution, Britain resorted to its long-
standing practice of employing military officers as governors.  Robert Harvey in his study of the 
American War of Independence comments that the Crown frequently employed a time-tested 
practice of appointing colonial governors from the ranks of soldiers or ex-soldiers who presided 
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over locally chosen legislatures.28  Douglas M. Peers argues that Britain’s practice of choosing 
military men was a practical necessity because most colonies were located near hostile 
neighbors.29  Security was a primary concern for a significant number of colonial administrators.  
A competent military leader was an essential prerequisite for the position.  John S. Galbraith 
noted that Britain in the early nineteenth century consistently utilized men of character who were 
“required to assume vast authority.  His [the governor] supreme task was the maintenance of 
order within his area: failure to do so was the one unpardonable sin; and in the prosecution of 
that objective he was often led to take actions which were not authorized by his instructions, 
indeed, in many cases, in direct violation thereof.”30  Frequently, the principal requirements for 
governing and administering a colony consisted of having the ability to maneuver and supply the 
troops needed to pacify either hostile neighbors or the local populace.  Helen Taft Manning 
observes that the colonial governors of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century received 
little formal training in administration, legal training, knowledge of colonial conditions, or 
history.31  Their administrative knowledge came primarily from military staff experience gained 
by Britain’s participation in almost one hundred years of continental wars.  
 The lessening of tensions that resulted from the concert system and a continuing need to 
supplement their income, a significant number of British military elites requested administrative 
positions in the colonies.32  Lord FitzRoy Somerset noted in the summer of 1833 that the 
commander-in-chief, with the concurrence of the king, often nominated high-ranking individuals 
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who had rendered distinguished service during the Napoleonic wars.  Defending this practice, 
Lord Somerset said, “ I consider that the just reward of individuals in all ranks, but particularly 
in the higher ranks, is a very important duty for the Commander-in-Chief to discharge, not only 
as it affects the officers of the King’s service but the credit of the country and the honour of His 
Majesty himself.”33  Indeed, at the same series of Parliamentary hearings Sir Willoughby 
Gordon, Quartermaster-general of the British Army, testified that colonial administrative 
positions were a just reward for soldiers who had rendered distinguished service.  Gordon 
commented, “an officer of very distinguished service is entitled to have something more than the 
mere allowances of his regiment [regimental pay]; and without these garrison appointments he 
would have nothing more.”34  Colonial Office appointment records for the three decades that 
followed the Napoleonic Wars confirm that significant numbers of military officers held 
governorships and positions of administrative importance throughout the empire.  This practice 
continued for nearly thirty-five years.  The appointment of military men to senior colonial 
administrative posts began to diminish around mid-century when the Colonial Office began to 
fill overseas administrative posts with professionally trained and educated civilian diplomats and 
bureaucrats.  Of the 262 officials employed between 1830 and 1880 as high colonial 
administrators, fifty-nine of them were active in politics and twenty-four received some legal 
training.35   
  Tables A. 9, A.10, and A.11 indicate that in the two-and-a-half decades following the 
Battle of Waterloo over 80 percent of colonial officials placed in important overseas posts were 
either military men or former military men.  The Army predominated in holding administrative 
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positions while the Royal Navy lagged far behind in securing these coveted overseas 
appointments.  Of the thirty British colonies and territories listed in the 1829 Colonial 
Appointments ledger only two naval officers held colonial administrative positions while army 
officers occupied a substantial twenty-two.  Six years later, the 1835 Colonial Appointments 
report yields similar imbalance between the Army and the Royal Navy.  Of the twenty-four 
colonies or possessions listed in the later census, only two naval officers held colonial 
administrative posts to the nineteen held by army men.  Among the military, this disparity was 
conspicuous as Admiral Sir George Cockburn noted in December 1833, “I do not think our 
officers have too much to look forward to as compared with officers of equal standing of the 
army who have commands, regiments, and government [colonial postings], out of number.  In 
France they give the government of their island colonies only to officers of their navy to put 
them on a par with the army in such matters.”36  Earlier that same year, Sir Willoughby Gordon 
noted to a Parliamentary committee that the French Army was unlike their British counterparts in 
that, except for Algiers, their regular army had an insignificant role in colonial administration.37  
Naval officers held posts at both Newfoundland and St. Vincent through the first half of the 
decade.  Both locations were the sites of naval bases and the Crown combined the offices of the 
port commander with that of the governor.  However, the Royal Navy considered Newfoundland 
a minor station with the duty squadron never consisting of more than twelve ships.38  England 
claimed the Caribbean island of St. Vincent in the early seventeenth century but it had remained 
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unoccupied for nearly 125 years.  In 1763, the island became a British Crown colony but was 
lost to the French in the early phases of the Revolutionary Wars.  British general Ralph 
Abercromby regained control of the island in 1797 in a bitter almost genocidal campaign against 
the pro-French Carib population.39  The port of St. Vincent, along with Antigua and Port Royal 
provided bases for the Royal Navy to enforce the Navigation Acts in the Caribbean.   
The personal profiles of the men who served as colonial administrators in the 1820s 
reveal a number of striking demographic and sociological variables (see Table A. 9).  The table 
lists all governors and colonial administrators of the principal colonies and territories under the 
Colonial Office’s control, 1815-1820, with the exception of India, which the Honourable East 
India Company administered.  Of the thirty-seven men, seven of these men have incomplete 
personal records and are, therefore, not included in the statistical study.40  Of the remaining thirty 
administrators, twenty-three have available birth records or traceable family names showing that 
nine descended from Scottish families, six were English, four were Irish, two American, one 
Welshman, and one, James Kempt, was half Scot and half English.  The Scots appear to have a 
disproportionate influence in the army given the size of its population in the early nineteenth 
century in relation to that of England and Wales.41  Nevertheless, this number is not surprising as 
over-recruiting among the clans occurred throughout Scotland during the Napoleonic Wars.42  
Furthermore, the fine education system present in Scotland made landowners and middle class 
Scots attractive officer candidates to the British Army.  Also well represented were the Irish who 
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supplied 21 percent of the colonial administrators in the highlighted period 1815-1829 (see 
Tables A. 9and A. 10).  All of the Irish listed in the profile came from landed elites, validating 
Linda Colley’s assertion that in the years following the American Revolution, Irish landowning 
gentry and titled aristocrats joined with their English counterparts to reinvigorate the elite power 
structure of Britain.43  Not surprisingly, four of the eleven English military men listed (Tables 
A.9 and A.10) were born in areas of Gloucestershire, Somerset, Devon, Wiltshire, Hampshire, 
Sussex, and Kent that were customarily strong recruiting districts because they were more 
vulnerable to French coastal raids and possible invasion sites.  Moreover, twelve of the men or 
one-third of them came from second-generation military families.  This substantial number 
coincides with Houlding’s research on the eighteenth century British Army noting that a 
significant portion, estimated to be as high as a quarter of the army, was composed of “army 
families,” families who for many generations traditionally served in the army.44  With the 
increase in British recruiting because of the perceived dangers of the French Revolution and 
Napoleon’s expansionist aims, it is not surprising that these numbers exceed even Houlding’s 
estimates.  Furthermore, army families were a socially diverse group that cut across socio-
economic lines.  Rising in the ranks within the British Army depended on both influence and 
merit.  For example, Sir Ralph Darling’s father began his military career as a sergeant in the 45
th
 
Regiment moving up through the ranks and eventually receiving an officer’s commission.  Like 
his father, Darling enlisted as a private, rose through the ranks and because of talent achieved the 
rank of major general in June 1813.  Nonetheless, titled gentry also made up a considerable 
portion of “army families.”  Sir Peregrine Maitland came from a well-established military 
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lineage with at least four other Maitlands listed as high-ranking officers in the 1820 Royal 
Military Calendar.45  Furthermore, Maitland’s mother was the daughter of General Edward 
Mathew.  In Maitland’s case, as in many others, patronage and birth played a significant role in 
promotion.  
In addition to birth and social status, a substantial number of the administrators profiled 
(Tables A.9, A.10, and A.11) were of comparable age (See Table A.12).  Of the surveyed thirty-
three military men who possess known birth dates, over half (seventeen) were born in the 1770s; 
thirteen, 41.5 percent were born before 1770; the remaining three, or nearly 10 percent, had 
birthdates after 1780.  Of these thirty-three officers, seventeen of them, or 42 percent of all the 
military men on the list, received their commissions during the 1790s reflecting a period during 
the French Revolutionary Wars when the British Army increased considerably.  Colley confirms 
this noting that France’s 1796 abortive invasion attempt on Ireland significantly stimulated 
British Army recruiting.46  Army estimates for the year reveal that in 1801, 131,818 men were 
under arms, troop strength up from 48,849 troops reported in 1792.47  The average age of all 
these gentlemen when they received their commissions was seventeen and a half years.  The 
Royal Navy men Charles Brisbane, Thomas Cochrane, and Charles Hamilton were not included 
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in this statistic as naval trainees normally went to sea at a very young age.  Brisbane 
accompanied his father, at the age of ten, Hamilton at nine, and Cochrane was seven years old 
when he began shipboard duty.  Of Lord Cochrane, naval historian Brian Lavery notes “Lord 
Cochrane was perhaps the most famous example; [going from nursery to ship] he had been 
entered at the age of five, and carried on one ship or another commanded by his uncle until he 
reached the age of eighteen.”48  Among the army officers, age anomalies did exist with some 
officers such as D. Stewart and C. Colville receiving their first commissions at the tender age of 
eleven.  Philip Haythornthwaite, Michael Glover, and J. W. Fortescue note that before the Duke 
of York’s reforms stipulating, “no person is considered eligible for a commission until he has 
attained the age of sixteen years,” commissions were sold to all who had the money to purchase 
one.49  Gentlemen of means purchased commissions for their infant sons in prestigious regiments 
guaranteeing regimental placement when their children became adolescents.  
Statistical data supplied in Table A.13 indicates that a substantial number of these 
colonial administrators received considerable administrative experience while acting in either 
regimental, division, or army staff positions as either aide-de-camps, military secretaries, brigade 
majors, adjutants or quartermasters.50  The data proves that a substantial number of important 
colonial officers had prior administrative and staff experience.  Of the thirty-three military men 
listed, twenty-three of them, or 69 percent, were known to have had some staff training prior to 
their colonial appointments at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars.  It is important to note that 
these staff positions were ideal preparation for managing colonial bureaucracies.  In 1833, Lord 
FitzRoy Somerset, Military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief, testified before Parliament 
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that staff officers were particularly well suited to oversee colonial territories.  Somerset argued 
that “there are certain appointments of which the duties are not purely military, and which 
officers may have rendered themselves so useful, that Government would feel justified in 
objecting to any change.”51  Nevertheless, it is important to briefly outline the role of a staff 
officer, what his duties were, and the evolution of military staff positions in the eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries.   
From the early seventeenth century on, a staff officer’s principal duties were to assist his 
immediate superior in areas of personnel or supply.  John I. Alger notes that the term staff 
originated from the idea that a general relies on these individuals in much the same way, as he 
would support himself with a cane or staff. 52  As armies increased in size, commanding generals 
were unable to personally attend to their army’s supporting administrations thereby delegating 
officers to assist him.  In the eighteenth century, European states attached regimental line officers 
to the commander’s headquarters, assigning them specific staff duties such as gathering and 
directing of supply, determining march routes and placement of camps, policing the army and 
administering military justice, and the collecting, housing, and provisioning of prisoners.  During 
the Napoleonic Wars, with the notable exception of the French, staff positions remained 
temporary and existed solely for the length and distance of a specific campaign.53  Britain, like 
many of its Continental European counterparts, produced military staffs but only when necessity 
dictated—namely to conduct a foreign campaign.  British officers detached for staff duty 
retained both their regimental seniority and pay making these positions desirable.  Compared to 
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Napoleon’s efficient Grand Quartier-General under the direction of Marshal Louis Berthier, the 
British system was miniscule and virtually untrained with officers learning the staff trade while 
on the job.54  However, the long years of campaigning during the Napoleonic Wars created a 
small cadre of competent officers familiar with organizational and administrative tasks 
associated with staff work.   
Wellington’s Peninsular Army, in particular, received invaluable experience during its 
six-year campaign in Iberia.  Among the lessons Wellington’s staff learned were: how to conduct 
and supply a campaign hundreds of miles from home and how to control a civilian population 
when the legitimate civil government had either fled (as in the case of Portugal) or was in serious 
disarray (as in the case of Spain).  Charles W. C. Oman outlined the varied staff duties and 
obligations of the Quartermaster General’s department in his monumental study of Wellington’s 
army in Spain.  Oman noted that the Quartermaster General’s department was primarily 
responsible for the efficient movement of the army or of separate detachments while on 
campaign without the need of the constant supervision of the headquarters.  It was the 
quartermaster’s duty and responsibility to make topographical surveys, to report on roads and 
bridges, and to evaluate the supply resources of districts through which the army might have to 
move through in the near future.55  Predictably, the length and scope of the Napoleonic Wars led 
to considerable growth in the size of British Army staffs.  In the autumn of 1813, three 
Anglo/allied armies operated in Spain.  Two of them were located in central Spain and under the 
direction of Wellington, while the third, an Anglo-Sicilian Army in eastern Spain was 
commanded by Lieutenant General William Bentinck.56  Worldwide there were substantial 
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British forces, all utilizing staffs, operating in the northern German states, Canada, India, and the 
West Indies. Parliamentary records reveal that at the end of the Napoleonic Wars there were 350 
staff officers worldwide still holding their regimental commissions.57  
 British officers on colonial duty practiced the lessons they had learned during the nearly 
twenty-five years of war with France.  For example, during the three decades following 
Waterloo, officers in India were frequently detached or seconded from their regiments in order to 
fulfill staff postings in civil or political administration.  Peer’s research on the British Army in 
India in the 1820s reveals that because of this practice field regiments were often critically short 
of line officers.  In 1820, only 35 percent of the officers in the Bengal Army were serving with 
their regiments; in 1825, the percentage climbed to 45 percent, but by 1830, the number had 
again dipped to 40 percent.58  D. A. Washbrook observes that the East India Company, with 
Parliament’s approval, intentionally and routinely gathered civil and judicial functions into the 
hands of the military.59  Soldiers received orders to take care attend of duties normally reserved 
for civilian authorities.  Military men adjudicated cases, built roads and bridges, conducted civil 
affairs, and collected revenues thereby subsuming all previous established civil administrative 
institutions.60  The opening paragraphs of a January 1829 letter written by R. Nisbet to Captain 
Benson provide an example of military men carrying out duties normally reserved for civilians.   
Lord William Bentinck was so kind yesterday morning as to enquire regarding 
the method I pursued in making roads and bridges while judge and magistrate at 
Rangpur, and condescended I believe to ask my opinion as to the practicability of road 
making in general through the country. 
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Having been interrupted by the entrance of different gentlemen, and the 
announcement of breakfast, I was unable to explain at all what was required.  I feel 
therefore anxious to take the liberty of soliciting the favour of your to submit to his 
Lordship’s notice the following remarks when an opportunity may offer of so doing. 
I understood Lord William to ask first how I made the roads, and bridges, and 
secondly how I kept them in repair.  In reply to the first, I beg to state that all the roads 
within 5 or 6 miles of the station were made and kept in repair exclusively with the 
convicts.  With regard to roads further distant, my plan was, first to make the road with 
convicts, and then to place the superintendence of it under the different zamindars 
through whose estates it passed and they in return vested the management in their village 
officers (gomasta and patwari) who caused the different ryots in each village to keep in 
repair as much of the road as magistrates can do so, but to ensure a willing compliance 
requires a little management.  In Rangpur I was so fortunate as to secure the good wishes 
and co-operation of the landed proprietors, owing to my long residence in the district, and 
my constant endeavors to conciliate them and also frequent personal communication.  
The result was, I had only to propose anything advantageous to the community or which 
justice demanded, and they were not only willing to aid my endeavors but actually did so, 
most zealously.61 
 
However, military administration was not limited only to India.  British officers served as 
administrators throughout the empire.  In 1835, Colonel Harry Smith, military adjutant to 
General Benjamin D’Urban, Cape Colony’s governor, with his superior’s approval, administered 
Queen Adelaide’s Province.  From his residency at King William’s Town, Smith conducted 
provincial affairs that included the building of military posts, supervising a postal system, the 
creation of a civilian administrative infrastructure that included the creation of a native police 
force, the enforcement of British and Dutch statures, the establishment of Christianity, and the 
institution of a western-style education system.  With a flair for theatrics, Colonel Smith, seated 
on a makeshift throne, attended by a policeman holding a staff topped with a brass bed knob, 
ruled like a nineteenth century Solomon over his territory.62  In Lower Canada, Lieutenant 
General James Kempt chaired a committee that oversaw the construction of the Rideau Canal 
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linking Ottawa with Montreal.  The canal, originally intended for the rapid movement of troops 
to counter any invasion from the United States, in effect became an economic arterial lifeline 
assuring the union between Upper and Lower Canada.63  The canal designed and built by British 
Army engineers, under the direction of Colonel John By, served as a defensible barrier and as an 
alternate supply route between Montreal to the Great Lakes.  In addition, during that same 
decade Parliament working in conjunction with the Colonial Office selected a considerable 
number of military men as special magistrates who adjudicated West Indian cases involving the 
newly freed slaves.  The appointment of these officers was a response by the Crown to hear the 
manifold number of cases brought by former slaves contesting the Emancipation Act’s 
apprentice clause.64  In October 1833, Colonial Secretary Edward G. G. S. Stanley noted that the 
twenty-five military judges posted in Barbados were neither professional men nor worth their 
£30 salary.65   
Research also indicates that most of the men appointed to colonial office attained the rank 
of major general or even higher rank before their appointment.  In the 1830s, Parliament 
mandated that only military men holding the rank of major general or lieutenant general be 
eligible to administer or serve as governors for all of the major colonies.  Of the thirty-one who 
have sufficient personal data, nineteen of these men achieved the rank of major generals around 
the age of forty-two years.  Moreover, twelve of these nineteen, or 63 percent, served with 
Wellington as regimental commanders, staff officers, or divisional commanders.  One officer, Sir 
James Campbell served with Wellington in both India and in the Peninsula.  Wellington kept in 
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close contact with Campbell throughout their service careers.  In 1821, Wellington wrote to 
Major General Sir Herbert Taylor, military secretary to the Duke of York, Commander-in-chief 
of the British Army, requesting the nomination of Campbell for the Order of the Bath.66  The 
Duke continued to assist his old friend and colleague in finding him a vacancy among the 
colonial appointments.67  Campbell eventually received the governorship of Grenada some five 
years later. 
The typical military governors who served as a senior colonial administrator in the 
decades following Waterloo were born in the 1770s to families of titled aristocrats.  These 
gentlemen joined the army in their teens, most likely at the onset of the wars with France in 
1793.  The young officers received promotion quite rapidly usually attaining the rank of colonel 
mainly through purchase by their early thirties.  Nearly 70 percent of them received staff training 
while serving as an aide de camp, military secretary, adjutant, or quartermaster in the field under 
the command of a general officer.  Frequently, these gentlemen served under Wellington during 
the Peninsula Campaign gaining the Duke’s attention, respect, and friendship.  While serving in 
the Peninsula promotion came very rapidly as nearly all of the surveyed individuals attained the 
rank of major-general while still in their forties.  Peninsular officers often achieved rapid 
promotion because of merit, family connections, patronage, and campaign attrition.  Estimates 
put the annual attrition rate during the Peninsular War as high as 1,000 officers a year.68  
Colonial appointments soon followed at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars.  Many received 
their first appointment between 1815 and 1820, although men such as Thomas Maitland, Francis 
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Gore, and William Bentinck worked in a civil administrative capacity in some of the smaller 
colonies or in the occupied territories during the wars.  Their colonial tenure of office averaged 
between five and seven years with many of these men exchanging small less lucrative colonial 
postings for larger, higher salaried, and more prestigious colonies.  Lord FitzRoy verified this 
practice when he testified before a Parliamentary committee that officer’s military or civil 
appointments “should be held for five years” or longer.69  An excellent example of this custom 
was the colonial career of Lieutenant General Sir Peregrine Maitland who in the span of twenty-
five years served as the lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, governor of Nova Scotia, 
commander of the Madras Army, and governor of the Cape Colony.  The average age of military 
governors when they received their first colonial posting was forty-eight years.  However, there 
was a wide disparity of age among these administrators with Sir Edward Barnes receiving his 
first appointment in Dominica at age thirty-two and Sir Tomkyns Hilgrove Turner becoming 
governor of Bermuda when he was fifty-nine years old.  Many of these men continued to work 
into their seventies holding dual civil administration positions both overseas and in the home 
islands.  Four of the noted individuals, Lieutenant General Sir Benjamin D’Urban, Lieutenant 
General Sir Edward Barnes, Major General Sir James Colborne, and Lieutenant General Sir 
Peregrine Maitland each occupied at least four major colonial governorships or prominent 
overseas military commands during their post-Waterloo careers. 
Although the governors and administrators played a prominent role in formulating 
colonial policy, their staffs were the ones who implemented it.  For the most part, many of 
administrators’ chief subordinates were also military men.  For example, in 1816, the governors 
or commissioners of Malta, the Ionian Islands, the West Indies, Jamaica, the Bahamas, Canada, 
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Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, St. John’s Newfoundland, the Isle of France/Mauritius, the Cape 
of Good Hope, Ceylon, and St. Helena controlled civil and military affairs and retained 
significant military staffs.70  Examination of Hart’s Army Lists from 1815 to 1835, the 1820 
Royal Military Calendar, and Colonial Office Appointment Books reveals that military 
governors normally, depending on the size and population of the colony, employed an adjutant 
general, deputy adjutant general, a quartermaster general, deputy quartermaster general, and a 
judge advocate.  In 1830, Lieutenant General Sir Edward Barnes governed the colony of Ceylon.  
Barnes was assisted by his second-in-command, Major General Sir Hudson Lowe and a military 
staff that included deputy adjutant general brevet Lieutenant Colonel George Warren Walker and 
deputy quartermaster general John Fraser.  Barnes also had a number of civilian bureaucrats who 
worked in both a civilian and military capacity.  One such member of his civilian staff that 
served in both a military and non-military capacity was C. E. Layard, the civilian and military 
paymaster general who earned £2000 annually while working in this position.  Normally, 
military paymasters were staff officers who held the rank of captain or subaltern and were 
required to carry out military duties such as serving as Officer of the Day, commanding working 
parties, and sitting on Courts Martial.71  Likewise, Dr. Forbes, Ceylon’s Superintendent of 
Vaccine Establishments in the 1820s and 30s, received his salary from both military and civilian 
sources.72  However, Ceylon’s colonial establishment at this time was not an isolated occurrence.  
The colonies of Mauritius, Upper and Lower Canada, and St. Lucia consisted of mixed civilian 
and military administrations.  
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The vast majority of these subordinates assigned to the positions of adjutant general and 
quartermaster general held the rank of colonel, lieutenant colonel, or major.  However, colonels 
and lieutenant colonels did hold some of the smaller administrative and government assignments.  
Indeed, in 1831, colonels in residence commanded twenty-four smaller non-overseas posts such 
as Landguard Fort, Pendennis Castle, Sterling Castle, Isle of Wight, and Heligoland.73  The 
duties of these officers included overseeing and maintaining Crown fortifications and 
administering them in the stead of their non-resident superior officer who rarely visited their 
assigned duty station.  The War Office, with the consent of the king, frequently bestowed these 
positions on distinguished veterans, often disabled by wounds.  Salaries for these much sought 
after positions were more than adequate as they supplemented the officer’s half-pay and 
pensions.  For example, in 1830 the resident lieutenant governor of Heligoland was Colonel 
Henry King.  King, a colonel in the 58
th
 Regiment, had entered the service in March 1794 as a 
cornet in the 25
th
 Light Dragoons.74  In 1801, he lost his leg while participating in Abercromby’s 
campaign in Egypt and ten years later received an annual pension £300 for the lost limb.75  
Because of his disability and his service to the Crown, the War Office appointed King as 
governor of Heligoland as a reward for his service.  According to the War Office’s description of 
King’s duties  “[he] has no military duty to perform; [but] is Civil Governor.”76  For the posting 
King received an annual salary and emoluments from the garrison totaling £500 along with his 
half-pay of £200.15 and pension of £300 which amounted to a very respectable £1000.15 yearly 
income.   
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Like their military chiefs, the subordinate officers who served in administrative and staff 
positions in the colonies entered the army during either the French Revolutionary or the 
Napoleonic wars.  A survey of officers serving in 1816, 1821, 1825, and 1830 in colonial stations 
indicates that fifty-nine men occupied important overseas military staff postings.  Seventy-six 
percent of the officers in Table A.13 began their military careers during this conflict.  The vast 
majority of these subordinates who held the post of adjutant general and quartermaster general 
were colonels and lieutenant colonels.  Many of their military careers mirrored their 
commanding officer’s experience but with some notable differences.  Biographical data 
concerning these officers is not as complete as their superiors, however some inferences are 
possible.  Nine of the thirty -nine men, or 24 percent, began their military careers in the cavalry.  
Traditionally, officers entering the cavalry came from financially well-off families as the 
commission purchase price for cavalry regiments, mess bills, uniforms, accoutrements, and 
horses required a considerable outlay of cash.  As David Chandler pointed out, cavalry 
customarily was the more expensive arm and its gradual decline in significance and numbers in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was, in part, due to its high cost, both to the state and to 
its officers.77  Byan Perrett, editor of Lieutenant Thomas Brotherton’s memoirs, observed that 
this officer came from a family of considerable means in that he consistently purchased 
commissions in cavalry regiments.78  Moreover, Fortescue notes that during the regency and 
reign of George IV officers spent between £60 to £80, or the equivalent of one year’s pay, on 
their uniforms as well as horses, weapons, and accoutrements.79  In the years following the end of 
the Napoleonic Wars, as regent and king, George IV continually changed uniforms making them 
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more ornate, impractical, and expensive in an effort to match the splendor of the continental 
powers of Bourbon France, Hohenstauffen Prussia, and Romanov Russia.  Philip 
Haythornthwaite argues that during the 1820s and 30s that all of the major and minor European 
powers endeavored to make uniforms more ornate and less functional “until the whole process 
resulted in an overdressed, over-drilled and less efficient version of the mighty armies which had 
brought about the downfall of Napoleon.”80 
Four other officers in Table A.13, or 10 percent, began their military careers in the 
prestigious and highly expensive guard regiments.  Officers who purchased guard commissions 
usually came from the most elite families in the kingdom.  Fortescue observed that during the 
Peninsular War, fifty-one titled gentlemen served in either the Household Cavalry or the Foot 
Guards compared to 107 titled aristocrats that served in all other regiments in the British Army.81  
Ian Fletcher, who has studied regimental society of the late Georgian and Regency period, has 
reflected that among the guard regiments only the well connected or titled could afford the 
concomitant expenses of these socially exclusive military units.82  Gentlemen who wished to 
enter the army paid a high price for a commission; a lieutenant colonelcy cost £6,700, a majority 
£6,300, a captaincy £3,500, and a lieutenancy £1,500 83 Accordingly, those officers who were 
fortunate to secure a commission on one of the guard regiments could expect a higher rate of pay 
than that in the regular line regiments.  A major in the Foot Guards received £1 4s. 6d. per day, a 
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captain 16s. 6d., and a lieutenant 7s. 10d. compared to that of similar officers in line regiments 
who collected 16s, 10s 6d., and 6s. 6d. per diem.  Additionally, officers who served in the guard 
regiments were prohibited from serving outside of the kingdom during peacetime, only in 
wartime were they sent overseas.  Membership in these socially elite units, however, carried a 
high financial burden.  These officers, known to the rest of the army as “The Gentlemen’s Sons” 
because of the predominance of titled individuals within their ranks, served as the military 
escorts to the royal family, and as such, possessed a variety of uniforms for multiple occasions 
and ceremonies in which they participated.84  Moreover, the elite of the army found it necessary 
to belong to a number of expensive and socially exclusive clubs such as White’s, Boodle’s, 
Brook’s, Arthur’s and Graham’s where important associations were made and patronage was 
established between general officers, leading politicians, and young socially prominent 
subalterns.  
Connections between general officers and junior officers were important and vital to 
career mobility.  Twenty-one of the fifty-nine officers, a significant 36 percent, served as either a 
military secretary or aide de camp to a general officer.  General officers generally chose aide de 
camps carefully, as an aide’s principal duty was to convey orders to subordinate commanders 
while on campaign or in battle.  Knowledge of the aide’s character and ability was essential and 
competent general officers chose their assistants with some measure of care.  Frequently aides 
were the sons of lifelong friends or relatives who showed promise.85  Lord Lake, Commander-in-
Chief of British forces in India during the Marathas Campaign of 1805, invited John Harvey to 
join his staff as an aide de camp.  Harvey subsequently married Lake’s daughter, Elizabeth, one 
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year later.  The relationship between generals and their aides often fostered lifelong friendships, 
with the senior military man adopting a paternal attitude toward the young officer, assisting the 
subordinate up the ladder of promotion.  For example, Lieutenant Charles Gore, the son of 
Arthur Saunders Gore the Second Earl of Arran, began his service as an aide de camp to Major 
General James Kempt in 1812 while posted in the Peninsula.  Gore remained with his superior, 
friend, and patron serving intermittently for the next ten years as Kempt’s aide de camp in the 
Peninsula (1812-1814), the Montreal District, Canada (1814-1815), Waterloo (1815), and Nova 
Scotia (1820-1822).  Kempt’s high regard for his aide de camp is evidenced by the fact that when 
he died in 1854 in his will he bequeathed £60475 to relatives, friends, and fellow officers that 
included his two principal subordinates, Colonel Charles Stephen Gore, and Colonel Campbell.86  
For the majority of these subordinates, their careers followed a similar pattern.  Nearly all 
of them, a substantial 81 percent, witnessed combat during the nearly twenty-five years of war 
with the French.  Some observations and informed conjectures concerning their early military 
service require some examination.  Fifty-six percent of these officers served, at one time or 
another, with Wellington in the Peninsula either in regimental or staff positions.  However, this 
number is not surprising as the Peninsula was the primary British theater of operations against 
the French during their war against Napoleon.  Charles Esdaile, in his recent study of the 
Peninsular War, argues that the Iberian Peninsula provided Britain an ideal site for arresting the 
growth of Napoleonic hegemony in Europe.87  Encouraged by the Portuguese appeal for 
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assistance and popular resistance in Spain, Britain committed a substantial portion of its army to 
this theater.  During the six years of combat in Iberia, some 10,000 British officers saw service in 
Portugal, Spain, and southern France.88  Likewise, 16 percent of these men witnessed combat in 
the West Indies, another critical theater of operations.  Returning once again to Esdaile’s thesis, 
Britain’s war aims against France included not only freeing Europe from the tyranny but also 
eliminating the economic challenge of the Napoleonic Empire manifested in the Continental 
System.89  Britain’s solution to this conundrum was to secure their enemies’ overseas empires 
gaining unfettered access to the West Indian colonies and their enormous commercial benefits.  
Even before the Spanish opportunity presented itself in 1808, the British Army aided by the 
Royal Navy gobbled up the French and their allies’ possessions in the Caribbean, assuring their 
merchants alternative markets to those European ones closed by Napoleon.  Evidence of British 
colonial aggrandizement is further evident by those officers, nearly 16 percent, who participated 
in the South American (Buenos Aries) Campaign, the Cape of Good Hope expedition, and the 
conquest of Mauritius.  
At the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, the future careers of these officers typified 
that of many of their comrades in the British army.  All sought continued service in the 
dramatically downsized British military.  However, the army, given its post Napoleonic military 
mission, considered those officers with staff experience as a valuable commodity.  Table A.13 
notes that twenty-six of them, or 66 percent of them, had previous staff experience as aides de 
camp, judge advocates, adjutant generals, or quartermasters.  Furthermore, it is apparent that 
officers with combat service in a specific area of the colonial empire usually remained in that 
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part of the world after the peace.  For example, Lieutenant Colonel Sackville Berkley remained 
in the West Indies for more than ten years after 1815.  Lieutenant Colonel John Harvey, who 
arrived with British forces during the American War of 1812, did not leave Canada until 1826 
when he accepted a civil position as an inspector general of the Irish constabulary.90  Both 
Lieutenant Colonel William L. Herries and Colonel George E. Raitt served more than ten years 
in Mediterranean posts after the declaration of peace.  
The typical subordinate administrator was usually ten years younger than his superior 
officers, with 76 percent of them receiving their first commission between 1790 and 1808, the 
year British forces intervened in Iberia.  Based on extant records, many of them were well 
educated and nearly 20 percent achieved higher degrees; the products of Eton, Oxford, Harrow, 
Lincoln’s Inn, and the Royal Military College.91  Colonel Thomas Drake received both a 
bachelors and masters degree from Oxford University before attending the Royal Military 
College, graduating in 1808 and 1810.  Lieutenant Colonel Edward Brabazon Brenton was a 
trained barrister, spending most of his military career in the judge advocate’s office.  Six of the 
thirty-nine officers attended the Royal Military College, the Horse Guards’ rudimentary staff 
school established by Colonel J. G. Le Marchant in 1800.  Le Merchant’s planned school would 
educate officers intended for duty on the General staff.92  It is important to note that the senior 
branch of this school was extremely select, with a student population never exceeding more than 
thirty-four.  
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Socially, these staff officers came from a diverse group and reflected a cross section of 
British society.  Nine of these men (Table A.13), or 23 percent, came from the elites, and of 
these, four had titled fathers.  However, a notable number, eight, or 20 percent, had middle-
class/professional backgrounds.  Interestingly, four of these men, or 10 percent, of the thirty-nine 
were the sons of Anglican clergymen with two having fathers who were bishops.  The number of 
men having clergymen as fathers is considerably higher than the average found in Dalton’s 
Waterloo survey, which notes that more than forty officers present of the 1,795 officers in 
Wellington’s 1815 Waterloo army were the sons of clergymen or only 2 percent came from 
fathers who were clergy.  This number, however, dispels the notion of the untutored and 
unmannered country vicar of the early eighteenth century found in Henry Fielding’s novels and 
comes closer to the reality of the churchmen found in Jane Austen’s works one hundred years 
later.  The rise of Methodism along with Presbyterian and Baptist revivals outside the sphere of 
Wesley’s movement was largely responsible for the improvement in the quality of both the non-
Conformist and the Anglican clergy.93  Seven of these military men, or nearly 18 percent of 
them, came from known military families with six having fathers who served in the military and 
one who had either siblings or uncles in the service.  Lieutenant Colonel William George Moore 
came from a family of military men of which the most notable was his elder brother Major 
General John Moore, the ill-fated commander of British forces in Iberia.   
The subordinates exhibited many of the same characteristics as their commanders with 
one significant difference.  Their commanding officers, or those officers who were the first 
generation of colonial administrators, were primarily regimental military officers who had 
witnessed combat and climbed the promotional ladder by commanding soldiers.  Many of the 
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officers listed in Table A.9 such as James Leith, Stapleton Cotton, Benjamin D’Urban, and 
Frederick Cavendish Ponsonby were field commanders first and administrators second.  Like 
their subordinates, they gained experience and honed their military skills during the nearly 
twenty-five years of war with France frequently fighting in the peripheral theaters of the West 
Indies, the Cape Colony, and India.  The subordinate or ancillary officers, the fellows listed in 
Table A.13, with the notable exception of Henry G. W. Smith, also began their service careers in 
regiments but moved swiftly into staff duties when they exhibited an aptitude for organization 
and detail.  Many of these officers first experienced combat while serving in the Peninsular 
Campaign.  A substantial 52 percent of them served in either Moore’s or Wellington’s force in 
Spain.  As previously noted, a significant 66 percent of them served a substantial portion of their 
wartime careers in a staff capacity.  It is possible to argue persuasively that subordinate military 
officers were more qualified to handle colonial administrative duties while their 
predecessors/commanders were more experienced in conducting military operations.  Together 
these gentlemen fulfilled Britain’s genuine need to administer a global empire.   
There were inherent weaknesses in the proconsular system as practiced by the British.  
Time and distance allowed the colonial administrator a relative freedom in governing his colony.  
Sitting governors and administrators were permitted to make critical policy decisions without the 
close supervision of the home country.  Frequently these administrators either exceeded their 
instructions or ignored them all together.  The Colonial Office repeatedly criticized or questioned 
a governor’s policy but rarely did they reverse an administrator’s actions.  In the three decades 
following the fall of Napoleon, British colonial policy rested principally in the hands of onsite 
administrators who determined colonial policy independently of the home country.  Moreover, 
the men chosen for overseas colonial administrative positions were primarily military men who 
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had held independent command making them more likely to act autonomously when put in 
positions of authority.  Furthermore, many of the military governors listed in Tables A.9, A.10, 
and A.11 held major commands during the Napoleonic Wars increasing the likelihood of them 
acting with impunity.  For example, Sir Galbraith Lowry Cole, in the summer of 1813, 
conducted independent operations in the Pyrenees Mountains fighting the French at 
Roncesvalles; and Sir James Frederick Lyon who in June 1813 organized Hanoverian troops for 
operations with the army under the command of Crown Prince Bernadotte of Sweden.  Many of 
these imperial administrators saw service in Spain under the direction of Wellington, and as 
such, formed an informal coterie of proven talent and ability available for imperial service 
abroad.  Wellington’s correspondence in the decades following Waterloo demonstrates that the 
Duke exerted disproportionate influence on army, colonial, and governmental affairs.  Historians 
such as Hew Strachan, Peter Burroughs, J. W. Fortescue, and George Raudzens argue that 
Britain’s military stagnated in the period between 1815 and 1854 because the army was 
dominated by the military conservatism of Wellington and his cadre of Peninsular officers, who 
Peer refers to as “Wellington’s Kindergarten.”  Nevertheless, fellow officers who served under 
him in Spain continually requested his support in finding them sufficiently suitable employment.  
Wellington’s correspondence between 1819 and 1828 indicate that as commander in chief in 
France, Master of Ordnance, and commander in chief of all British forces he received a veritable 
blizzard of requests seeking employment.  In an 1819 letter to Wellington from Lieutenant 
General Stapleton Cotton, Lord Combermere requests that the Duke “do his utmost to obtain an 
appointment somewhere out of this country to which sufficient emolument is attached.”94  
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Combermere was at this time governor of Barbados and clearly had designs on moving up to a 
more prestigious and lucrative position in the colonies.  
Ronald Hyam has noted that nineteenth-century colonial administrators appeared to 
attract a specific character type who found opportunities to exercise their talents and practice 
their eccentricities normally not tolerated in Britain.95  There are many examples in British 
Imperial history of magnificent eccentrics such as Sir Thomas Raffles, Sir Charles Brooke, 
General Charles Gordon, Colonel Thomas Edward Lawrence, and Colonel Ord Windgate who 
were imbued with a messianic-like mission of replicating the social structure, mores, manners, 
and religion of England throughout the globe.96  Michael Edwardes argues that these unique 
individuals were Byronic romantics who viewed themselves as instruments who did not witness 
history but fashioned it.97  Especially among career military officers who became colonial 
administrators, there was a sense that by defeating Napoleon they had saved Europe.  Moreover, 
these officers believed providence ordained them with the task of improving humankind by 
perpetuating British values and civilization around the globe.  Britain’s victory at Waterloo 
reinforced many Britons’ belief that they were the new Israel, an elect nation chosen by God to 
act as the globe’s civilizing agent.  In a sense, the defeat of Napoleon reiterated the centuries old 
Elizabethan view that English Protestantism manifested itself in a “national self-assertion of a 
people fighting for its religious independence and its due place in a new European and extra-
European order.”98  This long held exceptionalist viewpoint was annunciated in a sermon 
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preached in 1759 by Reverend Simon Lavington following British victories at Minden, Quiberon 
Bay and Quebec.  Lavington observed that Britain “counted it our duty to take a delight in 
ascribing our success to Divine Providence, because it endears and sweetens our victories to 
consider them as proceeding from God, and as being an eminent and signal display of Divine 
Favor.”99  Nearly fifty years later, this belief experienced a revival in the years following the 
Battle of Waterloo.  Linda Colley echoes this sentiment, noting that British society immediately 
recognized that Waterloo was an event of historic importance in determining Britain’s future 
destiny.  In the decades that followed the battle, Britain’s collective social attitudes and their 
perception of their place in the world underwent dramatic and significant changes.  For example, 
in 1807, Parliament abolished the slave trade, and two decades later that deliberative lawmaking 
body provided for the emancipation of all of its slaves in the West Indies.  Colley suggests that 
many influential leaders in Great Britain assumed that as the new Israel its condemnation of 
slavery was proof of its moral supremacy among the nations. 100  Furthermore, within months of 
Waterloo the Royal Navy under the command of Admiral Edward Pellew, Lord Exmouth 
bombarded Algiers effectively ending the Barbary States’ state-sponsored captive and ransom 
system of Christian slaves.101  This act, ordered by the House of Commons, demanded by a 
British press and public was further indication that Britain viewed itself as a world leader in 
championing humanitarian missions.  A significant portion of the population subscribed to this 
notion and believed that how they comported themselves on moral and secular issues would 
determine their future success and prosperity as a nation.  Humanitarianism, religious revival, 
and hatred of oppression were perspectives directly attributable to the providential mantle 
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Britons believed they inherited because of Waterloo.  For the next century this sentiment 
provided a powerful legitimization for the British to act as arbiters of both the civilized and 
uncivilized world.  Within a year of Waterloo, Britain justified its use of military force against 
the Pindaris in India as a campaign to restore morality and stability to a lawless region.  In the 
period following the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the British in India sought to bring a sense of 
order on the collection of minor states that remained in the subcontinent.  Percival Spear argues 
that it was no accident that in 1818 “British dominion in India became the British dominion of 
India” by carrying out the unification of the subcontinent under Crown control.102   
Two other significant contributing issues to this prevailing post-Waterloo sentiment was 
the reemergence and redefining of Evangelicalism and the espousal of Utilitarianism among 
influential members of British society.  David Bebbington defines Evangelical Christianity as 
having four principal characteristics: “conversionism, the belief that lives need to be changed; 
activism, the expression of the gospel in effort; Biblicism, a particular regard for the Bible; and 
cruciencentrism, a stress on the sacrifice of Christ on the cross.”103  Christian activism stipulated 
that souls be won for Christ throughout the world.  Evangelicals firmly believed that in making a 
commitment to Christ brought with it a responsibility to make a difference in the world.104  By 
their example, Evangelicals strived to others to follow their example in making the world a better 
place.  With the end of the Napoleonic Wars, there was among Evangelicals a renewed interest in 
reviving global missionary activity.  Bebbington attributes the growth of world wide Christianity 
to these new missionary societies that emerged in the early nineteenth century.105   
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While the majority of English Evangelicals remained apolitical, an activist minority had a 
major influence on the activities and policies within the Colonial Office.  Chief among their 
concerns were humanitarianism and the correction of social ills in the empire.  In the 1820s, a 
small but vocal group within the Colonial Office determined to abolish slavery in the West 
Indies.  Other institutions, namely the East India Company, also adopted a policy of Christian 
activism and moral reform.  In 1813, Charles Grant, Director of the East India Company, and 
William Wilberforce, a Member of Parliament and an Evangelical Christian, worked together to 
propose revisions to the 1793 “Pious Clause” in the East India Company’s charter.  The “Pious 
Clause” stipulated that the company would assume the duty of appointing the Christian 
missionaries in India and pay their salaries.  The 1813 clause proposed that an Ecclesiastical 
Establishment be set up in India similar to those in England.  In itself, the new clause was 
innocuous and elicited little controversy.  However, the Preamble of the clause was noteworthy 
in that it signaled a new willingness to spread Westernizing influences and values in India 
through the medium of Christian missionaries.  The Preamble is clear in its intentions by 
declaring “It is the duty of this country to promote the interests and happiness of the native 
inhabitants of the British Dominions in India; and such measures ought to be adopted as may 
tend to the introduction among them a useful knowledge, and of religious and moral 
improvement; and in the furtherance of the above objects, sufficient facilities out to be afforded 
by law to persons desirous of accomplishing those benevolent designs.”106  Grant further argued 
in a Parliamentary Paper that same year that the benefits of Christianity were not only religious 
but material as well.107  Since the Reformation, the progress of Europe in comfort and wealth was 
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directly attributable to Protestant influence.108  It is noteworthy that within a few years of 
Waterloo, 1818, the military governors and administrators of the East India Company began to 
encourage enthusiastically a missionary movement that had remained dormant in India during 
the eighteenth century.  Especially important to the European missionaries were the newly 
acquired territories of northwestern India, scarcely touched by Christianity.109   
At the same time, the East India Company instituted a policy aimed at improving 
morality and instilling Christian values among its European employees.  During his tenure in 
India Governor-general Richard Wellesley, the brother of the Duke of Wellington, instituted a 
series of strict measures that condemned open concubinage with Indian women, censured 
drunkenness and gambling, and publicly denounced immoral behavior.110  In a view held by 
British elites and the public at large, a positive moral example would clearly demonstrate the 
superiority of western institutions to a native population.  A substantial majority in Britain 
believed that a genuine paternalistic, humanitarian, and religious policy toward subject 
populations would be sufficient to carry civilization to the non-Christian populations they 
ruled.111  Indeed, a significant number of senior colonial administrators subscribed to the notion 
that Christianity was useful as a means of westernizing their non-European subjects.  Colonel 
Harry G. Smith, administrator to Queen Adelaide’s Province on the frontier of the Cape Colony, 
wrote that after defeating Xhosas in the Eighth Frontier War, he intended to introduce 
Christianity to the Xhosas as a means to westernize and counter the traditional tribal practices of 
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polygamy, witchcraft, and euthanasia of the old and sick.  Smith noted in his autobiography, 
“Having thus gained an ascendancy over these people never attempted before, my mind was 
dwelling on the great and important subject of their conversion to Christianity, and many is the 
conference I had with the missionaries upon the subject.  Of ultimately effecting a general 
conversion I never despaired, but I was convinced it could only be through the educating of the 
youth at the same time introducing habits of industry and rational amusement.”112  
Military governors of non-western provinces were not the only administrators who 
championed Christian values.  In the Western Hemisphere colonies of Nova Scotia and Lower 
Canada, military administrators were active in promoting Christianity often preferring one 
denomination over others and predictably and frequently sparking controversy.  D. B. Read, a 
late nineteenth century biographer of Canadian administrators, observed that Sir John Colborne, 
lieutenant governor of Upper Canada and then commander in chief of Canada (1828-1839), came 
into conflict with the Scottish Presbyterian majority of Upper Canada when he insisted on 
provisioning and maintaining a minority in the Church of England at the expense of the 
majority.113  Colborne insisted on implementing a clause in the Imperial Act or Quebec Act of 
1791 that mandated portions of crown land in both provinces of Canada to be reserved for the 
Anglican Church.  Anglicans, however, were clearly in the minority in Upper Canada even when 
the census counted those who professed no religion or whose religious affiliation was doubtful.  
Colborne infuriated Presbyterians when he continued to endow the established church despite 
their protests.  Fred D. Schneider has argued that the Act of 1791 gave administrators virtually 
autocratic power, a control that governors frequently used to reinforce the British imperium at 
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the expense of popular opinion.114  The employment of this authority, especially following the 
conclusion of the American War of 1812, conflicted with nascent Canadian demands for a polity 
nearer to that of English model.  Dissident Canadians, under the leadership of William Lyon 
Mackenzie, made this issue one of their prime grievances during the abortive revolution of 1837.  
It is apparent that during the 1820s and 1830s those global proconsular administrators espoused a 
Tory philosophy of benevolent but firm paternalism that would shield their subjects from the 
contagion of republicanism.  In the established old order colonies of the Western Hemisphere, 
benevolent paternalism often included and tolerated representative colonial assemblies tasked 
with debating financial issues leaving all other issues for a strong executive.   
  During the proconsular period, Canadian administrators often grappled with religious 
questions that became intertwined with associated secular issues, specifically those concerning 
schooling, political rights, church establishment, and majority representation based on changing 
demographics.115  Frequently these issues undermined the proconsuls’ legitimacy and questioned 
the efficacy of this form of polity especially in colonies with a long-standing tradition of 
representative government.  Graeme Wynn noted the “diverse and fractured” nature of Canadian 
North America that Britain inherited from France in 1763 revealed fatal shortcomings in this 
form of administrative government.116  Moreover, in religious matters many of the military 
proconsuls were ill equipped to grapple with the highly charged emotional issue of religion.  
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Andrew Porter characterized many of post-Napoleonic imperial governors as Tory-High Church 
Anglicans who, when it came to matters of religion, often displayed a striking lack of political 
aptitude.117  Two conspicuous examples illustrate this case in point: the 1825 Newfoundland 
crisis concerning Lieutenant Governor John Cochrane, the Test Act, and his appointments to the 
executive council and the 1835 case of Governor John Colborne and Upper Canada’s 
“University Question.”  
In 1825, the lieutenant governor of Newfoundland, John Cochrane, appointed an interim 
council consisting of Justices of the Supreme Court and his military commander, Lieutenant 
Colonel Thomas Burke, to assist him in an advisory capacity in administering the colony.  Burke 
had a long career in the military entering the army in 1805 as a captain in Dillon’s Corps.  
Initially, Dillon’s Corps, organized during the French Revolutionary Wars, was comprised of 
officer émigrés from the Irish Brigade of the old French army.118  During the Napoleonic Wars, 
the regiment spent most of its time in the Mediterranean Theater, specifically Gibraltar, Malta, 
Sicily, and eastern Spain.  Many of the officers who served in the regiment were Catholic, as was 
Burke.  However, Burke’s faith apparently did not hinder his career and, by 1812, he had risen to 
the rank of lieutenant colonel.  Furthermore, by the end of the war the Crown had honored him 
with the appointment as Companion of the Bath.119  After the fall of Napoleon, Burke became 
military commander of the British garrison in Newfoundland. 
In October 1825, Cochrane appointed Burke to his executive council in an advisory post 
that held little legislative power.  By law, Burke was entitled to the position, took the mandatory 
oaths of office and allegiance, but because of his faith refused the oath of supremacy and Test 
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Act declaration of Transubstantiation.120  Cochrane, fearful of offending Catholic sentiments, 
prepared to waive these stipulations expecting little opposition from the home government.  A 
similar situation existed in Lower Canada nearly a decade earlier when the Colonial Office 
allowed the Catholic Bishop of Quebec, Joseph-Octave, to participate in that province’s 
executive council.121  This time, however, Bathurst refused to grant the necessary waiver despite 
the precedent established in Lower Canada.  The official opinion of the attorney general stated 
that it was constitutionally impossible for the king to issue a commission without the mandated 
oaths.122  Commissions needed to be set up to review the stipulations and if necessary abrogate 
the offensive oaths.  Therefore, the Colonial Secretary declined to place Cochrane’s nominations 
before the king.123  The Catholic majority of Newfoundland, which, in 1827 comprised 52 
percent of the province’s population, found Downing Street’s decision unacceptable.  The 
Catholic Bishop of Newfoundland, Thomas Scallan, counseled patience and for the moment, the 
crisis subsided.  Newfoundland Catholics believed that the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829 
enacted by Britain’s Parliament would apparently end the discriminatory policies aimed at 
Catholics and end the exclusion controversy in the governor’s executive council.  However, the 
Catholic Emancipation Act was applicable only in Britain, and full Catholic representation in 
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Newfoundland did not take place until 1840 when the first member of that faith became a 
representative of the provincial assembly.  Cochrane, who initially championed the Catholic 
cause, became disinterested and did not attempt to appoint a Catholic to the legislature in 1832 
when provided the opportunity to select one.  Cochrane, like his fellow proconsuls of the period, 
trod a fine line by attempting to satisfy all influential parties within the colony.  Without 
exception, proconsular administrators were well meaning and “high-minded” and were certainly 
not political Neanderthals.124  Nevertheless, Cochrane like his colleagues Colborne, Dalhousie, 
and Kempt endeavored to establish in Canada an Anglican preeminence despite the fact that the 
denomination was a minority.   
Phillip Buckner argues that proconsular administrators came from a literate and 
sophisticated segment of the aristocracy and gentry who believed firmly that they were duty 
bound to serve both King and Parliament.125  Adherence to the established church figured 
significantly into their concept of duty.  Furthermore, administrators believed that king, 
Parliament, and the Anglican Church played a significant role in maintaining an ordered society.  
Buckner writes that all politicians of Georgian and Regency periods were of the opinion that 
Britain’s stability was the result of a hierarchical society where each person knew his specific 
place.126  If this system of order were to break down, and either the Crown, nobility, or people 
achieved dominance over the others then chaos and anarchy would ensue leading to the demise 
of constitutional government and the end of the state.  Thus, British colonial administrators of 
the post-Napoleonic era employed this constitutional balance to those colonies with a western 
tradition, namely the Canadian provinces, the West Indies, and Australia.  Fred Schneider, in his 
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study of British Imperialism, echoes these sentiments.  Schneider maintains that after 1815 the 
British Empire was a product of an expanding commercial and industrial society that gained 
influence or control over large portions of the world.  It did so through the means of force, 
ideological persuasion, or settlement “with the object of shaping those societies in the interests of 
the metropolitan power and more or less in its image.”127  David Cannadine has joined the chorus 
of Imperial historians by noting that Britons viewed themselves as belonging to an unequal 
society composed of layered gradations, tested by tradition, and sanctioned by religion.128  Every 
individual Briton knew their place and from this starting point, they constructed their empire.  
The Upper Canadian secular/religious crisis of the “University Question” precipitated 
during the tenure of Sir John Colborne also revealed the serious shortcomings of traditional 
methods of administration and the proconsular system.  In the 1830s, radical and reform 
elements in the province argued that the establishment of a provincial university benefited only 
privileged elements of a minority Anglican Canadian society perpetuating a stratified aristocratic 
society similar to that found in England.  The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography notes 
that the governor was “a devout Anglican,” and his background certainly supports his preference 
for High-Church Anglicanism.129  Colborne’s stepfather was the Reverend Thomas Bargus, 
educated at Winchester and a Fellow of Pembroke College, Oxford, who served as rector of St. 
Michael’s Parish, Winchester.  G. C. Moore Smith, a biographer of Colborne, notes that Bargus 
“became a second father to his stepchildren and, received from them in return a lifelong 
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affection.”130  Colborne’s known devotion to Anglicanism almost immediately aroused 
suspicions among radicals and reformers that his conduct would be less than impartial.  William 
Lyon MacKenzie, Colborne’s chief critic and antagonist during the governor’s tenure, 
characterized him as the leader of a cabal noting in the January 5, 1831 edition of the Colonial 
Advocate, “He is continually surrounded, flattered, guided and advised by a host of church and 
state priests, placemen, sinecurists, courtiers, parasites and sycophants….”131   
Like the Newfoundland controversy ten years earlier, the Upper Canadian “University 
Question” included not only religious issues, but also essential questions concerning the nature 
of popular representation and the limits of authoritarianism at the provincial level.  The genesis 
of the problem rested with the desire of Colborne’s predecessor, Governor Sir Peregrine 
Maitland and John Strachan, Anglican Rector of York, to establish a university in Upper Canada.  
Fred D. Schneider notes that two conditions were necessary for the establishment of a colonial 
university that would strengthen ties with the mother country: the university faculty must come 
from Britain and men chosen to be educated must be from the elite of the colony.132  Thus, the 
faculty would be able to indoctrinate in their student the political and economic ideology of the 
parent state.  Under the Maitland and Strachan plan the university’s charter provided for an 
Anglican president and a governing council consisting of members of the Church of England.133  
Subsequently, a cadre of the educated elite could easily assume the reigns of power when the 
metropolitan authorities determined that the colony was ready to exercise limited power.  
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Colborne apparently agreed that an educational system in the colony provided mutual benefits 
for both the governing and the governed.  In December 1835, Colborne wrote to Bishop John 
Bethune, editor of Christian Sentinel and Anglo-Canadian Churchman’s Magazine, and proposed 
the building of a seminary in Canada which he argued would annually confer on the colony 
significant benefits, especially from the liberal and extensive education it gives to the 
colonists.”134  
 As beneficial as a university might be to the population, its establishment would reveal a 
number of critical issues concerning the changing nature of Canadian society and their views on 
British administration.  By the beginning of the third decade of the nineteenth century, the 
demographics of Upper Canada had changed significantly with the Anglican elites now a 
minority.  The population of Upper Canada had divided along two principal lines.  On one side 
was the “Family Compact,” predominantly Anglican elites.  On the other side was the majority 
composed of newly arrived immigrants of modest means and evangelical beliefs.  The “Family 
Compact” essentially collaborated with British administrators and as such were members of the 
colonial elite who comprised the bulk of the local councilors, office holders, sheriffs, militia 
officers, customs collectors, and members of the judicial system.  These individuals were 
interrelated by marriage and normally espoused conservative primarily Anglican and Tory 
viewpoints.135  They, along with the governors who exercised a considerable measure of power, 
dominated the government of Upper Canada in the 1820s and 1830s.136  By the end of the 
American War of 1812, the majority resented the rule of the few and began to agitate for a 
greater voice in colonial affairs.  Some of the Family Compact’s most vocal critics were settlers 
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of American descent who maintained small farms in the eastern section of York County and 
adhered to the Methodist beliefs of Egerton Ryerson and his Christian Guardian newspaper.137  
This activist majority viewed the “University Question” as further strengthening of the power of 
the Anglican Church and the Family Compact, at the expense of traditional British constitutional 
practices.  Both dissenters and Roman Catholics were fearful that, like the British universities of 
Cambridge and Oxford, Canadian universities, dominated by Anglican traditionalists, would 
become bastions of unwarranted social privilege.138   
In the “University Question,” reformist and radical politicians were unified in opposing 
what they perceived to be an attempt by the Anglican Church to acquire greater power and 
prestige in Upper Canada.  Mackenzie, Ryerson, and many dissenters demanded the removal of 
all tests at existing and proposed universities in Canada, arguing that colleges supported by 
public funds should be “equally accessible to persons of all religious persuasions and of all 
classes of society.”139  Unfortunately, the Tory council defeated the move, fearing that abolishing 
the tests would create universities similar to that which existed at London College.  Governor 
Colborne, caught in the middle of the controversy, sought to find a middle road by noting that 
money earmarked for a university might be better used to create a preparatory school.  However, 
the governor’s decision angered all of the interested parties.  Strachan was outraged.  Colborne 
halted progress on the creation of the university.  The Colonial Office was unhappy because the 
governor had acted arbitrarily without their approval, and the reformers believed that the 
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governor had sided with the established elites and disregarded their viewpoints.  The fall of 
Wellington’s Tory Government and the rise of the Whigs under Lord Grey in November 1830 
further weakened Colborne’s proconsular authority in Canada.  The Whigs believed in the 
economy of colonial governments and were prepared to turn over issues that such as local 
expenditure to the local assemblies.140  Local politicians continued to debate the question that, in 
time, strengthened their authority and stature and significantly weakened Colborne’s.  The 
Whig’s assumption of power in London portended a move that moderate colonial change would 
now come from the colonies rather than London.  
A number of military administrators who championed Christian values also advocated 
applying Utilitarian practice to governing their provinces.  Utilitarianism, as espoused by Jeremy 
Bentham, argued that political action should work to generate the greatest good for the maximum 
number of citizens.141  Over the years, this philosophy has been refined, debated, and scrutinized.  
Recently B.C. Postow defined the utilitarian principle as “In any given situation, and group of 
one or more agents ought to follow a course of action by means of which the group would 
produce the most good that it can produce in that situation.”142  David Cannadine argues that 
British administrators in India such as Thomas Macaulay and James Ramsay implemented a 
combination of Evangelicalism and Utilitarianism in their administrations.  These men, who 
believed local rulers to be corrupt and native customs barbaric frequently applied western style 
government and educational practices that they thought  “would be efficient rather than 
ornamental.”143  Bentham’s philosophy was entirely compatible with the British public’s notion 
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of good government.  Professor Suresh Chandra Ghosh notes that Bentham’s able disciple John 
Mill argued in his 1817 work, History of British India, that Indian society would be an ideal 
laboratory for testing reforms patterned after Benthamite models.  Mill   believed that Western 
science and knowledge would pave the way for the colony’s economic, political, and social 
progress.144  As noted, at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, Britons were convinced of the 
superiority of liberal government, which in many instances employed Utilitarian philosophy that 
proved beneficial to all who encountered it.145  Britain’s victory at Waterloo, its economic 
strength, and size of its global empire confirmed this notion of exceptionalism.  From 1830 on, 
the British public deemed their government to be superior to that of the republicanism and 
autocracy of the continental European states.  As a result, Britons felt compelled to spread their 
notion of good government to those states and peoples whom they believed were governed 
badly.  British proconsular colonial administrations, in particular, were ideally suited for carrying 
out Utilitarian experiments.  Both Bentham and Mill argued that authoritarian administrations 
were the best vehicles for imposing benevolent policies on a naïve population.146  The East India 
Company’s administrations of the Earl of Cornwallis and Richard Wellesley provided a 
foundation on which Anglicization of Indian political, economic, and social institutions could 
take root.  Cornwallis, in particular, found the Company’s pragmatic practice of continuing 
traditional Indian methods of governance to be the source of every evil.147  During his tenure as 
governor general, Cornwallis extended the Company’s control by introducing district 
administration and British judicial practices.  Government interference at the local level was, 
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however, to be limited to the bare necessities.  Professor Eric Stokes notes that Cornwallis 
followed a Whig philosophy of government that had as its central belief that political power was 
“essentially corrupting and inevitably abused; that power, to be exercised with safety, must be 
reduced to a minimum, and even then kept divided and counterbalanced.”148  East India Company 
governors who administered British possessions in India after 1815 rarely followed Cornwallis’ 
methodology.  Thomas Munro, John Malcolm, Mountstuart Elphinstone, and Charles Theophilus 
Metcalf, subordinates of either Cornwallis or Wellesley, repudiated Whig philosophy, choosing 
instead to bring the entire subcontinent under complete British subjugation.  Britain would rule 
India according to British traditions, not Indian ones.   
Noteworthy proconsuls who appeared to have applied Utilitarianism to their governing 
methodologies were Lieutenant Colonel Lachlan Macquarie, who governed New South Wales 
from January 1810 to December 1821 and Lieutenant General William Cavendish Lord 
Bentinck, who administered Sicily during the Napoleonic Wars and later became Governor 
General of India.  Peter Burroughs describes Macquarie as a classic example of a benevolent 
military autocrat who was disdainful of orders and unconcerned with legality.149  Professor Peter 
Burroughs of Dalhousie University, Nova Scotia, observes that Macquarie heads a list of 
masterful individuals who acted independently and frequently exceeded Colonial Office 
instructions “with cavalier exuberance and …impunity.”  Macquarie, a career officer had risen 
through the ranks seeing action in the Mediterranean and India during the Napoleonic Wars.  
When the 73
rd
 Foot arrived in New South Wales in 1809, Macquarie received an appointment as 
both regimental commander and provincial governor.  The new governor immediately grappled 
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with a host of problems that plagued the infamous penal colony, including quelling a rebellion, 
restoring order, and sending the previous governor, William Bligh, of H. M. S. Bounty fame, 
home in disgrace.  Macquarie, with his wife’s assistance then, began a nearly two decades 
authoritarian rule of apparently benevolent Utilitarianism.  He instituted a vigorous building 
program, revamped the judicial administration, integrated convicts into Australian society, 
curbed rampant vice, instituted temperance, and protected aborigines in Australia and Maoris in 
adjacent New Zealand.  The governor of New South Wales was especially successful in 
rehabilitating convicts, emancipating them and restoring their rights after they had served their 
sentences.  Macquarie’s legacy in Australia was that he was singularly responsible for converting 
the nature of the colony from that of prison to that of a vibrant territory financially beneficial to 
the Crown.  
Macquarie’s tenure as a benevolent autocrat brought good government to New South 
Wales to the greatest number of its inhabitants.  Because of its remote location in the empire, 
Macquarie frequently acted independently implementing his own programs and agendas.  As 
Burroughs points out, administrators separated from the homeland by long distances determined 
policies compatible with their provinces’ peculiar situations.150  Geoffrey Blainey observes that 
ships carrying dispatches and news from Australia took between twelve and eighteen months to 
reach England.151  Early in his career as a governor, Macquarie reduced arbitrary punishments 
meted out to convicts, frequently advocating clemency.152  His chief judicial officials Ellis Bite 
and Sir John Wylde, noted that the governor was far too indulgent with the convicts.  Macquarie 
prohibited gaolers and superintendents from punishing prisoners arbitrarily, as he assumed 
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complete control over prisoner discipline.  Macquarie was also responsible for massive building 
projects that largely benefited the convict population of Sydney.  In 1810, the governor began 
work on a hospital as the building currently in use was little better than “a ruined shed.”153  
Macquarie declined to finance the hospital with government funds instead choosing to use 
money collected from the importation of rum.  In addition to the hospital, the governor rebuilt 
many of the existing Sydney churches because of his conviction that regular religious services 
would reform the colony’s convicts.  At the end of Macquarie’s tenure, J. Lycett, commented on 
the city of Sydney in his 1825 work, Views in Australia: 
There are now numerous habitations of various descriptions, some excellently 
built with stone, two stories in height, and many very good brick-built houses.  
The public Buildings were all erected during the governorship of Major-General 
Macquarie, by whose active zeal and sound judgment the whole Colony, and 
Sydney in particular, was improved with rapidity truly surprising.  Among other 
erections which arose under his vigilant superintendence, must be particularly 
noticed the King’s Stores, Commissariat Offices and Stores, the Guard-house, two 
Courts of Justice, the General Hospital, the Military Hospital, the Military 
Barracks, the Governor’s Stables, the new Fort at the mouth of the Harbour, 
Dawe’s Battery, new Church, Prisoners’ Barracks, Dragoons’ Stable and 
Barracks, the Market-house, Judges’ Houses, Secretary’s Offices and Swelling, 
Offices and House of the principal Magistrate of Police, Governor’s Guard 
House, and General Guard House.  Many of these are very handsome large stone 
Buildings; others of brick, but they are all very commodious.154 
 
However, Macquarie’s enlightened humanitarian rule and public building policy did not 
please the Colonial Office.  J. M. Bennett argues that the governor’s good faith standards and 
progressive policies upset the traditional order, and that Macquarie’s successful governance 
offended wealthy citizens, judicial officers, and Anglican churchmen, who saw their power and 
influence diminished.  Bathurst’s criticisms of the Macquarie administration in Australia were 
two-fold in nature.  First, he was concerned that governmental expenditures in maintaining the 
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colony exceeded imperial estimates.  On this point, Bathurst was disingenuous, as Macquarie had 
reduced significantly the government’s cost of sustaining convicts.  In 1810, the first full year of 
Macquarie’s governorship it had cost the Colonial Office £60 to keep a convict, in 1821, the last 
year of his tenure, the cost was reduced to less than £15 per convict.155  Government expenses for 
keeping convicts in New South Wales had indeed risen.  This was largely because of economic 
unrest in Britain following the end of the Napoleonic Wars causing the crime rate to rise.  
Between 1810 and 1820, 16,943 convicts were s transported to New South Wales from Britain, 
and 11, 250 of these arrived in 1816.156   
On the second point, Bathurst sided with the established elites of New South Wales who 
insisted on reinstating rigorous and harsh oversight of the convicts.  Bathurst, in his 1819 
instructions to John T. Bigge, Parliamentary Select Commissioner on Gaols, informed him that 
New South Wales was once again to be “rendered an Object of real Terror” and that any decision 
motivated by compassion for convicts by Macquarie should be reported.157  Bigge’s first report of 
June 1822 ignored the fact that the governor’s system of repatriating convicts into Australian 
society was working and instead criticized their integration into Sydney society.  Moreover, 
Bigge disapproved of Macquarie’s building projects, characterizing them as wasteful and 
unnecessary at a time when colonial administrators should be practicing frugality.  Bigge’s 
biographer, J. M. Bennett notes that the commissioner’s reports were little more than 
misrepresentations and innuendo created to strengthen his standing with the traditional elites of 
New South Wales stating that the commissioner reported only what he chose exhibiting an 
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overwhelming prejudice against Macquarie.158  Chiefly because of Bigge’s first and subsequent 
reports, Bathurst recalled Macquarie, replacing him with another military man, Sir Thomas 
Brisbane.  
William Cavendish Bentinck was well acquainted with Utilitarian practices.  Scholars 
Manazir Ahmad and Eric Stokes believe that Bentinck’s relationship with Jeremy Bentham and 
John Mill influenced his political philosophy.159  Born William Cavendish Bentinck, he came 
from an aristocratic family who traveled to England in the late seventeenth century in the 
entourage of William of Orange.  Bentinck, while commander in chief of British forces 
occupying Sicily during the last years of the Napoleonic Wars, employed measures construed as 
Utilitarian in nature, introducing  judicial reforms and principles based on the British 
constitutional model.  While these reforms were largely unsuccessful and short-lived, Bentinck, 
described by Sir Charles Webster as “ A brilliant and unbalanced egoist all the more dangerous 
because he was also imbued with a species of idealism,” held these views throughout his 
administrative career.160  Indeed, in 1827, when notified that he was appointed Governor General 
of India, Bentinck wrote Bentham, “I am going to British India, but I shall not be the Governor 
General.  It is you that will be Governor General.”161  Immediately upon arrival in India, 
Bentinck created a sensation by proclaiming that he wanted suggestions from all groups in the 
colony, both European and Indian to further “the general prosperity and happiness of the British 
empire in India.”162 
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As Governor General of India, Bentinck embarked on a program that included improving 
the efficiency of the Company’s civil service while cutting administrative expenses.  In his quest 
to accomplish these measures, the governor general found it necessary to adopt a plan put forth 
by Holt Mackenzie, a high-ranking Company civil servant: to reform completely the executive 
and judicial administrative structure of the colony.  Bentinck envisioned that the most cost 
effective method would be military in form with a European military officer in charge of a 
district, having the local powers of  “judicature, police and revenue.”163  Under the officer, 
natives would serve the local populace but always be subject to the European’s oversight.  
Districts would be under the administration and scrutiny of the province, governed by a 
commissioner who, in turn, was responsible to one of the three presidencies.  The pinnacle of 
this hierarchy was the Supreme Government “which should exercise authority in all branches of 
the administration, including the revising, correcting and altering of judicial decisions, wherever 
it might deem its interference necessary from good and sufficient cause.”164  Bentinck and 
Mackenzie believed that these measures would improve efficiency and promote affection by a 
populace who were no longer burdened with the corrupt and despotic methods of the past.  
Bentinck’s tenure in India was also notable for a number of additional reforms he enacted 
while governor.  Chief among these was the transformation of the Indian educational system.  
Bentinck believed that the adoption of English as the official language and education patterned 
on western style methods would benefit the population.  Beginning in 1813, a chorus of voices 
that included Charles Grant and William Wilberforce of the Clapham Sect advocated western 
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education that “informed and enlightened the minds of the natives of India.”165  Bentinck 
believed that by educating Indians in Western traditions, the British could fashion a future 
colonial administration composed of lower and midlevel civil servants.  With the adoption of a 
Western rather than Oriental modes of education, a service class of high-caste Hindus “fulfilled 
the intention of westernizing reformers of the 1830s to create ‘interpreters’ between British 
rulers and Indian society.166  Moreover, before Bentinck resigned his governorship in 1835, his 
administration enacted reforms that included the abolishment of Sutee, or the immolation of 
Hindu widows, and the reform of the East India Company’s military forces.   
Along with the incentive of promoting good government similar to the English model, 
there was the very real attraction by British administrators of furthering their own financial well-
being.  Yearly salaries for governorships and high-level colonial administrative positions were 
generous and frequently more lucrative than salaries available at home.  For example, in 1830s, 
the governor of the Cape Colony received £5000 annually, the lieutenant governor of Sierra 
Leone £2000, the governor of Ceylon £8000, and the governor in chief of Lower Canada 
£5000.167  Additionally, military governors received staff-pay commensurate with their rank.  In 
1828, the governor of New South Wales, Lieutenant General Sir Ralph Darling, earned £4200 
annually as governor and £691 19s. 7d. military pay.168  In most instances, administrators 
intended to live and work overseas long enough to settle their financial difficulties and save for a 
comfortable retirement in Britain.  Sir Charles Theophilius Baron Metcalf, a career East India 
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political official, believed, that as chief administrator for Delhi, he could save at least 800 rupees 
a month from his salary of 2000 rupees.  In 1810, the period of his Delhi appointment, 800 
rupees was the equivalent value of nearly £100.169  Metcalf had determined that at this rate, he 
could invest his savings at a high rate of interest earning nearly £3000 per year, accumulating 
enough wealth to retire to England in twelve or fifteen years living “in a manner in which I mean 
to live.”170 
Many colonial governors, however, were disappointed that overseas positions were not 
the panacea to alleviate their acute financial difficulties brought on by army reductions in the 
wake of Waterloo.  Major reductions in the British military in the 1820 placed a significant 
number of officers on half-pay.  Lord FitzRoy Somerset calculated that the troop reductions of 
1821 put a substantial 638 serving officers on half-pay.171  Additional reductions among staff 
officers in 1828, 1829, and 1830 culled 108 more officers from the army rolls.172  Furthermore, 
an Act of Parliament in 1831-1832 reduced the pay of all serving lieutenant generals dropping it 
to that of a major general as the government continued its quest to cut military budgets.  Career 
officers, however, clung to the belief that officers serving in the colonies received substantial 
salaries and could improve their economic situation.  In 1819, Stapleton Cotton Lord 
Combermere wrote to the Duke of Wellington that his probable appointment to the governorship 
of Ceylon would net him £12,000 a year, which is considerably more than he had earned at his 
present post.  Combermere felt that he could not refuse the present offer unless he received a 
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more attractive colonial position, “but would always give it up if there was a prospect of active 
military service.”173   
One of the great myths of colonial service, then and now, was that governors and their 
subordinates became wealthy serving overseas.  Evidence presented by high-ranking military 
officers during the 1833 Parliamentary Select Hearings on Army and Navy Appointments dispels 
this notion.  For high ranking administrators, specifically governors, lieutenant governors, and 
commandants, out of pocket expenses were considerably higher than anticipated because these 
administrators were expected to pay the expense of entertaining both civilian authorities and 
members of his military staff.174  During subsequent hearings, Lord Viscount Ebrington 
wondered if the increased costs and the reductions in salaries might consequently limit the 
Government in obtaining the best men to administer overseas posts.175  Lord FitzRoy Somerset 
indicated that a considerable number of qualified and deserving officers “will not be induced to 
go to these foreign commands …” as they would find it difficult “in keeping up the sort of 
establishment that they must have to maintain their situation with the means at present afforded 
them.”176  Somerset cited the example of a “very capable,” but unnamed officer who declined the 
appointment of Commander-in-Chief in the West Indies because of salary.  Furthermore, it was 
reported to him that Sir Matthew Whitworth, Lord Aylmer, governor of Lower Canada, Sir 
Frederick Adam, commander of forces on the Ionian Islands, Lieutenant General Sir George 
Murray, commander of British forces in Ireland, and an unidentified Governor of Nova Scotia 
(probably Sir Peregrine Maitland), lost considerable amounts of personal cash while employed as 
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administrators.  Somerset noted that military governors often incurred considerably greater 
expenses than their civilian counterparts.  
Despite the increased expenses, some enterprising administrators were able to make their 
overseas duty profitable.  Most often governors, administrators, and their subordinates speculated 
in land as an easy opportunity to alleviate their financial burdens and put away substantial 
amounts of cash for retirement.  Cape Colony’s governor D’Urban awarded Colonel Harry Smith 
large tracts of land along the Buffalo River that was rich in timber and granite.177  Smith assured 
his wife Juana that he planned to sell the land as soon as settlers began to move into the province 
observing “Money is the word.”178  However, evidence indicates that many colonial 
administrators were careful not to appear as land speculators, carefully masking their financial 
dealings to avoid any hint of scandal.  Stapleton Cotton Lord Combermere wrote to the 
Wellington in 1821 requesting that the he use his influence to secure for him a colonial 
appointment.  Combermere “assures Wellington that he has never speculated in the West Indies.  
The property he has in Nevis and Saint Kitts was left to him and his son by his first wife….”179  
Combermere, however, was concerned that this situation hinted of a scandal and that it would 
keep him from obtaining future colonial postings.   
 
Conclusion 
 In the immediate aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, Britain’s small Colonial Office 
bureaucracy was woefully unprepared to manage its newly acquired and vast global empire.  In 
need of an immediate solution, Colonial Office Secretary Lord Bathurst turned to a remedy that 
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had served empires for millennia, proconsular despotism.  The practice of proconsular despotism 
was familiar to British elites in that the state had employed it in governing selected colonies 
before American Revolution.  After 1815, this form of governance became the norm throughout 
the empire.  The Colonial Office with Parliament’s approval determined that serving military 
officers be employed as administrators all across the globe.  Parliament believed that bestowing 
colonial posts on senior officers would be a means of rewarding these military men for 
distinguished service they had rendered during the nearly quarter of a century of war with 
France.  
 The employment of military officers in administrative colonial posts appeared to be the 
ideal answer in that it engaged the services of officers that otherwise would have been 
demobilized during the reduction of the army following the Napoleonic Wars.  Furthermore, the 
placement of military officers in the colonies was a fiscally sound policy during a period of 
Parliamentary economic retrenchment.  Military proconsuls fulfilled a dual role both as civil 
administrators and as regimental officers with military commands in colonies that had restive 
populations, hostile neighbors, or both.   
 The first generation of post-Napoleonic War colonial proconsuls were primarily chosen 
from general officers who had commanded divisions or brigades in Wellington’s Peninsular 
Army.  Frequently, these officers came from the ranks of Britain’s aristocracy or landed gentry.  
As these men retired or died, younger subordinates who had served in field grade or staff 
positions replaced them.  The proconsuls who followed, however, rarely came from the 
aristocracy or gentry.  Instead, these officers frequently were members of a rising British middle 
class who had received extensive staff training during the Napoleonic Wars.   
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CHAPTER FIVE: A SOCIAL PROFILE OF THE POST-NAPOLEONIC BRITISH MILITARY 
OFFICER 
 
In September 1913, Captain Acland Anderson, of the 3
rd
 Dragoon Guards and a former 
colonel commandant of His Majesty’s Military Forces in Victoria, Australia, and son of 
Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Anderson, published his father’s memoirs.  During his lifetime, the 
elder Anderson was commissioned at the outset of the Napoleonic Wars, served in the Peninsula, 
and then in the post-Waterloo army occupied a number of regimental and staff positions in the 
West Indies, New South Wales, and India.  He ended his long and distinguished career by 
retiring in September 1848 in Australia as a lieutenant colonel.  Originally, this memoir, like 
many others of its kind, was not intended for popular distribution and was written only for the 
family.  Renewed interest on the occasion of the centenary of the Napoleonic Wars prompted 
many publishing houses to collect and produce Napoleonic era reminisces.  Commercial demand 
for such books was high. Ronald J. Caldwell’s bibliographical research notes that between 1908 
and 1914 at least seventy-two book-length memoirs and wartime letters by Peninsular War 
veterans had been published.1   
Personal memoirs, while valuable, must be carefully scrutinized. Charles Oman warned 
that great care should be exercised when weighing the evidence presented in these memoirs.  He 
claimed that these remembrances fall into three categories of decreasing value.2  The first, where 
memory is vivid, consists of diaries and letters written while on campaign.  These documents 
frequently followed events as they occurred.3  The second group, was also based on letters and 
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diaries, but they were written long after the events took place.  Here memories have faded and 
the sequence of events and specific details are imprecise.  Oman characterized these works as 
charming romantic tales whose value is diminished by the author’s desire to be dramatic rather 
than accurate.  The final group comprises those books written by well-known authors interested 
in a good story rather than an accurate depiction of the events.  Even for the most meticulous 
observer, what was once a vivid memory becomes blurred over time.  Keeping in mind these 
limitations, memoirs provide an important insight into the life and personality of the 
author/soldier.  Anderson’s memoir, like many of those published by his comrades, continued his 
story past his Napoleonic service, offering a career-long study of his life.  Many of these officers 
served in the post-Waterloo British Army in colonial positions.  The value of Anderson’s 
memoir is that it is an excellent case study of the military’s involvement in the colonial empire.  
Others in this genre and equally important to this study include Joseph Gubbin’s New Brunswick 
Journals of 1811 & 1813, George Bell’s Rough Notes by an Old Soldier During Fifty Years 
Service, Robert C. Wallace’s Forty Years in the World; or Sketches and Tales of a Soldier’s 
Life, and Walter Henry’s Surgeon Henry’s Trifles: Events of a Military Life.  In addition, 
memoirs provide a basis for recreating service records for British officers during the Napoleonic 
Wars and the Regency periods.  Recreating service records during these times is problematic for 
the historian in that the War Office did not develop a single comprehensive service record until 
the mid-1830s.  Prior to that time, there were no records in the British Army comparable to the 
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French Army’s contrôle de troupes that contained information on the provincial origin and social 
background of its soldiers.4 
Beside the numerous memoirs available, a wealth of information can be gathered from 
the many available regimental histories.  These histories fall into two categories: those that were 
compiled under War Office direction by Richard Cannon, Adjutant General’s Office, and 
published in the 1830s and 1840s; and those created outside official circles at a later date.  
Unfortunately, the Cannon series suffers from numerous historiographical flaws that include 
unsubstantiated research, too few regimental statistics, and an arid and lackluster writing style.  
All of the contributions in the series exhibit a dull sameness and hasty construction that does 
little to commend itself to the 1836 Horse Guard directive that inaugurated the series.5  However, 
the later regimental histories are valuable tools in tracing officers’ careers as many of them 
                                                 
4 Sylvia Frey, The British Soldier in America (Austin, Texas: The University of Austin Press, 1981), 9. 
5 A January 1836 Horse Guard General Order specified: 
 “His Majesty has been pleased to command that, with a view of doing the fullest justice to Regiments, as 
well as to Individuals who have distinguished themselves by their Bravery in Action with the Enemy, an Account of 
the Services of every Regiment in the British Army shall be published under the superintendence and direction of 
the Adjutant General; and that this Account shall contain the following particulars, viz.:-- 
---The Period and Circumstances of the Original Formation of the Regiment; The Stations at which it has 
been from time to time employed; The Battles, Sieges, and other Military Operations in which it has been engaged, 
particularly specifying any Achievement it may have performed, and the Colours, Trophies, &c., it may have 
captured from the Enemy. 
---The Names of the Officers and the number of Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates Killed or 
Wounded by the Enemy, specifying the Place and Date of the Action. 
---The Names of those Officers who, in consideration of the Gallant Services and Meritorious Conduct in 
Engagements with the Enemy , have been distinguished with Titles, Medals, or other Marks of His Majesty’s 
gracious favour. 
---The Names of all such Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Privates, as may have specially 
signalized themselves in Action. 
And, 
---The Badges and Devices which the Regiment may have been permitted to bear, and the Causes on 
account of which such Badges or Devices, or any other Marks of Distinction, have been granted. 
By Command of the Right Honourable 
      GENERAL LORD HILL 
                        Commanding-in-Chief                         
                         John MacDonald, 
                         Adjutant-General 
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exhibit a high standard of accuracy relying on the Public Record Office, regimental archival 
materials, veteran interviews, and unpublished papers from former officers.  As Oman observed, 
regimental histories written after 1860s are superior in that they display solid historiographical 
methodology and offer subsequent generations of researchers statistical and personnel data 
unavailable from existent War Office documents.  The sheer volume of unofficial regimental 
histories makes these works indispensable when recreating Regency period military personnel 
records.  In 1965, War Office librarian Arthur White, working in conjunction with The Society 
for Army Historical Research, compiled a bibliography of British Army regimental histories.  
White’s research uncovered hundreds of published regimental histories for Guards, Cavalry, 
Infantry, Artillery, and Engineer formations.  For example, during the Napoleonic Wars, Britain 
fielded six regiments of Guards, thirty-two cavalry regiments, one hundred and four regiments of 
infantry, ten regiments of the King’s German Legion, seven foreign regiments, and 
approximately sixty-one regiments in the East India Company’s army.6  Fortescue reports that in 
1819, a much-reduced British Army comprised some ninety-three regiments of infantry and 
seventeen of cavalry remained.7  Using these numbers as a guide and calculating conservatively 
an average of three studies per regiment yields nearly four hundred regimental histories.  In 
addition to data supplied in the text, many of these histories have exhaustive appendices 
supplying officers’ service records and vital personal information.  Among the best are R.P. 
Dunn-Pattison’s, History of the 91
st
 Argyllshire Highlanders, W. F. Butler’s, Narrative of the 
Historical Events Connected with the Sixty-Ninth Regiment, G. L. Goff’s Historical Records of 
                                                 
6 The number of British Army regiments determined from tables constructed by Richard Partridge and 
Michael Oliver, Napoleonic Army Handbook: The British Army and Her Allies (London: Constable and Co., 1999), 
35-89. 
7 J. W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army, Vol. XI, 1815-1838 (London: Macmillan and Co., 
Limited, 1923), 56. 
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the 91
st
 Argyllshire Highlanders, and Neil McMicking’s, Officers of the Black Watch, 1725-
1937. 
   Official and semi-official publications and documents such as Hart’s annual List of All 
the Officers of the Army and Royal Marines on Full and Half Pay, the War Office’s Return of 
the Names of the Officers in the Army, who receive Pensions for the loss of Limbs, or for 
wounds, the incomplete 1829 Statement of Service for Retired Officers, the Royal Military 
Calendar or Army Service and Commission Book, and the East India Company’s Alphabetical 
List of the Officers of the Indian Army contribute important information that assists the historian 
in constructing a social profile of the British officers who administered the empire.  None of 
these official and semi/official papers present a complete picture of an officer’s military career.  
Hart’s list is nothing more than an annual register of general and field officers, their regimental 
affiliation, if they were subject to full pay, half-pay, or retired, the date of their commission (in 
both the army and the regiment), and honorary distinctions or medals received.  The War 
Office’s pension returns were a periodic listing of all officers who received emoluments for 
wounds or loss of limbs while in service.  The pension roll is limited to listing the officer’s name, 
his regiment, the military rank held when wounded, the officer’s present rank, the nature of the 
wound, the place and year when the wound occurred, the amount of the pension, and the date in 
which the pension began.  The 1818 Pension rolls are useful in that the lists can confirm an 
officer’s regimental affiliation, especially in an army in which officers frequently moved from 
regiment to regiment. 
For the researcher, the 1829 Statement of Service for Retired Officers yields the single 
most comprehensive accumulation of data in one record.8  This roll is confined to those officers 
                                                 
8 See Appendix II for a copy of the form retired officers we
 182
who retired from military service before 1829.  There is considerable biographical information 
for the names contained in this list.  Information most commonly found in this report include the 
officer’s date and place of birth, his commission dates, a summary of his military record, his 
present pay category (if he is receiving full pay, half-pay, or is retired), marriage and family data, 
and if the officer is available for further service.  However, even this significant document has its 
limitations.  The Statement of Service was a voluntary submission of personal and service 
information tendered to the War Office.  The document was a blank form sent to retired officers 
who then were to fill it out and forward it to the Horse Guards.  Because it was voluntary, many 
officers failed to supply critical information rendering the record incomplete.  The Royal 
Military Calendar or Army Service and Commission Book, first published in 1821, contains 
similar information found in the 1829 Statements of Service.  This document also has some 
significant limitations.  The list, consisting of five volumes, contains detailed information on the 
careers of hundreds of officers, but the listing only includes those officers who held the rank of 
major or higher in 1820.  In 1820, a substantial number of company-grade officers would not 
have yet attained their majority because of the army’s recent rapid reduction slowed promotions.  
The Duke of York’s December 1809 regulations that stipulated that no captain could have 
advanced in rank until he had served at least six years in that rank.9   While the service records of 
high-ranking British officers are described in detail, the Military Calendar offers few 
demographic details.  For example, the record does not give either the officer’s date or place of 
birth, nor does it yield any supplemental information such as if the officer were married or had 
any offspring.  Moreover, the Military Calendar was privately published in 1820 and no 
additional volumes were issued after that date.  
                                                 
9 Philip J. Haythornthwaite, The Armies of Wellington (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1994), 31-32. 
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Another valuable tool in recreating the social profile of British officers who served in 
colonial administration are records from the East India Company.  Two important documents 
available are the Alphabetical List of the Officers of the Indian Army published in 1838, and 
Vernon C. P. Hobson’s List of the officers of the Bengal Army, 1758-1832 compiled between 
1927 and 1947.  While the East India Company’s military service was a separate entity and not a 
part of the British Army, it was by its composition and structure intimately connected with the 
Crown and the Horse Guards.  A significant number of officers who served during the 
Napoleonic Wars and the Regency periods came from military families who had intimate ties 
with the East India Company’s Army.  For example, Philip VanCortlandt, an American loyalist 
who settled in Halisham, Sussex, sired a number of children who served as officers in either the 
regular army or in the East India Company Army. 10 
 Each of the three Indian Presidencies—Bombay, Madras, and Bengal—retained military 
forces for both internal and external defense.11  British officers commanded these forces, 
composed of native Indian soldiers, or sepoys, and Indian non-commissioned officers.  In 
addition to these forces, there were in each presidency a small number of exclusively European 
regiments officered and manned by Europeans.  British regular regiments also served in India as 
separate and distinct units. Contemporaries argued that these European regiments, paid and 
maintained with Company funds, stiffened the fighting spirit of native troops. 
 The multiplicity and complexity of the forces in the Company’s Army fostered 
confusion and jealousy among its officers.  Questions concerning honor, precedence, and chains 
of command continually plagued the army’s ability to function effectively.  Advantages enjoyed 
                                                 
10 For a more detailed examination of the VanCortlandt family and their military service see Chapter Six.  
11 Richard Holmes, ed., The Oxford Companion to Military History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 435. 
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by the King’s regiments irked officers who served in the either the Company’s native regiments 
or the European regiments that did not possess such advantages.  For example, a King’s officer 
had the power to issue orders to a Company officer of equal rank.12  Furthermore, officer’s pay in 
a King’s regiment was often higher than that of a Company officer.  Nonetheless, officers who 
served in the Company Army were vital in assisting Crown and Company with administrative 
duties in India, Ceylon, and throughout the East Indies.  Arthur N. Gilbert notes that despite the 
criticisms leveled at the Company Army by the regular Army and lawmakers in London, the 
Company Army was remarkably successful during its existence in exerting the authority of the 
East India Company and Britain on the subcontinent.13  
Sociological research by carried out by scholars such as P. E. Razzell on the Indian Army 
and J. A. Houlding on the eighteenth century British Army are useful in providing the researcher 
with significant preliminary data on the social composition of the post-Napoleonic British 
Army.14  Razzell, who primarily focuses his study on the social composition of officers in the 
Indian Army, provides valuable data templates on which to construct a social profile of a 
contemporaneous group.  Likewise, Houlding’s authoritative study of officers offers significant 
research on the ancestors of the men examined in this study.  Work by both these scholars 
provide this study with points of comparison and divergence in creating a social profile of early 
nineteenth century British officers as each historian examines the social origin, birthplace, rank, 
length of service, and social status of the officers.   
                                                 
12 Cyril Henry Philips, The East India Company , 1784-1834 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1961), 54. 
13 Arthur N. Gilbert, “Recruitment and Reform in the East India Company Army, 1760-1800,” in The 
Journal of British Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Autumn, 1975), pp. 89-111. 
14 For data on the social origins of the East India Company’s Army see P.E. Razzell, “Social Origins of 
Officers in the Indian and British Home Army: 1758-1962,” in The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 14, No. 3, 
(Sep., 1963), pp. 248-260 and statistical data for the eighteenth century British Army see J. A. Houlding, Fit For 
Service: the Training of the British Army, 1715-1795 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 99-116. 
 185
Important information in reconstructing a social profile can also be gleaned from a 
number of secondary sources.  Three significant works, all published in the early twentieth 
century, contribute essential information in reconstructing the lives and careers of these 
individuals.  Charles Dalton’s Waterloo Roll Call (1904) is a valuable compilation of data from 
the relatives of officers who served at Waterloo.  Dalton combined the information he had 
gathered with the obituary notices collected by J. W. O’Brien, formerly of the 4
th
 Dragoon 
Guards.15  His work, the collection of nearly 1800 biographies, lists only those officers who 
participated in the Battle of Waterloo.  A second work published just four years after Dalton’s 
study, L. Homfray Irving’s British Forces in Canada during the War of 1812-15, records the 
biographies of British and Canadian officers who served in Canada during the American War of 
1812.  This work, nearly identical in form and structure to Dalton’s study, was compiled from 
information found in Upper and Lower Canada land grant records, pay lists, appointments, 
promotions, militia rolls, Army Lists, petitions, returns, correspondence, military magazines, and 
obituaries in local newspapers.16  The third source is Colonel Robert Holden Mackenzie’s The 
Trafalgar Roll Call published in 1913.  On first sight, the Trafalgar Roll Call, a naval action in 
1805, may not appear to be relevant or connected to a study of British proconsuls, however, a 
small number of naval officers served in colonial administrative capacities.  Moreover, a number 
of British Army regiments such as the 30
th
, 51
st
, 69
th
, and the 12
th
 Light Dragoon regiments 
served as marines aboard Royal Navy ships during the Napoleonic Wars, and the biographies of 
these officers have been included in the roll.17  The Trafalgar Roll is an accurate career record of 
                                                 
15 Charles Dalton, The Waterloo Roll Call (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1971), i.  
16 L. Homfray Irving, British Forces in Canada during the War of 1812-15 (N.l.: Welland Tribune Print., 
1908), ii. 
17 Mark Adkin, The Waterloo Companion: A Complete Guide to History’s Most Famous Land Battle 
(Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 2001), 178. 
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the officers and men who participated in this seminal battle.18  The roll is invaluable in that it 
yields information on the birthdates, promotions, actions, and dates of death for nearly all of the 
officers present at the battle.  
Research conducted by British antiquarian Lionel Challis is also beneficial in uncovering 
personal records of Napoleonic and Regency era British military officers.  As British Army 
historian John Hall observes, Challis devoted nearly forty years of his life, from before the First 
World War until shortly after the Second World War, sifting through War Office records located 
in the Public Record Office, Kew.  In 1948, Challis had compiled on note cards the service 
records of nearly ten thousand officers who had served in the British Army during the Peninsular 
War.  Unfortunately, much of the card file so meticulously created by Challis was lost when the 
collection was moved from the Royal United Services Institution.  It is unknown if most of the 
collection was destroyed or just mislaid.  The surviving cards are now in the possession of the 
National Army Museum, Chelsea, and form the basis of John Hall’s History of the Peninsular 
War, Volume VIII: the Biographical Dictionary of British Officers Killed and Wounded, 1808-
1814 that lists the careers of officers who were killed or sustained wounds in Iberia.  Hall and 
Challis’ work utilize a multiplicity of sources, including articles and promotion notices in The 
Gentleman’s Magazine and The London Gazette, and the already mentioned 1829 Statement of 
Service for Retired Officers.   
By employing these sources, a military record can be recreated contributing to a 
comprehensive social portrait of British officers.  This new data pool focuses on the wider 
sample considering all British officers who served during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
periods.  All colonial officers originated from this pool, including chief administrative officers 
                                                 
18 Robert Holden Mackenzie, The Trafalgar Roll (London: Chatham Publishing, 2004), xiv.  
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and all other officers who functioned in subordinate and minor positions in both the civilian and 
military capacities.  A random sample of 236 British officers out of a total 10,590, or 2 percent 
of all officers who served in the Peninsular War contribute to this survey.19 Officers were chosen 
on the basis of supplying fairly complete military records in their 1829 Statement of Retired 
Officers.  Data parameters include all individuals who have known birthdates and birthplaces, 
their age when they began their military careers, wartime career information, post 1815 overseas 
service, and their place of residence upon retirement.20  
The average age of 346 surveyed officers when they entered military service was 
seventeen and a half years old.  However, the ages of officers when they received their first 
commissions varied considerably.  Henry Gillman was commissioned into the 27
th
 Foot at the 
tender age of one year, and Andrew Brown became an officer in 1795 at 29 years when he joined 
the 79
th
 Foot.  The majority of these young men, 48.3 percent, were born in the period 1780-
1789, while 43.1 percent were born a decade later.  Officers born between 1760 and 1769 
amounted to .03 percent, 7.8 percent were born in the 1770s, and .06 percent of the sample 
reported that their birthdates were unknown.21  The bulk of the surveyed officers received their 
first officer commissions during their late teens or early twenties.  Nevertheless, on closer 
examination, many of these officers entered the service during a time of extraordinary national 
consciousness and popular patriotism.  George Cruikshank, a witness to the popular spirit 
                                                 
19 This data on serving British officers of the Napoleonic period comes from the Army Records Society.  
The society, founded in 1984 with the intent of publishing original records that describe the “development, 
organization, administration, and activities of the British Army.”  Roger Norman Buckley cites this information in 
the preface of his edition of Thomas Henry Browne, The Napoleonic War Journal of Captain Thomas Henry 
Browne, 1807-1816, ed. Roger Norman Buckley (London: The Bodley Head, 1987), 3.  
20 Surveyed individuals were selected randomly from among those officers who supplied the most complete 
Statement of Retired Officers.  Information supplied was voluntary and officers who completed the form often left 
entire sections blank.  See appendices for complete form.    
21 Andrew Creach and William Farmer supplied to the Horse Guards detailed statements of service but 
indicated that they knew neither the place of their birth, the date of their birth, nor their age when they received their 
first commission. 
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evident during the French Revolutionary Wars and the subsequent invasion scares that threatened 
Britain in the first years of the nineteenth century, argues that this was a period of patriotic 
enthusiasm and martial volunteerism.  Cruickshank notes that in 1804, that volunteers, militia, 
and yeomanry regiments numbered more than 300,000 infantry; 33,000 cavalry; and 8,000 
artillerymen.22  It is during this time of popular passion that a significant number of the surveyed 
officers joined their regiments for the first time.  Returning to the 346 officers listed in the 1829 
survey eighty-four, or 24.3 percent, of the total began their military careers between 1794 and 
1805.  Moreover, the survey indicates that fourteen of these eighty-four noted in their service 
record that they joined local militia and yeomanry units before joining a regular regiment.   
 More than half of 236 surveyed officers who knew the place of birth were born in either 
in Ireland, which constituted 39 percent; or Scotland, the remaining 20 percent.  Historically, the 
Irish and the Scots were martial races and contributed, in relationship to their population, a 
disproportionate number of soldiers to the British Army.  Throughout the eighteenth century, the 
Scottish contributed a greater number of recruits.  However, by the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, Ireland became the primary recruiting ground for the British Army.23  Colley attributes 
Scotland’s higher proportion of military commitment to the traditional relationship that existed 
between the landlord and tenant.24 Heads of clans were frequently instrumental in raising units 
for defense of the realm.  During the Revolutionary and the early Napoleonic period, Scots were 
expected to own land in order to qualify for a commission.  Frequently, landlords recruited a 
company of men to insure a captaincy, without purchase, in the regiment.  Scottish regiments 
                                                 
22 George Cruikshank, A Pop-Gun Fired Off By George Cruikshank, In Defence of the British Volunteers 
of 1803, Against the Uncivil Attack Upon That Body by General W. Napier; To Which Are Added Some 
Observations Upon Our National Defences (London: W. Kent & Co., 1860), 8. 
23 Stephen Wood, The Scottish Soldier (Manchester: Archive Publications, 1987), 55.  
24 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 
1992), 294.  
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such as the 42
nd
, the 73
rd
, the 78
th
, the 79
th
, the 91
st
, the 92
nd
, the 93
rd
, the 97
th
, the 98
th
, the 100
th
, 
the 109
th
, the 116
th
, the 132
nd
, and 133
rd
 were recruited from ancestral lands that comprised the 
holdings of clan families.  Diana M. Henderson in her social study of the Highland Regiments 
notes that among Scots there was a strong inclination to serve with men of similar background 
and origins.25  Nevertheless, by the end of the Napoleonic Wars attrition, retirement, and 
purchase erased much of regimental regional identity, particularly in Scottish regiments.  A 
notable example was the 2
nd
 Battalion of the 73
rd
  (Highland) Regiment that had a complement of 
thirty-two officers in 1815.26  Among the twenty-three officers of the regiment who have known 
birthplaces, eleven of the officers were English; seven Irish; and the remaining five Scots.  
Throughout the Regency period, the distinctive Highland Scottish regimental identity continued 
to diminish.  Archivist for the National Army Museum, Stephen Wood reports, that in 1828, the 
26
th
 (1
st
 Cameronians) about to embark for India recruited heavily in Ireland and accepted drafts 
from other regiments, none of them were Scots.27    
Among the regiments that originated in Ireland, officer recruitment remained brisk 
throughout the Napoleonic and Regency periods.  Peter Karsten observes that pay and adventure 
were the principle motivators among the Irish in joining the British military.28  Among the less 
affluent Irish Catholic gentry there was an additional incentive in joining the military.  Acquiring 
an officer’s commission not only assured an Irish gentleman social acceptance, but also 
guaranteed a “pleasant and sensible” career that often meant food, shelter, and pay.29   For many 
                                                 
25 Diana M. Henderson, Highland Soldier: A Social Study of the Highland Regiments, 1820-1920 
(Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd., 1989), 23-24. 
26 Charles Dalton, The Waterloo Roll Call (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1971), 185-88. 
27 Stephen Wood, The Scottish Soldier, 55. 
28 Peter Karsten, “Irish Soldiers in the British Army, 1792-1922: Suborned or Subordinate?” in Journal of 
Social History, Vol. 17, No. 1. (Autumn, 1983), pp. 31-64. 
29 Ibid.  
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Irishmen, entrance in a local militia unit paved the way for a commission in one of the many 
locally raised Irish regiments.  For example, the 87
th
 or the Prince of Wales’ Own Irish Regiment 
recruited its men and officers from the counties of Tipperary, Galway, and Clare.  Among the ten 
officers who were included in the survey that served in the 27
th
 or Enniskillen Regiment between 
1808 and 1814, five were natives of Ireland, three—Scotland, and two—England.  Donald 
Huffer’s research indicates that in 1829 the number of Irish officers in the 28
th
 Regiment 
numbered twenty out of a total of thirty-four.  The remaining nineteen came from England; two 
were native to Canada; and one from the island of Guernsey.30   
   The Midland Counties of England accounted for 9.5 percent, while 8 percent of the 
surveyed officers were born in the southern and Channel counties, 8.5 percent came from north 
Britain, and 1 percent from the Channel Islands.  As noted in the previous chapter, the coastal 
counties of Gloucestershire, Somerset, Devon, Wiltshire, Hampshire, Sussex and Kent were 
exceptionally strong recruiting districts as they were most vulnerable to French attack.  The 
recruiting strength of these counties is evidenced by an 1804 abstract of volunteers mobilized 
during the invasion alarm reveals that Gloucestershire contributed more than 7,256 troops, 
Somerset 9,291, Devon 16,395, Wiltshire 5,324, Hampshire 9,252, Sussex 7,775, and Kent 
10,617.31  Devonshire and Kent were among the six countrywide localities that returned the 
highest number of volunteers.  Nearly 7 percent of the surveyed officers were born in London.  
London, because of its size, was another significant recruiting site.  In 1804, London supplied a 
substantial 12,460 militiamen.  Of the remaining officers, 2.5 percent came from Wales and 
                                                 
30 Donald B. M. Huffer, “The Infantry Officers of the Line of the British Army, 1815-1868,” Ph.D. 
University of Birmingham, 1995. 48. 
31 Wellington Gazette, “Abstract of the Return of All the Volunteer and Yeomanry Corps, Whose Services 
Were Accepted in 1804,” quoted in George Cruikshank, Pop-Gun Fired Off By George Cruikshank, 7-8. 
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nearly 4.5 percent were born overseas in locations as varied as Bermuda, Gibraltar, Antigua, 
Calcutta, and Berlin.  
Forty-nine of the officers, or nearly 21 percent, of the sample were born in cities.  These 
cities included London, Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Dublin, 
Belfast, Londonderry, Coventry, Nottingham, Chester, and Worcester.  An 1801 estimate 
revealed that London’s population numbered 1,088,000, Liverpool’s 82,000, Manchester’s 
75,000, Edinburgh’s 83,000, Glasgow’s 77,000, Coventry’s 16,000, Nottingham’s 29,000, 
Chester’s 15,000, and Worcester’s 11,000.32   The populations of Dublin, Belfast, and 
Londonderry were not collected until 1821, and then both city and county were combined into 
one total.  Dublin reported a population 336,000, Londonderry 194,000, and Belfast 37,000.33  
However, the sample numbers gathered from the 1829 retirement reports are inconsistent with 
those of P. E. Razzell’s study of British officers who served in the Indian Army during the same 
period.  Razzell’s research indicates that 47 percent of the officers who went to India to serve in 
the East India Company’s armed forces were born in urban localities.34  Razzell observes that this 
overrepresentation of urban areas reveals an early nineteenth century trend of rural flight into 
cities because of industrialization.  It may also be inferred that officers who chose military 
careers in the Company Army came from less prosperous urban households than those who 
normally sought commissions in the regular army, largely because initial costs commensurate 
with a Company commission were cheaper.  Razzell furthermore notes that the cities in which 
significant officer recruitment took place were traditionally those localities that had a long 
                                                 
32 B.R.Mitchell and Phyllis Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics, “Population and Vital 
Statistics—Population of the Principal Towns of the United Kingdom—1801-1851” (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1962), 24-27. 
33 Ibid., 21and 24. 
34 P.E. Razzell, “Social Origins of Officers in the Indian and British Home Army: 1758-1962,” The British 
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 14, No. 3. (Sep., 1963), pp.248-260. 
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history of producing officers.  It is on this point that both Razzell’s study and the 1829 Statement 
of Retired Officer’s survey concur as the cities of London, Dublin, and Edinburgh contributed 
the majority of urban officers.  Indeed, the Royal Barracks in Dublin was the oldest billet in 
Europe.35  Dublin was the birthplace of fifteen, or 6 percent, of the surveyed officers; while 
London supplied thirteen, or 5.5 percent.  The cities of Edinburgh and Glasgow contributed five 
and two respectively, or 2 percent and nearly 1 percent of all city born officers.   
A sizeable portion of the officers who received commissions during the Napoleonic Era 
came from military families who had siblings or a father who were also serving in the military.  
J. A. Houlding’s study of the eighteenth-century British Army observes that a significant portion, 
estimated at between 12-15 percent of the regimental officers, were made up of “army families,” 
families whose sons traditionally served in the army and possessed little wealth.36  This trend 
continued during and after the Napoleonic period with a substantial number of “army families” 
serving.  Dalton lists that over one hundred of the 1,795 officers, or 5.5 percent of all of the 
officers at the Battle of Waterloo were the sons of military men.  As previously noted, Colonel 
Patrick Doherty commanded the 13
th
 Regiment of Light Dragoons; among the regiment’s 
complement of junior officers were his two sons, Joseph and George.  The Doherty family had 
long standing ties with the military and governmental service.  Patrick Doherty’s uncle, John 
Doherty of Dublin was Chief Justice of Ireland; and another relative, H. Doherty, commanded a 
troop of the 3
rd
 Hussars.37  An extreme example was that of the seven Coane brothers who all 
served as officers in the first decades of the nineteenth century. Four of the brothers served in the 
                                                 
35 Peter Karsten, “Irish Soldiers in the British Army, 1792-1922: Suborned or Subordinate?” in Journal of 
Social History, Vol. 17, No. 1. (Autumn, 1983), pp. 31-64. 
36 J. A. Houlding, Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715-1795 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1981), 105. 
37 Charles Dalton, The Waterloo Roll Call, 79-81; and United Kingdom, The Royal Military Calendar, or 
Army Service and Commission Book, Vol. IV (London: A. J. Valpy, 1820), 202-04.  
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same regiment, 73
rd
 Regiment, while the others served in the 7
th
, the 19
th
, and the 95
th
 
regiments.38 Unfortunately, five of the brothers died within a ten-year span from 1809 to 1819 in 
conflicts around the globe.  Family tradition and kinship ties encouraged the development of a 
patronage network within the officer corps that aided many career officers who entered the army 
without the benefit of birth and income up the ladder of promotion.   
The British officer corps of the Napoleonic era was a social mélange that encompassed a 
variety of classes.  One of the great stereotypes of this period is that a substantial portion of the 
British officer corps came from the ranks of the nobility.  Many scholars believe that titled 
aristocrats were over-represented in the Napoleonic British Army.  Historians Michael Glover 
and Philip Haythornthwaite mention that this misconception is still widely held by many 
reputable intellectuals.  Glover even quotes an unnamed twentieth-century American historian 
who referred to the Napoleonic British Army as “aristocratic and coming almost entirely from 
the landed gentry.”39  Even the respected Napoleonic historian Gunther Rothenberg subscribed to 
this notion commenting that “the British army …essentially retained its eighteenth century 
character.  Officers were neither skilled professionals nor, with rare exceptions, dedicated 
idealists; they were representatives of the English upper classes ….“40  However, the British 
Army of the Napoleonic period contained relatively few aristocrats.  Unlike contemporary 
continental states, very few peers or sons of peers served as officers in the British army during 
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the Georgian and Regency periods.  Richard Holmes observes that the reason that aristocrats 
never dominated Britain’s army was that there were relatively few peers in the kingdom.  
Holmes notes that there were fewer than 500 British peers in the kingdom.  Dividing the junior 
sons of these peers equally among the army, navy, government, and church would leave a 
relatively small number of each in any one group.  A Guards Regiment, the elite of the British 
Army, in both recruits and officers would theoretically have a high proportion of men of birth as 
officers.  An 1812 survey of officers of the Coldstream Guards, one of the three guard infantry 
regiments of the British Army, revealed that only five out of a muster roll of forty-seven officers, 
or 11 percent, were either titled or the sons of titled fathers.41  The 1st Division of Wellington’s 
Peninsular Army was given the sobriquet “the Gentleman’s Sons” by the enlisted men because 
this division contained a majority of Foot Guards regiments.  However, in all of the guards there 
were few aristocratic officers.  Dalton reports that at Waterloo, the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Life Guard 
Regiments contained only two titled peers or the sons of peers, the Hon. Edward P. Lygon, 
fourth son of Edward Lygon, Baron and Earl of Beauchamp; and the Hon. Henry Edward Irby, 
the second son of Baron Boston.42  Even in the exclusive Royal Regiment of Horse Guards (the 
Blues) the number of peers is astoundingly small.  Three of the twenty-five officers, or 12 
percent of the regiment’s officers were titled peers.43 
Charles Oman, the famed chronicler of Wellington’s Peninsular Army, may be 
responsible for the widespread belief that the British Army of the period contained a 
disproportionate number of aristocrats.  Oman’s Liberal Party views on the practice of 
purchasing officers’ commissions significantly influenced his seminal study of the early 
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nineteenth-century British Army.  In his 1902 study, Wellington’s Army, he insinuated that the 
wealthy and influential had unscrupulously acquired a majority of officer commissions at the 
expense of more qualified but socially inferior candidates.  Oman’s suppositions concerning the 
perceived unfairness of the purchase system were grounded in two erroneous assumptions: that 
the purchase system was inherently evil and subject to manipulation, and that the social makeup 
of the late Victorian and early Edwardian office corps of Oman’s time was similar to that of 
Wellington’s day.44  Oman misrepresented the purchase process, ignoring the fact that the British 
Army operated on a seniority system and overemphasized the importance of patronage among 
company grade officers.  Recent historical analysis of the system by J. H. Bassett, Richard 
Holmes, and Richard Blanco has proven Oman’s assertion to be simplistic and misleading. 
The purchase system usually served the British Army well during its almost 300 years of 
existence.  The practice was beneficial to both the army and the state because it fostered 
regimental corporateness, and it relieved the state from having to apportion large sums of money 
for officers’ retirement pensions.45  From their inception, British regiments were the property of 
the commanding colonel, and by association, subordinate officers also shared in that ownership.  
In many ways, British regiments of the Stuart and early Georgian periods were similar to a 
medieval guild, in that officers became members of an elite and restricted brotherhood that took 
great pride in their trade and were loyal to their leader.46  The British state accepted the system 
because of Parliament’s historical proclivity to inadequately fund the army.  The funds secured 
through the process of purchase provided retired officers pensions, thus relieving the state of the 
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need to apportion substantial sums of money for that purpose.  Furthermore, a portion of officers 
purchase fees supplied the state with the money required for the maintenance of the army’s 
hospital in Chelsea.  Parliament also saw the system as a means for limiting the army’s size to a 
small collection of regiments that were incapable of threatening the civil power.47  By its nature, 
purchase severely limited the number of eligible officers and ensured an elite corps based on 
wealth.  Parliament, through the adoption of the purchase system acquired a method of supplying 
officers to the army that was both inexpensive and politically reliable. 
The process of purchase is also beneficial for modern scholars in ascertaining the 
financial well being of these officers, thereby adding another dimension to their social profile.  
As Hew Strachan observed, “it was not birth that dictated the grant of commissions, so much as 
the wealth to purchase (a commission) and to provide an income (while serving in the 
military).”48  Judging the economic condition of these Napoleonic era officers is extremely 
difficult given the lack of hard data available.  However, important and significant clues are 
accessible in determining if the officer candidate, or his family, had sufficient cash necessary to 
acquire a commission.  Regulated commission purchase prices in the British Army were 
established during the reign of George II by the Royal Warrant of 1719-20.49  Commission prices 
were considerable, with cavalry and guards commissions fetching substantial amounts more than 
line infantry regiments.  Artillery and engineer commissions were considered technical services 
and not subject to purchase.  Fixed commission prices prior to 1821 stipulated that, in the 
infantry, an ensign paid £400, a lieutenant £550, a captain £1,500, a major £2,600, and a 
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lieutenant colonel £3,500 for their commission.50  In the cavalry a cornet was expected to pay 
£735, a lieutenant £997 10s., a captain £2,782 10s., a major £3,882 10s., and a lieutenant colonel 
£ 4,982 10s.51  These were substantial amounts and officers frequently requested and received 
more than the stipulated price for the more senior and prestigious regiments despite laws that 
prohibited “cashiering” or selling commissions above the regulation price.52  Scrupulous officers, 
however, followed regulations as evidenced by a July 1807 letter from Lieutenant Alexander 
Bruce to Major General Sir Arthur Wellesley requesting permission to sell his commission in the 
33
rd
 Regiment notes that “Should the King be pleased to permit the sale…upon the word and 
honour of an officer and a gentleman, that he has not and will not demand or accept, at any time, 
or in any manner whatever, more than the sum of five hundred and fifty pounds, this being the 
price fixed by the King’s regulation as the full value of the commission.”53 
The mechanics of purchase were simple.  Each regiment required a fixed number of 
officers.  A young man who desired to become an officer would deposit a fixed sum of money 
with an agent with which to buy his commission.  The agency would then hold the money until a 
regimental vacancy was found in either a regiment of cavalry or infantry.  Vacancies in 
regiments followed a strict seniority system.  When an officer retired, resigned, or died, that 
regimental slot would become vacant.  Officers within the regiment, according to their seniority, 
would then be permitted, if they could afford it, to purchase the next vacant slot above their rank 
while selling their former rank to the individual immediately below them.  If the officer could 
not afford the purchase price of the next highest rank, then the officer immediately below in 
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seniority would be given the opportunity to purchase it.  In theory every officer in the regiment 
below the departing officer would move up a notch.   
During the late Georgian and Regency periods, the principle agency for securing 
commissions was Greenwood and Cox.  However, other agencies existed, such as the firms of 
Ross and Olgivie, and the Dublin based Borough, Armit, and Co.  These agencies fulfilled a 
number of essential functions for both the commissioned officers and the government.  
According to a 1798 report by the Deputy Secretary at War to a Parliamentary Committee of 
Finance, the duties of an accredited agent were:  
   To apply for, receive, disburse, and account fore [sic] public money  
advanced to him under general regulations or by particular orders.  He is the  
ordinary channel of communications between the Regiment and the Public 
Departments and is resorted to not only providing and forwarding of arms,  
clothing, and other regimental supplies but also in the business, public or 
private, of the individual officers.54 
 
The agencies acted as the regiment’s accountant and saw to it that each officer received his pay.  
Most importantly, these firms acted in a fashion similar to that of a modern business 
“headhunter” that searches for and secures qualified candidates for employment in large 
corporations.  The Barrett Group, a leading Internet “headhunting” service advertises that it is a 
career management firm assisting the professional in finding the ideal job that maximizes career 
potential.55  Similarly, these regimental agencies received a purchase deposit and then searched a 
variety of infantry and cavalry regiments for vacancies.  For example, in December 1813, 
Lieutenant George Hennell, an officer in the 43
rd
 Regiment, wrote to his brothers asking them to 
inquire at the agency of Greenwood and Cox into the possibility of exchanging his commission 
for a commission in a more senior regiment.  In the letter, Hennell explained:  
I will now state my principle reasons for intending to come home.  As our  
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1
st
 batt. is only 650 or 700 strong [and] the 2
nd
 batt. only about 200, the oldest & 
most experienced officers say that there is no doubt that, in case of a peace, the 
officers of the 2
nd
 batt., would have to go on half-pay & it was thought by most 
[that] I might get an exchange into another regiment for £100 or £150 or I might 
get into a single batt. regiment & then I should not go on half-pay.  There are 
some powerful reasons why an exchange would be desirable.  If we go home the 
principal is that in England we should be obliged to live at great expense.  Think 
over the exchange & if you approve of it, go to Greenwood and Cox & see who 
wish to get into the 43
rd
  & leave your address to receive proposals for an 
exchange, advising me of what you are doing.56   
  
 In addition to the cash payment, the prospective officer candidate needed to furnish a 
letter of recommendation to the War Office from a serving military officer at the rank of major 
or above confirming that the petitioning aspirant was of a good character.57  Sir William M. 
Gomm observes that he received an ensigncy in the 6
th
 Regiment through the “zealous 
intervention” of Colonel Fisher shortly after his father’s demise in combat at Pont-à-l’être, 
Guadeloupe.58  Recommendations by senior officers ensured that officers entrusted with 
command of the military remained politically reliable, as it limited entry to those who benefited 
by the status quo.  As Wellington noted, “It brings into service men of fortune and education–
men who have some connection with the interests and fortune of the country …59 Additionally, 
commissioned officers were required to prove that they were literate; a determinant that the 
applicant was a “gentleman.”  This condition was the great dividing line before the advent of 
widespread education.  Education was the determinant, although the extent and quality of the 
officer applicant’s education would vary considerably.  Gentlemen fortunate enough to possess a 
thorough education tended to advance through the ranks more rapidly.60  Officer candidates who 
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came from Scotland, where the public education system was more advanced than the rest of 
Britain, found it easier to rise in the ranks than officers from other ethnic groups.   
Beside purchase, young men could acquire a commission by other means  Britain’s 
nearly twenty-five year conflict with France during Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods 
required the British War Office to offer to all qualified takers subaltern commissions without the 
benefit of purchase.  Glover estimated that during the Peninsular War manpower demands were 
responsible for the fact that 80.5 percent of all British Army first commissions were non-
purchased.61  Wartime attrition caused the normally prestigious Guards and cavalry regiments to 
even offer non-purchased commissions to acceptable applicants.62  Figures culled from the 
promotion lists published in the London Gazette between 1810 and 1813 indicated that in the 
cavalry 54.9 percent of the commissions were acquired without purchase.  In the infantry the 
percentage was a striking 82.3 percent.  Hart’s Army List for 1810 revealed that of the fifty 
officers on active service with the 16
th
 Regiment of Dragoons, non-purchase officers held eleven 
                                                                                                                                                             
humanities, all others were limited to the grammar school that restricted their learning to reading, writing, and a little 
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commissions.63  Three years later, in 1813, during the height of the British involvement in the 
Peninsular War, all sixteen ensigns of the 43
rd
 Light Infantry Regiment held non-purchased 
commissions.  Moreover, in the same regiment, seven lieutenants received promotions to the 
rank of captain without purchase.  At the Battle of Waterloo, of the twenty-eight officers serving 
in the 2
nd
 Battalion of the 73
rd
 Regiment, nine of the officers received commissions without 
purchase, while four others apparently became officers by means other than purchase.   
Young men wishing to become officers but unable to come up with the price of purchase 
could turn to other means to acquire a military commission.  One method was to become a 
“volunteer” in a regiment.  While there was no apparent regulation concerning volunteers, Oman 
notes that in addition to the regiment’s regular composition of officers, each battalion frequently 
had one or two “volunteers” who served with the unit.  These men, probationers, were allowed to 
serve with an active service battalion on the chance of being gazetted to it without purchase.64  
While in service, these men carried muskets and served in the ranks but wore uniforms of 
superior quality and messed with the officers.  Moreover, volunteers drew no pay and were 
required to contribute the mandatory sixpence for their mess rations.  Glover estimates that 
during the Peninsular War period 4.5 percent of all serving British officers gained their first 
commissions as volunteers.65  George Hennell, the son of a Coventry ribbon manufacturer of 
moderate means, began his military career as a volunteer in the 94
th
 Regiment.  During the 
storming of Badajoz, his gallantry brought him to the attention of Major-General Thomas Picton, 
who appointed him ensign in the 43
rd
 Light Infantry, one of the more illustrious units in the 
British Army.  In addition, Joseph Dowling’s military record reveals that his father, “a 
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impecunious Latin teacher” could not afford to purchase his son a commission, embarked for 
Portugal as a volunteer in the 42
nd
 Regiment.66   
Aspiring officers could also obtain a non-purchased commission if they could recruit a 
significant number of enlisted men.  An 1804 directive stipulated that twenty-one recruits were 
required to gain an ensigncy, twelve to gain a promotion from ensign to lieutenant, forty-five 
from lieutenant to captain, ninety from captain to major, and eighty-two from major to lieutenant 
colonel.67  In this case, directives stipulated that men recruited were to be mustered into a new 
battalion within an existing regiment.  Moreover, recruiting officers could only recruit for the 
regiment in which they served and they could only gain one step in promotion no matter how 
many soldiers they enlisted.  Personal records for Lieutenant John Acres and Lieutenant Richard 
Leyne of the 73
rd
 Regiment revealed that they both procured commissions in this fashion.  
Richard Leyne, born in 1790, was the eldest of son of Dr. Maurice Leyne of Tralee, Co. Kerry.  
He was unable to purchase a commission but recruited a number of troops from the militia thus 
acquiring a lieutenancy.68  Dalton notes that Leyne encouraged 400 Kerry Co. militiamen to 
enlist in the regulars but this number appears suspect and the actual figure was probably closer to 
forty as suggested by his rewarded commission.69  Leyne fought at Waterloo before transferring 
to the 58
th
 Regiment and serving a number of years in New South Wales.  
In 1814, the British Army contained 10,590 officers on full pay.  Extant records also 
indicate that a significant majority of these officers came from middle class families.  Scott 
Hughes Myerly observes that many of these officers were men without the benefit of family or 
income.  Aristocratic elites who held senior commands in the military feared that a change in the 
                                                 
66 Alan Lagden and John Sly, The 2/73 At Waterloo, 58. 
67 Philip Haythornthwaite, The Armies of Wellington, 30. 
68 Alan Lagden and John Sly, The 2/73 At Waterloo, 125. 
69 Charles Dalton,  The Waterloo Roll Call, 187.  
 203
perceived social balance within the military command structure would have far-reaching 
consequences for the state.  A March 31, 1820 letter from the Duke of Cumberland to King 
George IV expressed a fear that a substantial number of officers in positions of command were 
no longer members of the aristocracy.  Cumberland wrote, “Many of the generals and principal 
officers with whom I am in daily habits agree with me, that was good and necessary in 1813 to 
1815 ought to have ceased after the War, as it was only calculated for the necessity of the times, 
but this was not done & under false pretences that formation (the army) was made subservient to 
the worst of objects namely making the army useless, and employing a class of men for officers, 
who were never intended for such a profession….”70 Writing more than forty years later, Charles 
Clode argued that the traditional makeup of the army consisted of two distinct social classes, the 
rank and file recruited from the lower classes, and the men who command them “intrusted to the 
higher class.”71  Clode further notes that only during the Commonwealth period did this 
separation blur with disastrous consequences for both the army and the state.  Many influential 
Britons found the idea of placing middle class individuals into positions of command unsettling.  
There were inherent dangers in granting the privilege of military command to members of an 
inferior social class.  Political stability required that military officers be drawn from members of 
a sound and reliable social stratum who had more to lose than gain from domestic turmoil.  
Memories of the Cromwell’s Commonwealth offered reliable proof that the military’s 
involvement in the state’s politics was to be avoided.  Few Britons wished to repeat the 
Cromwellian experience of rule by a military elite that could contain social inferiors.  However, 
a nearly twenty-five year global war against France upset the perceived status quo within the 
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army.  By experiencing a national emergency of unprecedented scale, the British Army 
commissioned an unprecedented number of middle class officers   
The social makeup of the army had changed dramatically during the late Georgian and 
Regency periods.  Employing status group categories established by Burke’s Peerage, and Ian 
Worthington’s research, the officer corps of the British Army in the first decades of the 
nineteenth century comprised three distinct groups: the aristocracy, the landed gentry, and a 
residual collection encompassing members of the middle class.72  Between the years of 1805 to 
1835, the aristocracy comprised 5 percent of the officer corps, while 19 percent descend from the 
landed gentry, and the remaining 76 percent came from the middle class.  Furthermore, Holding 
notes that this shift in social composition of the army was already occurring during the 
eighteenth century.  He observes that after 1715, British officers came from four specific groups: 
the nobility and landed gentry, lesser gentry and professional men, foreigners, mainly 
Huguenots, and non-commissioned officers who because of age or ability were awarded 
commissions.  Of the second category, Houlding notes that a great majority of the regimental 
officers were men drawn from the ranks of the lesser gentry, professional men, successful 
tradesmen, the minor clergy, and yeoman farmers.  Their distinctive characteristics were lack of 
birth, money, and influential patrons, or as an officer of this class described himself as “a private 
Gentleman without the advantage of Birth and friends.”  Nonetheless, this group was able to 
accumulate through association powerful patrons who readily assisted them in rising socially. 73   
The term “middle class” is problematic when discussing Georgian and Regency British 
society.  Scholars of British social history rarely agree on a single comprehensive definition.  E. 
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P. Thompson divided eighteenth-century British society into patricians and plebeians.74  Frank 
O’Gorman refers to the British middle class as “the middling orders” and claimed that this group 
consisted of professional men, merchants, and tradesman.75  O’Gorman, however found this 
classification inclusive as it embraced and extremely broad range of British society.  Another 
difficulty O’Gorman discovered in trying to fit the middle class in a specific category was the 
failure of this group to realize that they did indeed comprise a class.  Individually they were 
aware of their social status and proud of their independence, but collectively they were unaware 
of their class identity.  Elizabeth Marshall preferred to use the term “middling sort” rather than 
middle class, as there was no clear consensus of how to define this group.  According to her, this 
assembly consisted of those families whose income came from a non-manual occupation “who 
by way of life or attitude had no claims to ranked with the gentry.” 76  Eighteenth-century 
statistician, Joseph Massie calculated social status by estimated annual income.77  Massie’s 
calculations yielded the following income ranges for members of the British middle class.  
Among the upper-middle class there were an estimated 52,000 families, who had annual incomes 
of between £60 and £600.  The middle or core group consisted of 317,500 families.  This 
assemblage had an income of between £40 and £400 per annum.  An additional 246,000 families 
comprised the lower-middle class.  These families had yearly incomes of between £60 and £22 
6s.  Samuel Boswell’s 1760 treatise “Scheme of Living” noted that a person could live 
comfortably in London on a yearly income of £157.  Therefore, upper and middle-income 
families of the “middling sort” who had incomes of £100 or more per annum lived well.  
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However, those who had incomes in the lower income bracket were unable to purchase many 
incidental items, but they were able to exist being able to afford the necessities of life such as 
food and shelter.   
Nevertheless, it is important to determine specific identifiers that describe the middle 
class during the late Georgian and Regency periods.  Even the term “middle class” may not be 
fitting for our subjects.  The term “middling sort” may be more suitable then the label “middle 
class,” as this term invokes connotations more appropriate for the mid-nineteenth century.  Eric 
Hobsbawm writes that the middle class was a product of the time between the “dual revolutions” 
of 1789 and 1848.78  If this were the case, then those members of British society who displayed 
middle class characteristics during the time period in question would be in the developmental 
stage.  This assessment concurs with the viewpoint of Paul Deschamps, who argues that the 
British middle-class of the late eighteenth century consisted of those families in the process of 
rising socially.79  Subscribing to this argument, it can be claimed that British “middling sort” 
families were on the cusp of this transition, but had not yet achieved their goal until the mid-
decades of the nineteenth century.  It is therefore, premature to refer to this amorphous class as a 
“middle class,” and I choose instead to refer to this social group as a nascent middle class or, a 
more preferred term, “the middling sort.”   
What then did make a Briton a member of the “middling sort?”  What characteristics 
differentiated this group from both the aristocracy and the common laborer?  Two criteria define 
the “middling sort” as a distinct and separate social group.  First, members of this order needed 
to be literate.  Literacy was the determinate for an officer’s commission.  It also signified that the 
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individual came from social fabric superior to that of a common laborer.  Thompson notes that it 
was not until decades after the Napoleonic Wars that the lower orders of British society began to 
receive some rudimentary instruction in “the Three R’s.”  Linda Colley estimates that in 1830 
some 6,000 charities and Sunday schools provided instructions for 1,400,000 children of the 
poor.80  During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, a significant number of company 
grade officers received their first commissions.  These officers came from families with enough 
income and status to privately educate their children in the fundamentals of reading and writing.  
Sir Harry Smith begins his autobiography by observing that he received his education from the 
Rev. George Burgess, the curate of St. Mary’s Whittlesey.  Smith notes that he was one of eleven 
children and that his father took great pains to see that he [Harry] was educated in natural 
philosophy, the classics, algebra, and music.81  If these families did not have the necessary 
income to send their children to school, they frequently had sufficient learning to educate them 
themselves.  Indeed, there exist a number of examples where the fathers of these officer aspirants 
had sufficient education to educate their offspring.  Returning to the available personnel records 
of officers of the 2
nd
 Battalion of the 73
rd
 Regiment, six of the twenty-five, or 24 percent of the 
company grade officers had fathers who were professional men.  Two such officers, Captain 
Alexander Robertson and Lieutenant Joseph Dowling had fathers who were teachers.   
Second, members of the “middling sort” required a sufficient amount of money to outfit 
themselves in a manner appropriate as officers.  Enough cash was necessary so that a new officer 
could purchase the necessary uniform and equipment commensurate to his rank.  Furthermore, 
all officers during this period were required to pay for their mess expenses, which depending on 
                                                 
80 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837, 226. 
81 Harry Smith, The Autobiography of Lieutenant General Sir Harry Smith, Baronet of Aliwal on the Sutlej, 
ed. G.C. Moore Smith (New York: E.P. Dutton & Company, 1902), 1. 
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the regiment could be somewhat expensive. Table A.15 details the estimated expenses of John 
Patterson of the 50
th
 Regiment.  As Scott Hughes Myerly observed, an officer’s uniform and kit 
could well absorb the first year’s pay.82  Charles Booth of the 52
nd
 Regiment wrote that his 
uniform and kit, including a sword cost £57 18s. 6d.83 Additionally, Robert Knowles upon 
entering the Royal Fusiliers reportedly paid £ 45 15s. 0d. for his uniform.   
 A profile of the typical company grade officer who entered British service during the 
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, and then continued their army career after the 
conclusion of the wars in 1815 can now be pieced together.  These officers were young, with a 
substantial majority of them entering service in their late teens, their median age being seventeen 
and a half years when they received their first commission.  More than half of these men were 
either Irish or Scots.  However, by 1815, officers born in Ireland outstripped all other ethnicities 
entering the British Army.  Furthermore, the typical company grade officer came from rural 
areas; although officers from urban areas were making significant inroads as London, Dublin, 
and Edinburgh all contributed a substantial number of officer candidates.  The characteristic 
officer most likely had blood relations serving in the military.  Holding’s research and data from 
British regimental indicate that at least one quarter of all officers had kin serving in the military.  
Family kinship ties were a factor in the development of a sophisticated patronage system within 
the army that assisted junior officers up the promotion ladder.  Our archetypical officer was born 
into a “middling sort” family, whose father was either professional man, clergyman, or a 
merchant engaged in trade.  All of these families were able to provide their children with a 
rudimentary education.  While being self sufficient, these families had little additional funds in 
which to buy first-time commissions for their sons.  In the case of a significant number of Irish 
                                                 
82 Scott Hughes Myerly, British Military Spectacle, 2. 
83 Michael Glover, Wellington’s Army, 43. 
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officers, a military career meant food, shelter, and continuous pay.  Glover’s research reveals that 
during the Peninsular War purchase accounted for one in five first commissions.84  With this 
being the case, the average company grade officer received his first-commission without 
purchase, either by direct appointment to a regiment, as a volunteer, or as a result of recruiting a 
prescribed number of enlisted men.  Additionally, wartime attrition necessitated a constant 
demand for officers.  Commissioned military service was a means to advance socially.  Middle 
class families sought commissions for their children in the hope that distinguished military 
service would allow them entrance into the ranks of the gentry and the nobility.  The company 
grade officers who fought for Britain during the Napoleonic Wars and then went on to serve the 
empire in either a military or civilian capacity were, in essence, a very young Irishman or 
Scotsman raised in rural areas by a family of professionals who has little financial wealth.  A 
military career appeared to be a sterling opportunity for rising socially and becoming financially 
secure.   
 Another aspect in reconstructing these officers’ careers is tracing their military service.  
Wartime service and the personal relationships they established with their superiors and brother 
offices significantly influenced the course of their careers.  In many instances, the Peninsular 
War and its concurrent conflicts provided these young men with an opportunity to achieve social 
status.85  These conflicts also joined company grade officers into a bond of brotherhood that was 
forged through the rigors of campaign and combat.  Evidence indicates that these wartime 
relationships would prove highly beneficial in providing these officers with postwar employment 
                                                 
84 Ibid., 44.  
85 The Wars of Revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic Wars were truly global conflicts.  Fighting 
occurred not only in Europe but also in Asia (India), Africa, (the Cape Colony), South America (Buenos Aires), and 
North America (Canada and the continental United States).  For an overview of these far-flung theaters of war see 
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opportunities in the colonies in either a combat or administrative capacity.  Relationships forged 
during the wars with France significantly benefited these officers.  All of the 236 officers in our 
sample served at one time or another in the Peninsula.  This is not unusual as some 10,000 
British officers served in Portugal, Spain and southern France between 1808-1814.86   
 British Army regimental records indicate that almost every regiment in the army served 
at one time or another, in this theater of operations, David Gates notes that between 1808 and 
1814 the War Office sent to Iberia fifty-one regiments of line infantry, three regiments of guards, 
fifteen regiments of cavalry, the Life Guard and Household cavalry.87  Richard Partridge and 
Michael Oliver’s extensive research reveals further that eighty-six battalions from these fifty-
four infantry regiments served in the Peninsula.88  In normal wartime circumstances the War 
Office would assign one battalion of a regiment to overseas service while keeping a second 
battalion in Britain for home defense or as a depot unit accepting replacements.  However, as the 
demand for manpower grew the second battalion would be sent out subsequently creating the 
need for a third and fourth battalion.  Frequently, the same regiment might have a number of 
battalions serving in many far-flung theaters.  An extreme example of this was case of the 60
th
 
Loyal American Regiment that during the period 1808 to 1809 had its 1
st
 battalion posted to the 
West Indies, the 2
nd
 battalion deployed in the Peninsula, the 3
rd
 battalion also in the West Indies, 
                                                 
86 This number is based on John Hall’s extensive research of the surviving Lionel Challis data.  See John 
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its 4
th
 battalion posted to the Cape Colony, the 5
th
 served in North America, and the 6
th
 battalion 
garrisoned Jamaica.  Furthermore, a number of these regiments also saw active service in many 
other important subsidiary theaters such as India, the West Indies, and Canada.  The wartime 
career of Sir Harry Smith provides an excellent example as he saw combat with the 95
th
 
Regiment in three different theaters of war: South America, Europe, and North America.89   
 It is evident from Table A.16 that a significant portion of the British Army saw periodic 
service in the Peninsula, especially during the period of 1808-1814.  Napoleon’s invasion of 
Spain and the subsequent popular insurrection offered the British an excellent opportunity to 
strike directly at the French by sending an army to Iberia.  As Charles Esdaile notes in his 
excellent history of the Peninsular War, Britain, because of the smallness of its army, was 
initially confined to a wartime policy of striking at France through blockade, colonial 
aggrandizement, and financial and material subsidies to their allies.90  By committing an army in 
Spain in 1808, Britain accomplished a twofold course of action that confronted French armies 
directly and also allayed any suspicions Britain’s allies may have had concerning its commitment 
to its coalition partners.  The charts also reveal that in the early years of the Napoleonic Wars, 
the focus of British strategic policy remained fixed on concentrating a substantial numbers of 
troops in specific global areas, particularly India, the West Indies, and the Mediterranean.  As 
war progressed Britain’s strategic focus evolved from colonial cherry picking expeditions to that 
of confronting France, her allies, and cobelligerents in Spain, the Low Countries, North America, 
and the West Indies.  The charts, however, do not reveal that because of its limited manpower, 
Britain was forced to move regiments and battalions from theater to theater, especially during the 
                                                 
89 See Harry Smith, The Autobiography of Lieutenant General Sir Harry Smith, Baronet of Aliwal on the 
Sutlej, Vol. I.  
90 Charles Esdaile, The Peninsular War: A New History  (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 3.  
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period 1812-1815.  For example, the 77
th
 Foot served from 1813 to 1814 in the Peninsula, and 
then transferred to North America in 1814 to 1815.  Likewise, the 1
st
 Battalion of the 21
st
 Foot 
was posted in the Mediterranean from 1806 to 1814 and then moved west to North America in 
1814-1815.   
 What is less evident is how particular wartime service in major theaters of operations 
affected officers in their ability in securing postwar careers in a much-reduced army.  Did the 
officers who served in other subsidiary and less notable theaters have the similar career prospects 
and opportunities as those who served in the primary theater with Wellington in Spain?  
Examining the postwar careers among both general and company grade officers who served in 
Iberia provide some clues.  Moreover, further claims are possible when comparing the postwar 
service careers of Peninsular officers with those officers who were posted in other theaters.  Did 
the postwar careers of officers suffer because they were posted on the peripheries of the empire 
such as North America, the West Indies, or India?  Did those officers who served with 
Wellington in the Peninsula receive preferential treatment when seeking postwar colonial 
appointments?   
Between 1808 and 1814, more than one hundred general officers and colonels served as 
brigade and divisional commanders in Wellington’s Peninsular Army.  Postwar correspondence 
by many of these officers indicates that a number of them solicited Wellington’s assistance in 
securing overseas colonial employment.91  It appears that among these gentlemen that patronage 
was an important factor, but was only one facet in securing a colonial position.  Wellington’s 
influence and patronage frequently assisted officers in their careers but the Duke’s ire could also 
derail a promising career.  For example, Sir William Houstoun, who commanded the 7
th
 Division 
                                                 
91 Letters soliciting employment in the colonies can be found in a significant amount of Wellington’s 
correspondence.  See University of Southampton, Wellington Papers.  
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at Fuentes D’Onoro, ran afoul of Wellington.  Houstoun saw his post war career seriously 
hampered, settling for a post as lieutenant governor of Gibraltar in 1831.  Perhaps the most 
convincing evidence concerning Wellington’s use of patronage and influence in securing 
postwar colonial appointments for his Peninsular companions is found in Lieutenant General 
John Wood’s correspondence to Lord Glenelg.  In an October 6, 1835, letter, Wood complains 
that despite honorable service his posting on the peripheries and absence in the Peninsula and at 
Waterloo kept him outside of Wellington’s network and deprived him of a postwar civil 
governorship.92   
Despite these instances some inferences can be offered concerning the post-war careers 
of these officers.  Of the ninety-seven divisional and brigade officers surveyed, (Table A.17) 10 
percent, were either Hanoverian or Portuguese officers and therefore not subject to post-war 
employment in colonial service.93  Furthermore, seventeen or 17.5 percent, died during the 
Napoleonic Wars, victims of either combat or disease.  There were also six obscure individuals, 
whose careers could not be fully reconstructed, constituting 6 percent of the group.  The careers 
of eighty-one officers remained to be examined for evidence that Peninsular War service proved 
beneficial in helping them secure post-war overseas colonial employment.   
 Two revealing and striking characteristics emerge from this surveyed group.  Of the 
eighty-one, the overwhelming majority, sixty-nine or 85 percent of them, held combat 
                                                 
92 Public Record Office, C.O. 201/251 f. 529 Lieutenant General John Sullivan Wood to Lord Glenelg.  
Moreover, examination of Wood’s military service indicates that he served primarily in secondary theaters of war.  
In the 1790s, he served in Ireland and at the beginning of the nineteenth century, his unit, the Eighth Light 
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distinction in the Nepalese War (1814-16).  See Frederic Boase, Modern English Biography, containing many 
thousand concise memoirs of persons who have died between the years 1851-1900 with an index of the most 
interesting matter, Vol. III, R-Z  (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1965), 1471; and United Kingdom, The Royal 
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93 During the Napoleonic Wars, French forces occupied the Kingdom of Hanover.  Hanoverian officers and 
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primarily in Spain, often being brigaded with regular British Forces under the command of either British general 
officers or German officers. 
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commands as evidenced by their service and wound pension records.94  Indeed, a striking thirty-
one, or 32 percent, of these brigade or divisional commanders were wounded in action.  If this 
total is added to those nineteen who were killed, the total casualty number rises to nearly 53 
percent loss rate among Wellington’s divisional and brigade commanders.  As Rory Muir 
observes, senior commanders of the Napoleonic period led from the front, as personal bravery 
under fire was a required prerequisite for instilling faith and trust among their subordinates and 
soldiers.95  Many of the officers who held combat commands also served at one time or another 
in staff positions.  These positions included staff officers in the adjutant or quartermaster 
general’s office, barrack masters, storekeepers department, aides de camp, or as instructors of 
military theory and tactics.96   Staff duties included administrative or logistical duties such as 
enforcing army discipline, managing requests for leave and promotion, planning march routes, 
securing quarters, handling pay and rations, dealing with civilian authorities, and collecting 
intelligence.97  Twenty-four, or nearly one third, of Wellington’s senior officers served in this 
capacity.  When a British officer attained general rank, it was assumed by both society and the 
state that he should be well versed in staff duties commensurate with administrative tasks.  
Charles Clode, in his study of the army, noted that officers must be qualified by education, 
prudence, and other (unspecified) qualities to perform administrative duties.  As he observed, 
                                                 
94 Some of the individuals, such as Major General Samuel Venables Hinde and Major General Alexander 
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“When he [the general officer] attains the rank of General Officer he must be qualified to fill the 
post of a Governor of a Province.  He must manage a Legislature; he must perform the most 
difficult and arduous functions of Government which can be entrusted to any Subject, if he 
means to be a candidate for the situation of Colonel of a Regiment.”98  Colonel Harry Smith who 
served in a staff capacity in the Peninsula, North America, and Waterloo, reported that a staff 
officer assigned to an army, division, or a brigade performed a number of logistical, 
administrative, organizational, and command duties.  During the 1815 Waterloo Campaign, 
Smith, the Assistant Quartermaster General for the 6
th
 Division, wrote that he “reconnoitered the 
country and prepared to conduct the troops” for his commander, Major-General Sir John 
Lambert, just prior to the battle.99  Therefore, officers who occupied staff positions during the 
Napoleonic Wars and its concurrent conflicts were well qualified to perform those civilian duties 
that corresponded to that of a magistrate or lord-lieutenant of a colony or county.100   
Evidence gathered from the above survey suggests that there is a direct correlation 
between prior staff experience and postwar colonial administrative positions.  Nearly 83 percent 
of all officers who held divisional or brigade commands in the Peninsula had some familiarity 
with staff duties such as aides-de-camp, brigade-majors, adjutant, and quartermaster officers. 
Among these officers who functioned in a staff capacity, thirty-five, or 36 percent went on to 
hold either colonial administrative positions or colonial military commands.101  Many senior staff 
officers who did not pursue a postwar colonial career entered politics.  Eight Peninsular division 
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and brigade officers became members of Parliament after leaving active military service.  
However, staff experience, while important, was not the only critical qualification necessary in 
securing a post-war colonial administrative position.  Birth and political predilection also played 
a significant role in securing these coveted positions.   
The importance of birth among senior British commanders cannot be overemphasized.  
As Colley notes, Britain’s twenty-five year struggle against Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
France was primarily an ideological struggle between England’s traditional societal status quo 
and the threat of French style egalitarianism.102  Britain’s established social order encouraged 
domestic stability and promoted economic growth.  Key to this order was the ownership of land, 
which conveyed both prestige and political rights.103  Social and propertied elites of Britain 
considered it necessary to retain power and maintain social order in the face of French inspired 
revolutionary social engineering.  Because of this perceived threat, senior military officers were 
selected from members of a responsible and politically reliable social class who had more to lose 
than gain from domestic turmoil.  In 1869, Clode echoed this same sentiment, an opinion voiced 
on previous occasions by members of Parliament that included Sir Robert Walpole, Lord 
Holland, Charles J. Fox, Lord Folkstone, and Lord Palmerston.104  Consequently, appointments to 
colonial administrative posts rewarded senior officers from landed elites for prior distinguished 
service and also assured that overseas possessions remained loyal and secure.  As David 
Cannadine argues, post-Napoleonic colonial administrators sought to create full-scale replicas of 
a graded social hierarchy they had left behind at home.105  European elites who administered 
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colonies frequently collaborated with likeminded local native elites in perpetuating graded 
societies.  Parliament found that providing overseas administrative positions to members of their 
own social standing was an expedient and relatively cost effective means of rewarding them for 
distinguished service.  As Lord Fitzroy Somerset, Military Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief, 
revealed in 1833 Parliamentary hearings, senior officers who provided distinguished service 
during the Peninsular War were entitled to some reward by the state.106  However, as revealed in 
Parliamentary testimony it was the duty of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to make 
recommendations to the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, who then made the official 
appointment.   
In the decade that followed Waterloo, a striking 54.5 of those who held postwar 
governorships or military commands came from either the aristocracy or gentry.  While only 24 
percent of the Napoleonic British officer corps were born into these backgrounds, more than half 
of all postwar senior appointments came from this minority group validating the sentiments of 
Walpole, Holland, Fox, Folkstone, Palmerston, Clode, and Cannadine.  Myerly observes that the 
inclusion of the British middle class into the ranks of officers was a necessary expedient during 
the Napoleonic Wars.  However, in the post-Waterloo period, Parliament and senior staff 
members at the Horse Guards concluded that the state would best be preserved if the army culled 
members of the middle class as they would be more likely to embrace mercenary or 
revolutionary sentiments.107   
Family connections, working relationships, influential friends, and distinguished past 
service were critical in securing these coveted positions.  As Charles Oman noted, Parliamentary 
                                                 
106 United Kingdom, British Parliamentary Papers: Select Committee On the Establishment of the  
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Appendix, Naval and Military No. 2 (Shannon, Ireland: Irish University Press, 1969), June 12, 1833, 1674-1675. 
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influence played a significant role in securing coveted military positions for those who possessed 
“gentle blood.”108  Frequently, British patricians reaped rewards bestowed on them by members 
of their own class.  As Colley points out, elites of the early nineteenth century were expected to 
work for their rewards, but they were to be rewarded nonetheless.  In 1813, Lord William 
Bentinck, who was both a military officer and colonial administrator, wrote in 1813, “The true 
reward of public service was the public respect which you will enjoy if you deserve it … this 
depends … upon my own conduct.  But the Government can give me what the public cannot, 
which is income and comfort.”109   A fine example of elites rewarding their own is evidenced in 
the records of the 1833 Parliamentary hearings on Garrison Pay and Emoluments.  Lord 
Somerset testified that many worthy senior officers deserved rewards because of their long-
standing and distinguished military careers.  Using Lord Rowland Hill as an example, Somerset 
said that Hill, because of the laws of primogeniture (Hill was a younger brother with “no private 
fortune”), deserved some remuneration by the state for his Peninsular service that caused him 
“considerable [personal] expense.”  This compensation could come in form of “a government, a 
regiment, a staff appointment either at home or abroad, or a government in the colonies.”110  
Wellington noted that officers who had served him well in the Peninsular War or during the 
Waterloo Campaign deserved rewards from the state for past service.  In his voluminous 
correspondence, the Duke often used his substantial influence and power to assist officers who 
had served him well.  One example occurred in April 1819 when the Duke assisted Colonel 
Ralph Gore of the York Fusiliers, helping him obtain land in Canada as a settler.  In his letter of 
recommendation to Lord Bathhurst, Wellington noted that Gore was both a fine man and a good 
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officer and would be grateful if Bathurst could assist him.  The Duke ended his note by 
remarking that Gore would be useful in Canada.111  On another occasion, Major General Sir John 
Cameron solicited Wellington’s assistance in securing him the position as Governor of Grenada.  
In a subsequent letter in July 1823, Wellington recommends Cameron “ as an excellent officer 
deserving the favour of the government.”112   
Political and ideological affiliation also contributed significantly in securing positions.  
During the periods of the French Revolution and the 1
st
 Empire, Tories dominated Parliamentary 
politics.113  The Whigs normally associated with political and social reform lost favor as proposed 
measures of change became associated with events occurring in Revolutionary France.  Britain, 
standing alone against French republicanism and Napoleonic domination, determined that the 
survival of state required political stability rather than change in these uncertain times.114  Within 
five years of the end of the Napoleonic Wars, reform was once on the minds of the British 
populace.  However, the general domestic dislocation in Britain that followed the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars only strengthened Tory views that Britain not succumb to the French 
experience.  Wellington, a national hero for defeating the “Corsican Ogre” at Waterloo, believed 
firmly that the British aristocratic system could meet any revolutionary challenge as long as it 
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remained resolute.115  As both Wellington and Bathurst were staunch supporters of the Party of 
Cottage, Throne and Altar, it appears that their political views played a significant role in the 
selection process of colonial administrators.   
 The survey of divisional and brigade commanders suggests that officers who expressed 
known Whig sentiments received less than favorable consideration in seeking colonial positions.  
For example, Sir Rufane Shaw Donkin, an experienced staff officer during the Napoleonic Wars, 
received in 1815 the command of the Madras Army.  In 1820, Donkin, while convalescing in 
South Africa, suggested to Bathurst that he assume the government of the Cape Colony during 
Lord Somerset’s absence.  It appears that Donkin was intent on reforming what he perceived was 
the corrupt, irresponsible, and immoral Somerset Administration.  What specifically disturbed 
Donkin was Somerset’s benign attitude toward slave-owners in the colony; he believed that the 
governor failed to enforce the directives dictated by Parliament mandating humane treatment for 
the colony’s slaves.116  Bathurst, however, rejected the request even though Donkin appeared to 
be both a popular and capable administrator.  As a result, Somerset and the entire Beaufort 
family instituted a highly public vendetta against Donkins.  While the evidence proving that 
Donkin’s reformist tendencies kept him from assuming the post of Cape Colony governor is 
circumstantial, it is acknowledged that both Bathurst and Wellington held strong Tory anti-
reformist views.  By 1818, when Wellington returned to Britain from the Continent, he was now 
a hero whose views were highly respected.  It is therefore possible, that given Wellington’s 
influence, he may have been instrumental in seeing that only Tories be appointed to govern 
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Britain’s vast empire as he believed Toryism to be the safest political creed.117  Donkin, 
subsequently returned to England and entered politics as a Whig Member of Parliament in 1831.   
Lord William Henry Cavendish Bentinck was also politically and ideologically at odds 
with Wellington.  Relations between the two men had been strained since 1813, when they 
clashed over the employment of Bentinck’s military forces in eastern Spain.  Bentinck’s colonial 
appointment to the Governorship of India did not occur until 1828, when the Tory party began to 
fracture and the Whig opposition was once again given a new lease on life.118  While the Tories 
remained strong, both Bathurst and Wellington appear to have awarded honors and appointments 
to those attuned to their own political views.  This pattern of political patronage is most evident 
in a series of letters exchanged between Wellington, Bathurst, and Lord Liverpool in the fall of 
1825.  It appeared that William Pitt Amherst, who was already under scrutiny for his role in the 
Barrackpore Mutiny, was planning to vacate the governorship of India.  In an October 6, 1825 
letter, Liverpool confided to Wellington that the appointment of Bentinck would be awkward for 
his administration, noting, “I think it highly probable that the party  [the Whigs] of opposition to 
the government would bring forward Lord William Bentinck again who is a popular candidate.  I 
need not add that a majority of the court being in his favour would be a mortifying result to the 
Duke of Buckingham and a very embarrassing one for the government.”119  In response, 
Wellington urged Liverpool to consider candidates other than Buckingham more suited for the 
position.  The Duke, however, warns the Prime Minister “If Lord William Bentinck should be 
chosen by the Court of Directors [East India Company], he must be rejected by the government 
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at all events.”120  Two weeks later, Bathurst wrote Wellington, commenting that it may be 
difficult to prevent the appointment of Bentinck given the mood of the country and East India 
Company’s Board of Directors.  Bathurst sarcastically notes that “If Lord William Bentinck is to 
be the Governor … I hope that there will be some explanation with him on the rights of the free 
press and other Whiggish questions.”121  In this instance, the East India Board of Directors 
determined not to appoint Bentinck as Governor General of India, and chose instead Major 
General Sir Thomas Munro, a veteran India officer.   
Officers who received preferential treatment in securing colonial positions in the decade 
following Waterloo were those men who had both staff and combat experience, prominent social 
status, influential friends, and strong Tory sentiments.  However, there were exceptions.  Men 
such as Archibald Campbell and Sir George Townsend Walker obtained colonial administrative 
positions largely through competent, efficient, and loyal service.  Campbell had served in India 
and had established relationships with influential patrons such as Governor Lord Cornwallis.  He 
also gained valuable combat experience taking part in the siege of Seringapatam, the reduction of 
Cochin, and the 1796 expedition to Ceylon.  When he returned to Europe just after the Peace of 
Amiens, he acquired important staff experience serving in Ireland, Scotland, and England.  
Campbell came to the attention of Wellington while serving in the Peninsula training and 
commanding Britain’s Portuguese allies.   
Sir George Townsend Walker was the son of Major Nathaniel Walker, a military officer 
who served in the corps of rangers during the American War of Independence.  Because of 
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distant family connections, he received his first commission as an ensign through the influence 
of Queen Charlotte.  He served in India on staff as quartermaster-general for four years.  
Invalided home in 1787, Walker served in a variety of staff positions in the Low Countries, the 
Black Forest, Switzerland, Portugal, Egypt, and Malta for the next decade and a half.  In 1808 he 
joined Wellesley in the Peninsula taking part in the Battle of Vimiero.  Sent home with 
dispatches, Walker returned to the Peninsula in 1810 as a brigadier general tasked with aiding 
Spanish authorities in Gallicia and Asturias. One year later, Walker became a brigade 
commander and served with Wellington’s Peninsular Army for the remainder of the war..  
These two officers did not possess the advantage of birth and high social station but they 
were capable combat officers who had proved their ability under fire.  Furthermore, each of them 
received staff instruction and functioned in this capacity for a number of years.  Campbell for 
nearly ten years held staff positions in the British Isles.  Similarly, Walker served as 
quartermaster-general in India, and functioned as an inspector general of émigré and foreign 
troops in British service.  Moreover, both of these officers had powerful and influential patrons 
who assisted them up the career ladder.  Campbell enjoyed the patronage of Cornwallis and 
Wellington, and Walker began his military career supported by Queen Charlotte and later by the 
Duke of Wellington.   
Officers who became colonial officials a decade and a half after the Battle of Waterloo 
replaced many of the aging senior officers of the Napoleonic Era.  This group constituted a 
second generation of military/colonial administrators.  Although these officers displayed many of 
the characteristics of their predecessors, they also exhibited some marked differences.  Like 
those who came before them, a significant number of them became officers in the last years of 
the eighteenth century, served in the Napoleonic Wars, and then endured the postwar reduction 
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of the army.  Many barely survived on half pay or, if fortunate, were retained on active service at 
a reduced rank without much promise of swift promotion.  Colonial Office appointment books 
for the 1830s reveal that twenty-six separate colonies required not only the office of governor but 
a host of subordinate administrative positions such as secretaries, judges, registrars, assessors, 
and clerks.122  Assisting the governors’ colonial administrative apparatus was a parallel military 
administration consisting of adjutant generals, quartermaster generals, and inspectors of militia.  
In many of the colonies there was little delineation between civil and military functions.  For 
example, John Pitt Kennedy, an Inspector of Militia in the Ionian Islands, worked primarily as 
the Director of Public Works; and William Stavely, Deputy Quartermaster on Mauritius 
functioned as the Director of Roads and Bridges on that island.  In addition to the colonies the 
empire also encompassed the three presidencies of India, Bombay, Madras, and Bengal.  
Moreover, officer applicants came to view Ireland’s civil administration as a part of their 
empire’s colonial administrative structure, while technically it was not.  A survey of senior 
colonial officers in 1830 indicates that governorships remained firmly in the hands of the army.  
Table A.18 indicates that of the sixty-two senior colonial positions, military men held fifty-five 
of them.123  The armed forces of Britain held an astonishing 89 percent of the senior positions, the 
army occupying fifty-two positions and the Royal Navy retained the remaining four.  Civilians 
accounted for only six positions, with their affiliations limited to the East Indies Company or the 
sugar islands in the West Indies.  In 1830, senior civilian administrative colonial /imperial 
officials were Robert Fullerton, Governor of the Straits Settlements; Stephen Lushington, 
Governor of the Madras Presidency; John Malcolm, Governor of the Bombay Presidency; 
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George Fitzgerald Hill, Governor of St. Vincent; and Somerset Lowry-Corry of Governor of 
Jamaica, who was an influential and well-connected Irish politician.   
A principal characteristic of this second generation of military/colonial administrators 
was their previous staff experience.  As evidenced by the 1830 roll of imperial/colonial officials, 
60 percent of them had prior staff experience, which they had received while serving in the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic conflicts.  Of the twenty-six men who occupied governorships 
between 1815-1819, seventeen were military men and of these eight, or 47 percent, had some 
staff experience.  Consequently, for the next fifteen years, during the period 1820 to 1835, 
military staff officers who occupied colonial governorships numbered thirteen in 1820, or 56 
percent, of the governorships, twelve of twenty-four, or 50 percent in 1825, sixteen of twenty-
six, or 61.5 percent, in 1830, and eleven of twenty-eight, or 39 percent in 1835.  Evidence for the 
period 1815 to 1830 indicate that a significant number of second generation officers received 
their appointments largely because of their organizational and managerial skills.  As the empire 
grew larger, an expanded bureaucracy became more complex and necessitated the services and 
obligations of technocrats.  As Peter Burroughs noted, by the 1830s, the Colonial Office realized 
that the implementation of good government in each colony necessitated that administrators be 
cognizant of the multiplicity of obligations and responsibilities owed to their subjects.  These 
included the control of tariffs and currency, fiscal and monetary policies, intervention in creating 
infrastructures, the creation of lines of communication, the management of land and labor, and 
the management of internal and external security 
 The career of Colonel Octavius Temple provides an excellent example of a second-
generation military colonial administrator.  Temple was born in 1784 in Cornwall, the youngest 
son of the Rev. William Temple and Anne Stow.  He acquired his first commission as an ensign 
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in the 4th Regiment on October 28, 1799, at the age of fifteen.  Temple rose in rank during the 
Napoleonic Wars, becoming a lieutenant in 1801, a captain in 1804, and a brevet major in 1814.  
He periodically exchanged regiments while moving up the promotional ladder, serving in the 
48
th
 Regiment, the 38
th
 Regiment, 34
th
 Regiment, and the 14
th
 Regiment.  Hart’s Army list notes 
that Temple served at the Battle of Waterloo and was awarded a medal for participation in the 
action.  However, examination of the Fourteenth’s activities during June 1815 reveal that the 3
rd
 
Battalion was indeed on the field of Waterloo, while Temple was with the 2
nd
 Battalion posted to 
Marseilles during this climatic campaign.  In 1819, Temple became a Sub-Inspector of Ionian 
Militia, a post he remained at for six years.  His next assignment came in 1828, when he 
transferred to the island of Corfu as Administrator of ecclesiastical and municipal revenues.  It 
was during this period that Temple received the administrative experience that enabled him to 
assume the lieutenant governorship of Sierra Leone in November 1833.  Unfortunately, disease 
ended Temples’ life less than a year after he had taken office.   
  The survey also indicates that “middling sort” individuals were beginning to make 
inroads in what was previously the domain of the gentry and aristocrats.  Table A.17 reveals that 
twelve of these gentlemen came from non-gentry/aristocratic backgrounds.  Both James 
Carmichael Smyth and Harry George Wakelyn Smith were the sons of doctors.124  Charles 
Napier’s father was a career military officer, and John Malcolm’s career with the East India 
Company was due largely due to the influence and money of his maternal uncle, John Pasley, a 
wealthy London merchant.125  Also noticeable in the 1830 survey is the weakening of Torism 
among colonial/imperial positions as evidenced by the appointment of prominent Whigs William 
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Bentinck and Charles Napier.  The change is even more noteworthy in 1835, when Whigs 
continue to supplant the remaining Tories.  Archibald Acheson, lieutenant governor of Lower 
Canada and brother in law to William Bentinck; Robert Grant, administrator of Bombay; 
Somerset Lorry-Corry, governor of Jamaica; and Richard Bourke, governor of New South 
Wales, all prominent Whigs, received colonial appointments in the period 1830-1835.126  
However, this trend is not unexpected, as the fall of Wellington’s Administration in December 
1830 heralded the decline of the Tories and the beginning of Whig ascendancy.  Indeed, the 
Whig’s return to power in December 1830 resulted in a reformist shift within the Colonial Office 
that included the gradual replacement of military men with civilians with organizational and 
administrative abilities.127  As the survey indicates, in 1835 civilian governors were making 
significant inroads in what was traditionally a military activity.  In that year, civilians held nine 
of the twenty-nine senior colonial administrative and governing positions, a clear departure from 
previous years when civilians held only a handful of these positions.  In the years that followed 
civilian technocrats would gradually replace the military proconsuls so prevalent in the decades 
following Waterloo.  Among the civilians, Evan Nepean and Robert Wilmot-Horton worked in 
the Colonial Office before their appointment as governor.  Nepean served as Colonial Under-
Secretary from July 1794 to March 1795; Wilmot-Horton worked as Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State during Lord Liverpool’s administration, December 1821 to January 1828.128   
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Conclusion 
 The military records for officers who served during the Napoleonic Wars and in its 
immediate aftermath are frequently incomplete.  Nevertheless, substantial information 
can be pieced together to construct a social profile of officers who served in the Napoleonic 
Wars and who formed the foundation of the post-Napoleonic colonial administrators.  As noted 
in the previous chapter colonial administrators were frequently drawn from a force pool of 
military men who had proven their leadership abilities in the Peninsula.  It is therefore necessary 
to step back and examine the social backgrounds and wartime careers of officers who comprised 
this group.   
 The typical British officer who served in the Napoleonic Wars was a young man between 
the ages of 17 and 22 years.  Socially, he was either a member of the emerging middle class or 
from the lesser gentry.  The young officer’s parents usually possessed enough income to provide 
for their children an education.  Literacy practically guaranteed a young man’s entry into the 
British officer corps.  Officers’ commissions were acquired either through purchase, or non-
purchase means that could be obtained through a variety of methods.  A substantial number of 
these officers entered the army in the first years of the nineteenth century when the threat of 
French invasion was the greatest and patriotic feelings ran high.  Nearly three quarters of all 
company and field grade officers who entered the army served some time campaigning in the 
Peninsula.  Officers who served in this theater of operations appear to have an advantage in 
securing postwar employment in overseas administrations.   
 Officers who benefited from the patronage of either Wellington or his cadre of senior 
division and brigade commanders enjoyed a distinct advantage in securing the coveted 
subordinate positions in the postwar colonies.  Furthermore, senior officers who were appointed 
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to colonial governments frequently employed subordinates who had served them in similar 
capacities during wartime.  Although these subordinates were talented staff officers, employment 
was frequently secured through the process of networking.  Networking was accomplished in a 
variety of ways that included comradeship, combat solidarity, regimental ties, familial 
relationships, patron-client associations, and religious affiliation.  As noted in the next two 
chapters, the relationships that were cultivated by subordinates with their senior officers through 
the process of networking frequently paid handsome dividends.   
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CHAPTER SIX: TIES THAT BIND: NETWORKING AMONG MILITARY COLONIAL 
OFFICIALS 
 
 Networking is as old as civilization; recently the corporate world has rediscovered the 
phenomenon.  Corporations believe that a successful business depends on building successful 
employee teams.  “A great team multiplies your prospects for success by enabling you to form 
relationships with powerful people….”1 For the post-Napoleonic British Army, networking was a 
natural process and not a product of the self help books found in the business world today.  
Relationships forged in the military were the product of many types of bonds: comradeship, 
combat solidarity, regimental ties, familial relationships, patron-client associations, religious 
affiliation, and administrative experience.  The post-Napoleonic British Army was small by 
continental standards and fostered a close-knit society.  It was within this community that 
networking between individuals occurred along a complex and interweaving path.   
Military leaders have long recognized the importance of solidarity and comradeship 
among soldiers.  The rigors of campaign and the terror of combat create a profound bond of 
brotherhood.  Military psychologists note that this relationship is often the result of the personal 
sufferings soldiers endure and the fears they encounter while exposed to constant danger.  J. G. 
Fuller, in his study of troop morale among British and Dominion forces during the First World 
War, noted that troop solidarity developed mainly in the primary group, at the platoon or section 
level.  Soldiers who had experienced frontline combat together developed “a fierce loyalty” to 
their mates and “an almost religious sense of comradeship.”2  Along with this sense of loyalty 
came the associated fear that soldiers could break this bond of trust by letting their comrades 
down in combat.  This viewpoint was confirmed in a 1943 Yale University study of 300 combat 
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soldiers; research discovered that one of the principle anxieties among front line soldiers was the 
fear that they would let their friends down in combat.  The overwhelming majority (94 percent) 
of the men stated, “they were better soldiers because of the fear that if they showed weakness 
they would endanger the lives of their friends.”3  Moreover, John Ellis, who studied the World 
War II foot soldier, discovered that troops who experienced constant danger, privation, and 
suffering often subordinated their personal anguish by focusing their attention on the welfare and 
care of their comrades.  Ellis notes, “Out of their sufferings there emerged a real sense of 
selflessness and equality and it is these that ultimately characterize this exclusive fraternity.”4  
Egalitarianism exists because all combat soldiers recognize that they share a common identity 
with their fellow soldiers.  They must work together doing everything possible to ensure that 
each of their comrades survive the ordeal.  Soldiers are often willing to sacrifice themselves to 
see that their comrades survive.   
Both ancient and modern historians are quick to point out that field commanders in 
antiquity realized that fusing small groups of soldiers into comrades was integral to unit morale, 
army cohesion, and battlefield success.  The ancient bard, Homer, noted in the Iliad that related 
clans and tribes brigaded together fought effectively as cohesive units.5  Homer also recounted 
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you will see which of your leaders is bad, and 
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and  which also is brave, since they will fight 
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the deep relationship that existed between comrades-in-arms as exemplified by the bond shared 
by the Greek hero, Achilleus, and his friend and chariot driver, Patroklos.  When Nestor, King of 
Pylos, informed Achilleus of Patroklos’ death at the hands of Hektor: 
….the black cloud of sorrow closed on Achilleus. 
In both hands he caught up the grimy dust and poured it. 
over his head and face, and fouled his handsome countenance 
and the black ashes were scattered over his immortal tunic. 
And he himself mightily in his might in the dust lay 
at length and took and tore at his hair with his hands and defiled it.6   
 
Achilleus’ grief stemmed not only from the loss of his close friend but that he had abandoned his 
comrade by not being at his side during combat.   
The ancient writers Thucydides, Xenophon, Onasander, Caesar, and Plutarch recognized 
the close relationship between battlefield comrades.  Like their modern counterparts, ancient 
fighting men fought to protect their comrades at their side.  To do otherwise would risk shame 
and ostracization by their fellow soldiers.  The Greek Onasander noted that Hoplites fought well 
when placed “in rank beside brother, friend beside friend, lover beside lover.”7  Combat soldiers 
receive comfort from the knowledge that their fellow soldiers, in turn, will support them.  In a 
post-World War II study commissioned by the United States Army World War II, S. L. A. 
Marshall acknowledged the importance of unity on battlefield morale.8  The study revealed that 
even a crowded battlefield can be a lonely place for the solitary soldier and that a comrade’s 
voice or even touch will dispel some of a soldier’s fear during combat.  Victor Davis Hanson 
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and might learn also whether by magic you fail 
   to take this 
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notes that ancient weaponry fulfilled a two-fold function that contributed to a soldier’s 
dependence on his comrades, thus encouraging bonding.  The large Hoplite shield carried by the 
Classical Greek armies protected both the bearer and his comrade’s right arm and side.9  Hanson 
observes that the Greek phalanx was a closely packed formation and that the armament and 
tactics employed by the Greeks encouraged dependence on the man to the right of the file.  The 
close proximity of Greek warriors in file incessantly bumping and touching each other produced 
a tactile sensation that constantly reinforced the notion that each soldier supported his comrades 
and was not alone.  
The role of officers and commanders is another key component in maintaining morale.  
Successful military commanders improved morale and army esprit de corps by sharing the lot of 
the common soldiers and by experiencing their hardships and dangers.  There are many accounts 
of commanders who, in sharing the rigors of combat, win the admiration and respect of their 
troops.  Early in his career, Napoleon solidified his reputation as a leader when he personally 
sited twenty-four guns of the Army of Italy during the Battle of Lodi.10  During World War II, 
Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. landed with the first wave of assault troops at Utah Beach armed with 
only a walking cane and his Army Colt containing six rounds of ammunition.11  Even the 
ancients were quick to grasp the importance of officers in providing an example to their men by 
sharing the rigors and dangers of frontline combat.  Xenophon observed that an effective 
commander was one that soldiers both feared and respected.  Writing about his commander’s 
severity, Xenophon noted Clearchus’ strict demeanor revealed a resolve that “in the midst of 
dangers … troops were ready to obey him implicitly and would choose no other to command 
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them.”12  Plutarch commented that the late Republican military commander Gaius Marius 
achieved great popularity among his troops because he ate, slept, marched, labored, and fought 
alongside his men.13  Marius, in sharing the rigors and dangers of combat, won the respect and 
loyalty of his army.14  On many occasions, Julius Caesar emulated the example of Marius in 
perpetuating the perception that their commander was one with his soldiers.  Caesar noted in his 
commentaries on the Gallic War that when the Nervii attacked he dismounted, took up a 
legionary’s shield, and fought in the front line with his troops.  In seeing their leader enter the 
fray, “the legionaries were given new heart and were anxious to do his utmost when his general 
[Caesar] was looking on”15 Caesar’s legionaries were neither willing to disappoint their 
commander nor let their comrades down.   
 Military commanders appreciate the powerful bond that exists between men who face 
combat together.  In pre-industrialized warfare, assured, confident, and seasoned armies could 
easily panic and rout on the field of battle for no apparent reason.  Steady leadership provided the 
enlisted men with tangible proof that their officers would lead them through the chaos and 
suffering of combat.  Soldiers relied greatly on their fellow comrades, but they also depended 
and trusted that their officers to see them through.  In a significant number of battles, officer 
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casualty rates often determined the balance between victory and defeat.  Even the morale of 
vaunted and renowned units could break when faced with catastrophic officer losses.  
Napoleon’s 3rd Regiment of Grenadiers of the Guard were routed at the conclusion of the Battle 
of Waterloo when twenty-three officers and 200 men fell to the withering fire administered by 
2,700 muskets from British guardsmen and infantry.16  Officers often provided the necessary 
stiffening of the ranks.  In a period when victory was determined not by destruction of the 
enemy’s army, but by destroying the enemy’s will to resist, the role of a strong inspiring leader 
was paramount to not only army and unit morale, but to its survivability.  There were many 
examples of officers who displayed battlefield courage that inspired and encouraged their men to 
accomplish amazing feats of bravery.  At the Battle of Albuera in the spring of 1811, Lieutenant 
Colonel John Colborne’s British Brigade suffered an astounding 64 percent casualty rate and yet 
these troops remained on the field as a viable combat unit.17  Philip Haythornthwaite attributes 
the brigade’s survivability in one of the most sanguinary battles of the Peninsular War, to the 
exemplary leadership of the unit’s officers.   
 It is an officer’s duty to provide leadership and motivation in battle to the troops under 
his command.  However, in pre-industrialized warfare the notion of honor was the central 
rationale of officers in carrying out their obligations with courage.  Honor is a difficult term to 
define as the concept can differ between nationalities, ethnicity, social class, race, and time.  The 
Classical Greeks gauged honor by a warrior’s ability to engage in single combat with the 
enemy.18  The individual combats by Greek and Trojan heroes in the Homeric epics provided 
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templates for the later Greeks to emulate.  Scholars of ancient history have observed that the 
Romans developed killing to an efficient and deadly art.  Yet, these same historians have largely 
ignored the notion of honor among Roman officers.  Adrian Keith Goldsworthy argues that in 
battle Roman officers consciously displayed battlefield courage or personal virtus that often 
inspired the men under their command.19  In battle, the Roman high command expected their 
subordinate officers to urge the men forward and actively engage in the fighting along with their 
men.   
 Officers began to adhere to an unwritten “cult of honor” in the early eighteenth century.20  
This code, along with the associated “civilized warfare” practiced by the armies of the 
Enlightenment, resulted from a widespread rejection by military men of the depredations 
attributed to soldiers during the French Wars of Religion and the Thirty Years’ War.  Officers, 
like their enlisted comrades, were most concerned with how they appeared in the eyes of their 
peers.  During this period, officers began to establish professional relationships with their peers, 
a tradition that continued into the nineteenth century.  John Keegan, in his groundbreaking work, 
The Face of Battle, observed, “honor [among early nineteenth-century British officers] was 
paramount, it was by establishing one’s honourableness with one’s fellows that leadership was 
exerted indirectly over the common soldier.”21  Christopher Duffy comments that eighteenth-
century officers would often take the initiative of expelling from its ranks those who did not 
measure up to an accepted standard of battlefield courage.  He notes that in 1748 captains and 
lieutenants of the Médoc Regiment turned on one of their own after they perceived that the 
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officer skulked during a recent combat.  The offending officer had his coat and sword destroyed, 
the symbols of command, before his fellow soldiers drove him from the camp with sticks and 
stones.22 
 Physical courage was the essential component to this “cult of honor.”  Society expected 
officers to exhibit valor because of their social station.  Duffy notes that writers like Turpin de 
Crissé equated courage with virtues that characterized nobility.23  Robert R. Palmer, in his 
assessment of Frederick the Great and his Prussian Army, observed that the King of Prussia’s 
Army reflected the spirit of the state; its officers mirrored aristocratic attributes of honor, class 
consciousness, glory, and ambition.24  Other important elements figured into an officer’s concept 
of honor.  These included an individual’s self-perception as a gentleman.  A gentleman 
traditionally was a man entitled to bear arms.  Throughout the seventeenth century royal heralds 
continually made visitations throughout England to determine who was fit and who was not fit to 
bear arms.25  During the next century, this definition expanded to include any person who dressed 
and comported the manners of a gentleman.  Guy Miège, a Swiss visitor to London, observed in 
1703 that anyone who “has either a liberal or genteel education, that looks gentleman-like 
(whether he be so or not) and has the wherewithal to live freely and handsomely, is by the 
courtesy of England usually called a gentleman.”26  As the eighteenth century progressed, the 
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definition of a “gentleman” became less precise.  The title, no longer based exclusively on family 
background, became loosely associated with money and behavior.27    
 Military officers repeatedly found that adherence to the code of honor often collided 
with the accepted laws of the state in which they served.  Moreover, the honor code was 
frequently a source of friction among the officer corps fraternity.  Duffy observes that officers, 
when they interacted among themselves, were often victims to their own sense of insecurity.28  
Duffy contends this insecurity was a product of the lawlessness and indiscipline of the age 
coupled with the vague code of honor officers followed.29  The brotherhood forged on the 
battlefield often crumbled in the mess or in cantonments.  Officers consistently believed that 
their peers were constantly testing their sense of honor.  Perceived slights and unintended acts of 
disrespect were numerous, frequently prompting quarrels that demanded satisfaction.  In a 
significant number of instances, the question of money, women, or behavior figured prominently 
in such disputes.  Dueling provided the means for settling disputes and restoring lost honor to the 
injured party.   
 Dueling was a common practice in eighteenth and nineteenth century British society, 
especially among military officers.  Charles Oman commented that dueling among military 
officers, while prevalent in England reached epidemic proportions in Ireland and India.  During 
the Peninsular War, the Duke of Wellington specifically forbade dueling among his officers.  He 
could ill afford to lose good officers to personal conflicts.  British Army court martial records for 
the period 1809 to 1814 reported that only four fatal duels took place while the army campaigned 
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in Spain.  Oman’s research indicates that there were numerous instances of dueling, but 
regimental authorities hushed them up.30  
 It is apparent that dueling took place in Spain among British officers, but few 
acknowledged it openly.  It is only from memoirs and extant correspondence by the participants 
that researchers are aware of its pervasiveness within the officer community.  In his memoirs, 
Joseph Anderson wrote of a duel that occurred in Portugal between two surgeons who fought 
over the question of a woman’s honor.  On this occasion, the duel ended without bloodshed.  
Anderson ended his account by observing that during his posting in the Peninsula, duels were 
frequent and “considered by many [officers] to be both necessary and unavoidable.”31  The 
practice of dueling among officers presented a particularly awkward and embarrassing situation 
for the British high command.  Dueling caused officers to choose between their adherence to 
army regulations and their observance of the code of honor.  In all cases, a gentleman’s sense of 
honor caused the duel, but the notion of honor also prevented the participants from divulging the 
details of the duel to higher military authorities.  Moreover, all involved with the duel were 
obliged to keep silent.  There was often little doubt as to who was involved, but the code of 
honor ensured silence that consistently prevented army authorities from conclusively 
determining culpability and punishing the guilty parties.  As a result, among official army circles 
the matter of dueling became a solemn farce that the high command often ignored and even 
grudgingly tolerated.32 
 The majority of officers who had shared the rigors and dangers of combat were part of 
a select fraternity.  Their friendship and loyalty to one another remained firm throughout their 
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lives.  Memoirs and reminisces by Peninsular War veterans attest to the deep bond they shared.  
William Thornton Keep became friends with Henry Alexander while both men were young 
officers in the 28
th
 Regiment in the Peninsula.33  The close relationship between the two men 
lasted until Alexander’s death in 1847.  Neighbors of Keep noted that for many years the two old 
men would re-fight Peninsular War battles sitting outside of Keep’s Camden Garden home.  
Another friendship that lasted for decades was that between Colonel Charles Nicol, the 
commander of the 68
th
 Regiment and the unit’s regimental surgeon, Walter Henry.34  Nicol and 
Henry remained together as friends in the same regiment for twenty-five years until Nicol’s 
retirement in 1837.  Lieutenant Colonel Harry Smith carried on a affectionate correspondence 
with Lieutenant General Sir Benjamin D’Urban for decades.  Both Smith and D’Urban had 
served in Wellington’s Peninsula Army.35  From 1828 to 1837, Smith served as deputy 
quartermaster general in Governor D’Urban’s Cape Colony administration.  When Smith 
transferred India, he continued to correspond with his friend and mentor, D’Urban closing his 
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letters with phrase “My ever dear friend and tutor as a soldier.  Gratefully for all your kindness, 
your devoted old servant.”36 
 The most fitting example of the enduring fellowship between Peninsular officers was 
the celebratory meals held by British officers to observe notable victories.  None of these dinners 
was more famous then the Waterloo Banquets held annually at Wellington’s Apsley House.  The 
tradition in the British Army of holding memorial dinners gained prominence in the Napoleonic 
period.  During the Peninsular War, Wellington hosted dinners on the anniversaries of important 
actions.  For example, in 1813, Wellington held a series of feasts for officers who had 
participated in the battles of Busaco, Badajoz, Fuentes de Oñoro, and Salamanca.37  Because of 
its great significance, the Waterloo Banquets attracted widespread attention in the press and 
among the public.  Interest was so great that the citizens could obtain special passes to view the 
table settings before the gala.38  Guests, often four score and more, included command, staff, and 
company grade officers who had participated in the battle.  Guest lists for some of the years have 
survived as well as William Salter’s massive painting depicting those in attendance at 1836 
banquet.39  Attendees of this dinner included many officers who had become colonial 
administrators including Sir Frederick Adam, governor of Madras; Sir Edward Barnes, on the 
staff of Governor Sir Robert Brownrigg, Ceylon; John William Fremantle, deputy adjutant 
general in Jamaica; John Gurwood, deputy adjutant general, West Indies; and Francis Dawkins, 
deputy quartermaster of the Ionian Islands.  Another celebratory dinner that brought together old 
Peninsular warriors acting in a civil administrative and military capacity was the March 1846 
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victory banquet held in Lahore celebrating the conclusion of the First Sikh War.  Seated at the 
head table were four former Peninsular War officers, Sir Hugh Gough, Sir Henry Hardinge, Sir 
Charles Napier, and Sir Harry Smith.40 
 Combat was not the only tie that bound Peninsular officers.  Regimental spirit also 
played a significant role in fostering solidarity among soldiers.  Regiments provided soldier and 
officer alike a sense of belonging in a normally impersonal army.  Within a regiment, a soldier 
found comradeship, loyalty, and a deep-seated primal sense of belonging to an elite, all-male 
community.41  Baynes, in his study of the 2
nd
 Scottish Rifles in World War I, observes that once 
an officer joined a regiment he subordinated all of life’s priorities to the demands of the 
regiment.42  Wife, family, and social station all became secondary.  F. M. Richardson suggests 
that the inherent tribalism of regimental constancy may have its origins in seventeenth and 
eighteenth century recruiting practices that often resulted in enlisting soldiers from specific 
regions or villages.  A young soldier knew that if he did not measure up on the battlefield, he 
faced the displeasure of his officers and comrades and the scorn from his own family and 
village.43  In the 1830s, general orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief, General Rowland 
Lord Hill, at the behest of His Majesty William IV, directed the adjutant general, John 
MacDonald, to engage Mr. Richard Cannon, “Principal Clerk,” at the Horse Guards, in preparing 
historical records for every regiment in the British Army.  The Cannon series of regimental 
histories pays particular attention to the initial recruiting areas of regiments.  For example, 
recruits for the 8
th  
, or King’s Regiment came from the area of Hertfordshire, Derbyshire, and the 
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environs outside of London.44  A similar example is the historical record of the 9
th
, or the East 
Norfolk Regiment that in 1685 “a regiment of foot was raised in Gloucestershire” under the 
command of Captain Henry Cornwall of the Royal Regiment of Horse Guards.45  Initially, British 
regiments took the name of their colonel.  As the army grew the colonel’s name disappeared as 
regiments identified themselves by numbers that indicated their seniority within the army.46  In 
1782, infantry regiments acquired county or region appellation in an effort to spur local interest 
in recruiting.47  By the time of the Napoleonic Wars, this regional affiliation with their named 
counties had all but ceased to exist.  A History of the Service of the 41
st
 (the Welch) Regiment 
reports that in 1844 the unit consisted of five hundred and forty-eight English, twenty-one Scots, 
and two hundred and twenty-two Irish.48 
 Regiments, by their composition and structure, promote bonding.  Keegan points out 
that the creation of regiments fulfilled a need by early modern European monarchs to bind the 
army to the interests of the state.49  By marginalizing the influence of the landed nobility who 
throughout the Middle Ages had supplied the manpower to the monarchies, proprietary 
regimental colonels now owed loyalty and allegiance to their state paymaster in the person of the 
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king.  Keegan notes that unlike the mercenaries of the Renaissance, regimental soldiers were 
regularly paid thus ensuring permanence.50  
As an organizational and tactical unit, regiments began to appear in European armies at 
the beginning of the seventeenth century.  Keegan’s argument is that initially most regiments 
were a collection of companies, as the company was too small of a unit to count on the 
battlefield.51  Other scholars, such as Trevor Dupuy, contend that the regiment was a conscious 
attempt to maximize maneuverability, firepower, and shock on the battlefield by combining both 
pike and firearm.  In the late sixteenth century, Maurice of Nassau, smarting from defeats by the 
Spanish, reorganized his armies along Roman lines receiving inspiration from Vegetius, 
Frontinus and Aelian.52  Maurice recreated the approximate size of the Roman cohort, combining 
about 500 men on a front of 250 meters.53  Placing pikemen in the center and musketeers on the 
flanks increased Maurice’s regiments man-for-man capability in a linear formation, effectively 
countering the phalangeal configuration of the tercio.  Maurice’s revolutionary contribution to 
warfare was that he had succeeded in creating a compact maneuverable military unit.  Within the 
next half century, every army in Europe had adopted the regimental system.  England’s New 
Model Army of the 1640s embraced the regimental system consisting of a battalion made up of 
ten companies commanded by a colonel and assisted by a lieutenant colonel, major, and seven 
captains, each leading a company. 
By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the basic administrative unit of European 
armies was the regiment.  Battalions further subdivided the regiment and many European states 
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adopted a multi-battalion regimental structure.  Most states retained a two-battalion organization 
but there were instances of regiments consisting of three, and even, four battalions.  It was 
comparatively rare for British regiments to have more than one battalion.54  Historian David 
Chandler notes that a one-battalion infantry regiment on full establishment in the wartime armies 
of William III, Marlborough, Cumberland, and George II numbered between 780 to 930 rank and 
file soldiers commanded by forty to sixty officers.55  British infantry regiments numbered 
between 600 and 1000 soldiers by the beginning of the nineteenth century.56  Only during 
wartime, were British regiments expanded to include multiple battalion regiments.  During the 
Napoleonic Wars, the 95
th
 Regiment of Foot (the Rifles) raised in 1801, received a second 
battalion in 1805 and a third in 1810.57  When the Napoleonic Wars ended in 1815, massive 
demobilization of the British Army mandated the reduction of all regiments to one battalion.  
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, British regiments remained relatively small 
entities when compared to their Continental counterparts.   
The established complement of officers for a British regiment in the post-Napoleonic 
period numbered between forty and one hundred officers, depending on the number of 
companies the regiment fielded.  As previously noted, regiments that were on campaign 
frequently fielded more companies than regiments on peacetime duty.  Moreover, Guard 
                                                 
54 David Chandler, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough (New York: Sarpedon, 1995), 97. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Richard Partridge and Michael Oliver observed that regimental strength varied greatly throughout the 
Napoleonic period.  This fluctuation of unit strength depended on a number of factors including attrition, station, 
and regimental seniority.  During the Napoleonic period, major theaters of war received priority in replacements.  
Wellington’s Peninsular Army, located in a major theater of war, obtained the lion’s shares of replacements thus this 
army’s regiments remained somewhat close to their established strength.  Regiments stationed further from Europe 
were often well below authorized strength.  For example, in 1809, the strength of the 1st Battalion, 6th Regiment of 
Foot in the Peninsula numbered 943 officers and men; the 1st Battalion of the 1st Regiment of Foot stationed in 
Upper Canada reported a strength of 571 officers and men.  See Richard Partridge and Michael Oliver, The 
Napoleonic Army Handbook: The British Army and Her Allies, 31-32. 
57 Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1978), 182. 
 246
regiments because of their status, seniority, and proximity to the monarch fielded more 
companies than regular line regiments necessitating more officers.  In 1815, the combined 2
nd
 
and 3
rd
 Battalions of the First Foot Guards listed ninety officers in its complement.58  Peacetime 
line infantry regiments fielded considerably fewer officers.  For example, in 1817, the 19
th
 
Regiment  reported a complement of fifty-five officers.59  In 1819, the same regiment had thirty-
eight officers.60  During peacetime, officer establishments remained small Hart’s Army List of 
1837 lists sixty-seven officers serving with Coldstream Regiment of Foot Guards.61  The 1840 
administrative document “Officer Paysheets” reveal that forty-one officers served with the 27
th
  
Fusiliers.62  
The British officer class was a relatively tight knit social group.63  Sylvia Frey suggests 
that the smallness of the corps and their social isolation encouraged bonding.64  Because of the 
small size of their unit, regimental officers knew their fellow officers intimately through daily 
interaction.  Major General F. M. Richardson likened a regiment to a substitute home and family 
that the officer embraces in place of his real home and family.65  In March 1807 Captain John 
Colborne wrote to his stepfather, Reverend Thomas Bargus, acknowledging that his regiment 
had become “another home.”66  Young officers tended to shift their feelings of family loyalty and 
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affection to their regimental peers.  In a letter written while campaigning in the Peninsula, 
William Thorton Keep admitted to his brother Samuel the special relationship that existed 
between regimental officers.  Keep wrote, “among the family of officers united as we have 
become by association in our daily amusements and pursuits, engaged in the same glorious 
cause, of the same Regiment and age, dining at one board, and partaking equally in all the 
vicissitudes incidental to such a precarious life, and changes are severely felt, at least by me, and 
I look with surprise at my companions who can bear with such a stoical indifference their 
frequent separations from each other.”67  In most cases, regimental officers treated their fellow 
officers as not only comrades in arms, but also as adopted brothers within the regiment.  Indeed, 
throughout the eighteenth century the phrase “brother officer” became commonplace by a 
number of military writers.  Adam Williamson, in Military Memoirs and Maxims of Marshal 
Turenne, employed the term in 1740.  The phrase again appears in Samuel Bever’s 1756 tract, 
The Cadet: A Military Treatise, Thomas Simes 1768 work, The Military Medley: Containing the 
Most Necessary Rules and Directions for Attaining a Competent Knowledge of the Art, and by 
Robert Donkins’ 1777 treatise, Military Collections and Remarks.   
The regimental experience inculcated group values and forged among the officers a 
conscious notion of group identity.  The regiment encouraged its members to take familial pride 
in the customs, traditions, and history of their unit.  Visual reminders constantly recalled the 
regiment’s great deeds and inspired its members to uphold the honor of the regiment.  What may 
have appeared as an eccentric practice to an outsider evoked pride among its members.  A few 
examples illustrate the point; two red feathers in the shakos or campaign hats of the 46th 
Regiment recalled the spirited defense conducted by the unit in 1777 at the Battle of Brandywine 
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Creek.  Officers and men of the 95th Regiment took particular pride in their “Green Jackets” and 
spirit of discipline that denoted their elite status.68  Every March 1
st
, since 1777, on St. David’s 
Day, the officers of the Royal Welch Fusiliers, eat leeks in the regimental mess while the band 
plays the regimental tune “The Noble Race of Shenkin” as a drum boy leads a goat three times 
around the table.69  Likewise, battle honors embroidered on the regimental colors provided a 
constant reminder to all members of the regiment that their predecessors accomplished great 
feats of valor.  Officers who threatened the harmony within the regimental fraternity faced 
ostracization or expulsion by their fellow officers.  Charles Oman, in his study of Wellington’s 
Peninsular Army, observes that “young Irish squireens with bullying and dueling habits, as well 
as the hard-drinking, which were notoriously prevalent among the less civilized strata of society 
beyond St. George’s Channel” were often expelled from the “genteel” company of the 
regiment.70  
The regimental mess best elucidates the exclusivity and camaraderie that existed among 
officers.  Throughout history, the fellowship meal has exemplified a sacred bond.  In the Judeo-
Christian western tradition, the Passover Seder and the Eucharistic meal signified unity and 
solidarity for a select group.  The first century Jewish sect, Essenes, ritualized the act of eating 
believing that God participated in every meal.71  In the early Church, Christians accorded the 
Eucharistic rite special importance as only the initiated shared in the sacramental meal.72  Among 
British officers, the regimental mess contained elements of both the sacred and the profane.  A 
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religious-like experience coexisted with riotous behavior.  During the Napoleonic and post-
Napoleonic periods, the regimental mess contained elements of religious solemnity and 
intemperate camaraderie.  Lieutenant Robert Blakeney’s account of the 28
th
 Regiment’s mess 
aptly demonstrates this blending: 
…We sat down to table, and eating seemed but a work of necessity, which passed 
in mute action.  The cloth being removed, a bumper was proposed to the memory of the 
immortal Moore.
73
  It was drunk in perfect silence and, as it were, with religious 
solemnity….  Our next bumper was to the memory of our late gallant comrades, 
who gloriously fell since our last march from Lisbon, gallantly maintaining the honour 
of their country and corps.  This toast was also drunk in solemn silence, while many an 
eye swam at the recollection of scenes and friends gone forever.…  Our third and last 
bumper was ‘To our happy meeting; and whosoever’s lot it be fall may the regiment soon 
and often be placed in a situation to maintain the glory of their country, and may they 
never forget the bravery and discipline which won the ‘back plates.’  This sentiment was 
received with wild enthusiasm, and so loudly cheered by all that gloom and melancholy 
were frightened out of the room.  The festive board gradually resumed its wonted 
cheerful tone; the merry song went round drowning the doleful funeral dirge; past 
misfortunes and useless regrets were forgotten.
74  
 
 In a dual effort to curb ungentlemanly conduct and to control exorbitant mess, 
expenses regimental commanding officers instituted “Rules of the Mess.”
75
  In April 1784, 
Major General Richard Grenville, who held the colonelcy of the Royal Welch Fusiliers, laid 
down a set of rules intended to curb excessive drinking and limit expense.  Every member of the 
officers’ mess would be charged ! d. daily for “dinner and small beer” while “It is expected that 
no member of the Mess drinks more than one glass of wine during dinner.”
76
  Although, minor 
idiosyncrasies existed, all regimental messes operated under similar strictures. 
 Comradeship and regimental affiliation made for strong ties but they were not the only 
bonds that united officers.  Family connections were equally strong and many within the officer 
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corps belonged to military dynasties that for generations held commissions.  Houlding observes 
that, in the eighteenth century, at least one quarter of serving officers in the British Army came 
from “army families” made up of commissioned fathers and their sons.77  Many of the original 
military families could claim Huguenot ancestry.  One of the notable examples of this tradition 
was the De Lancey family who in the span of sixty years produced three celebrated soldiers.  
General Oliver De Lancey served in the American War for Independence; Colonel William De 
Lancey Wellington’s deputy quartermaster general killed at Waterloo; and Oliver De Lancey 
who died while participating at the siege of San Sebastian in 1837.  The small size of the 
eighteenth-century British peacetime army and the laws of primogeniture fostered generations of 
military men.  Frequently, second or third sons from the minor gentry chose a military career as 
their life’s vocation.  Their concentration of numbers created an accumulation of influence and 
power that, in time, produced a sizeable number of distinguished officers.  An examination of 
Peninsular and Waterloo officers who achieved field marshal rank in the 1850s and 1860s 
indicates that seven of the fourteen officers had military fathers.78  Two of these seven same 
officers sired sons who went on to become officers.  Charles Dalton’s extensive Waterloo 
research reveals that over one hundred officers who fought in that celebrated battle were the sons 
of military officers.79  The number of father-son combinations within individual regiments in 
1815 is truly remarkable.  For example, Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Doherty commanded the 13
th
 
Regiment of Light Dragoons.  Among his officers were two of his sons, Captain Joseph Doherty 
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and Lieutenant George Doherty.  Harry Smith writes that he and his two brothers, Thomas and 
Charles, all served at Waterloo in the 95
th
 Regiment.  In his autobiography, Smith relates an 
incident in which his father said to the trio sorrowfully, “Napoleon and Wellington will meet, a 
battle will ensue of a kind never before heard of, and I cannot expect to see you all again.”80  
Remarkably, all three survived the battle.  Harry remained on active service with the army.  
Charles returned home later becoming colonel of the Whittlesea Yeomanry, and Thomas went on 
half-pay in 1819 but returned to the service serving as principal barrack master at Aldershot.  
The Smith family contributed additional members to the army, as evidenced by a letter Harry 
sent to his sister Alice during the Maharajpore Campaign, where he was delighted that his 
nephews Hugh and Harry were regimental officers serving with him.81  
 Among the Highland regiments family connections were even stronger than in the 
English or Irish regiments.  As Diana Henderson points out in her study of Highland regiments, a 
significant number of officers in the kilted regiments had pre-regimental associations of some 
kind with the regiment that they eventually entered.82  These associations frequently took the 
form of family ties or regional affiliation with noble or landed families.  Moreover, Highland 
regiments in the early decades of the nineteenth century were able to maintain a preponderance 
of Scots that indicate family ties remained strong in these regiments.  Throughout most of the 
nineteenth century, the five kilted regiments could, on average, claim that 61.8 percent of its 
officers were Scots.83  On the other hand, Henderson notes that among trews and line regiments 
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Scots dominance diminished significantly.84  Scottish participation in these regiments averaged 
30 percent with the English contribution at 47.5 percent and the Irish 22 percent.  However, 
finding close blood relationships in Highland regiments is more difficult because of the 
commonality of surnames.  Hart’s 1815 edition of the Army List for the 92nd Regiment 
(Highland kilted) indicates that of the forty-one officers on the regimental roster   contained three 
Macdonalds, three MacPhersons, three Gordons, and two Campbells.   
 As unusual as it may appear, wartime encouraged family members to congregate in the 
same regiments or serve in the same theaters.  Peacetime, however, frequently forced families 
apart as competition for the limited number of available postings increased dramatically.  After 
1818, a significant number of family combinations split up as officers desiring to stay in the 
military accepted assignments that spanned the globe.  One such military dynasty was the 
VanCortlandt-Anderson families.  The head of this military dynasty was Philip VanCortlandt, a 
wealthy American whose great grandfather was mayor of New York City.  Born in 1739, 
VanCortlandt received a commission as a major in the loyalist forces and fought with the British 
until Cornwallis’ surrender in 1781.  At the conclusion of the war, VanCortlandt, penniless, 
sailed to Britain with his wife, Catherine Ogden VanCortlandt, and their thirteen children.  In 
Britain, he established himself at Hailsham, Sussex and petitioned the government for 
reimbursement of his losses.  Eventually the government gave him !1,500 and an additional 
!2,000 from the sale of land in America.  In 1804, VanCordlandt received an appointment as 
barrack master for Halisham and command of all soldiers garrisoned in the town.  He retained 
this post until his death on May 1,1814.85  
                                                 
84 The 72nd, 74th, 75th, and 91st Regiments.  
85 National Army Museum Library, Chelsea, Van Cortlandt Papers, Vol. 1,Mary Lucy Courtlandt and 
Anderson Mulcaster. 
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 Evidence indicates that Philip VanCortland’s son Philip fought with loyalist forces 
from New Jersey during the American Revolution.  He eventually immigrated to Canada where 
he served as deputy barrack master general for Lower Canada during the War of 1812.86  A 
daughter, Mary Ricketts VanCortlandt, married John Mackeil Anderson and gave birth to three 
males and four females.  Of their seven children, two of the males received commissions and two 
of the females married officers.  The eldest son, John Mackeil Anderson born in 1791, entered 
the army in 1810 receiving a commission as a lieutenant in the 17
th
 Dragoons.  In January 1812, 
he succumbed to disease in Bombay.87  The next son, Philip Cortlandt Anderson was born in 
1793 and received an appointment in 1811 as an ensign in the 6th Bengal Native Infantry.  He 
saw action in the Gurkha War of 1814 and the Maharatta Wars in 1817-1819.  In 1822-1823, 
illness forced him to take leave and in 1824, he traveled to the Cape Colony where his sister 
Catherine Anderson joined him.  Accompanying Catherine was her friend, Lucy Young, who had 
relatives living at Cape Town.  Later that year Philip Anderson married Lucy Young, and they 
along with Catherine, returned to India.  Catherine subsequently married Frederick Angelo of the 
Honourable East India Company one year later.88  Family records indicate that Philip Anderson 
remained in India for the rest of his military career.  During Brigadier Morrison’s Arakan 
Campaign, he served with the pioneer and sapper corps and reportedly made contact with 
Clinton VanCortlandt, a relative posted with the 31st Regiment and his future brother in law 
Lieutenant Frederick Angelo of the 7
th 
Regiment of Bengal Light Cavalry. 89  In the late 1820s, 
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Philip participated in the siege of Bharatpore under the command of Major General Sir Jasper 
Nichols, but was relieved of command because of an accusation of dereliction of duty.  
Appealing to authorities, he cleared his name and rejoined his unit, remaining with the pioneers 
for the next three years. 
 In 1828, Anderson became a captain and received the appointment as second-in- 
command to the Mhaierwarra Battalion.  He served in this capacity until 1831, when Anderson 
accepted duty as depot commander at Landour.  Official reports cited his record of service at 
Landour emphasizing his “efficiency and honesty in maintaining order” in the district.90  For the 
next few years, Anderson remained on duty, posted with the Meerut Division commanded by Sir 
Samuel Ford Whittingham.  While stationed at the post, Anderson embarked on an ambitious 
program of renovating the public buildings and bazaars of the region that gained him official 
praise from his superiors.  The East India Company officials especially noted that the 
renovations came in under budget at a time when they had demanded economy.91  In February 
                                                                                                                                                             
1st Brigade—H.M. 44th, det 26th. B.N.I., 49th B.N.I.  1809 
2nd Brigade—H.M. 54th, 42nd, and 62nd B.N.I.  2416 
3rd Brigade—10th, 16th M.N.I. 1062 
2nd L. I. Bn. 1033 
Native levy  553 
Pioneers  649 
7th, 14th, 39th, 44th, 45th, 52nd B.N.L. 2399 
 11,209 troops 
According to this order of battle, the 31st Foot was not allocated to this particular campaign.  Moreover, 
Hart’s Army List does not list a Clinton VanCortlandt in any of the British regiments that served in this campaign.  
Apparently, Lucy Van Cortlandt Anderson Mulcaster’s recollection is in error.  It is possible that Clinton 
VanCortlandt served in one of the native regiments during this campaign.  Interestingly, Hart’s Army List for the 
45th (Nottinghamshire) Regiment of Foot, a unit that did serve in the Arakan Campaign does list a Captain Arthur 
Abraham Van Cortlandt commissioned in the regiment March 26, 1825.  See J.W. Fortescue,  A History of the 
British Army, Vol. XI, 1815-1838 (London: Macmillan and Co. Limited, 1923), 308 and A List of the Officers of 
the Army and Royal Marines on Full, Retired, and Half Pay with An Index 1826 [Hart’s Army List] , (London: W. 
Clowes and Sons, 1826), 208-209.  
90 NAM, Van Cortlandt Papers, vol. 1, 103. 
91 Fortescue, History of the British Army, Vol. XIII, 1839-1852, 1.  See also Van Cortlandt Papers, vol. 1, 
103-104.  
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1835, Anderson received command of the Mhaierwarra Battalion after its commanding officer 
Lieutenant Colonel Hale returned home on leave.  Also during this time, Anderson became 
political officer of the district as the East India Company joined civil and military duties under 
the same officer.92  Anderson received the rank of major commensurate with his new position 
later that same year.  He held this assignment until 1837 when he transferred as brigade major to 
Aleyshur.  Within a year, Anderson, in early 1839, became a commander of the Delhi palace 
guard, a position he held until ordered to proceed to Ferozepore in preparation of the Afghan 
Campaign.93  Posted in the 64
th
 Native Infantry, Madras Army, he participated in Elphinstone and 
later Pollack’s operations in Afghanistan.  In April 1842, Anderson died while his unit engaged 
Ali Masjid’s Afghans outside of Jalalabad. 
 Another of Philip Anderson’s siblings, Margaret Maria Douglas Anderson, contributed to 
the family’s military tradition by leaving England in 1820 to live with her uncle Philip 
VanCortlandt, the previously mentioned deputy barrack master general for Lower Canada.  Four 
years later, she married Captain Noah Freer in Quebec.  Freer began his military career in 1810 
as an ensign in the Nova Scotia Fencibles.  At the outbreak of War of 1812, he transferred to the 
Canadian Fencibles but remained only briefly with the regiment as he accepted promotion as a 
captain in the New Brunswick Fencibles in 1813.94  Freer, who before the war had been military 
secretary to Lieutenant General Sir George Prevost in Nova Scotia, served his friend and 
superior during the war in that capacity.  Wesley B. Turner in his study of British high command 
in Canada observes that Freer never intended to be a combat officer, preferring to serve 
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throughout the war as an aide to Prevost.95  Apparently, Freer did see some combat, receiving the 
“Chateauguay” medal.  After the war, he went on half-pay, eventually finding a career as a 
cashier in a Quebec bank. 
 The next generation of the VanCortlandt-Anderson family continued their military 
tradition by contributing three of their five sons to the army.  Although their military careers lay 
outside the scope of this study, it is important to note that Van Cortlandt-Anderson military 
connection continued well into the twentieth century.  Philip VanCortlandt’s eldest son, Harry 
Cortlandt Anderson married the daughter of a military officer and retired in England with the 
rank of general and as a Companion of the Bath.  Moreover, his brothers, Frederick Cortlandt 
Anderson and Arthur Cortlandt Anderson achieved the ranks of major general respectively.  
Additional generations kept up the military tradition by serving in the military during World War 
I.96 
 As evidenced by the VanCortlandt-Anderson family, military folk traveled in the same 
circles interacting, establishing relationships, and frequently intermarrying; creating ever-
widening spheres of networks and family connections.  The Brownrigg family offers additional 
insights on this phenomenon.  The Brownriggs, an impoverished Irish gentry family, owed their 
spectacular career success to marrying wealth and attaching themselves to powerful and 
influential patrons.  
 Sir Robert Brownrigg was one of four sons of Henry Brownrigg and Mary Alcock of 
Rockingham, County Wicklow.97  Of the four sons, three achieved high military rank during the 
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Napoleonic Wars, two attained general rank, and the third retired as a lieutenant colonel.  
Additionally, Henry served as an officer in the 52nd Regiment, where he eventually achieved the 
rank of major.  The regimental history of the 52nd reveals that between 1755 and 1765 the unit 
remained in England and Ireland.  In 1765, the regiment left Cork for Canada, and remained 
there until its transfer to Boston where the unit reinforced General Thomas Gage’s troops just 
before the outbreak of the American War of Independence.98  Unfortunately, neither regimental 
records nor the Brownrigg family history indicates whether Brownrigg traveled with his 
regiment to these overseas stations or participated in the American war.  Furthermore, editions of 
Hart’s Army List, while indicating an officer’s affiliation with a specific unit, does not specify if 
an officer was present with the regiment at its duty station. 
 The military tradition was also strong on his mother’s side of the family.  Robert 
Brownrigg’s grandfather, Michael Alcock, and his uncle, Hugh Alcock, served as military 
officers.  Robert was a captain in the Right Honourable Earl of Effingham’s Regiment when 
posted in Gibraltar in 1759.  Hugh served in the Honourable East India Company’s Madras 
Army as a captain in 1762 and a lieutenant colonel in May 1783.  Indian Office records indicate 
that Captain Hugh Alcock commanded the East India Company’s Tanjore garrison during Hyder 
Ali’s First Mysore War.99 
 Robert Brownrigg entered military service receiving a commission in the 14
th
 Regiment 
in November 1775.  He served with his regiment at Halifax, Nova Scotia and participated in the 
New York Campaign in 1776.  Brownrigg returned to Britain and remained there until promoted 
to lieutenant and adjutant of the 6
th
 Regiment in June 1778.  Two years later, the regiment served 
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as marines in the Royal Navy’s Channel Fleet.  At the conclusion of the American War for 
Independence, the regiment sailed to Jamaica where Brownrigg remained until the beginning of 
1784.100  While posted in Jamaica, he married Elizabeth Catherine, the fifth daughter of William 
Lewis of Cornwall, who may have commanded the 2
nd
 battalion of the Jamaica Rangers.  Lewis’ 
wealth and authority may have assisted Brownrigg’s career by providing him the money 
necessary to purchase commissions in prestigious and senior regiments of the army.101  In March 
1784, Brownrigg purchased a captaincy in the 100
th 
Regiment, subsequently exchanging to the 
35
th
 Regiment and then moving to the 52
nd
 Regiment.   
 In the 1790s, Captain Brownrigg held a number of important and significant military 
posts such as deputy adjutant general for a campaign against the Spanish in South America.  He 
then accepted the assignment as commandant and paymaster to the detachments of regiments on 
foreign service.  In 1794, he received an appointment as deputy quartermaster general of the 
army serving in Flanders.  In the fall of that year, Brownrigg became lieutenant colonel of the 
88
th
 Regiment and took part in all actions including the retreat through Holland and Westphalia.  
The next year he returned to England and received an appointment as military secretary to the 
Duke of York, a position he held until March 1803 when promoted to quartermaster general of 
British Forces.  During Brownrigg’s tenure as military scretary to the Duke of York, he was 
instrumental along with Quartermaster General Sir David Dundas in supporting Col. J. G. Le 
Marchant’s plan for the establishment of a “course of instruction for officers intended to serve on 
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the General Staff.” 102  Under the aegis of Dundas and Brownrigg, Marchant received permission 
to establish two schools, one housing a Junior Department and the other a Senior Department, 
the former at Marlow, and the latter at High Wycombe, to train British quartermaster generals.103  
Furthermore, it was during his tenure as Quartermaster General that Brownrigg established a 
number of close personal ties with talented officers who exercised commands during the 
Napoleonic Wars such as Sir John Moore and Sir David Dundas. 
  Promotions came quickly during the early years of the Napoleonic Wars with 
Brownrigg achieving the rank of major general in 1805, and lieutenant general in 1808.  
Brownrigg’s career, however, suffered a setback in 1809 when he served as quartermaster 
general in the ill-fated Walcheren Expedition.104  He was recalled briefly to his previous London 
assignment at the Horse Guards and helped complete the reforms initiated by his patron the Duke 
of York.   In 1813, Brownrigg received an appointment as governor and commander-in-chief in 
Ceylon.  He held this post until 1820 when Lieutenant General Sir Stapleton Cotton, former 
governor and commander-in-chief of Barbados, succeeded him.  Brownrigg returned to England 
and ended his military career by accepting the post of governor of Landguard Fort located near 
his home, Helston House, Monmouth. 
 Thomas Brownrigg, Robert’s brother, also attained general rank in the army.  Like his 
sibling, Thomas entered the army at an early age commissioned as an ensign in the 36
th
 
Regiment.  He remained with this regiment for ten years making little progress up the promotion 
                                                 
102  PRO, W.O. 25/747, M (i), N. 24, Le Marchant’s Record of Service in his own hand, 1 Jan. 1810 as 
quoted in S.G.P. Ward, Wellington’s Headquarters: A Study of the Administrative Problems in the Peninsula, 1809-
1814 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957), 24. 
103 Ibid., 24-25.  
104 Brownrigg served as chief of staff to Sir Eyre Coote, second-in-command to the expedition.  Fortescue 
believes that Brownrigg was chosen because he was one of the few officers at the Horse Guards who argued that a 
surprise capture of Antwerp was possible.  See Fortescue, A History of the British Army, Vol. VII, 1809-1810, 49-
56.  
 260
ladder.  In 1793, however, the younger brother purchased a lieutenant colonelcy in the 3
rd
 
Regiment and began to be posted to prominent staff positions, no doubt because of his brother’s 
influential position as quartermaster general.105  Records indicated that the younger Brownrigg 
spent a considerable amount of time working at the Horse Guards, the same agency as his 
brother.  For the rest of his military career Brigadier General Thomas Brownrigg served as Chief 
Comptroller of Army accounts in Ireland, a position he held for nearly thirty years.106  In May 
1824, Thomas Brownrigg, appealed to the Duke of Wellington for assistance in securing a 
pension for his wife “who will be left unprovided for in the event of his death.”107  Although 
Thomas Brownrigg was not a close associate of Wellington, he nevertheless applied to the Duke 
for a pension: “As [Wellington] the Lord Lieutenant [of Ireland] has a fund of one thousand two 
hundred pounds from which he can grant pensions to worthy individuals.  Brownrigg hopes that 
forty three years of service, thirty of which have been in Ireland will be sufficient, with the 
Duke’s recommendation to secure him a pension.”108  Brownrigg, however, did not secure a 
recommendation or a pension from Wellington.  
 Robert James Brownrigg, the eldest son of Robert Brownrigg senior, also chose a 
military career.109  Commissioned a lieutenant in the 52
nd
 Regiment in 1806, he rose rapidly in 
the ranks receiving his captaincy in 1807, his majority in 1814, and a lieutenant colonelcy in 
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1815.110  Robert served in Spain during the initial campaigns of the Peninsular War as aide de 
camp and deputy assistant quartermaster general to General Sir Brent Spencer, who was 
Wellington’s second in command.  Wellington disliked Spencer believing that his second-in-
command was instrumental in undermining Robert Jenkinson Lord Liverpool, the Secretary of 
War’s confidence in Wellington’s ability to command.  During Wellington’s retreat to the Lines 
of the Torres in late 1810, Spencer wrote disparaging letters home criticizing his commander’s 
actions.111  William Napier, in his multi-volume History of the Peninsular War, observed that 
Wellington believed that Spencer was “more noted for intrepidity than for military quickness.”112  
Other high ranking Peninsular officers were less kind to Spencer with Edward Pankenham 
commenting “Sir Brent Spencer has charge of this Corps, and is as good a fellow as possible to 
meet at a Country Club, but as to succeeding Wellington it is quite Damnation to him…”113  
Spencer’s departure from the Peninsula was probably awkward for the junior Brownrigg, as aide 
de camp assignments were often the product of personal friendships.114 Soon after Spencer’s 
departure, Brownrigg also returned to England, and in 1813, transferred becoming aide de camp 
and military secretary to his father in Ceylon.  While attached to his father’s staff, Robert 
Brownrigg married Emma Nisbit, the daughter of Major General Colebrooke Nisbit.  
 Robert James Brownrigg’s posting as aide de camp to Sir Brent Spencer illustrates 
another avenue of networking that prevailed within the British military.  As noted, general 
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officers chose aides as a means to repay past favors or to strengthen relationships between 
friends.  Only general officers received aides and within the British Army, aides de camp and 
brigade majors were members of that general officer’s personal staff.  Every general officer had 
at least one aide de camp.  Lieutenant generals received two and the Commander of Forces had 
as many as he could afford.115  Wellington, as commander of Forces in both the Peninsular and 
Waterloo campaigns, had an enormous staff of aides de camp seldom employing less than six 
young officers.  As was general practice in European armies of the period, the expenses for the 
upkeep of an aide de camp was the responsibility of the general officer.  However, British 
officers of the Peninsular War period received a daily allowance from the Treasury of 9s. 6d. a 
day for aides. 116  Additionally, British general officers were required to feed their aides daily and 
many found this to be an added benefit. 
Most often brigade majors and aides de camp were young men who were just beginning 
their military careers apprenticed to older, senior military commanders who acted as patrons and 
mentors.  Aide de camp and brigade major appointments were personal.  However, the King’s 
Regulations were clear in delineating their specific duties.117  While aides de camp frequently 
came from well-connected families, brigade-majors tended to come from a different class of 
soldier who had some sort of administrative experience serving as regimental adjutants.  Their 
regimental brother officers viewed them as pedestrian paper shufflers and often looked down 
upon them.  Brigade majors served an important administrative function, as they were the 
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channel in  which orders were communicated between the brigade commander and his troops.118  
Essentially, brigade majors were responsible for the units’ roster, keeping an account of their 
duties that included maintaining picquets, posting guards manning outposts, and determining the 
brigade’s order and route of march.119  Harry Smith during his service in the Peninsula served as 
both an aide de camp and a brigade major noted, that in 1811, as a brigade major for the 2
nd
 
Light Brigade, he was rebuked by his commanding officer Colonel Edward Drummond for 
requesting orders for placing picquets.  “I said to my Brigadier, ‘Have you any orders for the 
picquets, sir?  Pray Mr. Smith, are you my Brigade Major?   I believe so, sir.  Then let me tell 
you, it is your duty to post the picquets, and mine to have a damn good dinner for you every 
day.’  We soon understood each other.  He cooked the dinner often himself, and I command the 
brigade.”120  Furthermore, it was the duty of the brigade major to act as a conduit between the 
staff of the commanding officer and the brigade.  
 Regulations specifically defined the duties of an aide de camp.  Aides were general 
officer’s messengers.  “All orders sent by an Aide de Camp are to be delivered in the plainest 
terms and are to be obeyed with the same readiness as if delivered personally by the General 
Officers to whom such Aides de Camp are attached.”121  One of the few qualifications for an aide 
de camp was that the officer be a competent horseman.122  Once again, Sir Harry Smith vividly 
illustrates this point. When Brigadier General Sir Sydney Beckwith asked Smith if he could 
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serve as his aide de camp, Smith replied, “Yes, I can ride and eat.”123  Although the position 
required few skills, general’s aides who consistently braved shot and shell on the battlefield 
delivering messages needed some small measure of courage.124  A general’s decision to appoint 
an aide de camp was a personal one and lasted only as long as the commander wished.  
Commanders exercised some discretion in choosing their aides, frequently selecting an officer 
who showed particular promise.  Wellington commented that he paid particular care in 
recommending an aide to a general as he would “in recommending a girl for a man to marry.”125  
Beside the duty of messenger, the aide de camp frequently acted as the commander’s personal 
secretary, writing letters, issuing invitations, doing errands, and generally making himself useful.  
Frequently these relationships fostered lifelong friendships between the patron and their younger 
client.  In 1796, Brigadier-General John Moore choose his friend Captain Paul Anderson to be 
his brigade major while Moore served as second in command to General Sir Ralph 
Abercromby’s expedition to the West Indies.126  After serving in the West Indies, Anderson 
became Moore’s aide de camp and eventually his assistant adjutant general.  The two men 
remained close life-long friends with Anderson remaining with Moore until Moore’s death at 
Corunna in 1809.127  Other aides de camp were less loyal to one specific commander.  As a 
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young captain, Sir Rowland Hill, served as an aide de camp to a succession of general officers 
that included Lord Mulgrave, General O’Hara, and Sir David Dundas.128  Lieutenant General 
Hill, however, reverted to tradition by selecting his brother as his principal aide de camp during 
the Waterloo Campaign.   
Relationships established between general officers and aides de camp were often 
permanent and lasted lifetimes.  Generals displayed a patriarchal affection towards their charges 
that served as their aides.  This was hardly surprising; as aides were frequently members of the 
general officer’s immediate family, close friends, or the siblings of a close friend or benefactor.  
Of the eight aides de camp who served Wellington at Waterloo: Lord George Lennox was the 
son of his friend, the fourth Duke of Richmond; Col. C. F. Canning was the brother of the 
diplomatist Viscount Stratford Canning who personally requested that the Duke take his brother 
on staff; Major Henry Percy, a friend of the Duke; Lieutenant Arthur Hill, a relation from his 
mother’s side of the family;129 Lieutenant George Cathcart, the son of Wellington’s former 
commander during the Danish Campaign of 1807; Lieutenant Colonel Sir Alexander Gordon, Sir 
David Baird’s favorite aide and nephew who Wellington inherited when he assumed command 
in the Peninsula; Lieutenant Colonel Fremantle became an aide to Wellington in 1813 and was 
one of two aides who accompanied him at the Congress of Vienna; the Prince of Nassau-
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Usingen, son of Duke Bernard of Nassau, a German nobleman and therefore outside the purview 
of this study.  Examination of the forty-four British aides de camp who served general officers at 
Waterloo reinforces the notion that aides were chosen because of familial or personal ties.  For 
example, Lieutenant General Lord Rowland Hill, who commanded the II Corps, employed five 
aides-de-camp: consisting of his younger brother, Lieutenant Colonel Clement Hill; Major R. 
Egerton, “a companion, secretary, confidant, and friend.”130  Major Chatham Horace Churchill, 
son of Major General Horace Churchill and great nephew of Horace Walpole, initially served as 
aide de camp to Major General Robert Crauford before transferring to staff of Hill’s staff in 
1810;131 Captain Digby Mackworth, aide de camp to Hill in 1814 remaining with him through 
Waterloo;132 and Captain Orlando Bridgeman, the third son of Orlando Bridgeman, 2
nd
 Baron 
Bradford who went on half-pay in 1819 and subsequently quitted the service.  
 Religious ties frequently served as a conduit through which strong relationships were 
forged and sustained by like-minded individuals.  The officers of the British Army of the 
Napoleonic Wars were rarely known for being either religious or devout.  However, some 
notable individuals promoted the Gospel and gathered around them officers and men devoted to 
the faith.  During the Peninsular Campaign, Wellington mistrusted the evangelical enthusiasm of 
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Methodism, but conceded that religion provided a necessary moral underpinning for both 
officers and men.  The Reverend Edwin Sidney echoed these sentiments concerning lack of 
religious piety in the early nineteenth century British Army when he wrote, “The Gospel is the 
only genuine source of virtue in the many, and the only check to the unblushing demonstration of 
the hideous qualities of the base minority, by whom in all great collections of men barbarous 
crimes are committed, out of which arises the ill report of the whole.”133  To remedy this 
situation, Wellington believed that official circles, in this case general officers, were best suited 
to control the practice of religion within the army.  The Duke outlined his views in a February 6, 
1811 letter to the adjutant general of the army at the Horse Guards, “The army should have the 
advantage of religious instruction, from knowledge that it is the greatest support and aid to 
military discipline and order.”134  Thomas Browne observed that, in order to set an example, 
Wellington ordered that all of the officers and their staffs attend Sunday Divine services while 
the army was in winter quarters at St. Jean de Luz.135  Even though official measures were put in 
place to encourage religious practices, a great body of evidence suggests that the only a small 
devout portion of the army actively participated in the prescribed Sunday services.   
 Despite the lack of religious fervor among significant numbers of officers, believers 
tended to gather in small groups.  Throughout the empire, groups of officers and soldiers 
expressed their faith in small but noteworthy measures.  In 1808, the 93rd Regiment, the 
Sutherland Highlanders, while garrisoned at the Cape Colony decided to augment their 
regimental Divine service by forming a church “based agreeably on the tenets of Scottish 
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National Church.”136  The regiment appointed elders and other office holders, found and paid a 
clergyman from the Church of Scotland, regularly scheduled services, and purchased 
communion plate.  Throughout the empire many other pious officers and men congregated under 
the aegis of the Naval and Military Bible Society, founded in 1780 for the express purpose of 
“diffusing the Holy Scriptures to the British troops in France, to our naval and military forces in 
West Indies, Canada, &c.”137  In 1818, this organization chaired by the Duke of York and 
supported by important political and religious figures that included the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, the Bishops of London, York, and Gloucester, the Reverend Connyham of the Kirk 
of Scotland, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and members of Parliament Lord Gambier, Lord 
Harrowby, and William Wilberforce.  The 1824 annual report of the society revealed that a 
number of senior military and colonial officers were members of the association.  Members 
included Major General Lachlan Macquarie governor of New South Wales, the officers and 
soldiers of the 48
th
 Regiment garrisoning New South Wales, John Marshall of the Cape Colony, 
and Vice Admiral Sir James Saumarez.    
In 1824, a significant number of the society’s members were located in Halifax, Nova 
Scotia administered at that time by Lieutenant Governor Sir James Kempt.  It appears that 
Reverend J. T. Twining, chaplain to the garrison, led the group that included a sizeable portion of 
the 74
th
 and 34
th
 Regiments, the Royal Artillery, as well as J. Strachan M.D., the deputy medical 
inspector stationed there.138  Moreover, a membership list reports that Kempt was a subscribing 
member of the chapter.139  It appears that Kempt, during his wartime years, kept his religious 
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views to himself.  However, some insight into his religious beliefs can be determined from his 
actions and observations on matters of faith during his tenure as lieutenant governor of Nova 
Scotia.  As administrator of Nova Scotia, and later, as Governor General of Canada, Kempt’s 
tolerant and liberal views on religion often brought him into conflict with stated colonial policy 
on religion.140  Nevertheless, Kempt agreed with his superiors in the Colonial Office who viewed 
religion as necessary in reinforcing the moral values among the population. 
Sir James Kempt, like many of his fellow military administrators, climbed the ladder of 
success through a network of patronage and clientage he had established.  Kempt’s early life 
remains a mystery, however, he was the son of Gavin Kempt of Batley Hall, Hants, and his wife, 
the daughter of Alexander Walker of Edinburgh.  Kempt joined the army in March 1783 as an 
ensign in the 101
st
 Regiment.141  The young officer’s early career was unremarkable as he was 
placed on half pay almost immediately after he had joined when his regiment was reduced at the 
conclusion of war in America.  He remained on half pay for almost ten years until 1794 when 
Kempt received a captaincy in 113
th
 Foot, a regiment he helped to recruit.  In June 1796, Kempt 
became inspecting field officer of the recruiting service in Scotland, a position he held for three 
years.  While working in this capacity, he came to the attention of General Sir Ralph 
Abercromby, commander of forces in Scotland, who in 1799, appointed Kempt to be his aide de 
camp.  Kempt remained with Abercromby acting as aide and personal secretary to the general 
during campaigns in Holland and Egypt.142  After Abercromby’s death in 1801, Kempt served as 
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aide de camp to Lord John Hely-Hutchinson and General Sir David Dundas.  In 1807, Kempt 
received an appointment as quartermaster general to British forces in North America, a position 
he retained until 1809, when he returned to Britain to serve as aide de camp to King George III.  
Promoted major general in 1812, Kempt went to Spain and participated in the siege of Badajoz 
and the Battles of Vittoria, Nivelle, Nive, Orthes, and Toulouse.143  At the conclusion of the war 
in the Peninsula, Kempt again transferred to America where he commanded a brigade under 
General Sir George Prevost.144  He returned to Europe in time to see action at Waterloo, as a 
commander of a brigade.  
 At the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, Kempt, like many other British officers, 
embarked on a career as a colonial administrator.  He first served as lieutenant governor of 
Portsmouth, Hampshire, but upon hearing of the death of the Governor General of Canada, 
Charles Lennox, 4
th
 Duke of Richmond, he petitioned his former commander, the Duke of 
Wellington, for the governorship of Nova Scotia, then rumored to be vacated by his friend 
Lieutenant General Sir George Ramsay, the 9
th
 Earl of Dalhousie.  In a series of letters 
exchanged between Kempt, Wellington, and the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, 
Henry Lord Bathurst, it was decided that Dalhousie would relinquish his governorship of Nova 
Scotia accepting the post of Governor General of Canada; Kempt would then accept the 
lieutenant governorship of Nova Scotia with the approbation of Wellington.145  In a supplemental 
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letter by Bathurst, the Duke of Richmond’s family would be taken care of by the posting the 
Richmond’s two sons, William and Frederick, “on the American staff.”  Bathurst continues by 
making provisions for the rest of the family noting that Richmond’s daughters would receive   
assistance in the form of lifetime pensions.146  
 Kempt arrived in Nova Scotia in June 1820.  Aspects of his colonial service in Nova 
Scotia and Canada have already received some attention in this work.  It is however, important at 
this point to examine the interwoven connections that existed between Kempt’s military 
relationships and his religious views.  Unofficial correspondence in early 1825 between 
Lieutenant Governor Kempt; the Duke of Wellington; Reverend J. C. Cochran, a missionary in 
Nova Scotia; and Dr. John Inglis, the Anglican Bishop of Nova Scotia illustrates the networking 
that took place between religious and military/imperial administrators.  In January 1825, 
Wellington received a request for his patronage in assisting the Rev. Cochran in the building of a 
church in Wellington, Nova Scotia.  Cochran observes that the settlement is “inhabited 
predominantly by Peninsular War veterans” who have become farmers but are too poor to 
construct a church.147  Wellington responds to the request by directing his military secretary, 
Lieutenant Colonel Lord Fitzroy Somerset to make inquiries to Kempt concerning this project.  
As previously, noted, Kempt served under Wellington in both the Peninsular War and the 
Waterloo Campaign and they knew each other well.  Wellington and Kempt were also members 
of the Naval and Military Bible Society evidencing their interest in propagating Christianity 
among the military, and in this case a group of former soldiers.  Kempt, unaware of the activities 
                                                                                                                                                             
asking the Duke to apply to Lord Bathurst for him for the expected vacancy in the governorship of Nova Scotia, 
October 3, 1819 
146  WP1/632/15, Letter from Lord Bathurst to Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington, about the 
provision to be made for the children of the Late Duke of Richmond, 10 October 10, 1819. 
147 WP1/810/13, Letter from Reverend J.C. Cochran to Arthur Wellesley, first Duke of Wellington, asking 
for money to build a church in the settlement of Wellington in Canada, January 12, 1825. 
 
 272
of the Anglican missionary Cochran responded by informing Somerset that he had requested 
information concerning the missionary from Bishop Inglis.148  The last extant letter in the series 
is a note from Somerset reporting that Wellington is grateful to Kempt for the effort he has in 
investigating Cochran’s application.  “Kempt should deal with the matter as he thinks proper.  If 
necessary, the Duke is prepared to subscribe to the cost of building a church in Wellington.”149  
Unfortunately, the resolution of this issue is unknown as further correspondence concerning the 
matter is unavailable. 
 Military officers occupied the top administrative positions in Britain’s global empire for 
almost three decades following the end of the Napoleonic Wars.  All of these officers retained 
their military rank and pay while engaging in a combination of military and civilian capacities.  
The British Army Lists for the period 1815 to 1837 delineate a specific hierarchy of military 
officers who accompanied governors assisting them with their duties.  A number of military 
officers who fulfilled the roles of adjutant general, quartermaster general, judge advocate, and 
barracks master normally assisted governors.  The King’s Regulations outline their duties and 
responsibilities.  Moreover, governors supervised a myriad of bureaucratic offices occupied by 
either civilian or military personnel.  Table A.19 illustrates the 1834 colonial administrative 
structure in the Cape Colony 
In addition, Governor Benjamin D’Urban had the services of two additional military 
officers who could, and did, serve in civilian capacities: Deputy Adjutant General Lieutenant 
Colonel Thomas Francis Wade, a Peninsular officer who served with Lieutenant General Sir 
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Lowery Cole; and deputy quartermaster General Lieutenant Colonel Henry George Smith.150  
Now, it is only necessary to point out that Smith, under D’Urban’s direction, frequently 
combined military and civilian administrative duties within the office of deputy quartermaster 
general.  For example, in a June 1835 directive D’Urban appointed Smith to the civil and 
military command of the District of Queen Adelaide’s Province.151  With this directive in hand, 
Smith immediately set up a judicial and bureaucratic structure to govern the new province.  In a 
confidential letter of July 13, 1838, Smith wrote to Governor D’Urban that Colonial Secretary 
Lord Charles Glenelg praised him “not only for his Military Services, but for his gracious, 
humble, and enlightened administration of the Civil Government of the province under his 
control and the adjacent District.”152  Upon examination of this listing, it is evident that there was 
a mixture of military and civilian civil servants who reported to the military governor.  Civil and 
military jurisdictions overlapped and jurisdictional turf wars ensued, threatening organizational 
chaos. 
 The War Office recognized the inherent dangers of such a system existing in the colonies 
and attempted to establish systematic guidelines to prevent administrative anarchy.  Lord 
Bathurst, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, realizing “the anomalous position” the 
present situation placed on military governors instructed the Adjutant Generals Office to 
formulate an unambiguous policy for military governors to follow.153  A November 20, 1824 
circular letter issued by Bathurst provided specific guidelines for military governors throughout 
the empire.  Specifically, “The King having taken into His Consideration the necessity of laying 
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down some definite Regulations by which Governors or Officers administering the Government 
of His Colonies and Settlements abroad, and the Officers in command of Military Forces in those 
Colonies and Settlements, may more clearly understand the relative duties and authority.  I have 
received His Majesty’s Commands to communicate to you, for the guidance of yourself and your 
successors in the Government of the Colony of the following instructions.”154  The letter issued to 
all colonies administered by military governors proved to be such a success that it became 
incorporated into the King’s Regulations and Orders for the Army 1837 and the subsequent 
Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the Army 1844. 
The instructions consisted of ten articles: 
1
st
. Whenever it may seem fit to His Majesty to entrust the Civil Government of 
the Colony of _______________to an Officer, holding a Commission in His Majesty’s 
Land Forces, of the Rank of Colonel, or of any superior Rank, and whenever in 
pursuance of His Majesty’s standing Instructions the Civil Government may devolve 
upon any such Officers, he will consider himself as invested by virtue of that 
appointment with the Military Authority and Command over His Majesty’s Forces within 
the Colony, unless His Majesty should specially appoint some other Military Officer of 
higher Rank, or of the same Rank, or, of the same Rank, but bearing a Commission of 
earlier date, to take the Command of those Forces. 
 
2
nd
. But when His Majesty shall see fit to confide the Civil Government of the 
Colony to a person who does not hold any Commission in his Land forces, or who holds 
a Commission of inferior rank to that of a Colonel, and whenever, in pursuance of His 
Majesty’s standing Instructions, the Civil Government may devolve upon any such 
person, the following Rules are to be observed, for preventing any conflict of authority 
between any such Civil Governor and the Military Officer who may be appointed to the 
Command of His Majesty’s Land Forces in the Colony. 
 
3
rd
. It will be the duty of any such Civil Governor, or person administering the 
Civil Government, to issue to the Officer having the Command of His Majesty’s forces 
within the Colony, such Orders respecting the marching of the Troops, or the distribution 
of them, or the making and marching Detachments and Escorts, or respecting any other 
military service, as the safety or welfare of the Colony may render necessary.  It will be 
the duty of the Officer in Command of His Majesty’s Forces to carry all such Orders into 
execution, and he alone will be responsible to His Majesty for the prompt and efficient 
performance of any such service in all its details. 
 
4
th
 If, however, the Colony should be invaded, or assailed by a Foreign Enemy, 
and become the scene of active military operations, the power of the Civil Governor, or 
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the person administering the Civil government, to issue any such orders, will be 
suspended, and during any such emergency, the Officer in Command of His Majesty’s 
Land Forces will, upon his won responsibility, and with reference to the Orders of the 
Civil Governor, or Person administering the Civil government act in such manner as he 
may consider necessary for the defence and security of the Colony. 
 
5
th
. It will be the Duty of the Governor, or Person administering the Civil 
Government of the Colony, as representing His Majesty, to give the word in all places 
within his Government, except only during the continuance of such active military 
operations as are noticed in the preceding paragraph. 
 
6
th
. The Officer in Command of His Majesty’s Land ** will make to the 
Governor, or Person administering the Civil government of the Colony, returns of the 
state and condition of the Troops under his Command, of the Military Departments and 
of the Stores, magazines, and Fortifications within the Colony. 
 
7
th
 The Officer in Command of His Majesty’s Forces will consider himself as 
charged with the single exclusive superintendence of all details connected with the 
Military Department, with the Regimental Duty and the Discipline of the Troops, with 
the Inspections, and with summoning and holding Courts Martial, Garrison, or 
Regimental. 
 
8
th
 The Sentences of Courts-Martial will be carried into execution without the 
previous sanction of the Civil Governor, or Person administering the Civil Government, 
except only in cases where Sentence of Death may be pronounced in which case, 
execution of the sentence will be suspended, until the sentence shall have been approved 
on His Majesty’s behalf, by such Civil Governor, or other Person or Persons 
administering the Civil Government. 
 
9
th
 The Officer in Command of His Majesty’s Forces will render to the Civil 
government of the Colony, a Duplicate of such Returns as he may, from time to time, 
make either to the Commander-in-Chief at Home, or to any Military Officer, upon whose 
more general Command his own local Command may be dependent, so far as such 
Returns relate to the detail of the Military Department, the Regimental Duty the 
Discipline of the Troops, the Inspections, or Courts-Martial, General, Garrison, or 
Regimental. 
 
10
th
. The preceding Instructions will form the Rules for your guidance upon this 
subject in the performance of your duties as Civil Governor of His Majesty’s Colony of 
_____________. 
 
The Commander-in-Chief will issue, as occasion may require, corresponding 
Instructions for their guidance, the Military Officers in Command of His Majesty’s 
Forces within your Government.155 
 
Shortly after the issuance of this circular letter, Bathurst issued a second supplemental 
circular letter.  This letter, specifically addressed to military officers who held civil appointments 
                                                 
155 Ibid. 
 276
in the smaller colonies Bermuda, Tobago, Grenada, Dominica, Antigua, Honduras, Bahamas, St. 
Christopher’s, Prince Edward’s Islands, and Van Diemen’s Land informed them that they were 
also subject to the instructions of the initial circular letter of November 1824.  Bathurst points 
out that while the governors of these colonies were military men, they were to concern 
themselves with civil matters only and not interfere with the duties and regulations of officers 
placed in those colonies by the staff (Horse Guards).156  Five specific points are enumerated in 
the instructions: the military authority of the civil governor shall remain strictly local and will 
not extend beyond the limits of the colony; the exercise of the civil authority will not interfere 
with the “General Officers employed generally upon the Staff of the station” even if that officer 
is of inferior rank or resides in the same local as the governor, furthermore the civil governor will 
not hinder or obstruct Half Yearly Inspections of Troops, Confidential Reports, the Reports of 
Vacancies, or an recommendations concerning the change or relief of regiments or detachments; 
that the addition of the governor to the staff will not infringe on the general officers ability to 
command the troops even if that officer is of inferior rank; that the civil governor is only allowed 
horses and rations for servants allotted to a major general even though he may be of higher rank; 
civil governors appointed to the staff will not be reimbursed (by the Horse Guards) for aide de 
camps or any other person assisting him while on the staff.  Bathurst concludes the document by 
observing that the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, Mauritius, New South Wales, the Western Coast 
of Africa, and the principal Governments in British North America were exempt from the 
supplemental letter. 
It is necessary at this point to briefly examine the duties of a number of military staff 
appointments available to officers in the colonies.  While these positions were specifically 
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administrative in function, many times these offices acquired civil and judicial roles as well.  The 
use of the military in colonial civilian administrative posts proved attractive to the Secretary at 
War and Parliament for the simple reason it was cheaper to employ military men rather than 
civilians.  Michael Fisher points out that seconded army officers could be had at cheaper salaries 
than civilian civil servants.157   With British garrisons spread across the globe, it made fiscal and 
psychological sense to employ these troops in a highly visible capacity that implied both 
efficiency and power.  As D.A. Washbrook has ably pointed out in his study of early nineteenth-
century British India, a powerful military presence asserted itself as the dominant institution 
within the state, subsuming all other institutions.158  Washbrook observes that the army’s strength 
was apparent by its high visibility throughout India with deputations of soldiers carrying out 
routine civil activities such as revenue collection and judicial functions.159  Within the colonies, 
Britain’s army was not merely an instrument of defense, but also a means for the structuring and 
staffing all other administrative posts.  Moreover, British staff positions were principally 
administrative in nature making the transition to civil administration relatively easy.  In a 
December 21, 1832 letter to Charles Grant, Lord William Bentinck, Governor-General of India, 
observed that military officers were not only cheaper, but were “generally of a mature age, … 
more docile, more active and more accustomed to the management of natives, and can be sent 
back to his regiment in case of misconduct or inefficiency.”160  The military offices of deputy 
adjutant general, deputy quartermaster general, judge advocate, and barrack master were all 
positions that were easily adaptable to carry out civilian tasks. 
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The Adjutant General of the Forces was one of the two principal staff officers of the 
kingdom.  Along with the quartermaster general, these two officers worked in conjunction with 
the king, the titular commander-in-chief of all British forces.  It was the adjutant general’s duty 
to see that the commander’s orders were carried out.  Even the quartermaster general vetted 
orders through the adjutant general’s office, making this position the more powerful of the two 
officers.  The adjutant general was responsible for issuing all orders, making up daily, weekly, 
and monthly returns, determining the state of troops, and keeping rosters of duty.161  Additional 
duties of the adjutant general included overseeing discipline and punishment within the army, the 
drilling of regiments, and the clothing and equipping of troops.  The King’s Regulations of 1837 
state, “the General Officer Commanding is to report to the Adjutant-General, as soon as possible 
after its March, the State and Condition, with respect to Arms, Ammunition, and General 
Equipment, in which it marched to its new destination.”162  However, regimental staff officers 
handled many of these responsibilities relegating the adjutant general’s duty to one of 
administrative oversight. 
In field armies and in the colonies, the position of deputy adjutant general fulfilled many 
similar duties of the adjutant general’s office but on a smaller scale.  Regulations stipulated out 
that the deputy adjutant general and the assistant adjutant general should be well acquainted with 
all army regulations.  On campaign and in the colonies, the deputy adjutant general frequently 
acted as his commander’s chief of staff and charged with such duties relevant to unit strength, 
parade states, casualty returns for both men and horses, drill, matters of discipline, and 
prisoners.163  An examination of the deputy adjutant generals who served on foreign stations 
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between 1815 and 1837 reveal that of the forty-eight officers who served in this position, thirty 
had previous staff experience during the Napoleonic Wars.  
Quartermaster general’s duties included the quartering, marching, and encamping of 
troops.  S. G. P. Ward notes that in 1792, the Quartermaster’s Department was a sleepy little 
office inhabited by only three officers: the quartermaster general, a deputy quartermaster general, 
and an assistant quartermaster general.164  The duties of the department were almost non-existent 
consisting only of determining march routes for troops from place to place.  However, the 
incessant warfare of the Napoleonic Era caused the Quartermaster’s Department to take on 
additional duties and expand beyond recognition.  Prompted by the British Army’s debacle in the 
Dutch Campaign of 1798, the department sponsored a school that would train future 
quartermasters in supply and equipage of forces in the “French mode” of rapid warfare.165 
Additional lessons learned in Spain and Portugal prompted the branch to include topographical 
studies that prepared surveys on terrain through which an army may have to pass.  Oman notes 
that in early 1810 the department issued a small manual, The Instructions for the officers in the 
department of the Quartermaster-General, to all departmental staffs.  The manual contained 
instructions and sample forms on all of the possible duties the quartermaster department 
encountered.166  In the book, officers received instructions on noting terrain and features of 
importance including positions, valleys, the size of villages, the character of the roads, the 
location and the depth of rivers, and the accessibility of fords.  The King’s Regulations of 1837 
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directed assistant quartermaster generals to have a  comprehensive knowledge of the roads, the 
terrain, and the principal rivers in the army’s theater of operations.167  
Quartermaster generals who served in a colonial administrative capacity carried out many 
additional duties beside those outlined in the regulations.  The career of Lieutenant Colonel 
Francis Cockburn, deputy quartermaster of Canada who served on the staff of Governor General, 
Charles Lennox, 4
th
 Duke of Richmond, offers insights into the additional duties and obligations 
quartermasters at foreign stations encountered.  Cockburn entered the military by purchasing a 
cornet’s commission in the 7
th
 Dragoon Guards in 1800.  His entrance into one of the army’s 
more prestigious cavalry regiments indicates that Cockburn’s family had both money and 
connections.168  The young officer participated in the 1807 Buenos Aires South American 
Expedition and served from 1809-1810 in the Peninsula.  While in the Peninsula, Cockburn was 
a member of Wellington’s staff serving as deputy assistant adjutant general and occasionally as a 
deputy judge advocate.  In 1811, he secured a commission as a major in the Canadian Fencibles 
displaying gallantry in actions at Red Mills and Salmon River, New York.  Cockburn’s plan for 
establishing a naval base at Penetanguishene attracted the attention of Sir Thomas Sydney 
Beckwith, quartermaster general for Upper and Lower Canada.169  
By the end of the American War, Cockburn had transferred to the quartermaster general’s 
department for Upper Canada.  While serving in this capacity, he received a promotion to 
lieutenant colonel in the New Brunswick Fencibles and rose to the post of assistant quartermaster 
general for Upper Canada, whose duties included the settling and supplying the initial groups of 
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immigrants and soldiers under Bathhurst’s plan of assisted immigration.  In 1818, Cockburn 
moved to Quebec where he became deputy quartermaster general for Upper and Lower Canada.  
Ed McKenna notes that during this period as the senior officer in the department, Cockburn was 
accountable for the military settlements in Upper Canada at Perth [established in 1816], 
Richmond [1818], Lanark [1820], and the Bay of Quinte area and Glengarry County [1815], and 
in Lower Canada on Rivère Saint-François [1816].170  Because of the increased activity in placing 
and maintaining these new settlements, Cockburn expanded his office to deal not only with 
military and topographical matters, but also with settlers’ petitions and town planning.  The 
quartermaster’s office worked closely with the Duke of Richmond, accompanying the governor 
in his ill-fated inspection tour of military and civil settlements throughout Upper Canada.  
Cockburn remained in Canada serving in the quartermaster’s office during the early period of 
Dalhousie’s governorship, leaving the department for Britain in mid-1823.  He returned to 
Canada a year and a half later as one of five commissioners studying a plan by the Canada 
Company to stimulate further emigration to the colony.  Cockburn made several additional trips 
to North America all concerned with opening new lands for settlement.  In 1829, the veteran 
quartermaster general became governor of British Honduras, a position he held for seven years.  
Cockburn ended his military career as the governor of Bahamas in 1837. 
The judge advocate and his office provided interpretation and enforcement of the British 
Army’s Articles of War.  A civilian political appointee, the judge advocate general headed a 
department that was the principal advisor to the king and commander in chief on the 
administration of law within the military.171  As the army’s chief prosecutor the judge advocate 
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had the authority to conduct trials, but frequently delegated these duties to subordinates 
preferring instead to interpret and advise on points of law.  Because the adjutant general’s 
department was responsible for matters of discipline, it worked closely with officials in the judge 
advocates department.  In field armies that operated outside of Britain, representatives of the 
judge advocate’s department enforced military law.  Overseas branches normally consisted of a 
colonel with several assistants with the rank of major working under him.172  Wellington’s judge 
advocate during the Peninsula War, Colonel Francis Seymour Larpent kept a journal of his 
experiences with the army.  His journal offers a fascinating insight to the workings of the 
department.  Larpent noted that his duties consisted primarily of oversight; reviewing court-
martial verdicts, correcting legal procedural errors, and providing Wellington advice on the legal 
confirmation of sentences handed down.173  Larpent’s journal reinforces the notion that there was 
within the judge advocate’s office a serious shortage of legally trained personnel in the British 
Army.  The serious lack of legal personnel forced commanders in the field to frequently rely on a 
small cadre of lawyer/officers whose duty was to oversee judicial matters.  On the divisional and 
regimental level, assistant adjutant generals, or regimental adjutants frequently adjudicated legal 
cases.  Military governors coped with similar situations in colonies that lacked sufficient 
numbers of civil judicial authorities versed in English law.  These situations were most evident in 
the Cape Colony where Dutch law prevailed and in India, which lacked trained Company judges, 
attorneys, and law clerks.  Military authorities in Bengal, at the beginning of the First Burma 
War, complained that the forces earmarked for the campaign “were seriously hampered by the 
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number of its officers seconded to the ‘civil’ service as de facto [tax] Collectors and 
Magistrates.”174 
The duties of the barrack master were defined in an 1820, publication, The Instructions to 
Assistant Inspectors General of Barracks.  Barrack masters’ responsibilities included reporting 
on such issues as to the condition of the existing barracks, the efficiency of his assistants, the 
nature of leases and the amount of rent paid on privately owned buildings used by the military, 
plans to build new structures, and the state and cleanliness of the privies.  Remarkably, the 
instructions allowed the barrack master to engage in a civilian trade as long as the occupation 
does not interfere with the executions of his duties.175  The instructions also indicate that the 
barrack master is an integral member of the civilian community enjoining him to make available 
for civilian use military buildings.  The document also advised the barrack master to make his 
fire engine and fire fighting equipment available for public use.176 
Many colonial garrisons employed a barrack master general.  Hart’s Army Lists for the 
years 1815-1837 reveal that barrack master generals were posted in Ireland, Gibraltar, Malta, 
Bahamas, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, St. John’s Newfoundland, and Portugal.  According to 
the King’s Regulations and Orders for the Army 1837, officers who held the post of barrack 
master were under the direction and authority of the Civil Branch of the Ordinance 
Department.177  Ward and Haythornthwaite note that the Secretary at War set up a separate 
department, the Barrackmaster General’s Office, without parliamentary sanction in the late 
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eighteenth century.178  The department enjoyed unusual status in that all expenditures came 
before Parliament after the fact thus encouraging profligate spending.179  The estimate of 
expenditures by the department in 1796 amounted to £10 million when total spending on 
barracks for period 1792 to 1804 amounted to only  £9 million.180  After the resignation of the 
first barrack master general, Colonel Oliver De Lancey in 1804, and the prosecution and 
imprisonment of the department’s agent, Alexander Davison, the Secretary at War more closely 
monitored the office.  
   There were three specific grades to this duty with a commensurate rank requirement for 
command.  Officers holding the rank of major or higher were entitled to be barrack masters first 
class; captains; barrack masters second class, and lieutenants; barrack masters third class.  It 
appears from extant biographies of officers who served as barrack masters that the position was 
frequently assigned to long serving soldiers who had rendered faithful staff service, but were no 
longer fit for active duty.  Deputy barrack master of Ireland General Quin John Freeman is a 
good example of this type of soldier.  Freeman joined the military as an ensign in July 1775.  He 
was educated for the Engineer Department but initially served as an infantry officer.  In 1777, 
while serving in America, Freeman became brigade major to Brigadier General Simon Fraser 
and served in that capacity until Fraser’s death later that same year.  His next posting was as aide 
de camp to Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Haldimand.  Freeman, promoted to captain in the 
24th Regiment in 1786, served with his regiment in Canada from 1787 to 1793.  Recalled to 
Britain, Freeman acted as first aide de camp to Lieutenant General R. Cunningham, commander 
in chief in Ireland where he remained until 1796.  Later that same year, he was appointed 
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assistant adjutant general, a position that Freeman held until May 1799 when he received the 
assignment of deputy barrack master general of the forces in Ireland.181  The Army List notes that 
Freeman held the post of Deputy Barrack Master General of Ireland until 1822.  In 1823, 
Freeman’s name and post he supervised disappear from the list. 
Conclusion 
 British military officers found the process of networking critical in securing coveted 
positions in colonial service.  Individual officers established networking bonds on many levels.  
Among the relationships that fostered bond were wartime comradeship, regimental ties, familial 
links, patron-client associations, religious affiliations, and occupational ties.  Nevertheless, 
among British officers, the common denominator in bonding was that all had endured the rigors 
of combat and the privation of campaign.  The wartime hardships that they had experienced 
frequently created a relationship of mutual respect, trust, and assistance.  The wartime 
relationships forged during the Napoleonic Wars frequently lasted a lifetime as comrades-in-
arms consistently remained in contact with one another even after their military careers ended 
and they had left the service.  
   In the wake of the British Army’s massive demobilization that followed in immediate 
aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, a substantial number of officers consistently relied on 
networks they had established with senior officers in securing needed employment.  In the next 
chapter, the career of Henry George Wakelyn Smith provides an illustration of how these post-
Napoleonic British officers consistently and repeatedly employed the intricate web of 
networking in securing overseas colonial employment. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: HARRY SMITH, A CASE STUDY OF COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION 
BY MILITARY MEN 
 
 
 On April 9, 1836, the Times of London reported that, some weeks earlier, a great meeting 
had occurred at King William’s Town in the Cape Colonies between the Xhosa people who 
inhabited the land between the Buffalo and the Kei Rivers and British authorities.  An official 
delegation, led by Colonel Henry G. W. Smith, deputy quartermaster general to Cape Colony 
Governor General Sir Benjamin D’Urban, had called the principal tribes of the region together 
for the purpose of administering the oath of allegiance to the population and magistrates who had 
become “voluntary subjects” to King William IV.1  This new land, designated by Smith as Queen 
Adelaide’s Land, won by British arms the previous year, was neither ordered, sanctioned, nor 
accepted by Lord Gleneg’s Colonial Office.2  Smith, however, with D’Urban’s approval 
governed the conquered land for months as a virtual dictator appointing “magistrates,” 
administering British law, and constructing missionary schools in an effort to turn the Xhosa 
territory into a slice of “little England.”3 
 On January 7, 1836, Xhosa people, including their principal chiefs Macomo and Tyalie, 
assembled before Smith.  He appeared before them in a full dress uniform of gold and scarlet, 
accompanied by his wife and military staff to formally accept the annexation of the Xhosa 
territories into the British Empire.  The elaborate ceremony began with an “impressive prayer” in 
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the Xhosa language by the Reverend Mr. Chalmers followed by a signal gun.  Smith then arose 
from his chair, took off his cocked hat requested a cheer for King William IV, and then began an 
hour-long speech which, was translated in Xhosa language by Mr. Theophilius Shepstone, the 
son of a missionary.  In the address, Smith noted that the subjects of the newly annexed territory 
desired to become sovereign subjects of the British Empire.  However, these new subjects must 
renounce their old way of life and become like the English who educate their children, practice 
industry, engage in trade, and embrace Christianity.  Smith observed, that if they followed his 
guidance, they would become part of the great British Empire as “real Christians and 
Englishmen.”4  To do otherwise would lead to degradation, evil, and their eventual destruction 
by the British.  He reminded the assembled Xhosa of their recent past when they broke the peace 
with English.  Smith intoned, “You were almost destroyed, soon would have been annihilated, 
and driven from your native country; your women and children were starving, almost the prey of 
wild beasts, and the widows of 4000 of your warriors lament their husbands slain during the war; 
the greater part of your cattle starved or taken; your plunder so treacherously seized from the 
Colony, lost to you from the robberies of others; you were in a lamentable, nay, a deplorable 
plight….”5   
 The theatrics ended with Tyalie speaking for all of the Xhosa gathered.  The chief 
thanked Colonel Smith for all he had done for him and his people noting, “They [the Xhosa] do 
not see the King, nor the Governor, but only Colonel Smith, who is here for the King.”6  
Moreover, the influential Tyalie reiterated that the tribes appreciate Smith’s goodness and will 
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try to be good subjects and remain peaceable.  With this statement all of the tribes present quietly 
dispersed to their own allotted territories.  
 This brief example of Colonel Smith’s style of governing the Xhosa reveals many salient 
features evident in proconsular colonial administration.  British proconsuls were career military 
men, who for the most part, were strong willed self-assured individuals willing to make 
independent decisions in keeping with the perceived goals of the metropole without supervision.  
Because of the constraints of time and distance within Britain’s global empire, Colonial Office 
authority tended to be reactive thereby increasing their dependence on dynamic individuals who 
were thought to be in a better position to assess conditions in their colony.  The Napoleonic Wars 
served as the incubator for these individuals because the conflict provided them the necessary 
command, organizational, and administrative skills necessary in governing distant provinces.  J. 
E. Edmonds notes that despite Wellington’s famous observation “ I have got an infamous 
Army… and an inexperienced staff,” his staff officers were, on the whole, an experienced 
capable lot.7  Military historian, Philip Haythonthwaite concurs with Edmond commenting that 
during the Napoleonic period, Wellington was fortunate in that he possessed a number of reliable 
deputies on which he could depend.8  Late in his life, even Wellington acknowledged that his 
officers were well qualified in managing overseas governments and staunchly defended the 
practice of awarding them governorships.  In a lengthy March 7, 1833 communication between 
the Duke and Lord Hill, entitled “Memorandum upon Military Governments,” Wellington wrote 
that a grateful nation must not forget the sacrifices these officers made during the war and that 
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these men should receive compensation either commanding a regiment or administering a civil 
government.9 
 In addition to possessing competent command and organizational skills, Peninsular 
officers, especially those who exercised high command, were also an indisputable and visible 
symbol of the authority of the British state.  Zoë Laidlaw notes that in the colonies where British 
troops were posted, commanding authorities at the Horse Guards were insistent in exercising the 
greatest amount of influence abroad.10  A military governor or principal administrator was an 
unmistakable emblem of Britain’s authority, not only protecting the colony from outside threats, 
but also monitoring its internal security through both overt and covert means.11  Moreover, the 
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monarchy of George IV along with the Tory ministries of Liverpool, Canning, Goderich, and 
Wellington, championed policies that insured security and loyalty both at home and abroad.  As 
such, the Parliamentary majority in conjunction with the Colonial Office chose administrators 
who embodied a force of will and personality that could check internal subversion and disorder 
while cultivating the acquiescence and continued loyalty of subject populations.12  
 In addition to men chosen for their leadership abilities and force of character, many 
British proconsuls embodied a paternalist attitude toward their colonial populations.  Coupled 
with this attitude was a genuine sense of trusteeship that their administration would result in 
good humanitarian government.  The proconsul’s sense of paternalism and trusteeship was born 
from the aristocratic and autocratic values possessed by officers within the army.  Governors 
consistently complained that existing local institutions, customs, and influential colonial 
inhabitants stood in the way of implementing responsible, equitable, and humanitarian 
government.  James Kempt, lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia, grumbled, “The truth is that I 
have no Patronage Whatever.  When a Judges [sic] appointment becomes vacant it is given as a 
matter of course to one of the senior members of the Provincial Bar, and I have only one other 
situation of £100!! a year to give away in the 5 years I have administered the Government.”13  
Lord Dalhousie also faced difficulties in his attempt to implement responsible government 
commenting “in this Province I am convinced that much of the mischief arises from the really 
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state of contempt to which the King’s representative is lowered, without a house to live in 
respectably, or any patronage to distinguish merit or public services.”14 
  Coupled with these sentiments was the proconsul’s close affiliation with the Anglican 
Church.15  It appears that a significant number of the proconsuls were devout Anglicans.  Sir 
John Colborne, Sir Peregrine Maitland, Sir George Arthur, and Sir Stapleton Cotton were known 
to be religious men.  The notable exceptions to the majority of administrators’ religious 
sentiments were Mountstuart Elphinstone, a deist, and Thomas Maitland, a professed skeptic.  
Rowan Strong argues that high officials in the Colonial Office and their overseas administrators 
believed that the Church of England was valuable to the colonization effort, because it fostered 
identity and loyalty to the metropole.16  As such, it was to be promoted and supported 
wholeheartedly by the state and its colonial agents.  Smith’s address to the Xhosa 
enthusiastically exhibited these sentiments, despite the fact that he had married a Roman 
Catholic.17 The ceremony began with a prayer intoned by an Anglican divine and Smith’s 
subsequent speech extolled the virtues of Christianity while admonishing the gathered tribes to 
forsake the animist ways of their ancestors.  Fully one half of Smith’s address deals with 
religion, espousing a Hebraic view of history.  Accordingly, the history of humankind is a 
continuous development that enlightens and molds God’s chosen people and through them, the 
                                                 
14 Dalhousie to Kempt, October 29, 1821 as quoted in Phillip Buckner, The Transition to Responsible 
Government, 55. 
15 C. A. Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780-1830 (New York: Longman, 
1989), 136-137) 
16 Rowan Strong, Anglicanism and the British Empire c. 1700-1850 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 136-37.  
17 Harry Smith, aged 24 years, wed Juana Maria de Los Dolores de Leon, aged 14 years, in a Catholic 
ceremony in 1812.  It is known that in the 1830s, Juana conformed to the Church of England, much to the distress of 
her Spanish relatives.  As a result, her Spanish family disowned her.  See Henry Wakelyn Smith, The 
Autobiography of Lt.-Gen. Sir Harry Smith Baronet of Aliwal on the Sutlej, Vol. I, 72-73. 
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rest of humanity.18  Smith draws an analogy by noting that once the English were as uncivilized 
as the Xhosa: 
Years ago the English were as naked as you, and ignorant as you, as cruel as you 
were in the late war; but the bright day which has opened upon you, dawned upon them; 
they first learnt to believe in the omnipotent power of Almighty God, who judges every 
many according to his actions; worshipped, honoured, and obeyed Him; they loved their 
neighbours as themselves, and respecting their property, ceased to be thieves; they 
believed all that the ministers of God told them….19 
 
Smith continues by saying that missionary clergymen will teach the people “what God expects 
from them” and if they heed the missionary’s message they, like the English, will become the 
favored of God.  Smith concludes his message “the great English nation now regard you as 
British subjects and brothers, love your neighbours as yourself, fear God, honour your King, and 
the Governor, his representative.”20 
 Henry George Wakelyn Smith’s military career provides useful insights into the 
personalities and motivations of the typical post-Napoleonic British proconsul.  His life was, for 
the most part, typical of the officers of the period who moved between military and civilian 
spheres consistently performing within each the tasks at hand.  This ability can be attributed to 
two general trends at work in the British Army in the post-Waterloo period.  For a significant 
number of officers, the Napoleonic Wars had been the incubator for turning out trained staff 
officers proficient in the three basic elements of war fighting: that of operations, personnel, and 
supplies.21  For much of the British Army’s history before the Napoleonic Wars, these services 
operated at the most simple level, necessary only during wartime and frequently organized on an 
ad hoc basis.  Not until 1803, with reforms instituted by the Duke of York, were staff positions 
                                                 
18 Chester G. Starr, A History of the Ancient World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), 145. 
19 “Address of Colonel Smith to the Caffer (sic) Chiefs, 7th January, 1836 
20 Ibid. 
21 Frederick Myatt, The Soldiers Trade: British Military Developments, 1660-1914 (London: Macdonald & 
Jane’s, 1974), 247. 
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and their subsequent duties operated on reasonably efficient lines.22  During this period, the 
seconding of regimental officers into staff positions in the adjutant general, the quartermaster 
general, or the military secretary departments enabled these men to gain experience in the 
organization and administration.  Duties in these areas included that of discipline, training, 
accounting for unit strengths, quartering troops, arranging camps, determining march routes, 
intelligence, mapping, and the sending and receiving of correspondence.  Wellington’s nearly six 
years of campaigning in the Peninsula not only refined, but also expanded on these duties by 
adding those of reconnaissance, the planning and issuance of operational orders, and the 
administration of civil affairs in occupied localities.  Officers who received training in these 
departments were well qualified to work in the spheres of either civilian or military 
administration.   
 The second trend that prepared these officers well for work in administrative tasks was 
the level of their education.  Military historian Hew Strachan observes that the rising 
professionalism of British officers was due largely to the fact that commissioning in the officer 
corps during the Napoleonic period was based on education.  Strachan notes that literacy was the 
leveling agent that enabled landed and royal connections to mix with the “middling sort” on an 
equitable basis.23 To have an education was the mark of a gentleman.  In a December 8, 1845 
letter from Wellington to Fitzroy Somerset, the Duke observed, “ There is no greater mistake 
than to suppose the Service performed by the British Army could be carried on by any other 
description of Man excepting one educated as is an English Gentleman!”24  Indeed, it was during 
the French Revolutionary Wars that Britain established at High Wycombe a Military College that 
                                                 
22  Ibid., 252. 
23 Hew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 15-16. 
24 Herbert Papers, Wellington to Fitzroy Somerset, December 8, 1845 as quoted in Hew Strachan, 
Wellington’s Legacy: The Reform of the British Army, 1830-54 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 
111. 
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trained staff officers.  Smith, however, did not attend the Military College, but received practical 
experience in staff work early in his military career serving in that capacity in South America, 
the Peninsula, and in North America.   
 Henry George Wakelyn Smith was born into a family that was neither aristocracy nor 
landed gentry.  His father, John Smith was a surgeon in the Cambridgeshire village of 
Whittlesey, while his mother, Eleanor Moore, was the daughter of the local vicar.25  However, his 
mother’s family was slightly more illustrious than his father’s as it was said that her family 
descended from the line of Sir Thomas More, Henry VIII’s martyred Chancellor and canonized 
saint in the Catholic Church.   
 Harry was one of fourteen children, eleven of which survived to adulthood.  In his 
autobiography, Smith writes that he received a most excellent education from the curate of St. 
Mary’s Church, Reverend George Burgess, learning subjects such as natural philosophy, the 
classics, algebra, and music.26  Moreover, it appears that Harry’s father enjoyed a comfortable 
living as evidenced by his ability to provide education for his many children, two of which 
followed in his footsteps as surgeons.  Additional information concerning the family’s finances 
can be gathered from the amount of money Dr. John Smith spent on outfitting Harry for the 
army.  When Harry received his commission, the elder Smith spent most of his available money 
on the purchase of horses for his son borrowing, an additional £100 to pay for the purchase of 
uniforms and accoutrements.27   
                                                 
25 Harry Smith notes that his maternal grandfather was Reverend John Moore M.A., educated at Queen’s 
College, Cambridge, vicar of St. Mary and St. Andrew, Whittlesey, and minor cannon of Peterborough Cathedral.  
See Henry Wakelyn Smith, The Autobiography of Lt.-Gen. Sir Harry Smith , 2n. 
26 Ibid., 1. 
27 Joseph H. Lehmann, Remember You Are An Englishman: A Biography of Sir Harry Smith, 1787-1860 
(London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1977), 2. 
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 Harry Smith’s family background fits many of the parameters that characterized British 
officers who entered the army at the end of the eighteenth century and then became colonial 
administrators.  Referring to the social profile outlined in a previous chapter, Smith nearly fits all 
the principal categories.  Smith, born in June 1787, entered the army’s 95
th
 Regiment in May of 
1805, aged seventeen years.  The archetypical company grade British officer of the Napoleonic 
Wars entered the army in his teens with the median age being seventeen and a half years.  
Smith’s father was a professional man employed in a trade that placed him firmly in the ranks of 
the “middling sort.” Moreover, his maternal grandfather, a clergyman, occupied a similar 
position on the social scale.  Recent comparable research by Zoë Laidlaw concurs by observing, 
“many of those who proceeded to significant colonial careers came from the middle-class 
professional backgrounds, rather from the landed gentry, they were the sons of career soldiers, 
clergymen, and doctors.”28  Continuing the representative profile.  Smith’s birthplace of 
Cambridgeshire was a rural location, which also fits our typical officer of the period.  However, 
the county was not a primary military recruiting area during the “Invasion Panic of 1803-05” that 
prompted a substantial increase in men answering the call to the colors.  In his autobiography, 
however, Smith recounts that he succumbed to the patriotic fervor of the time noting “In 1804, 
the whole country was en masse [author’s italics] collected in arms as volunteers from the 
expected invasion of the French, and being now sixteen years of age, I was received into the 
Whittlesea troop of Yeomanry Cavalry commanded by Captain Johnson.”29 
                                                 
28 Zoë Laidlaw, Colonial Connections, 1815-45: Patronage, the Information Revolution, and Colonial 
Government (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 24. 
29 29 Henry Wakelyn Smith, The Autobiography of Lt.-Gen. Sir Harry Smith Baronet of Aliwal on the 
Sutlej, 2. 
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 Smith entered the regular army in the spring of 1805 when General, Sir William Stewart 
secured him a lieutenancy in the newly formed 95
th
 Regiment.30  He was fortunate in that the 
regiment had received authorization to raise an additional 2
nd
 Battalion and had not yet fulfilled 
its complement of officers.  As this unit was a newly formed regiment with little in the way of 
line seniority, it had a low purchase price.  As a result, Smith’s father was able to purchase a 
lieutenancy for the relatively inexpensive price of  £100, a real bargain since the set fee for 
established regiments was established at £500.31  Harry now began a life-long career in military 
service.  
 Almost immediately, the new 2
nd
 lieutenant saw action as a detachment of three 
companies of the 95
th
 participated in Sir Samuel Auchmuty’s expedition to Montevideo, South 
America.  While on duty in South America, Smith was appointed adjutant that, he noted, was “ a 
great honour for so young an officer.”32  The adjutant was selected by the commander from the 
available regimental subalterns to fulfill duties similar to those of the army’s adjutant general.33  
                                                 
30 The 95th Regiment was an experimental corps of infantry trained in the use of the rifle rather than the 
smoothbore musket.  In addition to the employment of a specialized weapon, the regiment was to be instructed in the 
special tactics and drill of the riflemen. Proponents, Colonel Coote Manningham and (then) Lieutenant Colonel the 
Hon. William Stewart, mindful of the success of open order skirmish tactics employed during the War of American 
Independence recommended that a unit be trained in this method.  In January 1800, Crown consent was obtained in 
a Royal Circular that authorized the formation of such a corps.  In part the order read:  
CIRCULAR 
Address to Officers Commanding the 2
nd
 Battalion Royals,  the 21
st
, 23
rd
, 25
th
, 27
th
, 29
th
, 49
th
, 55
th
, 69
th
, 71
st
,  72
nd
, 
79
th
, 85
th
, and 92
nd
 Regiments. 
        Horse Guards,  
        17 January 1800 
Sir—I have the honour to inform you that it is His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief’s intention to 
form a corps of detachments from the different regiments of the line for the purpose of its being instructed in the use 
of the rifle and in the system of exercise adopted by soldiers so armed ….  See; Willoughby Verner, History & 
Campaigns of the Rifle Brigade, 2 Vols., (London: John Bale, Sons & Danielsson, Ltd., 1912), 19. 
 
31  Horse Guards, The King’s Regulations and Orders for the Army, “Established Price of Commissions,” 
(London: The Horse Guards, 1837), 44. 
32 Henry Wakelyn Smith, The Autobiography of Lt.-Gen. Sir Harry Smith Baronet of Aliwal on the Sutlej, 
4.  
33 H. L. Scott, Military Dictionary: Comprising Technical Definitions; on Raising and Keeping Troops; 
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As Philip J. Haythornthwaite observed these duties included much tiresome clerical work such as 
keeping accurate regimental returns, compiling inventories and inspection reports, keeping the 
letter book, advising the commander on the correct customs of service, communicating in a clear 
and concise manner the orders of the commander, and issuing a myriad of reports concerning the 
health and physical well-being of the unit.34  In short, the adjutant must be a competent manager 
of nearly every regimental affair and work in conjunction with the other members of the 
command staff.  This relatively minor staff position prepared Smith for future organizational and 
managerial roles in both military and civil affairs.  
 For nearly seven years, Smith served as both a combat and staff officer in the Peninsula, 
North America, and Belgium.  He is most unusual among British officers of the period in that he 
participated in all of the significant actions of the Napoleonic Wars including Badajoz, 
Salamanca, Vittoria, Bladensburg, Washington, New Orleans, and Waterloo.  During this time, 
Smith made acquaintances and established friendships among influential and powerful 
individuals enabling him to create a valuable network that would prove most useful later in his 
career.  Among his friends and acquaintances was the Duke of Wellington, who thought so 
highly of the young captain that he gave the bride away at Smith’s 1812 wedding.35  Later, Smith 
would renew the Duke’s acquaintance hunting with him in France during Wellington’s tenure as 
commander of the Army of Occupation in 1816-1818.  The relationship that Smith forged with 
Wellington paid dividends.  In 1824, the Duke recommended him to Major General Sir Herbert 
Taylor, Military Secretary at the Horse Guards, for employment nothing that Smith was a proven 
                                                                                                                                                             
Actual Service, Including Makeshift and improved Material; and Law, Government, Regulation, and Administration 
Relating to Land Forces (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1861), 14. 
34 Philip j. Haythornthwaite, The Armies of Wellington (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1994), 29; and 
Horse Guards, The King’s Regulations and Orders for the Army, 59-60. 
35 Wellington’s indulgence went so far as to give permission for Smith to be married by a Roman Catholic 
chaplain from the Connaught Rangers.  See Joseph H. Lehmann, Remember You Are An Englishman: A Biography 
of Sir Harry Smith, 32-33. 
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and efficient officer who was competent handling any task assigned.36  Officers who had a 
personal association with Wellington discovered that his patronage was invaluable when 
searching for employment or requesting promotion.  As Smith discovered, the networking 
conduit that traveled through Wellington expanded throughout the entire British Empire, with 
important links between and within the colonies, as well as connections back to the metropole 
especially at the Horse Guards.37 
The process of networking through patronage was not limited to Wellington alone.  
Indeed, there were many general grade officers at home and abroad that could assist in securing 
the much-coveted overseas positions.  While campaigning in the Peninsula, Smith forged 
lifelong bonds with Fitzroy Somerset, Henry Hardinge, Lowry Cole, James Kempt, Benjamin 
D’Urban, and the Napier brothers, many of whom played significant and influential roles in post 
1815 colonial/imperial administration.  As Hew Strachen has observed, the “Peninsular 
Network” was particularly strong and beneficial to young promising officers in that it connected 
them to many of the principal military leaders of the age including powerful individuals in 
successive governments, parliaments, the aristocracy, and the royal court.38  Throughout his 
military and colonial career, Smith frequently called on these individuals to help him further his 
advancement.  For example, in 1826, while posted in Nova Scotia, Smith was placed unattached 
on half-pay, a position that proved to be financially difficult.  In an October 16, 1826 letter to 
Lord Fitzroy Somerset, Smith notes, “he would be ruined if he were retired on half-pay without 
[benefit of] a swift appointment.”39  Major General Sir James Kempt, the lieutenant governor of 
                                                 
36 University of Southampton, Wellington Papers, W.P. 1/797/13 Copy of a letter from Lord Fitzroy Somerset to 
Sir Herbert Taylor, recommending Lieutenant Colonel H.G.Smith of the Rifle Brigade to the Commander in Chief, 12 July 1824 
37 Zoë Laidlaw, Colonial Connections, 1815-45: Patronage , the Information Revolution and Colonial 
Government (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 21. 
38 Hew Strachan, Politics and the British Army (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 27. 
39 W.P. 1/863/19 Letter from Lieutenant Colonel H.G.Smith to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, asking for his 
 299
Nova Scotia and “my dear and valued friend” from the Peninsular War, came to Smith’s 
assistance by appointing him his temporary aide-de-camp.40 It was under Kemp’s guidance that 
Smith gained valuable experience in learning how to carry out administrative duties “which 
[Smith noted] was afterwards of the greatest possible use to me when administering a 
Government myself.”41  
Throughout his life, Smith continually made use of various networks and frequently 
called on patrons for assistance in moving up the military and colonial hierarchy.  Within weeks 
of receiving Kemp’s assignment, Smith accepted a non-regimental staff position as deputy 
quartermaster general in Jamaica.  For Smith, leaving the regiment was bittersweet, writing; “I 
had served twenty-five [records indicate that at this time, he had served only twenty-one] years 
in this Corps during the most eventful periods.  I had never been on service but I was fighting 
with some portion of it.  No officer had ever posted it so often on outlying picquet, and I had 
fought where it had not been; thus were severed on ordinary or transient ties.”42  Despite regrets 
in leaving his regiment, the Jamaican position was a posting that Smith had actively sought.  
Letters exchanged in the summer and fall of 1826 between Somerset and Smith reveal the 
intricate, complex, and personal nature of the active network system active within military and 
colonial circles.  
 In July 1826, Smith, posted in Nova Scotia, learned that Colonels James Mitchell and 
Samuel Fullarton of the Rifle Brigade intended to retire.  Additionally, Major William Eeles, 
                                                                                                                                                             
resignation to be placed in the hands of Sir Herbert Taylor, 14 October 1826 
40 Kempt was indeed a friend and sympathetic to the young officers hardships.  When Smith sailed from 
Nova Scotia to Jamaica, Kempt drew his A.D.C aside, generously giving him three times the amount of money 
necessary to pay his passage.  See Henry Wakelyn Smith, The Autobiography of Lt.-Gen. Sir Harry Smith Baronet 
of Aliwal on the Sutlej, ed. G.C. Moore Smith,  Vol. 2., 340; and Joseph H. Lehmann, Remember You Are An 
Englishman: A Biography of Sir Harry Smith, 129. 
41 Ibid., 341. 
42 Ibid., 342-3 
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also of the Rifle Brigade, expected to be promoted to a staff position thus opening up a majority 
in the Rifle Brigade that “should allow Smith to enter the corps as a major.”43  At the same time, 
Major General Sir John Keane, military commander in Jamaica, and his deputy adjutant general, 
Lieutenant Colonel Henry George McLeod arrived in Nova Scotia with the news that McLeod 
would soon resign his post and that the position of deputy quartermaster general would also soon 
be vacant.  The deputy quartermaster general’s post paid a handsome income of  £1000 annually 
and Smith’s promotion to major would make him eligible to apply for the post.  Almost 
immediately, Smith began networking to secure this available colonial position.  He immediately 
wrote Somerset applying for the post, sending along a letter of recommendation from Kempt, 
and an extract from a letter from Major General Herbert Taylor, Military Secretary, Horse 
Guards, recommending him for a position in either the West Indies or Jamaica.  Furthermore, 
Taylor’s letter noted that Colonel Charles Gore, the present deputy quartermaster in Jamaica and 
Lieutenant Colonel Francis Cockburn, deputy quartermaster in Canada intended to exchange 
their colonial positions.  Cockburn, however, did not accept the Jamaican assignment, which 
instead went to Smith.44  Within the span of a few months, Smith succeeded in receiving the 
colonial appointment. 
  The methods employed by Harry Smith are not unlike typical contemporary networking 
and hiring practices.  He sought the desired employment by making application, soliciting, and 
receiving the all-important letters of recommendation.  Wisely, he chose key influential patrons 
to write on his behalf.  In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, letters of recommendation 
were powerful mechanisms in allowing the candidate access to exclusive networks.45  Written 
                                                 
43 W.P. 1/859/9 Letter from Lieutenant Colonel H. G. Smith to Lord Fitzroy Somerset, seeking promotion 
or a new post, 19 July 1826 [docketed 18 July 1826]. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Pamela Walker Laird, Pull: Networking and Success Since Benjamin Franklin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
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introductions, similar to spoken ones, requested that friends and associates admit the bearer into 
their network with “access to the privileges, trust and opportunities” associated with that group.46  
Letters not only vouched for the candidates’ ability to perform the tasks required for the 
prospective position, but also guaranteed that their character and social standing warranted 
membership in that network.  In Smith’s case, he possessed the added advantage of access to two 
distinct yet intertwined networks available to British officers: the metropolitan network centered 
around Wellington and Taylor at the Horse Guards, and the colonial network consisting of 
overseas administrators, Kempt and Keane.47  The common connection that linked these two 
networks together was the Peninsular brotherhood.   
All of the participants in Smith’s 1826 employment search had significant Peninsular 
connections.  Furthermore, Smith by possessing these contacts was privy to inside information 
that worked to his advantage in discovering employment opportunities.48 Smith’s association 
with Wellington is well known and needs no further explanation.  Lord Fitzroy Somerset served 
as aide de camp to Wellington throughout the Peninsular War and Waterloo campaign.  Smith 
had known Somerset during his service in Spain as Somerset was once quartered in the home of 
his wife’s parents.  Smith was also well acquainted with Sir John Keane, serving with him in 
both the Peninsula and the New Orleans campaign.  Keane, a colonel during the Peninsular War, 
served on Wellington’s staff and was present at the battles of Vittoria, Pyrenees, Nivelle, Nive 
and Toulouse.49  Promoted to a major general, Keane served as deputy to Sir Edward M. 
                                                                                                                                                             
University Press, 2006), 22. 
46 Ibid., 23.  
47 Laidlaw that there existed two distinct spheres of influence among military administrators in networking 
the British Empire, one centered on Wellington and the Horse Guards in London, and the much vaster network of 
military men in command situations posted throughout the colonies.  See Zoë Laidlaw, Colonial Connections,  21-
27. 
48 Ibid., 25. 
49 United Kingdom, The Royal Military Calendar or Army Service and Commission Book, Vol. III 
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Packenham, the commander of the New Orleans expedition.  Smith, who also served in this 
campaign as assistant adjutant general, worked closely with Keane.  Indeed, Smith, in his 
memoirs, described Keane “as noble a soldier as our country ever produced.”50  Besides his 
association with Sir James Kempt in Nova Scotia, Smith had a close and cordial relationship 
with him in the Peninsula.  Kempt had commanded a brigade at the Siege and Storming of 
Badajoz in the spring 1812, an action in which Smith’s 95
th
 Regiment took a leading role.  One 
year later, at the Battle of Vittoria, Kempt was Smith’s brigade commander.  At the Battle of 
Waterloo, Smith, attached to Wellington’s staff as assistant quartermaster general of the 6
th
 
Division, was again reunited with Kempt who commanded the 8
th
 Brigade.51  In the evening, 
after the battle, Smith recounts in his autobiography that he made some tea for Sir James Kempt, 
Sir John Lambert [commander of 10
th
 Brigade, which comprised part of the 6
th
 Division], and 
himself while they discussed the battle.52   
 It was within this matrix of personal relationships and acquaintances that Harry Smith 
was able to secure employment.  Officers who knew Smith were well acquainted with his 
character and were willing to make him a part of their exclusive circle.  Nonetheless, there was 
another factor that figured prominently in influencing those who were instrumental in making 
military and colonial appointments.  Smith, as a young officer, associated with important patrons 
adopting them as his mentors.  In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, mentors were the 
social capital that provided opportunities for career advancement.  Pamela Walker Laird 
observes that many successful individuals “required the pull from above” in determining who 
                                                                                                                                                             
(London: A. J. Valpy, 1820), 376. 
50 Henry Wakelyn Smith, The Autobiography of Lt.-Gen. Sir Harry Smith Baronet of Aliwal on the Sutlej, 
Vol. I, 228. 
51 Charles Dalton, Waterloo Roll Call (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1971), 16 and 22. 
52 Henry Wakelyn Smith, The Autobiography of Lt.-Gen. Sir Harry Smith Baronet of Aliwal on the Sutlej, 
ed. G.C. Moore Smith, Vol. I,  273. 
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succeeded.53  Consequently, his acquaintances with many influential and powerful individuals 
caused Smith to consciously or unconsciously emulate them later in life.  However, while it is 
not certain, a good case can be made that Smith’s method of command and governance were 
modeled after that of the Duke of Wellington.54  Smith greatly admired his Peninsular 
Commander-in-Chief remarking, “[he was] one of the greatest men England or the world ever 
produced…I love Wellington with a fervour which cannot be exceeded.”55  
Wellington’s biographers have much to say concerning his style of command and 
drawing comparisons between the two men is not difficult.  Nineteenth century historian, Charles 
Oman, noted that Wellington was a supremely able military man despite the fact that he had 
risen in rank because of birth and political connections.  His officers and men alike trusted him, 
but few loved him.56  In battle he was always confident of victory.  Historian Roy Muir observes, 
“Wellington was a carefully calculating general … He did not fight unless he thought he could 
win, and that he would gain from the victory.”57 
Coupled with this apparent self-confidence was a notion that Providence was with him in his 
endeavors.  Frequently, he would remark to acquaintances that the “finger of Providence” was 
with him in explaining extraordinary pieces of good fortune.58  On the evening following the 
                                                 
53 Pamela Walker Laird, Pull: Networking and Success Since Benjamin Franklin, 21. 
54 In his autobiography, Smith writes of a private conversation he had with Wellington while both were 
stationed in France with the Army of Occupation.  The substance of the conversation centered around the Battle of 
New Orleans, an action that Smith had participated in, sharing with the Duke his observations on the nature of the 
battle.  At the end of Smith’s description, the Duke said, “I am glad I have had this conversation with you.  It agrees 
as nearly as may be with the opinion I had previously formed.”  See Henry Wakelyn Smith, The Autobiography of 
Lt.-Gen. Sir Harry Smith Baronet of Aliwal on the Sutlej, ed. G.C. Moore Smith, Vol. I,  304-5. 
55 Smith as quoted in Joseph H. Lehman, Remember You Are An Englishman: A Biography of Sir Harry 
Smith 1787-1860, 111. 
56 Charles W. C. Oman, Welllington’s Army, 1809-1814 (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1912), 
41. 
57 Rory Muir, Salamanca 1812 (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2001), 37. 
58 Elizabeth Longford, Wellington: The Years of the Sword (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1969), 
111. 
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Battle of Waterloo, the Duke said at dinner to the surviving members of his staff, “The hand of 
Almighty God has been upon me this day.”59  However, historians have discovered that under 
this veneer of confidence was an aristocratic arrogance manifested by a cold impersonal nature.  
Charles Esdaile, noteworthy historian of the Peninsular War, characterized Wellington’s style of 
command as that of “intellectual arrogance and aristocratic hauteur [that] produced a demeanor 
that was at best curt and distant, and at worst intolerant of human frailty and capable of great 
injustice.”60  Likewise Wellington biographer Elizabeth Longford noted that the Duke had a 
reputation for caustic repartee with little patience for fools.61  Throughout his military career 
Wellington repeatedly criticized his officers and scorned his troops.  At one point during the 
Peninsular War, Wellington remarked that “these [officers] were the persons on whom [he was] 
to rely to lead columns against French Generals, and who [were] to carry [his] instructions into 
execution made him tremble.”62  His soldiers fared no better with the Duke revealing, “I have no 
idea of any great effect being produced on British soldiers by anything but fear of immediate 
corporal punishment.”63   
Smith similarly imitated not only to Wellington's manner of command but his lifestyle as 
well.  He was neither a wealthy man, nor could his family guarantee him a steady income yet he 
still adopted the habits of one.  While posted to the Army of Occupation in France, Smith kept a 
pack of hounds and a stable of fine horses.  In his autobiography, Smith wrote, “Our life in 
Cambray (France) was one excess of gaiety… We were both young; my wife was beautiful.  We 
                                                 
59 Christopher Hibbert, Wellington: A Personal History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), 181. 
60 Charles Esdaile, The Peninsular War: A New History (Houndmills, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003), 96. 
61 Elizabeth Longford, Wellington: The Years of the Sword, 352. 
62 Christopher Hibbert, Wellington: A Personal History , 97. 
63 The Duke of Wellington as quoted in Joseph H. Lehmann, Remember You Are An Englishman: A 
Biography of Sir Harry Smith, 111. 
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were fêted and petted by every one.  I was a huntsman of a magnificent pack of hounds, steward 
of races, riding steeplechase, etc….  We were surrounded by the best society.”64  Unfortunately, 
his lifestyle frequently caused him to have serious financial problems and forced him to 
constantly find a means of supplementing his army income.  On leaving France in 1818, a 
worried Smith noted that he fallen behind in paying his bills discovering that “my money was far 
exceeded by my debts.”65  However, this was not to be the only time Smith faced financial 
difficulties.  Nearly ten years later when posted in the Cape Colony he noted to Juana, his wife, 
that their financial security would be assured “to grow rich in our old days’ by receiving a post in 
India.”66  Nevertheless, Smith’s appointment as Adjutant General of British Military Forces in 
India did not immediately alleviate his fiscal burdens.  Just after his arrival on the subcontinent 
he wrote, “For the present, I am more of a beggar than ever.”67  At that time, Smith continued to 
repay his substantial debts, which included 11 percent interest and £100 a month on the 
principal.68  Furthermore, Smith also assumed the financial burden of educating his widowed 
sister’s two children.  
Smith’s command style was similar to that of Wellington’s in many aspects.  He was a 
strict disciplinarian, an excellent tactician, and a confident and decisive battlefield leader.  
However, unlike his mentor, Smith genuinely sympathized with the hard lot of the enlisted 
soldier.  Apparently, his “middling sort” background caused him to understand and appreciate 
the common soldier’s plight more than his aristocratic brother officers, who frequently bypassed 
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company grade commands by purchasing senior commissions at a young age.69  For nearly ten 
years, he had campaigned as a company grade officer and dealt intimately with his troops.  
During the assault on Badajoz, he accompanied the storming party by scaling the walls 
characterizing the men under his command, as “every soldier was a hero.”70  Many years later, in 
1819, during a demobilizing ceremony at Shorncliffe in which 300 of his oldest and best soldiers 
were discharged, Smith recounted that “there was not one who could not relate some act of 
mutual kindness and reciprocity of feeling in connexion with the many memorable events in 
which they had taken part.”71  However, Smith was also a harsh disciplinarian.  He could punish 
as well as praise.  In correspondence with Benjamin D’Urban, Smith noted that as commandant 
of the 75
th
 Regiment he tried a soldier “for the intention to commit a flagrant breach of 
discipline” sentencing him to transport to Botany Bay.72  With some disgust, Smith observes that 
the soldier in question was “liberated by Lord Hill” and had his sentence commuted.  Smith, 
while serving as adjutant general in India refused a request by Colonel Anderson of the 50
th
 
Regiment to transfer two of his officers rather than subject the unit to the scandal of a court-
martial.  In a stern letter to Anderson, Smith noted, “if the officers named were not fit to serve in 
the 50
th
 Regiment, they were not fit to serve in any other.”73  
Smith’s command style was authoritarian and imperious.  To his superior officers, his 
brusque manner and quick temper were frequently construed as insubordinate.  This behavior 
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was most apparent during Smith’s police and peacekeeping duties in Scotland in the turbulent 
years following Waterloo.  Smith described the period as Bellum in Pace where “great judgment 
and patience were required” by his officers and men tasked with maintaining public calm in the 
midst of significant economic distress.  In 1820, while commanding a detachment of the 7
th
 
Hussars in Glasgow, Smith received orders to escort a group of radicals to be tried by the civilian 
authorities.  In the process of moving them, a mob formed and began to shower them with 
stones, brickbats, and all sorts of refuse.  Smith refused to fire on the mob preventing another 
“Peterloo” like incident.  Instead, he ordered his troopers to use the flat of their swords to clear 
the way.  When he returned to headquarters, his superior General Sir Thomas Bradford soundly 
criticized him for his “timid” action.  Smith responded to Bradford’s tirade by replying in what 
he described as a “dictatorial” manner:  
Because, my lord, I was acting under the officers of the law, the magistrates, of 
whom you are the Commander-in-Chief.  They would not act, and I did not desire to 
bring upon my head either the blood of my foolish and misguided countrymen, or the 
odium of the Manchester magistrates.  I brought off every prisoner; but, my lord, since 
that is your feeling, give me a written order to march through Glasgow with the same 
party of soldiers and my prisoners.  A mob will soon attempt the rescue, and d----- me, 
my lord, but I will shoot all Glasgow to please you.74 
 
Later in life, as a general officer, Smith adopted self-confidence in his martial ability 
much like his mentor, Wellington.  Longford relates that during the Peninsular War, Wellington 
counseled General William Carr Beresford on independent command, “Remember that you are a 
commander in chief and must not be beaten; therefore do not undertake anything with your 
troops unless you have some strong hope of success.”75  Apparently, Smith became a disciple of 
Wellington’s dictum.  The Battle of Ferozeshah, fought on December 21-22, 1845, was won 
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largely through Smith’s timely effort of personally leading the 50
th
 Regiment forward thereby 
carrying the right flank of the Sikhs.76  One month later, at the Battle of Aliwal, Smith, exercising 
an independent command, executed a masterful plan and won a stunning victory.  Writing to 
D’Urban just after the battle, Smith remarked, “My Battle [Aliwal] brings me to the exact 
conclusion that I could not have altered anything or done anything by which I could have 
achieved the Victory with Less Loss, or more rapidly and decisively.  I fell on all hands Cavalry 
Artillery and Infantry each in support of the other yet each in operation—a mass of irresistible 
Soldiers.”77  Smith concludes the lengthy letter by noting his gratitude to both the Duke of 
Wellington and to his friend, Durban, who he calls “my Dear Master, in having taught me a great 
deal.”78  In a similar letter written to his sister Alice, Smith comments, “Never was a victory 
more complete and never was one fought under more happy circumstances, literally with the 
pomp of a field-day; and right well did all behave.  I brought well into action each arm as 
auxiliary to the other….”79  
Like many proconsuls, Smith’s post-Waterloo career consisted of a combination of 
military, military/civilian, and civilian positions.  While it has been pointed out that he received 
his initial training in administrative duties as a staff officer during the Napoleonic Wars, it was 
only after the conclusion of these wars that he actively engaged as a military officer in civilian 
administrative affairs.  During the occupation of France, following the defeat of Napoleon at 
Waterloo, Smith served as both an officer in the 95
th
 Regiment and as a garrison officer as Major 
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de Place of Cambray (sic).80  There, he along with an officer of engineers were to “take over 
Cambray (sic), its guns, stores, etc., from the French Commander and Engineers.”81  Additional 
duties included receiving complaints from the inhabitants, acting on them, and making certain 
general peace was maintained between the citizens and the occupying forces.  Wellington, not 
wishing to precipitate a guerilla insurrection, insisted that British forces “pride themselves on our 
deportment, and that pride shall not be injured in my keeping.”82  As Thomas Dwight Veve has 
observed in his study of the occupation of France following Waterloo, Wellington was cognizant 
that “if the occupation army acted improperly, the repercussions would threaten the European 
peace settlement.”83  Moreover, in the wake of the 1814 and 1815 campaign, Napoleon had 
intended to launch a guerilla movement similar to the situation his troops had faced in Spain.  
However, by 1815, war weariness on the part of the French population and the lack of popular 
support caused this plan to be stillborn.84 Nevertheless, British troops were aware that any serious 
incident could lead to instability in that region or even open rebellion.  It was for this very reason 
that Wellington carefully chose capable officers with administrative experience to oversee their 
areas of occupation.  Smith’s fellow officers, however, envied his promotion with one brother 
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officer remarking, “Now, how will Harry Smith, after such extended authority, like to come back 
to the command of a Company.”85 
Upon the conclusion of the British occupation of France, Harry Smith’s next assignment 
was similar but far more delicate and hazardous.  Smith writes that, in October 1819, his 
regiment was ordered to maintain security and domestic tranquility during “the Radical Period” 
in the city of Glasgow and other large manufacturing towns of northern England.86  His duties 
included pacifying the local population burdened with problems of large-scale unemployment, an 
unstable currency, and widespread starvation.  Smith noted that many of the disaffected were 
either demobilized veterans or “misguided and half starved weavers.”87  The soldiers found the 
duty thoroughly irksome although the soldiers carried out their task professionally with Smith 
noting that the “deportment [of the troops] was so mild that we soon gained rather the respect” of 
the mobs that they faced.88  In addition to enforcing the peace, the young officer was also tasked 
with inspecting the Corps of Yeomanry raised to counter the dissatisfaction.  Smith thoroughly 
enjoyed this duty as the local Scottish aristocrats such as the Duke of Montrose, Lord Glasgow, 
and Lord Balantyre treated him like visiting nobility.89  Near the end of his posting in Scotland, 
Smith carried out the logistical and security arrangements for King George IV’s visit to Scotland.  
For his services, he received the personal thanks and approbation of the king.90 
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Smith’s first experience with colonial administration came in the early fall of 1825 when 
he accompanied his regiment to Nova Scotia.  At that time, the lieutenant governor of the colony 
was Major General Sir James Kempt, who Smith had known during the Napoleonic Wars.  
Kempt, was one of the first generation of post-Waterloo proconsuls who, like Smith, had neither 
the benefit of birth nor income.  Kempt, born in 1764, was the son of Gavin Kempt of Botley 
Hill, Southampton, and of Edinburgh, and Miss Walker, the daughter of Alexander Walker of 
Edinburgh.91 Little is known of his early life, but in March 1783, he was gazetted ensign in the 
101
st
 Regiment, a unit slated for duty in India.  It appears that Kempt had little income as joining 
a newly formed regiment with little seniority destined for foreign service rarely required 
purchase.  Because of the significant reduction in the army following the American War for 
Independence, the 101
st
 Regiment was disbanded before it sailed for India.  Kempt was placed 
on half-pay and forced to find work in the civilian sector.  Nearly ten years later, he was able to 
secure a captaincy in 113
th
 Regiment largely because of his ability in raising recruits for the 
newly formed unit.  It appears that Kempt again gained this commission without purchase. 
During the French Revolutionary Wars, Kempt served as aide de camp and military 
secretary to General Sir Ralph Abercromby until the general’s death in 1801.92  For the next few 
years, Kempt continued to act as aide and military secretary to a number of British commanders 
in the Mediterranean theater that included General John Hely-Hutchinson and General Sir David 
Dundas.  Like Smith, Kempt received a considerable amount of experience in administrative and 
organizational duties while acting in this staff capacity.  In 1805, Kempt received a combat 
command with General Sir James Henry Craig’s expedition to Sicily and Naples.  At the Battle 
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of Maida, Kempt’s Light Brigade bore the brunt of the fighting.  After serving a short stint as 
quartermaster general in North America, the young brevet colonel was assigned to the staff of 
Wellington’s Peninsular Army.  Beginning in 1809 and for the next seven years, Kempt served 
with Wellington in the Peninsula and in the Low Countries campaign of 1815.  It was during the 
storming of Badajoz in 1812, that Kempt became acquainted with Captain Harry Smith.93  Kempt 
and Smith again served together at the Battle of Waterloo.  
At the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, Kempt found employment as a colonial 
administrator.  In October 1819, Kempt wrote Wellington requesting assistance in securing the 
vacant command of British forces in Nova Scotia.94  Without hesitation, Wellington 
recommended Kempt for a position of authority.  As early as 1812, the Duke had remarked that 
regarded highly Kempt’s ability as a commander.95  Instead of receiving the command position, 
Kempt, as an alternative, was appointed Lieutenant-Governor of Nova Scotia.  Kempt’s nine-
year tenure as chief administrator was remembered as a time of peace and growth for the colony 
that included the construction of a new university, the expansion of the road network, and 
improvement and organization of the militia.  His formula for successful governance was 
summed up in a letter to his predecessor Lord Dalhousie observing “make it a rule to be 
universally civil to all Parties, without paying particular attention to one person more than 
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another.”96  Kempt’s successful governance, however, was assisted by a strong Tory presence in 
the colony’s assembly.97  Smith notes while he was stationed in the colony, “even the Whig 
opposition, admired his talent and never opposed any of his great acts, while by his amiable 
manners and kind, though unostentatious, hospitality, society was cemented, and indeed, what 
the word implies, social.98 (Smith’s italics) 
As previously noted, it was during Kempt’s term at Nova Scotia that Smith, acting as his 
aide-de-camp, recollected that he learned the mechanics of colonial administration.  However, it 
was at Smith’s next posting, in Jamaica, that he was able to put his administrative and 
organizational training into practice.  In 1826, Smith received a military appointment as deputy 
quartermaster general of British forces in Jamaica.  In that capacity, with Governor Keane’s 
wholehearted approval, Smith embarked on a program to improve the living conditions of the 
troops on the island.  Unsanitary living conditions were a significant contributory reason in 
facilitating the spread of yellow fever.  Among overseas garrisons, Jamaica was one of the 
unhealthiest postings within the empire.  In the years 1825-1836, the mortality rate of British 
soldiers in Jamaica was an astounding 130 per thousand.99  The only British posting that had a 
higher death rate was the small garrison stationed on Africa’s Gold Coast.  During Smith’s 
posting, Jamaica was considered by the British military high command to be of significant 
strategic value.  A large garrison was necessary to support Prime Minster Canning’s policy of 
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thwarting Spain’s attempts to restore hegemony over rebellious American colonies.100  Moreover, 
troops were necessary to insure order in a colony with a significant slave population that was 
becoming increasingly restless as Parliament debated emancipation.  
Soon after taking the post, Smith presented to Keane a barracks inspection report that 
revealed that most of the soldiers’ accommodations were “execrable.”101  Keane immediately 
gave Smith “carte blanche” to do what he thought was best to remedy the situation.  Smith’s 
solution was to move the regiments out of their existing barracks and construct new facilities at 
healthier locations.  Moreover, Smith established convalescent hospitals for soldiers who had 
recently recovered from the disease.  Smith noted that despite the “various difficulties …the 
success of the institution was an ample reward for labour, and established a precedent since 
equally advantageously acted on.”102  Indeed, inspection reports from the 84
th
 Regiment 
submitted after Smith’s improvements reveal that only one man was absent from the ranks, and 
this was because of a fractured leg.  Prior to this inspection the 22
nd
 and the 84
th
 Regiments 
reported that twenty-one officers and 668 succumbed to the disease.103  For his efforts, Smith 
received the personal approbation for his exertions from the Duke of Wellington.104  Apparently 
Wellington, at the time Chief of the Ordnance Department and arbiter of spending for colonial 
and military buildings, was aware of Smith’s work.105  However, there is little apparent evidence 
that the barrack construction costs ever went through the mandated government channels. 
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Like the biblical servant in the Parable of the Talents, Smith believed that the work 
accomplished on Jamaica paved the way for larger responsibilities.106  In the autumn of 1828, he 
was removed from his position in Jamaica and appointed as deputy quartermaster general in the 
Cape Colony under Governor Sir Lowry Cole, the former commander of Wellington’s 4th 
Division in the Peninsula.  Cole was just another in a long line of military men who governed the 
colony that included Lord Charles Somerset, Sir Rufane Donkin, Major General Richard Bourke, 
and Sir Benjamin D’Urban.  The Colonial Office had enjoined all of these administrators to 
pursue a policy of retrenchment of military expenditures and the cultivation of friendship among 
the indigenous tribes.107   
Cole, a lively Irish aristocrat, began his military career in 1787 when he obtained his 
cornetcy with the 12
th
 Light Dragoons.  He served as aide-de-camp and military secretary for 
commanders such as Sir Charles Grey and Sir John Hely-Hutchinson.108  Cole, as a Brigadier 
General, served as second-in-command at the Battle of Maida where his actions earned him the 
thanks of Parliament.  In 1809, he was attached to the staff of Wellington’s Peninsular Army 
commanding the 4
th
 Division, an assignment he held throughout the length of the war.  Charles 
Oman, considered Cole one of Wellington’s best division commanders especially for his actions 
at the Battle of Albuera noting that his timely advance with the Fusilier Brigade and Harvey’s 
Portuguese brought the British victory.109  J. W. Fortescue notes that of all of Wellington’s 
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division commanders, Cole was one of the few that the Duke regarded highly and could bring 
him into his confidence.110  Cole returned the complement to his commander by writing in 
February 1810 to his sister: 
I never served under any Chief I liked so much, Sir J. [John] Moore always excepted, as 
Lord W. [Wellesley] He has treated me with much more confidence than I had a right to 
or could be expected from anyone.  Few, I believe, possess a firmer mind or has, as far as 
I have heard, more the confidence of the Army.111 
 
Cole was unavailable for command at the Battle of Waterloo, even though Wellington 
specifically recommended him for a divisional command.112  However, he served with the Army 
of Occupation in France and remained in this post until November 1818.  In 1823, he received 
the governorship of the island of Mauritius and continued in that capacity for five years.  While 
governing this strategic waypoint to India, Cole was able to maintain amicability and stability 
among a diverse population that included European colonists, freed blacks, and slaves.113  In 
addition to his administrative duties, Cole was also tasked with overseeing the military defenses 
of the colony, which consisted of a garrison of two regiments of line infantry, a company of 
artillery, a company of engineers, and a company of the staff corps.114  Largely because of his 
success in Mauritius, Cole was promoted to the governorship of the Cape Colony in 1828.  
However, even this position was not profitable enough to support his expenses.  Just after 
receiving the position, Cole wrote to Wellington requesting his assistance in securing a non-
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resident sinecure as governor of Guernsey or Portsmouth to help supplement his colonial 
income.115  As governor of the Cape Colony, Cole proved extremely popular with the British and 
Boer populations.  He encouraged the growth and expansion of trade by repealing previous 
legislation that limited trading operations beyond the borders of the colony and championed laws 
that encouraged blacks “to more industry, befitting them for Christian society and inducing them 
to become field labourers.”116  Also, Cole favored punitive action against the Xhosa who engaged 
in predatory border raids.  Indeed, an 1833 ordinance was passed that provided for military 
organization of the local burghers and settlers in case of danger.117  However, the Colonial Office 
vetoed the ordinance leaving the issue of border security to be resolved by the next governor 
Benjamin D’Urban and his subordinate Harry Smith. 
 It was during the latter part of Cole’s tenure in South Africa that Harry Smith arrived to 
take over the military position of deputy quartermaster general of British colonial forces.  Smith 
knew Cole well, as he had served as Smith’s divisional commander during the Peninsular War.  
Smith in his autobiography relates the story of their first meeting.  It was an inauspicious 
beginning to a long and friendly relationship.  Smith, as a young subaltern, was sent to act as a 
guide for Cole, the new division commander.  During the course of introductions Smith smugly 
informed the general he was well acquainted with the road and would guide him and the division 
to the proper rendezvous point.  Smith then promptly became lost and led the general officer and 
his regiments on a long circuitous night march until the correct road was found.  Smith notes that 
the “hot Irishman Cole” was suitably disturbed by his conduct, but that he later served to that 
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officer’s satisfaction as his assistant quartermaster general during the Occupation of France and 
Commandant of the Cape Castle in South Africa.118  Smith on arrival at the Cape Colony noted 
that Cole in a private conversation delegated him to be “ex officio, as second in command to me 
[Cole], the senior Member of Council, and, if any accident happened to me, the administration of 
the government would devolve on you.”119  Nevertheless, Smith was unable to exercise any 
influence or command as Benjamin D’Urban replaced Cole a few months after Smith’s arrival in 
South Africa.  
Benjamin D’Urban, another of Wellington’s Peninsular cadre and colonial proconsul, 
was born in 1777, the son of a surgeon.120  He entered the army in 1793 as a cornet in the 2
nd
 
Dragoon Guards.121  Joining a senior guard cavalry regiment indicates that his family was of 
substance.  During the French Revolutionary Wars, he served in Germany and the West Indies.  
In early 1798, he became aide de camp to Major General George Augustus Lord Pembroke.  
Nearly a year and a half later, D’Urban embarked for Jamaica serving as aide de camp to Major 
General Frederick St. John.  With the reduction of the army in 1800, D’Urban was placed on 
half-pay but received an appointment as a student at the Royal Military College, High 
Wycombe.122  While at High Wycombe, D’Urban trained under French émigré officer General 
François Jarry de Brigny de la Vallette, who with Marshal Louis Berthier, was the most 
significant and valued staff officer in the French Revolutionary armies.123 In 1801, D’Urban 
received a majority in the 25
th
 Light Dragoons.  However, he did not serve with the unit for upon 
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the conclusion of his studies he became Superintendent of Instruction for the junior department 
Royal Military College, Marlow.  As superintendent, he trained a small select group of officers 
in staff work that paid significant dividends for Wellinton’s Army in the Peninsula.124 D’Urban 
served in this position for four years, resigning his post to participate in foreign service.   
In 1807, General Charles the Earl of Harrington, Commander of British Forces in Ireland 
requested that D’Urban establish stations for a telegraph system to be set up between Dublin and 
the seaports in the South and Southwestern Districts of Ireland.  In November of that same year, 
D’Urban received an appointment as assistant quartermaster general for the Limerick District.  
By the time D’Urban left Ireland in 1808 for staff duty in Spain, he had accumulated 
considerable staff experience.  Wellington utilized this experience by placing D’Urban under the 
command of Major General William Beresford who was then rebuilding, reorganizing, and 
training the allied Portuguese Army.  Beresford, with the assistance of a few British staff 
officers, set about converting what was little more than a rabble into a capable and dependable 
fighting force.125 D’Urban remained in Portugal after the war continuing to upgrade the 
effectiveness of their army.  Oman quoting an unpublished D’Urban memorandum on the 
Portuguese Army:  
The Portuguese captains are piqued into activity and attention when they see their 
companies excelled in efficiency by those under English, and do from emulation what a 
sense of duty would never, perhaps bring them to.  There are a variety of oblique means 
and by-paths by which the parts of a Portuguese corps are constantly, and almost 
insensibly, tending to return to their old habits, to which they are so much attached.  To 
nip this tendency, from time to time, in the bud, it is necessary to be aware of it: without 
the constant surveillance of English subordinate officers (who ever mingling with the 
mass of the men cannot but be aware of what is going on) the commanding officer can 
rarely be warned in time.126 
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D’Urban returned to Britain in the winter of 1816 receiving an appointment as colonel of 
the Royal Staff Corps and deputy quartermaster general at the Horse Guards.
127
  He was 
promoted to major general in 1819 and one year later assumed the governorship of Antigua.  
Proving himself an able administrator, D’Urban was transferred in 1824 to the possessions of 
Demerara and Essequibo combined with Berbice to form the colony of British Guiana.  In 1831, 
he succeeded Galbraith Lowry Cole as governor and military commander of the Cape Colony.  
Upon his arrival in South Africa, the new governor brought with him instructions from the 
Colonial Office to prevent military ventures with the indigenous border tribes by promoting good 
relations with them.  Colonial officials in London suggested that he should station resident 
agents among them and offer small annual gifts to keep them satisfied and restrain their 
followers from stealing cattle from the European settlers.
128
  However, the proffered policy 
yielded disappointing results.  
In his memoirs, Smith notes that shortly after D’Urban’s arrival at the Cape Colony, he 
was dispatched to the frontier to deal with the cross border raids.  Smith wrote that the governor 
immediately dispatched him to the frontier with full civil and military powers and empowered 
him to take any measures necessary to ensure peace.129  However, this was not the case.  
Fortescue observes that the new governor found too much business at Capetown to concern 
himself with the situation at the frontier.  Furthermore, D’Urban intended to initiate friendly 
relations with the Xhosa and forbade his officers from using force against them.130  Smith was 
dispatched to the frontier, some months later, after the Xhosa crossed the frontier in force.  In a 
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whirlwind campaign that lasted a few months, Smith was chiefly responsible for devising a 
campaign that defeated the Xhosa and impelled D’Urban to move the eastern boundary of the 
Cape Colony to the Kei River.  This new land, known as the Province of Queen Adelaide, was to 
be administered by Smith.  A June 11, 1835 General Order issued by D’Urban read: 
It diminishes the regret of the Commander-in-Chief at quitting this 
personal command, that he leaves them in charge of Colonel Smith, an officer in 
whom they must all have the fullest confidence as well on account of those high 
military qualities which they have witnessed, and which have made him a main 
cause of the recent successes, as because they know from experience he is a 
soldier, and will always have a watchful care of all that can contribute to their 
health, comfort, and convenience. 
Colonel Smith, C. B. is appointed to the command of the District of the 
Province of Queen Adelaide and all the troops therein, until his Majesty pleasure 
be known.”131 
 
Smith immediately began a vigorous administrative policy.  His first tasks were of a 
military nature such as improving the road network, establishing fords, and compelling the 
Xhosa to withdraw beyond the Kei River.  Smith next inaugurated a census, established 
magistrates, instituted a monetary system, created a local police force, set in place a postal 
system, and encouraged the development of trade and agriculture.  Smith was also the first 
European administrator to attempt to codify African law.132 However, he was well aware that he 
must proceed cautiously in introducing new institutions on the locals.  In his autobiography he 
noted:  
I found I had upwards of 100,000 barbarians to reclaim who had no knowledge  
of right or wrong beyond arbitrary power, desire, and self will.  To attach the 
people to the new order of things was of vast importance; to lessen the power of the 
chiefs equally so; but this had to be gradual, for if I removed the hereditary restraint of 
the chiefs, I should open the gates to an anarchy which I might not be able to quell.133 
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  Smith also encouraged the return of missionaries who had left because of the war.  The 
new governor of Queen Adelaide Province believed, like many other proconsuls, that 
Christianity would reinforce Imperial authority and encourage social order.134  Smith was 
especially anxious to break the power of the witch doctors that he believed challenged his 
authority noting, “the witch-doctors and the rain-makers are in the confidence of their respective 
chiefs.”135   
Smith’s administration with its intended reforms, however, was short lived.  When news 
of D’Urban’s annexation reached London, the Colonial Office under the direction of Charles 
Grant Lord Glenelg ordered the province to be abandoned.  John S. Galbraith observed that for 
both humanitarian and financial reasons, Britain did not think very highly of ruling large 
numbers of Xhosa.136  Furthermore, Glenelg worried that significant military forces would be 
needed for many years to pacify the region.  Both Galbraith and Smith biographer, Joseph 
Lehmann believe that James Stephen, Permanent Under Secretary in the Colonial Office, also 
played a significant role in checking any further expansion in South Africa.137  D’Urban, already 
criticized by Dr. John Philip and the London Missionary Society for his policies in South Africa, 
acquiesced and ordered Smith to relinquish control over the recently annexed province.  Smith, 
disappointed, wrote that Lord Glenelg, a worthy and honorable man was “led by a vile party, 
under the cloak of sanctity and philanthropy, directed the Province of Queen Adelaide to be 
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restored to barbarism, the allegiance the Kafirs had sworn to be shaken off, and the full 
plentitude of their barbarity re-established.”138  Rebuffed by London and isolated by his patron 
D’Urban, Smith believed his career was at an end.  Indeed, the Queen Adelaide fiasco was 
instrumental in the Colonial Office’s decision to replace D’Urban with a new proconsul, Major 
General George Thomas Napier.  Smith was fortunate in that soon after Napier’s arrival in 
Capetown, he was ordered to India to become Adjutant General of British Forces with the local 
rank of major general. 
George Napier was just one of a clan of illustrious Army officers and proconsuls of the 
post-Waterloo period.  Galbraith observes that Napier was a member of a family that dominated 
the British military and naval establishment for more than four decades.139  George Napier, the 
second son of Colonel George Napier, was born at Whitehall, London, on June 30, 1784.  As a 
youth, he had little scholastic ability.140  Because of his inability or unwillingness to learn, his 
father sought for him a career in the army.  As a youth of fifteen, he entered the army as a cornet 
in the 24 Light Dragoons but his family quickly secured a transfer to a foot regiment as he all too 
quickly learned “habits of dissipation” in the cavalry.141  In June 1800, Napier received a 
commission as a lieutenant in the 6
th
 Regiment.  As a young officer, he served under Sir John 
Moore at Shorncliffe, Sicily, Sweden, and Portugal.  Moore liked the lad and Napier became his 
most reliable aide-de-camp during the 1808-09 campaigns in Spain.142  After Moore’s death at 
Corunna, Napier served for a short time in the West Indies before he returned to Spain and 
                                                 
138 Henry Wakelyn Smith, The Autobiography of Lt.-Gen. Sir Harry Smith Baronet of Aliwal on the Sutlej, 
Vol. II, 94-5. 
139 John S. Galbraith, Reluctant Empire: British Policy on the South African Frontier, 1834-1854, 144. 
140Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee, The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. XIV, 57 and United 
Kingdom, The Royal Military Calendar or Army Service and Commission Book, Vol. IV, 405. 
141 Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee, The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. XIV, 57. 
142 Roger William Day, The Life of Sir John Moore: Not A Drum Was Heard  (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: 
Leo Cooper, 2001), 182. 
 324
Wellington’s Peninsular Army.  In Spain, Napier performed as both a combat and staff officer.  
As an officer in the 52
nd
 Regiment, he participated in the Battle of Busaco and the assault of 
Ciudad Rodrigo, where he lost his right arm.  For a short period in 1814, Napier was placed on 
Wellington’s staff as assistant adjutant general.  Upon conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, he 
was appointed to the command of a variety of regiments. 
In 1837, Napier received an appointment as Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the 
Cape Colony.  Smith was well acquainted with Napier, having served with him in the same 
division during the Peninsular War.  Smith thought Napier a good soldier, but not a particularly 
bright individual.143  Galbraith, notes that George Napier was safe and sane, honest but never 
brilliant unlike his brother, Charles, the conqueror of Sind, who “would have been certified for a 
mental institution had he lived in the less tolerant twentieth century.”144  However, Napier as 
governor relied on able assistants such as John Bell, his colonial secretary, for advice and 
direction.  During his seven-year tenure, Napier abolished slavery in the colony, reformed the tax 
system enabling the territory to exist on revenues it generated, and kept the peace on the frontier 
with the Bantu tribes.  Napier was also responsible for the expansion of British rule in the Cape 
Colony by annexing the territory of Natal in 1843 thereby curtailing Boer influence and securing 
for Britain the strategic port of Durban on the Indian Ocean.145  Despite his successful and 
relatively uneventful governorship, Napier never held any other civil administration preferring 
instead to retire to Nice. 
Smith’s service in India was exclusively military in nature.  Appointed adjutant general 
of the Queen’s forces in India, Smith believed that his present posting was a mere stepping stone 
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to future command of British troops in the event of a Burmese invasion.146  Much to his disgust, 
but probably his good fortune, he remained in India during Major General William G. K. 
Elphinstone’s disastrous Afghan 1841-1842 campaign.147  However, Smith was summoned for 
combat duty during the Sikh War that followed just three years after the Afghan debacle.  Smith 
performed admirably as a subordinate to Major General Sir Hugh Gough at the Battle of 
Ferozeshah and later brilliantly commanded British and native troops at the Battle of Aliwal.  
Military historians have characterized the Battle of Aliwal as “the battle without a mistake” in 
that Smith utterly destroyed the Ranjur Singh’s army.148  Wellington admired Aliwal as an 
admirable utilization of all three [combat] arms to the greatest possible advantage of each.149  For 
the British forces in India, the battle was a decisive victory for what had been a lackluster 
campaign against the Sikhs.  For the British public, Aliwal was a reaffirmation of British arms 
after an earlier embarrassment in Afghanistan and a near stalemate with the Sikhs.  William 
Thackeray wrote of the battle in his essay, “On Military Snobs,” “a noble deed was never told in 
nobler language.”150  For Smith, Aliwal, brought the recognition he craved from his peers.  In his 
memoirs he wrote, “I steered the course invariably pursued by my great master the Duke 
[Wellington], never needlessly to risk your troops or fight a battle without an object.  Hence the 
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decisive victory of Aliwal…”151 For his victory he received the thanks of Parliament.  In the 
House of Lords, Wellington praised him:  
Then my Lords I will say with regard to the movements of Sir H. Smith, that I 
have read the accounts of many Battles, but I have never read of an affair in which more 
ability, energy, and discretion were manifested than in this case, or in which an officer 
has ever shewn himself more capable than this officer in of Commanding Troops in the 
field or in which every description of Troops has been brought to bear with its arm in 
position in which it was most capable of rendering Service; or in which every thing was 
[illegible] or more perfectly, the nicest maneuvers being performed under the enemy’s 
fire with the utmost precision: nor my Lords have I read of any Battle in any part of the 
World in which at the same time energy and gallantry on the part of the Troops were 
displayed to a degree that surpasses that in this engagement.  I must say of this Officer 
that I never saw any case of ablility manifested more clearly than in this case; it has been 
shewn that Sir H. Smith is an Officer capable of rendering the most important Services, 
and ultimately being an honor to his Country.152 
 
At the same session, both Frederick John Robinson Lord Ripon and the Prime Minister Robert 
Peel spoke in the most flattering terms.153 Peel said, “What a series of gallant Services—How 
rejoiced am I that there should be an opportunity through his signal successes of bring before the 
view of a grateful Country a long life of Military exertion and an unbroken series of Military 
honours.154  Queen Victoria requested that she meet the “Hero of Aliwal” writing in her journal 
after meeting Smith: 
Sir Harry, a fine old man, was presented to me.  He seemed so pleased at my 
praises, saying he would ever serve me in the same way, & hoped all my subjects would 
do so.  He was so glad to see Albert, who asked him to come in the morning.155 
 
 Smith, now a hero, began to make inquiries about an available governorship.  Among 
those whom he discreetly contacted were Lord Henry Grey, the Secretary of State for War and 
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the Colonies.  Grey believed that Smith would be an ideal administrator for the Cape Colonies.156  
By having prior experience in South Africa, Smith understood the indigenous tribes.  He was 
also a successful campaigner on the Indian frontier with a proven military record.  A seasoned 
soldier who understood the region would be valuable in controlling the restive African border 
regions.  Galbraith argues that both of these assumptions were false noting, “the qualifications 
that Grey considered impressive were in fact no qualifications at all.  Smith was the most 
dangerous of men; an expert on the last war, he had formed his opinions of the basis of 
observations that were now obsolete, if they had ever been correct.”157  Smith was, indeed, an 
anachronism as civilian diplomats were now replacing most of the military proconsuls 
throughout the empire.  The case of South Africa was unusual, as Smith replaced the short-lived 
regime of Sir Henry Pottinger, a civilian administrator of the East India Company who had made 
a name for himself in India and China.  After his tenure in South Africa, Pottinger served as 
Governor of Madras but his government there was not a success.158   
 Smith’s annexation of African territory put him in conflict with the Peel Ministry, and 
Lord Grey in particular, at a time when they were opposed to any further increase in the British 
Empire.  Peel recognized that fiscal responsibility was necessary in order to overcome successive 
Whig deficits and enlarging the empire further would only add to the state’s budgetary woes.159   
Despite the best intentions of the Whigs it was politically and financially impossible to secure 
enough money to garrison, administer, and provide for the inhabitants of the empire.  For 
example, just after the emancipation of the slaves in the West Indies, the British Parliament 
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granted aid for the building of schoolhouses that equaled the domestic education subsidy.160  In 
1841, Secretary of State Lord John Russell reduced the subsidy from a previous £30,000 to 
£6000 before eliminating it altogether.  Even colonial military men realized that there was a limit 
to the empire’s expansion.  Major General Sir Charles Napier, the conqueror of Sind, observed in 
1843 “he [Napier] was averse to any extension of territory.”161 
 Within weeks of becoming governor of the Cape Colonies, Smith annexed significant 
tracts of land including Kaffirland to the east, and the country between the Orange and Vaal 
Rivers in the north.162  Grey reluctantly approved the extension of territory deferring to Smith’s 
“man on the spot” reasoning.  Christopher Saunders and Iain B. Smith have argued that Smith 
received approval for his land acquisitions only after he had convinced London that the 
annexations would prevent future wars on the frontier and that the new territory would be 
financially self-supporting.163   At the same time he was acquiring land, Smith unwisely 
reduced the size of the colony’s military contingent of British regulars by two thirds.  Sir Henry 
Pottinger, Smith’s predecessor, had around 5,500 regular troops stationed in the colony under the 
command of Lieutenant General Sir George Berkley.  Of these, more than 3,000 troops were 
posted on the frontier.164  Smith proposed to defend the frontier with 2,000 troops that included 
colonial levies as well as an augmentation to the local constabulary.165 By 1850, two years after 
his appointment, Smith sent back to England a battalion of the Rifle Brigade.166  Moreover, in the 
                                                 
160 Donald Southgate, The Passing of the Whigs, 1832-1886 (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1962), 172. 
161William Napier Bruce, Life of General Sir Charles Napier (London: John Murray, 1885), 324.  
162 Smith’s annexations added approximately 50,000 square miles of new territory to the colony was added 
to the already vast South African colony.  See John H. Galbraith, Reluctant Empire, 226. 
163 Christopher Saunders and Iain R. Smith, “Southern Africa, 1795-1910,” in The Oxford History of the 
British Empire: the Nineteenth Century, 602 and Leonard Thompson, A History of South Africa  (New Haven, 
Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1990), 95. 
164 George E. Cory, The Rise of South Africa, Vol. V (London: Longmans, Green, 1921-1930), 33. 
165 John S. Galbraith, Reluctant Empire: British Policy on the South African Frontier, 1834-1854, 220. 
166 J. W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army, Vol. XII, 1839-1852, 520. 
 329
place of the departing regular troops, Smith established a four hundred strong native police force 
and a small cadre of magistrates to enforce European laws.  In addition to these steps, the new 
governor established in “Kaffraria”* a series of military settlements populated by old soldiers 
that were willing to settle in the colony in exchange for grants of land.167  Lastly, Smith installed 
a loyal chief by the name of Hermanus in a buffer zone with the frontier.  
 Smith was frequently preoccupied with problems on the eastern frontier.  However, 
Dutch speaking Boer settlers in the interior also caused the new governor frequent difficulties.  
Smith’s acquisition of the highveldt between the Orange and Vaal Rivers offended Boers who 
had settled the region.  By taking control of this territory, Smith sought to stabilize his northern 
frontier by establishing order between the feuding Boers and the native Griquas and Basuto 
populations.  From lessons he had learned in India, Smith was convinced that British 
administration in the form of a resident, civil commissioners, and magistrates would establish 
stability while also bringing peace to his northern border.168  Unfortunately, South Africa was not 
India and the few officials were unable to pacify a restive population who neither wanted nor 
cared for British occupation.  Ultimately, Smith’s only option for imposing order was to send in 
British regular troops tasked with the dual role of protecting its officials while imposing peace 
among the warring factions.  In the end, Smith’s northern experiment failed miserably in that he 
was faced with a Boer insurrection that required a considerable amount of military force to 
quell.169  Furthermore, his arbitrary annexation alienated both the Griquas and the Boers, two 
groups that were to cause him future troubles. 
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 Smith’s final failing in administering South Africa was his vacillating policy concerning 
the transportation and settlement of Irish insurrectionists.  In 1849, Lord Grey informed Smith 
that the H.M.S.  Neptune was to sail from Bermuda to South Africa carrying a cargo of Irish 
peasants who had rebelled during the time of famine.170  When news of the ship and its cargo 
reached Capetown a panic ensued among the inhabitants.  Locals widely believed that this ship 
was only the first of many that the colony would receive and soon flood the territory with 
criminals.  Residents petitioned Smith to refuse to allow the ship to land as he shared the 
colonists’ objections.  In the late spring 1849, Smith wrote Grey begging the Colonial Secretary 
to revoke his decision while forwarding to him the petitions he received.171  To strengthen their 
hand, opponents of the Neptune venture formed an Anti-convict Association, an organization to 
prevent the colonial administration from allowing the convicts to land even threatening to stop 
all supplies to the government.  The Anti-convict Association backed up their threats by 
employing intimidation and violence against those who disagreed.  Within weeks, Smith reported 
to Grey that all but one member of his unofficial Legislative Council had resigned.  Despite his 
private sentiments, Smith was required to follow colonial office directives, as he had no legal 
power to send them elsewhere.172  Furthermore, his sense of duty to his sovereign proven by his 
long years of service would not allow him to do otherwise.  On June 18, 1849, Smith informed 
the Anti-convict Association:  
 This is the anniversary of the Battle of Waterloo—for four and forty years I 
served my sovereign—I say it with pride, —and I would rather that God 
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Almighty strike me dead, than disobey the orders of Her Majesty’s Government; 
and thereby commit an act of open rebellion.173 
 
  His only option was to deny permission for the convicts to land.  By upholding the dictates of 
the Colonial Office, Smith lost the support of the majority of colonists.  Within three years, 
Smith had alienated the colony’s three major groups, the colonists, the Boers, and the indigenous 
population.174  In London, the governor’s handling of the affair caused some consternation.  With 
the colony in near rebellion, Grey began to question Smith’s abilities.  Galbraith notes that as the 
convict crisis developed the Colonial Secretary began to have serious doubts about Smith’s 
physical and mental well-being.175  
 The convict controversy brought to the forefront the long simmering issue of South 
African representative government.  As early as 1841, the inhabitants of Capetown had 
petitioned Her Majesty’s government to entertain the notion of establishing a constitution 
modeled on that of the mother country.  The proposed plan of administration would consist of a 
Governor and executive council both appointed by the Crown, and a popularly elected 
Legislature.176  Smith’s predecessor, Sir Henry Pottinger received permission from Lord Grey to 
explore the possibility of implementing the proposed plan.  Little was done during Pottinger’s 
short tenure.  Smith was sympathetic to the colonists’ desire for limited self-government and 
actively worked toward this end.  However, the agitation caused by the convict crisis encouraged 
the more radical members of the colony to demand even greater autonomy with Great Britain.  
                                                 
173 Harry Smith as quoted in Joseph H. Lehman, Remember You Are An Englishman: A Biography of Sir 
Harry Smith 1787-1860, 311. 
174 To add insult to injury, the subscription raised for the erection of Smith’s statue in Capetown was 
diverted into the Anti-convicts Association’s coffers.  See Joseph H. Lehmann, Remember You Are An Englishman: 
A Biography of Sir Harry Smith 1787-1860, 312. 
175 Galbraith comments that in April and May 1849, Smith was confined to bed seriously ill with a serious 
inflammation at the back of his head. See John S. Galbraith, Reluctant Empire: British Policy on the South African 
Frontier, 1834-1854, 236. 
176 Henry Wakelyn Smith, The Autobiography of Lt.-Gen. Sir Harry Smith Baronet of Aliwal on the Sutlej, 
Vol. II, (Supplementary), 251-2. 
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Smith diffused the crisis by adroitly working a fine balance between the extremists and the 
moderates and appointed members of both groups to the newly formed Legislative Council.   
 Even though Smith overcame a series of serious threats to his administration, Grey had 
lost confidence in his governor.  Furthermore, the Colonial Secretary believed that Smith’s 
adventurous policies were becoming too expensive for the British taxpayer.177  Grey in a dispatch 
of February 14, 1851 strongly criticized Smith’s performance noting:  
It is very natural that having spent so large a part of your life in the Field…you 
should not have accurate knowledge of matters of this kind which is necessary for your 
guidance in critical times, but I cannot but think that if you had consulted Mr. Porter 
[Attorney General of South Africa] and Mr. Montague [his civil secretary] they would 
have prevented you from falling into some of the mistakes which I have been 
compelled very unwillingly to animadvert on.178 
 
Smith, deeply offended by the reprimand, fired off an impassioned defense of his administration 
commenting, “I will be censured by no man, but I will endeavor to obey when I can.  Within 
months of receiving Grey’s censure, Sir George Cathcart replaced Harry Smith as governor of 
South Africa.  For the rest of his life, Smith’s declining health prevented him from accepting any 
further senior military or administrative appointments
179
 
 Smith returned to Britain in the late spring of 185.  For the rest of his life, he held no 
significant field command, although, he was considered for the command of British forces in the 
Crimea succeeding Fitzroy Somerset Lord Raglan who had died while on campaign.  Lord 
Panmure noted that Smith was passed over for command because of “the circumstances of 
                                                 
177 T. O. Lloyd, The British Empire, 1558-1983 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 168. 
178 Correspondence of Lord Grey to Harry Smith, February 14, 1851 as quoted in Joseph H. Lehmann, 
Remember You Are An Englishman: A Biography of Sir Harry Smith 1787-1860, 318. 
179 For the rest of his life Smith remained in Great Britain.  In 1852, Smith was offered command of the 
army at Madras but declined it because of poor health.  When the Crimean War began in March 1854, Smith was 
considered for command but was passed over because of age and health.  Smith retired from the army in September 
1859.  His letters from this period reflect that of an aged man re-fighting the battles of his prime. See PRO, W. O. 
135/2 Correspondence, miscellaneous and private (marked Field Letter Book, No. 3). Sir Harry Smith. 
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impaired health and liability to excitement.”180  In his remaining years Smith relived old 
campaigns with a steadily dwindling number of wartime companions.  On October 12, 1860 
Harry Smith died at his home, 1 Eaton Place, West, London.  
 In light of the numerous difficulties he faced, it is not easy to characterize Smith’s 
administration as an abject failure.  Much was accomplished during his tenure and until the anti-
convict crisis he was extremely popular with the colonists.  Even the formidable Xhosa Chief 
Macomo and the great Basuto leader Moshesh respected Smith’s abilities.  During his tenure as 
governor, Smith successfully fought two difficult frontier wars.  Moreover, Smith, with the 
assistance of his colonial secretary John Montagu, increased revenue that they pumped back into 
the province improving roads, harbors, and public works.  However, Smith did have his flaws.  
He was impulsive, rarely having the patience to reflect and let situations develop.  Smith 
believed that the force of his personality could overcome even the most insurmountable of 
obstacles.  His military successes during the Sixth Frontier War, at Ferozeshah and Aliwal, 
reinforced his belief that he could accomplish the near impossible.  To many of his critics, his 
excessive confidence bordered on arrogance and his dramatic conduct in dealing with the 
indigenous people revealed traces of madness.  Mark Francis defends Smith’s apparent 
predilection for the dramatic as necessary components of effective governance as it 
accomplished its desired effect of imposing fear and awe on subject peoples.181  To his superiors 
in London, he was consistently over optimistic offering them reports that frequently did not 
reflect the true situation.   
                                                 
180 Lord Panmure to Queen Victoria, July 11, 1855 as quoted in Joseph H. Lehmann, Remember You Are 
An Englishman: A Biography of Sir Harry Smith 1787-1860, 359. 
181  Smith and his staff would often appear before native populations carrying a halberd and a staff 
surmounted by a brass bed knob.  Smith would then force the gathered chiefs to swear allegiance to either the “staff 
of war” or the “staff of peace.” See Mark Francis, Governors and Settlers: Images of Authority in the British 
Colonies, 1820-60 (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd., 1992), 68. 
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   Imperial scholars such as John Galbraith, Ronald Hyam, and Mark Francis along with 
biographer Joseph Lehmann argue that Smith, like many of his fellow proconsuls, subscribed to 
a number of early nineteenth century attitudes regarding the governance of overseas non-white 
colonies.  Smith was a product of an officer corps that participated in defeating Napoleon and as 
such exuded an apparent self-confidence that their beliefs and methods of governance would 
benefit all whom they ruled.  David Cannadine notes that British administrators desired to 
replicate British exceptionalism to all that they governed.  Smith was a creature of this 
environment thoroughly subscribing to the notion that God ordained Britain’s preeminent 
position in the world.  Smith supported fully the notion echoed by clergyman John. H. Newman, 
who in mid-century said of western civilization, “has a claim to be considered as the perfect 
representative society and civilization of the human race, as its perfect result and limit.”182   
Conclusion 
  Throughout his military career, Harry Smith utilized network connections to his 
advantage in securing military and colonial employment.  He accomplished this on many levels 
employing the ties he had established through patron-client associations, regimental ties, and 
wartime relationships.  Furthermore, the organizational and administrative experience Smith 
received during his service in the Napoleonic Wars made him a valuable commodity at a time 
when military colonial governments were in need of capable subordinate administrators.  His 
apprenticeship in Jamaica and later work as D’Urban’s assistant in the Cape Colony established 
his reputation as a capable manager.  Smith was also an accomplished military commander who 
had demonstrated his ability in the Cape Colony and in India.  In theory, this was an ideal 
combination and paved the way for his appointment as governor of the Cape Colony in 1848.   
                                                 
182 Ibid. , 50.  
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 Smith’s tenure as governor of the Cape Colony was not entirely successful.  Many of the 
characteristics that had made proconsular rule appealing to the Colonial Officer in the immediate 
period following Waterloo were, by the late 1840s, obsolete.  Smith’s greatest failing was that he 
was unable to adjust to the changing nature of British colonial policy.  By the 1840s, the 
Colonial Office had become more proactive in directing the actions of its governors.  
Increasingly, Parliament and the Colonial Office were subjected to domestic political 
pressures.183  Most importantly, the Colonial Office objected to unbridled annexations that 
required the garrison of more British troops and increased expenses for the treasury.  The trend 
toward responsible government for territories within the empire was driven by the Crown’s 
desire to extricate itself from divisive local politics and to rationalize reductions in Imperial 
expenditures while still exerting indirect control of its strategic interests.184  Smith while 
seemingly agreeing in principle with the mechanics of responsible government was still very 
much the autocrat as evidenced by his handling of the Boer and Anti-convict crisis.  In short, 
Smith the proconsul of an earlier period was either unable or unwilling to adjust to the evolving 
British Empire.  
  
 
                                                 
183 Peter Burroughs, “The Institutions of Empire,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire: The 
Nineteenth Century, 178. 
184 Philip A. Buckner, The Transition to Responsible Government: British Policy in British North America, 
1815-1850 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1985), 323. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 It had rained all evening and into the early morning hours but the dawn of November 18, 
1852 revealed a bright fall day.  The Duke of Wellington’s funeral was to be a glorious affair as 
befitting his stature in the kingdom and the empire.  Although he had died some two months 
before, on September 14, his state funeral required the meticulous planning that would be 
suitable for a military campaign.  Nearly £30,000 was spent on the arrangements that included 
four coffins, one of mahogany and the others of pine, oak, and lead.1  The funeral car that snaked 
its way past the estimated half a million mourners who lined the streets of London was pulled by 
twelve draft horses appropriately caparisoned in black.  The car itself was 21 feet long by 12 feet 
wide, and weighed 18 tons.2  Wellington’s final entourage comprised all the kingdom’s 
dignitaries from both the Anglican Church and the state.  Escorting the coffin were 3,000 
infantry, eight squadrons of cavalry, three batteries of artillery, the Chelsea pensioners, and a 
representative private from each regiment in the British Army.3  The eight pallbearers were 
carefully chosen from the Duke’s military acquaintances.  Of the seven who can be identified 
were Sir John Colborne Baron Seaton, General Sir Peregrine Maitland, and Sir Alexander 
Woodford had served with Wellington at Waterloo; Sir Henry Hardinge at Quatre Bras; General 
Charles Napier, General Hugh Gough, and General Sir Stapleton Cotton Lord Combermere who 
were with him in the Peninsula.   
 Seaton, Maitland, Woodford, Hardinge, Napier, Gough and Combermere had served in 
the colonies as military administrators.  Seaton served as lieutenant governor of Upper Canada 
                                                 
1 Christopher Hibbert, Wellington: A Personal History (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1997), 
400. 
2 Elizabeth Longford, Wellington: Pillar of State (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972), 403. 
3 Christopher Hibbert, Wellington: A Personal History, 401-02. 
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and as High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands.  Maitland was also lieutenant governor of 
Upper Canada, lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia, commander in chief of the Madras army, and 
governor and commander in chief of the Cape Colony.  Woodford commanded British forces in 
Gibraltar and the Ionian Islands, and for a time served as high commissioner for the islands.  
Hardinge, considered a competent staff officer and well respected by Wellington, served as 
governor general of India.4  Napier, one of a quartet of noteworthy brothers in the British Army, 
acted as an Inspector General of Militia in the Ionian Islands and as the military commander of 
the Bombay Presidency, acquiring the Indian territory of Sind during his tenure.  Gough served 
as commander in chief of the army of the Madras Presidency and later as commander of all 
British and Company forces in India.  Cotton occupied a variety of colonial posts that included 
the governorship of Barbados, commander-in-chief of the Leeward Islands, commander-in-chief 
in Ireland, and the commander-in-chief in India.   
 Proconsular despotism—the political practice of governing and administering colonies 
and provinces by selected elites, frequently military men, who were sensitive to the strategic 
aims of the state was a long accepted method of colonial governance.  Indeed, the custom is as 
old as recorded history.  The New Kingdom Egyptians, the Romans, the Ghaznavids, the 
Mughals, and the Spanish all employed this system long before British dominance of the globe.  
Britain saw its colonial empire grow substantially in the first decades of the nineteenth century, 
largely because of conquests and acquisitions it made during the Napoleonic wars.  In addition to 
its prewar overseas possessions in North America, the West Indies, South America and portions 
of the Indian Subcontinent, Britain added large swaths of territory in Asia and Africa that 
included the economically significant colonies of Ceylon, Mauritius, and the Cape of Good 
                                                 
4 Hardinge’s appointment as governor general of India was made at the suggestion of Wellington.  See 
“Henry Hardinge,” in Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee, The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. VIII (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1921-22), 1228. 
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Hope.  In total, the British governed some 200 million souls, comprising more than one quarter 
of the earth’s total population.  
 In order to govern and manage this immense territory, the British state required the 
services of capable senior bureaucrats who were experienced in running large administrative 
institutions.  At the close of the Napoleonic Wars the most readily apparent way was to fill these 
roles was to tap into the significant cadre of military officers who had command and staff 
experience.  The Colonial Office, acting in concert with the Horse Guards and Parliament 
devised a system of offering high-level colonial administrative positions to general officers with 
distinguished wartime careers.  The rapid postwar demobilizations that took place in the army 
had caused financial hardships for many of these officers.  Their employment as administrators 
helped them alleviate their economic distress and gave the Colonial Office experienced 
technocrats who capably staffed the British global empire.  Furthermore, the Colonial Office 
selected senior officers who came from or identified closely with the social status quo, thereby 
assuring that those chosen were sympathetic to the strategic aims of the mother country making 
them politically reliable.  Military officers chosen for administrative posts had experience in 
exercising independent military commands and were comfortable interpreting their government’s 
strategic aims.  Administrators were given wide latitude to govern with the home government 
allowing them to make “on the spot” decisions that fit each of their colony’s particular 
circumstances. 
 The Colonial Office welcomed this arrangement of employing serving military officers as 
colonial administrators.  During the post-Napoleonic era, the Colonial Office was much too 
small and provided only sporadic assistance to on-site colonial officials.  The office’s miniscule 
staff of never more than a few dozen bureaucrats, as mandated by Parliament’s fiscal austerity, 
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was often overwhelmed by the administrative duties requisite for an empire the size of Britain’s.  
Furthermore, the Colonial Office’s leading bureaucrat, James Stephen, spent most of his almost 
three decades in the office concentrating on the eradication of slavery in the West Indies, often 
ignoring other areas of the empire.  Stephen, an evangelical and a member of the Clapham Sect, 
worked tirelessly to “rid the British Empire of the blot of slavery and sought to bring the 
Christian evangel of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man to the farthest corners of 
the earth.”5  As such, the Colonial Office relied on the military to govern and protect the rest of 
the empire. 
 The British military embraced the opportunity to govern large areas of the empire.  The 
situation provided the British military with a definite mission in a postwar world that enabled the 
army to employ a significant number of officers that it would have otherwise furloughed.  
Furthermore, the practice of using military men satisfied the practical necessity of ensuring 
colonial security both internally and externally, as many of the colonies had restive populations 
or were located near hostile neighbors.  Senior military officers with command and staff 
experience were invaluable as they combined combat leadership with administrative ability.   
 Parliament and the Crown also benefited from the employment of military officers in the 
colonies.  Parliament viewed the appointment of officers to colonial administrative positions as a 
reward for long and distinguished service during the Napoleonic Wars.  During testimony to 
Parliament, Lord FitzRoy Somerset noted that the appointment of high-ranking officers not only 
honored the chosen individual but bestowed credit and honor on the king himself.6  As a means 
of recompense, Parliament, along with the Colonial Office, the Horse Guards, and the Crown, 
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continued the practice of selecting senior officers for administrative positions throughout the 
empire for nearly three decades after Waterloo.  It was not until mid-nineteenth century, during 
the tenure of Lord Glenelg that colonial posts began to go to professionally trained and educated 
civilian administrators.  
 Officers chosen in the immediate post-Waterloo era of proconsular administration came 
initially from the ranks of the social elite.  Of these first generation proconsuls, more than half 
came from the ranks of the aristocrats.  Besides the importance of birth, political connections 
played a vitally important role in securing coveted senior colonial positions.  A substantial 
number of those senior colonial officials had strong Tory sympathies that put them in good stead 
with the Liverpool ministry during its heyday of conservatism from 1812 to 1822.7  Personal 
acquaintance with the Duke of Wellington also significantly enhanced an officer’s probability of 
receiving a position.  Moreover, all of these officers held divisional or brigade commands during 
the Peninsular War and had significant experience in combat field commands.  Nearly 83 percent 
of all of these proconsular officers who held colonial administrative or military commands had 
some familiarity with staff duties having served as aide de camps, brigade majors, adjutants, and 
quarter master officers.   
 The second generation of colonial officials were men who succeeded those officers who 
began their colonial careers in the immediate aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars.  This group 
exhibited a number of similar characteristics as their predecessors, but they also displayed some 
striking differences.  Officers who inherited the senior offices of colonial administration in the 
1830s and 40s were the product of a substantially enlarged British Army.  Many officers who 
first entered the army in the last years of the eighteenth century or in the first decade of the 
                                                 
7 William B. Willcox and Walter L. Arnstein, The Age of Aristocracy: 1688 to 1830 (Lexington, 
Massachusetts, D.C. Heath and Company, 1996), 301. 
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nineteenth century often did so without having to purchase their commissions.  Britain’s critical 
wartime need for wartime officers enabled thousands of  “middling sort” men to enter the army 
as junior officers.  In 1814, near the end of the Napoleonic Wars the British Army was 
comprised of more than a quarter of a million men, of which 10,590 were officers on full pay.  
Existent records reveal that 76 percent of these officers came from middling sort families.  As 
the first generation of colonial administrators aged, retired, and died, officers with middling sort 
social backgrounds replaced their aristocratic seniors.  Moreover, more than 60 percent of the 
second generation of colonial officials had previous military staff experience.  As local colonial 
bureaucracies increased in size and sophistication, men with administrative and organizational 
staff experience were ideally suited for these situations.  As Peter Burroughs noted, by the 1830s 
the implementation of good government in the colonies necessitated that administrators 
recognize the need for the many obligations and responsibilities they owed to their subjects.  
Local issues included control of tariffs and currency, fiscal and monetary policies, intervention in 
creating infrastructure, creation of lines of communication, management of land and labor, and  
management of internal and external security. 
 Bonds between the first-generation aristocrats and the second-generation middling sort 
were, however, strong.  A man became an officer and a gentleman once he received a 
commission in the British Army, and that effectively erased the boundaries between the two 
societal groups.  Officers who had experienced the rigors, hardships, and dangers of combat 
developed a fraternal relationship.  J. G. Fuller observed that humans who share the dangers and 
hardships of combat with their fellow soldiers become “fiercely loyal to their mates developing 
an almost religious sense of comradeship.”8  This friendship and loyalty to one another remained 
                                                 
8 J. G. Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture in British and Dominion Armies, 1914-1918, 22. 
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firm throughout their lives.  However, combat was not the only tie that linked officers together.  
Pride in one’s regiment ran high among officers.  For many, the regiment became the soldier’s 
surrogate home in that it provided a sense of belonging.  Frequently, regimental bonds became so 
strong that it often transcended other human relationships such as marriage, family, and social 
station.   
 It was within this environment of shared bonds that officers engaged in a complex matrix 
of networking.  Through personal relationships and acquaintances, officers were able to solicit 
employment.  This intricate dance between powerful and influential patrons and their clients 
became vitally important in the immediate aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars when the rapid 
demobilization caused significant numbers of officers to go on half-pay.  Employment in the 
colonies as administrative officials was the preferred method of alleviating their financial 
hardships.  Competition was intense for the jobs available as each officer worked his own 
particular network.  Lieutenant Colonel Harry Smith’s example of securing employment was just 
one example of the many similar situations that occurred during the 1820s and 1830s.   
 In the decades following Waterloo, the decision to employ military officers as colonial 
officials was the best option available to a miniscule Colonial Office and a parsimonious 
Parliament.  Senior military officers, who had exercised independent command during 
Napoleonic Wars, were the obvious choice because these men could interpret and act upon the 
perceived strategic interests of the home country.  The men chosen for colonial proconsul duties 
were politically reliable and sympathetic to the home country’s status quo.  Moreover, a 
substantial number of these men had previous staff training that enabled them, for the most part, 
to capably run large administrative organizations.  No doubt, many were eccentrics who believed 
they were bestowed with a divine mission of improving humankind by perpetuating English 
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values and civilization around the globe.  However, senior officials such as James Kempt were 
successful in establishing the framework of good government in Nova Scotia and Canada.  
Kempt’s quiet diplomacy and unassuming manners won him respect from even his staunchest 
critics helping him to set the stage for responsible representative government.  Others, like Harry 
Smith, a fine military leader, were unable to adjust to the changing nature of colonial policy.  As 
the Colonial Office became more proactive in directing the actions of the governors, men who 
enjoyed independent command chafed at following directives issued by civilian bureaucrats. 
 The practice served the empire well, even through the record of its administrators was 
uneven.  However, proconsular despotism bought the British state some respite until a permanent 
corps of well-trained civilian bureaucrats could be emplaced.  The first half of the nineteenth 
century was the heyday of the empire’s proconsular colonial governance.  The Colonial Office 
employed the system well into the twentieth century.  Capable and competent military/colonial 
administrators continued to be employed especially in strategically valuable territories that had 
not adopted self-government.  Territories such as the Cape Colony, India, West and East Africa, 
and the Fiji Islands continued to make use of proconsular governance.  Frederick Dealty Lugard, 
governor of Nigeria during the early twentieth century, followed a career path identical to his 
fellow proconsuls who had governed the empire fifty years earlier.  Similarly, the last two 
viceroys of India, Field Marshal Archibald Percival Wavell and Lord Louis Mountbatten, were 
military administrators who governed India at a time when the British Raj was ending.  
 The proconsular system ceased to exist shortly after the end of the Second World War 
with the decolonization of the globe.  Britain’s retreat from the world stage as a preeminent 
colonial power and the recent collapse of the Soviet Union has dictated massive reductions in the 
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British Army that was once the model for the world.9  The British Army of the Napoleonic era 
was the largest ever fielded and it size was not eclipsed until the First World War.  It was this 
instrument that defeated Napoleon, one of the world’s greatest captains.  This same army also 
contributed a significant number of talented professional military officers who assisted Britain in 
establishing and governing a massive global empire in the decades that followed the Battle of 
Waterloo.  The proconsular system was a significant institutional dynamic utilized by Parliament 
and the Colonial Office in those critical early years following the Napoleonic Wars.  Proconsular 
rule permitted the world’s greatest empire to not only survive but to expand and thrive.  Perhaps 
the best indication of the importance of proconsular rule to the British state was that the practice 
existed as long as the empire.  
                                                 
9 In 1996, the British Army numbered 112,000 serving men and women.  See Michael Yardley, “Toward 
the Future,” in The Oxford History of the British Army (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 431. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table A.1  
Distribution and Location of British Troops 1792-1817 
Source:  Data supplied by Castlereagh to Parliament during the 1817 debates on Army estimates as reported in the 
Times (London), March 7, 1817. 
 
 Location of troops “rank and file” 1792 1817 
Great Britain, Jersey, and Guernsey (not including Ireland)  13, 092 26, 076 
Garrisons and Colonies including Gibraltar, Canada, 
Jamaica, &c. but not including India  
 
13,618 32, 594 
Total 26,710 58, 670 
 
Location of “Establishment” numbers that include 
officers and non-commissioned officers. 
 
  
Great Britain, Jersey, and Guernsey (not including Ireland). 15,919 30, 059 
Stations abroad, excepting India. 16,848 37,163 
Total 32, 767 67, 222 
Irish establishment 15,000 25,060 
India establishment 10,475 19,649 
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Table A.2 
Great Britain’s Total Gross Income and Expenditure on the Army and Ordnance, 1815-1831 
Source: Mitchell, B. R. and Phyllis Deane. Abstract of British Historical Statistics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1962. 
Year Great Britain Total Gross Income 
(in £ millions) 
Army and Ordinance Expenditure 
(in £ millions) 
1815 77.9 49.6 
1816 79.1 39.6 
1817 69.2 18.0 
1818 57.6 11.1 
1819 59.5   9.1 
1820 58.1 10.3 
1821 59.9  10.1 
1822 61.6  10.4 
1823 59.9    8.7 
1824 58.5    8.7 
1825 59.7    9.0 
1826 57.7    9.2 
1827 55.2  10.2 
1828 54.7    9.8 
1829 56.5     9.5 
1830 55.3     9.3 
1831 54.5     8.6 
 
Table A.3  
Regimental Strength of the 91
st
 Regiment of Foot. 
Source: R. P. Dunn-Pattison, The History of the 91st Argyllshire Highlanders (London: William Blackwood and 
Sons, 1910) 
Year  Sergeants Drummers Rank and 
File 
Year Sergeants Drummers Rank and 
File 
1815 51 21 766 1823 23 11 449 
1816 53 21 838 1824 24 10 404 
1817 52 15 908 1825 23 10 403 
1818 42 13 759 1826 25 3 333 
1819 45 21 654 1827 20 7 309 
1820 35 17 602 1828 28 8 409 
1821 35 21 626 1829 24 9 381 
1822 29 10 583 1830 27 9 454 
 
Note: While on occupation duty in France the battalion’s numbers remained close to its wartime strength.  When the 
Allied occupation of France ended in late 1818, the War Office ordered the regiment to Ireland where it remained in 
garrison for nearly two years.  In 1822, the Ninety-first garrisoned Jamaica and remained at this posting until 1831 
when it then returned to England.  Although tropical disease was responsible for some of the unit’s attrition while 
stationed in the West Indies the number of deaths because of disease, for the most part, were within acceptable 
attrition limits.  As the 91st’s official history attests, “Yellow fever played havoc with the young soldiers, and no less 
152 deaths were recorded in the first year…. In the following two years the losses of the 91st were respectively forty-
nine and sixty-nine; but in 1825 the casualties reached 150—after that the only severe year was 1829, when the 
deaths numbered seventy-seven…During its nine years’ of service on the island, the regiment lost twenty officers, 
thirty sergeants, ten drummers, and 576 rank and file.”  The history of the unit notes that the regimental strength 
varied significantly as drafts to fill the ranks varied greatly and intermittingly with only 299 men reaching the unit in 
February 1827. 
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Table A. 4 
Annual Colonial Salaries for chief administrators, 1828-1831. 
Source: PRO, C.O. 325/20 
 
Colony Position 1828-1829 1830-1831 
Antigua Governor £4600 £3000 
Barbados Governor £3866 £4000 
Dominica Lieutenant Governor £2400  
St. Christopher Governor £3490  
St. Vincent Governor £3522 £1300 
Trinidad Governor £4000  
Demarara Lieutenant Governor £5000  
Grenada Governor £3502 £950 plus staff pay 
Malta Lieutenant Governor £4000 £5000 
Gibraltar Governor £2800 £5000 
Sierra Leone Lieutenant Governor £2000 £2000 
The Cape of Good Hope Governor £7000 £5000 
Upper Canada Lieutenant Governor £3000 £3000 
Lower Canada Governor in Chief £4500 £5000 
Lower Canada Lieutenant Governor £1500  
Nova Scotia Lieutenant Governor £3700 £4100 
New Brunswick Lieutenant Governor £1500 £1500 
Prince Edward’s Island Lieutenant Governor £1000 £1400 
Newfoundland Governor £3000 £3000 
Bermuda Governor £3035 £2835 
Jamaica Governor  £8000 to £10000 
Honduras Superintendent £1200 £1000 
Bahamas Lieutenant Governor  £1500 
New South Wales Governor in Chief £4200 £5000 
Van Diemen’s Land Lieutenant Governor £2500 £2500 
Ceylon Governor £10000 £8000 
Mauritius Governor £8000 £7000 
Tobago Lieutenant Governor  £1300 
Montserrat President  £100 
St. Lucia Lieutenant Governor  £1500 
The Ionian Islands Lord High 
Commissioner 
 £5000 
Seychelles Civil Commissioner  £800 
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Table A. 5 
World Wide Royal Navy Fleet Distribution  (number of ships) 
Source: J.R. Hill, ed., The Oxford Illustrated History of the Royal Navy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); 
and William Laird Clowes, The Royal Navy: A History from the Earliest Times to the Present , Vol. 7 (London: 
Sampson Low, Marston and Company, 1901) 
 
 
Location 1795 1808 1848 
Home Islands 137 ships ---- 35 ships 
Mediterranean 31 ships 84 ships 31 ships 
West Indies  
(Jamaica and 
Leeward Islands) 
 
 
46 ships 
 
 
106 ships 
 
 
10 ships 
North American 
(Nova Scotia and 
Newfoundland) 
 
 
14 ships 
 
 
41 ships 
 
 
 
West African  ---- 14 ships 27 ships 
Cape of Good 
Hope 
 
---- 
 
14 ships 
 
10 ships 
East Indies and 
China 
 
12 ships 
 
32 ships 
 
25 ships 
South America ---- 13 ships 14 ships 
Pacific ---- ---- 12 ships 
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Table A. 6 
Number of British troops stationed in the colonies and foreign stations, exclusive of India, 1827. 
Source:  Data from Wellington Papers, WP1/895/4, “Letter from Sir Herbert Taylor to Arthur Wellesley,” 4 August 
1827. 
 
Colony or Foreign Station Battalions Total Number of Troops 
Gibraltar 5 battalions at 516 each 2,580 
Leeward Islands  8 battalions at 516 each* 
(one battalion proposed to be 
withdrawn) 
West India Regiment 647 men 4776 
Jamaica 5 battalions at 516 each 
(one battalion proposed to be 
withdrawn) 2,580 
Bahamas and Honduras 2nd west India Regiment 1000 
Canada 5 battalions at 516 each 2,580 
Nova Scotia 4 battalions at 516 each 2,064 
Newfoundland 3 veteran companies 300 
Bermuda 1battalion at 516 516 
New South Wales 2 battalions at 516 
3 veteran companies 1192 
Ionian Islands 6 battalions at 516 3096 
Malta 3 battalions at 516 
Maltese Fencibles 2010 
Sierra Leone, Cape of Good 
Hope, and dependencies 
3 battalions at 516 
3 companies of the Cape Corps  1782 
Mauritius  3 battalions at 516 
(one battalion proposed to be 
withdrawn) 1548 
Ceylon 4 battalions at 516 
Ceylon Corps 
(one battalion proposed to be 
withdrawn) 3334 
Total Number of troops on station  30,687 
 
 “The force in New South Wales had generally consisted of 2 ! battalions, 1 battalion being on passage as escorts to 
convicts and it being understood that no relief shall go from New South Wales to India until half of that battalion 
should have arrived, but the battalion which had been ordered to New South Wales was directed to Portugal and 
General Darling has detained half of the Buffs which ought to have gone to India. In fact there ought to be 
constantly 3 battalions in New South Wales besides the three companies of veterans which are for police duties.” 
Source: Wellington Papers, WP1/895/4, “Letter from Sir Herbert Taylor to Arthur Wellesley,” 4 August 1827. 
 
 350
Table A. 7 
Population and wealth of British Colonies c.1812 (in £ sterling) 
Source: Patrick Colquhoun, A Treatise on the Wealth, Power, and Resources of the British Empire in Every Quarter 
of the World Including the East Indies …2nd ed (London: Joseph Mawman, 1815), 307 and [John Doe], A Brief 
Sketch of the Political Importance of the British Colonies (Edinburgh: Bell and Bradfute, 18260, 14-15. 
 
Colony Population Value of 
products 
raised 
annually 
Exports Imports 
Canada, Upper and Lower  300,000 £7,302,827 £302,827 £1,180,000 
New Brunswick  60,000 £1,915,987 £713,987 £579,146 
Nova Scotia 100,000 £2,607,330 £607,330 £492,584 
Saint John’s, or Prince Edward’s 
Island 
5,000 £216,434 £116,464 £94,445 
Newfoundland 18,000 £1,065,594 £705,594 £572,338 
Jamaica 390,000 £11,169,339 £7,269,661 £4,577,726 
Barbados 77,506 £1,270,863 £548,803 £1,148,458 
Antigua 40,600 £898,220 £492,220 £384,627 
St. Christopher 31,500 £753,528 £436,538 £215,479 
Nevis 15,750 £375,182 £217,682 £94,222 
Montserrat 10,644 £211,160 £104,720 £71,206 
Virgin Islands 10,700 £201,122 £94,122 £77,079 
Grenada 35,003 £935,782 £565,782 £375,686 
St. Vincent 29,608 £812,081 £515,999 £159,195 
Dominica 26,300 £561858 £258,858 £97,398 
Trinidad 33,090 £735,017 £384,117 £647,017 
Bahamas 16,900 £269,806 £100,806 £155,995 
Bermuda 10,200 £175,560 £73,560 £81,881 
Honduras 4,170 £146,700 £125,000 £34,674 
St. Lucia 24,850 £595,610 £285222 £100904 
Tobago 17,720 £516,532 £326,188 £136,897 
Demarara and Essequibo 76,500 £2,238,529 £1,189,042 £416,243 
Berbice 26,600 £629,461 £270,440 £128,617 
Ceylon 806,000 £2,306,000 £1,500,000 £1,000,000 
Mauritius 91,000 £905,000 £450,090 £260,000 
New South Wales 11, 950 £169,500 £50,000 £119,500 
The Cape of Good Hope 90,000 £584,800 £334,800 £453,240 
 
Table A. 8 
1840-1850 population and yearly average of exports of British Colonies. 
Source: Archibald Hamilton, “On the Colonies,” Journal of the Statistical Study of London, Vol. 35, No. 1  (Mar. 
1872), 107-126. 
Colony Yearly Average 
1840-44 Exports 
Yearly Average 
1845-49 Exports 
Yearly Average 
1850-54 Exports 
Population 
1850 
North American 
Colonies 
 
£2,595,000 
 
£2,872,000 
 
£4,200,000 
 
2,471,137 
Australia and New 
Zealand 
 
£1,246,000 
 
£1,566,000 
 
£7,215,000 
 
546,184 
Cape Colony and 
Natal 
 
£419,000 
 
£597,000 
 
£949,000 
 
---- 
West Indies £2,536,000 £2,027,000 £1,962,000 921,925 
Mauritius £285,000 £256,000 £320,000 180,863 
Ceylon £184,000 £204,000 £254,000 180,863 
 
 
3
5
1
T
a
b
le
 A
. 
9
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
A
p
p
o
in
tm
en
ts
 i
n
 t
h
e 
B
ri
ti
sh
 E
m
p
ir
e 
1
8
1
5
-1
8
2
0
 
S
o
u
rc
e:
 L
es
li
e 
S
te
p
h
en
 a
n
d
 S
id
n
ey
 L
ee
, 
T
h
e 
D
ic
ti
o
n
ar
y
 o
f 
N
at
io
n
al
 B
io
g
ra
p
h
y
 (
L
o
n
d
o
n
: 
O
x
fo
rd
 U
n
iv
er
si
ty
 P
re
ss
, 
1
9
2
1
-1
9
2
2
);
 U
n
it
ed
 K
in
g
d
o
m
, 
T
h
e 
R
o
y
al
 
M
il
it
ar
y
 C
al
en
d
ar
 o
r 
A
rm
y
 S
er
v
ic
e 
C
o
m
m
is
si
o
n
 B
o
o
k,
 i
n
 f
iv
e 
v
o
lu
m
es
 (
L
o
n
d
o
n
: 
A
. 
J.
 V
al
p
y
, 
1
8
2
0
).
 
 Lo
ca
ti
o
n
 
O
ff
ic
e 
N
a
m
e
 o
f 
O
ff
ic
er
 
M
il
it
a
ry
 S
er
v
ic
e 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
v
e 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
T
er
m
 o
f 
 O
ff
ic
e 
A
n
ti
g
u
a 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
G
eo
rg
e 
W
. 
R
a
m
sa
y
 
 B
en
ja
m
in
 D
’U
rb
an
 
  N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s 
P
en
in
su
la
 W
ar
 
  S
u
p
er
in
te
n
d
en
t 
R
o
y
al
 M
il
it
ar
y
 C
o
ll
eg
e 
S
ta
ff
 o
ff
ic
er
 i
n
 P
o
rt
u
g
u
es
e 
A
rm
y
 u
n
d
er
 B
er
es
fo
rd
 
1
8
2
4
 D
em
er
ar
a 
an
d
 E
ss
eq
u
ib
o
 
1
8
1
6
-1
8
1
9
 
 1
8
2
0
-1
8
2
4
 
B
ar
b
ad
o
s 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
    G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
 
S
ir
 J
a
m
es
 L
ei
th
 
    S
ta
p
le
to
n
 C
o
tt
o
n
 
Ir
el
an
d
 
C
o
ru
n
n
a 
 
W
al
ch
er
en
 
P
en
in
su
la
 
 N
o
rt
h
er
n
 F
ra
n
ce
 
C
ap
e 
C
o
lo
n
y
 
In
d
ia
 
P
en
in
su
la
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
-i
n
-
C
h
ie
f 
Ir
el
an
d
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
-i
n
-
C
h
ie
f 
In
d
ia
 
S
ta
ff
 o
ff
ic
er
 i
n
 I
re
la
n
d
 
 
1
8
1
4
-1
8
1
6
 
    1
8
1
7
-1
8
2
0
 
D
o
m
in
ic
a 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
C
h
ar
le
s 
W
. 
M
ax
w
el
l 
 S
am
u
el
 F
. 
W
h
it
ti
n
g
h
am
 
  S
o
u
th
 A
m
er
ic
a 
C
ap
e 
C
o
lo
n
y
 
P
en
in
su
la
 
A
n
g
lo
-S
ic
il
ia
n
 
E
x
p
.-
S
p
ai
n
 
  D
ep
u
ty
 a
ss
is
ta
n
t 
q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r-
g
en
er
al
 o
f 
th
e 
fo
rc
e,
 u
n
d
er
 B
ri
g
ad
ie
r-
G
en
er
al
 
R
o
b
er
t 
C
ra
u
fu
rd
 
li
ai
so
n
 t
o
 S
p
ai
n
 
D
ep
u
ty
 q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r 
In
d
ia
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r.
 W
in
d
w
ar
d
 a
n
d
 L
ee
w
ar
d
 I
s.
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
-i
n
-C
h
ie
f 
M
ad
ra
s 
A
rm
y
 
1
8
1
6
-1
8
1
9
 
 1
8
1
9
-1
8
2
1
 
  
S
t.
 C
h
ri
st
o
p
h
er
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
C
h
ar
le
s 
W
. 
M
ax
w
el
l 
 
 
(s
ee
 D
o
m
in
ic
a)
 
S
t.
 V
in
ce
n
t 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
S
ir
 
C
h
ar
le
s 
B
ri
sb
an
e 
R
.N
. 
 
S
ea
 d
u
ty
 d
u
ri
n
g
 
F
re
n
ch
 
R
ev
o
lu
ti
o
n
ar
y
 
W
ar
s 
an
d
 
N
ap
o
le
o
n
ic
 W
ar
s 
 
1
8
0
8
-1
8
2
9
 
T
ri
n
id
ad
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
S
ir
 R
al
p
h
 J
a
m
es
 
W
o
o
d
fo
rd
 
 
 
 
B
er
b
ic
e 
C
o
lo
n
y
 -
S
ec
re
ta
ry
 
S
te
p
h
en
 A
rt
h
u
r 
G
o
o
d
m
an
 
1
8
0
0
 A
n
g
lo
-
A
u
st
ri
an
  
It
al
ia
n
 
E
x
p
ed
it
io
n
 
P
en
in
su
la
 
A
ct
in
g
-a
d
ju
ta
n
t-
g
en
er
al
 W
el
li
n
g
to
n
’s
 P
en
in
su
la
r 
A
rm
y
 
1
8
1
9
-1
8
3
6
 
 
3
5
2
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
 
O
ff
ic
e 
N
a
m
e
 o
f 
O
ff
ic
er
 
M
il
it
a
ry
 S
er
v
ic
e 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
v
e 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
T
er
m
 o
f 
 O
ff
ic
e 
D
em
ar
ar
a 
    Ja
m
ai
ca
 
L
t.
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
    G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
M
aj
. 
G
en
. 
B
. 
D
’U
rb
an
 
    W
il
li
a
m
 M
o
n
ta
g
u
e 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s 
P
en
in
su
la
 W
ar
 
  M
il
it
ar
y
, 
b
u
t 
n
o
 
o
v
er
se
as
 s
er
v
ic
e.
  
     “S
h
o
w
ed
 s
o
m
e 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
ab
il
it
y
. 
     1
8
0
8
-1
8
1
1
 
1
8
1
3
-1
8
2
7
 
S
t.
 L
u
ci
a 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
R
o
b
er
t 
D
o
u
g
la
s 
  R
ic
h
ar
d
 A
u
g
u
st
u
s 
S
ey
m
o
u
r 
 E
d
w
ar
d
 O
’H
ar
a 
 Jo
h
n
 K
ea
n
e 
         
 J
o
h
n
 J
o
se
p
h
 W
in
k
le
r 
 
G
ib
ra
lt
ar
 
H
o
ll
an
d
 
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s 
     E
g
y
p
t 
M
al
ta
 
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s 
P
en
in
su
la
 
N
ew
 O
rl
ea
n
s 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
-i
n
-
ch
ie
f 
B
o
m
b
ay
 
A
fg
h
an
is
ta
n
  
M
il
it
ar
y
 r
ec
o
rd
 s
h
o
w
s 
n
o
 s
ta
ff
 e
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
1
8
1
6
 
   1
8
1
6
 
 1
8
1
6
-1
8
1
7
 
 1
8
1
7
-1
8
1
8
 
         1
8
1
8
-1
8
1
9
 
B
ah
am
as
 
 G
re
n
ad
a 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
 
C
h
ar
le
s 
C
am
er
o
n
 
 P
h
in
ea
s 
R
ia
ll
 
  W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s 
C
an
ad
a 
 
1
8
0
4
-1
8
2
0
 
 1
8
1
6
-1
8
2
3
 
M
al
ta
/I
o
n
ia
 
L
t.
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
S
ir
 T
h
o
m
as
 M
ai
tl
an
d
 
In
d
ia
 
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
C
ey
lo
n
 1
8
0
5
-1
8
1
1
 c
ap
ab
le
 a
d
m
in
is
tr
at
o
r 
 
B
en
ev
o
le
n
t 
d
es
p
o
t 
in
 M
al
ta
 “
K
in
g
 T
o
m
” 
1
8
1
3
-1
8
2
4
 
S
ie
rr
a 
L
eo
n
e 
L
t.
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
S
ir
 C
h
ar
le
s 
M
cC
ar
th
y
  
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s 
C
an
ad
a 
 
1
8
1
4
-1
8
2
4
 
C
ap
e 
o
f 
G
o
o
d
 H
o
p
e 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
L
o
rd
 C
h
ar
le
s 
H
en
ry
 
S
o
m
er
se
t 
M
il
it
ar
y
 b
u
t 
n
o
 
o
v
er
se
as
 s
er
v
ic
e 
P
ay
m
as
te
r-
g
en
er
al
 o
f 
 B
ri
ti
sh
 f
o
rc
es
 
(a
u
to
cr
at
) 
“d
o
ct
ri
n
ai
re
 A
n
g
li
ca
n
 
1
8
1
4
-1
8
2
6
 
 
3
5
3
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
 
O
ff
ic
e 
N
a
m
e
 o
f 
O
ff
ic
er
 
M
il
it
a
ry
 S
er
v
ic
e 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
v
e 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
T
er
m
 o
f 
 O
ff
ic
e 
 
 
  S
ir
 G
o
rd
o
n
 D
ru
m
m
o
n
d
 
(C
an
ad
ia
n
 b
o
rn
) 
    S
ir
 G
eo
rg
e 
M
u
rr
ay
 
          S
ir
 F
re
d
er
ic
k
 P
. 
R
o
b
in
so
n
 
(b
o
rn
 i
n
 A
m
er
ic
a)
 
        F
ra
n
ci
s 
G
o
re
 
     S
am
u
el
 S
m
it
h
 
    S
ir
 P
er
eg
ri
n
e 
M
ai
tl
an
d
 
  W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
E
g
y
p
t 
C
an
ad
a 
  N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
E
g
y
p
t 
S
w
ed
en
 
P
en
in
su
la
  
       L
o
y
al
 A
m
er
ic
an
 
R
eg
t.
-A
m
er
ic
an
 
R
ev
o
lu
ti
o
n
 
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s 
P
en
in
su
la
 
C
an
ad
a 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
-i
n
-
C
h
ie
f 
W
in
d
w
ar
d
 
an
d
 L
ee
w
ar
d
 I
s.
 
1
8
1
5
-1
8
2
7
 
 F
la
n
d
er
s 
 
(a
ft
er
 A
m
ie
n
s 
n
o
 
fu
rt
h
er
 m
il
it
ar
y
 
se
rv
ic
e)
 
  M
il
it
ar
y
 s
er
v
ic
e 
d
u
ri
n
g
 A
m
er
ic
an
 
R
ev
o
lu
ti
o
n
 
  F
la
n
d
er
s 
 1
7
9
4
, 
 
O
st
en
d
  
1
7
9
8
, 
t 
V
ig
o
 a
n
d
 C
o
ru
n
n
a 
1
8
0
9
 (
W
al
ch
er
en
, 
C
ad
iz
. 
B
id
as
so
a,
  
N
iv
el
le
, 
N
iv
e 
 B
ay
o
n
n
e,
 
B
id
ar
t,
  
Q
u
at
re
 
B
ra
s 
an
d
 W
at
er
lo
o
 
  S
ec
o
n
d
 i
n
 C
o
m
m
an
d
 i
n
 C
an
ad
a 
u
n
d
er
 P
re
v
o
st
  
     Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r-
g
en
er
al
 o
f 
th
e 
H
el
d
er
 e
x
p
ed
it
io
n
ar
y
 f
o
rc
e 
q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r-
g
en
er
al
 f
o
r 
E
g
y
p
ti
an
 e
x
p
ed
it
io
n
 
1
8
0
4
-1
8
1
2
 q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r-
g
en
er
al
 f
o
r 
Ir
el
an
d
 
q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r-
g
en
er
al
 f
o
r 
M
o
o
re
’s
 S
w
ed
is
h
 m
is
si
o
n
 
q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r-
g
en
er
al
 f
o
r 
W
el
li
n
g
to
n
’s
 P
en
in
su
la
r 
A
rm
y
 
ch
ie
f 
o
f 
st
af
f 
o
f 
th
e 
A
ll
ie
d
 A
rm
y
  
o
f 
O
cc
u
p
at
io
n
 a
n
d
 q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r-
g
en
er
al
 
o
f 
th
e 
B
ri
ti
sh
 c
o
n
ti
n
g
en
t 
In
sp
ec
ti
n
g
 o
ff
ic
er
 o
f 
B
ed
fo
rd
 
              A
id
e-
d
e-
ca
m
p
 t
o
 t
h
e 
L
o
rd
 l
ie
u
te
n
an
t 
o
f 
Ir
el
an
d
,t
h
e 
E
ar
l 
C
am
d
en
 
L
ie
u
te
n
an
t-
g
o
v
er
n
o
r 
o
f 
B
er
m
u
d
a 
L
ie
u
te
an
an
t-
g
o
v
er
n
o
r 
o
f 
U
p
p
er
 C
an
ad
a 
1
8
0
6
-1
8
1
1
 
D
ep
u
ty
 t
el
le
r 
to
 t
h
e 
E
x
ch
eq
u
er
  
  M
em
b
er
 o
f 
U
p
p
er
 C
an
ad
ia
n
 E
x
ec
u
ti
v
e 
C
o
u
n
ci
l.
 
 
  1
8
1
3
-1
8
1
5
 
     1
8
1
5
 
           1
8
1
5
 
         1
8
1
5
-1
8
1
7
 
     1
8
1
7
-1
8
1
8
 
A
ct
in
g
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
 
   1
8
1
8
-1
8
2
8
 
           
 
3
5
4
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
 
O
ff
ic
e 
N
a
m
e
 o
f 
O
ff
ic
er
 
M
il
it
a
ry
 S
er
v
ic
e 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
v
e 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
T
er
m
 o
f 
 O
ff
ic
e 
L
o
w
er
 C
an
ad
a 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
in
 C
h
ie
f 
S
ir
 G
o
rd
o
n
 D
ru
m
m
o
n
d
 
    S
ir
 J
o
h
n
 C
. 
S
h
er
b
ro
o
k
e 
  C
h
ar
le
s 
L
en
n
o
x
 
 G
eo
rg
e 
R
a
m
sa
y
 
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
E
g
y
p
t 
C
an
ad
a 
 In
d
ia
 
P
en
in
su
la
 
     G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
o
f 
N
o
v
a 
S
co
ti
a 
1
8
1
6
-1
8
1
7
  
1
8
1
5
-1
8
1
6
 
    1
8
1
6
-1
8
1
7
 
  1
8
1
8
-1
8
1
9
 
 1
8
1
9
-1
8
2
8
 
N
o
v
a 
S
co
ti
a 
L
t.
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
S
ir
 J
o
h
n
 C
. 
S
h
er
b
ro
o
k
e 
 G
eo
rg
e 
R
a
m
sa
y
 
 S
ir
 J
a
m
es
 K
em
p
t 
 
  
1
8
1
1
-1
8
1
6
 
 1
8
1
6
-1
8
1
9
 
 1
8
1
9
-1
8
2
8
 
N
ew
 B
ru
n
sw
ic
k
 
L
t.
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
T
h
o
m
as
 C
ar
le
to
n
 
 G
eo
rg
e 
S
. 
S
m
y
th
 
 
 
1
7
8
4
-1
8
1
7
 
 1
8
1
7
-1
8
2
3
 
P
ri
n
ce
 
E
d
w
ar
d
 I
sl
an
d
 
L
t.
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
C
h
ar
le
s 
D
o
u
g
la
s 
S
m
it
h
 
(b
ro
th
er
 o
f 
W
il
li
am
 
S
y
d
n
ey
 S
m
it
h
) 
A
m
er
ic
an
 
R
ev
o
lu
ti
o
n
 
 
A
p
p
o
in
te
d
 b
ec
au
se
 o
f 
b
ro
th
er
’s
 i
n
fl
u
en
ce
 w
it
h
 L
o
rd
 B
at
h
u
rs
t 
1
8
1
2
-1
8
2
4
 
 
N
ew
fo
u
n
d
la
n
d
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
S
ir
 C
h
ar
le
s 
H
a
m
il
to
n
 
 
 
1
8
1
8
-1
8
2
4
 
B
er
m
u
d
a 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
M
aj
. 
G
en
. 
S
ir
 T
o
m
k
y
n
s 
H
il
g
ro
v
e 
T
u
rn
er
 *
  
 
 
1
8
2
5
 
V
an
 D
ie
m
en
s 
L
an
d
 
L
t.
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
N
/A
 
C
ey
lo
n
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
S
ir
 R
o
b
er
t 
B
ro
w
n
ri
g
g
 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
W
al
ch
er
en
 
O
n
 s
ta
ff
 o
f 
F
re
d
er
ic
k
 D
u
k
e 
o
f 
Y
o
rk
, 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r-
g
en
er
al
 H
o
rs
e 
G
d
s.
 
1
8
1
1
-1
8
2
0
 
M
au
ri
ti
u
s 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
R
o
b
er
t 
T
. 
F
ar
q
u
h
ar
  
 R
al
p
h
 D
ar
li
n
g
  
 
 
 
1
8
1
1
-1
8
1
7
 
 1
8
1
9
-1
8
2
0
 
 
 
 
3
5
5
T
a
b
le
 A
. 
1
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
A
p
p
o
in
tm
en
ts
 i
n
 t
h
e 
B
ri
ti
sh
 E
m
p
ir
e,
 c
.1
8
2
9
. 
S
o
u
rc
e:
 L
es
li
e 
S
te
p
h
en
 a
n
d
 S
id
n
ey
 L
ee
, 
T
h
e 
D
ic
ti
o
n
ar
y
 o
f 
N
at
io
n
al
 B
io
g
ra
p
h
y
 (
L
o
n
d
o
n
: 
O
x
fo
rd
 U
n
iv
er
si
ty
 P
re
ss
, 
1
9
2
1
-2
2
);
 U
n
it
ed
 K
in
g
d
o
m
, 
T
h
e 
R
o
y
al
 
M
il
it
ar
y
 C
al
en
d
ar
 o
r 
A
rm
y
 S
er
v
ic
e 
an
d
 C
o
m
m
is
si
o
n
 B
oo
k
, 
C
o
n
ta
in
in
g
 t
h
e 
S
er
v
ic
es
 a
n
d
 P
ro
g
re
ss
 o
f 
P
ro
m
o
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
G
en
er
al
s,
 L
ie
u
te
n
an
t-
G
en
er
al
s,
 M
aj
o
r-
G
en
er
al
s,
 C
o
lo
n
el
s,
 L
ie
u
te
n
an
t-
C
o
lo
n
el
s.
 a
n
d
 M
aj
o
rs
 o
f 
th
e 
A
rm
y
, 
A
cc
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 S
en
o
ri
ty
: 
w
it
h
 D
et
ai
ls
 o
f 
th
e 
P
ri
n
ci
p
al
 M
il
it
ar
y
 E
v
en
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
L
as
t 
C
en
tu
ry
, 
in
 
fi
v
e 
v
o
lu
m
es
. 
 (
L
o
n
d
o
n
: 
A
. 
J.
 V
al
p
y
, 
1
8
2
0
).
   
 
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
 
O
ff
ic
e 
N
a
m
e
 o
f 
O
ff
ic
er
 
M
il
it
a
ry
 S
er
v
ic
e 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
v
e 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
T
er
m
  
o
f 
 
O
ff
ic
e 
A
n
ti
g
u
a 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
S
ir
 P
at
ri
ck
 R
o
ss
 
 
 
1
8
2
6
-1
8
3
2
 
B
ar
b
ad
o
s 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
S
ir
 J
a
m
es
 L
y
o
n
 
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s 
E
g
y
p
t 
P
en
in
su
la
r 
W
ar
  
G
er
m
an
y
 
W
at
er
lo
o
  
C
o
m
b
at
 c
o
m
m
an
d
er
 
P
ro
m
is
ed
 G
o
v
er
n
o
rs
h
ip
 a
t 
G
ib
ra
lt
ar
 b
u
t 
d
id
 n
o
t 
 
re
ce
iv
e 
it
. 
 
1
8
2
8
-1
8
3
3
 
D
o
m
in
ic
a 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
M
aj
. 
G
en
. 
N
ic
o
la
y
 
In
d
ia
 
W
at
er
lo
o
 
S
er
v
ed
 o
n
 R
o
y
al
 S
ta
ff
 C
o
rp
s 
(S
er
v
ed
 a
s 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
o
f 
M
au
ri
ti
u
s 
1
8
3
2
-1
8
4
0
) 
1
8
2
4
-1
8
3
1
 
S
t.
 C
h
ri
st
o
p
h
er
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
C
.W
. 
M
ax
w
el
l 
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
o
f 
D
o
m
in
ic
a 
1
8
1
6
-1
8
1
9
 
1
8
0
8
–
1
8
2
9
 
S
t.
 V
in
ce
n
t 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
S
ir
 C
h
ar
le
s 
B
ri
sb
an
e 
R
.N
. 
*
 
M
ed
it
er
ra
n
ea
n
  
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s 
S
ta
ti
o
n
 
S
ea
 d
u
ty
 d
u
ri
n
g
 F
re
n
ch
 R
ev
o
lu
ti
o
n
ar
y
 W
ar
s 
an
d
 N
ap
o
le
o
n
ic
 W
ar
s.
  
 
T
ri
n
id
ad
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
M
aj
. 
G
en
. 
G
ra
n
t*
 
 
 
1
8
2
9
–
1
8
3
3
 
T
o
b
ag
o
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
M
aj
. 
G
en
. 
N
at
h
an
ie
l 
S
h
ep
h
er
d
 B
la
ck
w
el
l 
G
ib
ra
lt
ar
 
C
ap
e 
o
f 
G
o
o
d
 H
o
p
e 
E
as
t 
In
d
ie
s 
C
an
ad
a 
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s 
P
en
in
su
la
 
A
id
e-
d
e-
ca
m
p
 t
o
 G
en
. 
B
an
b
u
ry
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
an
t 
o
f 
H
ib
er
n
ia
n
 S
ch
o
o
l 
D
u
b
li
n
. 
1
8
2
8
–
1
8
3
3
 
B
er
b
ic
e 
L
t.
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
H
en
ry
 B
ea
rd
 
 
 
 
D
em
ar
ar
a 
L
t.
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
M
aj
. 
G
en
. 
B
. 
D
’U
rb
an
*
 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s 
P
en
in
su
la
 W
ar
 
S
u
p
er
in
te
n
d
en
t 
R
o
y
al
 M
il
it
ar
y
 C
o
ll
eg
e 
S
ta
ff
 o
ff
ic
er
 i
n
 P
o
rt
u
g
u
es
e 
A
rm
y
 u
n
d
er
 B
er
es
fo
rd
 
1
8
2
5
-1
8
3
1
 
Ja
m
ai
ca
  
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
S
o
m
er
se
t 
L
o
w
ry
-C
o
rr
y
 
2
n
d
 E
ar
l 
o
f 
B
el
m
o
re
 
C
o
lo
n
el
 T
y
ro
n
e 
M
il
it
ia
 
O
ff
ic
e 
o
f 
C
u
st
o
s 
R
o
tu
lo
ru
m
 C
o
. 
T
y
ro
n
e 
1
8
2
8
-1
8
3
2
 
S
t.
 L
u
ci
a 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
M
aj
. 
G
en
. 
D
. 
S
te
w
ar
t*
  
F
la
n
d
er
s 
E
g
y
p
t 
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s 
C
o
m
b
at
 c
o
m
m
an
d
er
 
1
8
2
5
 
G
re
n
ad
a 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
M
aj
. 
G
en
. 
C
a
m
p
b
el
l 
 
 
 
 
3
5
6
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
 
O
ff
ic
e 
N
a
m
e
 o
f 
O
ff
ic
er
 
M
il
it
a
ry
 S
er
v
ic
e 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
v
e 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
T
er
m
  
o
f 
 
O
ff
ic
e 
M
al
ta
 
L
t.
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
M
aj
. 
G
en
. 
S
ir
 F
re
d
er
ic
k
. 
P
o
n
so
n
b
y
 
P
en
in
su
la
  
W
at
er
lo
o
 
A
ss
is
ta
n
t 
ad
ju
ta
n
t 
g
en
er
al
 
In
sp
ec
ti
n
g
 f
ie
ld
 o
ff
ic
er
 i
n
 I
o
n
ia
n
 I
sl
an
d
s 
1
8
2
5
-1
8
3
5
 
G
ib
ra
lt
ar
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
E
ar
l 
o
f 
C
h
at
h
am
 
 
A
b
se
n
t 
g
o
v
er
n
o
r.
  
  
1
8
1
4
-1
8
3
1
 
G
ib
ra
lt
ar
 
L
t.
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
G
en
. 
S
ir
 G
eo
rg
e 
D
o
n
  
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
M
il
it
ar
y
 C
o
m
m
is
si
o
n
er
 t
o
 
P
ru
ss
ia
 
W
al
ch
er
en
 C
am
p
ai
g
n
 
A
id
e-
d
e-
ca
m
p
 G
en
er
al
 J
a
m
es
 M
u
rr
ay
 
O
n
 s
ta
ff
 a
t 
H
o
rs
e 
G
u
ar
d
s 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
o
f 
Je
rs
ey
 
1
8
1
4
-1
8
3
1
 
P
ri
n
ce
 E
d
w
ar
d
 I
sl
an
d
 
L
t.
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
L
t.
 C
o
lo
n
el
 S
ir
 H
o
w
ar
d
 
D
o
u
g
la
s 
 
S
p
ai
n
 
H
o
ll
an
d
 
P
en
in
su
la
 W
ar
 
 
 
U
p
p
er
 C
an
ad
a 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
M
aj
. 
G
en
. 
S
ir
 J
. 
C
o
lb
o
rn
e 
H
o
ll
an
d
 
E
g
y
p
t 
C
al
ab
ri
a 
P
en
in
su
la
 
W
at
er
lo
o
 
M
il
it
ar
y
 s
ec
re
ta
ry
 t
o
 S
ir
 J
. 
M
o
o
re
 
D
ip
lo
m
at
ic
 m
is
si
o
n
 S
p
ai
n
 1
8
0
9
 
L
t.
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
o
f 
G
u
er
n
se
y
 
1
8
2
8
-1
8
3
8
 
L
o
w
er
 C
an
ad
a 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
in
 C
h
ie
f 
L
t.
 G
en
. 
S
ir
 J
. 
K
em
pt
 
H
o
ll
an
d
 
E
g
y
p
t 
N
o
rt
h
 A
m
er
ic
a 
P
en
in
su
la
 
W
at
er
lo
o
 
A
id
e-
d
e-
ca
m
p
 t
o
 R
. 
A
b
er
cr
o
m
b
y
, 
 
J.
 H
el
y
-H
u
tc
h
in
so
n
, 
an
d
 D
av
id
  
D
u
n
d
as
 
Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r 
g
en
er
al
 N
o
rt
h
 A
m
er
ic
a 
L
t.
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
o
f 
P
o
rt
sm
o
u
th
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
o
f 
N
o
v
a 
S
co
ti
a 
1
8
2
8
-1
8
3
0
 
N
o
v
a 
S
co
ti
a 
L
t.
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
L
t.
 G
en
. 
S
ir
 P
er
eg
ri
n
e 
M
ai
tl
an
d
  
  
  
  
H
o
ll
an
d
 
P
en
n
is
u
la
 
W
al
ch
er
en
 
C
o
m
b
at
 c
o
m
m
an
d
er
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
 M
ad
ra
s 
1
8
3
6
-1
8
3
8
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
o
f 
C
ap
e 
C
o
lo
n
y
 1
8
4
4
-1
8
4
7
 
1
8
2
8
-1
8
3
4
 
 
 356
Table A. 11  
Colonial Appointments in the British Empire c.1835. 
Source: PRO, C.O. 325/20 Colonial Appointments 
 
 
Table A. 12 
Birthdates of Military Colonial Administrators 
Source:  PRO, W.O. 25 1829 Statement of Service for Retired Officers. 
 
Decade of Birth Number of Men 
1750-1769 13 
1770-1779 17 
1780-1800 3 
 
Location Office Name of Officer Date of Appointment 
Gibraltar  Governor Lieutenant General John Pitt, 
 The Earl of Chatham  
29 Jan. 1820 
Gibraltar Lt. Governor Sir William Houshoun 10 May 1831 
Malta Governor 
Lt. Governor 
Sir Frederick Cavendish Ponsonby 
John  Ponsonby  
1826-1835 
Dec. 1828 
Ionian Islands Lord High Commissioner  George Nugent Grenville,Lord Nugent 18 Aug. 1832 
Ionian Islands Second in Command Major General Woodford  15 Feb. 1827 
Cape of Good Hope Governor Major General  Sir B. D’Urban  1833-1838 
Sierra Leone Governor 
Lt. Governor 
Alexander Findlay 
Octavius Temple 
Major Campbell  
1830-1833 
1833-1834 
4 Nov. 1834 
Mauritius Governor Sir Charles Colville 
Sir William Nicolay 
1828-1832 
1833-1844 
Ceylon Governor Sir Robert John Wilmont Horton  Feb.4, 1831-1837 
Ceylon Second in Command Sir John Wilson 4 Feb. 1831 
New South Wales Governor Major General Sir Richard Bourke  June 25, 1831-1837 
Van Diemens Land Lt. Governor Lieutenant Colonel Sir Daniel Arthur  14 May 1824 
Lower Canada Governor in Chief Matthew Whitworth, fifth baron  Aylmer  1830-1835 
Upper Canada Lt. Governor Sir John Colborne  Aug.22, 1828-1836 
Nova Scotia Lt. Governor Sir Colin Campbell   Feb.4, 1834-1840 
New Brunswick Lt. Governor Major General Sir Archibald Campbell  
 
Mar.22, 1831-1837 
Prince Edward’s 
Island 
Lt. Governor Colonel Sir Aretas William Young  July 25, 1831-1835 
Newfoundland Governor Captain Prescott R.N. 24 Sept. 1834 
Bermuda 
 
Governor ColonelSir Stephen Remnant Chapman 12 Aug. 1831 
Jamaica  Governor  Howe Peter Brown, second marquis of Slego 1834-1836 
Honduras  Superintendent Col. Cockburn  29 July 1829 
Bahamas Lt. Governor Colonel William Macbean  
George Colebrooke  
Sept.9, 1834-1837 
Barbados Governor Major General  Sir Lionel Smith  17 Feb. 1833 
Grenada Lt. Governor Major.Gen. George Middlemore  Feb.14,. 1833-1836 
St. Vincent Governor 
Lt. Governor 
George Fitzgerald Hill 
Captain Tyler R.N.  
1831-1833 
4 Feb. 1823 
Tobago Lt. Governor Major General Henry Charles Darling 
(nephew to Ralph Darling) 
13 Mar. 1833 
British Guiana Governor Major General James Carmichael Smyth 1833-1838 
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Table A. 14 
Officers’ Incidental Expenses 
Source: Michael Glover, Wellington’s Army, In the Peninsula 1808-1814 (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1977). 
 
Dinner at the mess 2s0d Nett [sic] pay per 
day 
4s6d 
Wine at ditto 1s0d   
Servant and Sundries 0s6d   
Breakfast 0s6d   
Washing and mending 0s6d   
 
Balance left for pocket money & dress, £0 
0s 0d 
4s6d  4s6d 
 
 
Table A. 15 
Worldwide Distribution of British Forces 1803-1815 (in battalions) 
Source: Richard Partridge and Michael Oliver, Napoleonic Army Handbook: The British Army and Her Allies 
(London: Constable and Company, 1999). 
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Table   A. 15 (cont.) 
Worldwide Distribution of British Forces 1803-1815 (in  
battalions) 
 
1812-1814
22
29
5
19
3.5 4
29
12
48.5
92.5
1 3
13.5
25
1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
H
om
e 
Se
rv
ic
e
In
di
a
C
ap
e 
C
ol
on
y
M
ed
ite
rra
ne
an
Ba
lti
c
Si
ci
ly
/N
ap
le
s/
Ita
ly
W
es
t I
nd
ie
s
G
ib
ra
lta
r
N
. A
m
er
ic
a
Pe
ni
ns
ul
a
N
.S
.W
.
C
ad
iz
Ea
st
 C
oa
st
 o
f S
pa
in
N
. G
er
m
an
y/
H
ol
la
nd
M
au
rit
iu
s
1815
22
31
4
53.5
6
2
15
6
48.5
1
H
om
e 
Se
rv
ic
e
In
di
a
C
ap
e 
C
ol
on
y
W
at
er
lo
o
M
ed
ite
rra
ne
an
Ba
lti
c
Ita
ly
/N
ap
le
s
W
es
t I
nd
ie
s
G
ib
ra
lta
r
N
. A
m
er
ic
a
N
ew
 S
ou
th
 W
al
es
M
au
rit
iu
s 
 
 
3
6
6
T
a
b
le
 A
. 
1
6
 
C
ar
ee
rs
 o
f 
P
en
in
su
la
r 
D
iv
is
io
n
al
 a
n
d
 B
ri
g
ad
e 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
s 
 
 S
o
u
rc
e:
 L
es
li
e 
S
te
p
h
en
  
an
d
 S
te
p
h
en
 L
ee
, 
D
ic
ti
o
n
ar
y
 o
f 
N
at
io
n
al
 B
io
g
ra
p
h
y
 (
L
o
n
d
o
n
: 
O
x
fo
rd
 U
n
iv
er
si
ty
 P
re
ss
, 
1
9
2
1
-2
2
, 
F
re
d
er
ic
 B
o
as
e,
 M
o
d
er
n
 E
n
g
li
sh
 
B
io
g
ra
p
h
y
 (
N
ew
 Y
o
rk
: 
B
ar
n
es
 a
n
d
 N
o
b
le
, 
In
c.
, 
1
9
6
5
);
 W
ar
 O
ff
ic
e.
 L
is
t 
o
f 
th
e 
O
ff
ic
er
s 
o
f 
th
e 
A
rm
y
 a
n
d
 R
o
y
al
 M
ar
in
es
 o
n
 F
u
ll
, 
R
et
ir
ed
, 
an
d
 H
al
f 
P
ay
 w
it
h
 a
n
 
In
d
ex
. 
( 
L
o
n
d
o
n
: 
C
lo
w
es
 
an
d
 
S
o
n
s,
 
m
u
lt
ip
le
 
y
ea
rs
 1
8
1
5
-1
83
7
);
 U
n
it
ed
 
K
in
g
d
o
m
 
T
h
e 
R
o
y
al
 
M
il
it
ar
y
 
C
al
en
d
ar
 o
r 
A
rm
y
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
an
d
 
C
o
m
m
is
si
o
n
 
B
o
o
k
, 
C
o
n
ta
in
in
g
 t
h
e 
S
er
v
ic
es
 a
n
d
 P
ro
g
re
ss
 o
f 
P
ro
m
o
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
G
en
er
al
s,
 L
ie
u
te
n
an
t-
G
en
er
al
s,
 M
aj
o
r-
G
en
er
al
s,
 C
o
lo
n
el
s,
 L
ie
u
te
n
an
t-
C
o
lo
n
el
s.
 a
n
d
 M
aj
o
rs
 o
f 
th
e 
A
rm
y
, 
A
cc
o
rd
in
g
 t
o
 S
en
o
ri
ty
: 
w
it
h
 D
et
ai
ls
 o
f 
th
e 
P
ri
n
ci
p
al
 M
il
it
ar
y
 E
v
en
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
L
as
t 
C
en
tu
ry
, 
in
 f
iv
e 
v
o
lu
m
es
. 
 (
L
o
n
d
o
n
: 
A
. 
J.
 V
al
p
y
, 
1
8
2
0
).
 
 
N
a
m
e 
N
a
ti
o
n
a
li
ty
 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
W
o
u
n
d
s/
 K
IA
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
 
b
ef
o
re
 1
8
1
5
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
 
a
ft
er
 1
8
1
5
 
P
o
st
 1
8
1
5
 C
a
re
er
 
A
cl
an
d
, 
S
ir
 
W
ro
th
 P
al
m
er
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(E
n
g
li
sh
) 
Y
es
 
 
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
Il
l 
h
ea
lt
h
 p
re
v
en
te
d
 h
im
 f
ro
m
 
se
rv
in
g
 a
t 
th
e 
en
d
 o
f 
th
e 
N
ap
o
le
o
n
ic
 W
ar
s.
 
A
lt
en
, 
C
h
ar
le
s 
H
an
o
v
er
ia
n
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
In
sp
ec
to
r 
G
en
er
al
 o
f 
H
an
o
v
er
ia
n
 
A
rm
y
 
A
n
so
n
, 
G
eo
rg
e 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
—
A
D
C
 t
o
 
G
eo
rg
e 
II
I 
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
C
o
lo
n
el
 o
f 
2
3
rd
 D
ra
g
o
o
n
 G
u
ar
d
s 
u
n
ti
l 
re
d
u
ct
io
n
. 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 C
h
el
se
a 
H
o
sp
it
al
 
A
n
st
ru
th
er
, 
R
o
b
er
t 
H
an
o
v
er
ia
n
 
(K
G
L
) 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
A
sh
w
o
rt
h
, 
S
ir
 
C
h
ar
le
s 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
Y
es
 
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
F
u
rt
h
er
 s
er
v
ic
e 
u
n
k
n
o
w
n
. 
B
ar
b
ac
en
a,
 
V
is
co
u
n
t,
 
L
u
iz
 A
n
to
n
io
 
F
u
rt
ad
o
 d
e 
C
as
tr
a 
d
e 
R
io
 
d
e 
M
en
d
o
n
ca
 e
 
F
ar
o
 
P
o
rt
u
g
u
es
e 
Y
es
 
 
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
o
f 
E
lv
as
 
B
ar
cl
ay
, 
R
o
b
er
t 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
Y
es
 
N
o
 
W
o
u
n
d
 
N
o
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
B
ar
n
ar
d
, 
S
ir
 
A
n
d
re
w
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(I
ri
sh
) 
Y
es
  
Y
es
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
—
re
ce
iv
ed
 
m
u
lt
ip
le
 
w
o
u
n
d
s 
N
o
 
N
o
 
L
ie
u
te
n
an
t 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
o
f 
C
h
el
se
a 
H
o
sp
it
al
 
B
ar
n
es
, 
E
d
w
ar
d
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(E
n
g
li
sh
) 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
o
f 
D
o
m
in
ic
a,
 1
8
0
8
 
A
p
p
t.
 L
ie
u
te
n
an
t.
 
G
o
v
. 
o
f 
A
n
ti
g
u
a 
1
8
1
3
*
 
Y
es
 
S
ta
ff
 a
n
d
 t
h
en
 A
ct
in
g
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
o
f 
C
ey
lo
n
, 
1
8
2
0
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
 i
n
 C
h
ie
f,
 I
n
d
ia
 
 
3
6
7
N
a
m
e 
N
a
ti
o
n
a
li
ty
 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
W
o
u
n
d
s/
 K
IA
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
 
b
ef
o
re
 1
8
1
5
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
 
a
ft
er
 1
8
1
5
 
P
o
st
 1
8
1
5
 C
a
re
er
 
B
ec
k
w
it
h
, 
 
S
ir
 T
h
o
m
as
 
S
y
d
n
ey
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
 
A
ss
is
ta
n
t 
Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r 
C
an
ad
a 
Y
es
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
 i
n
 C
h
ie
f,
 B
o
m
b
ay
 
B
la
n
ty
re
, 
L
ie
u
te
n
an
t 
C
o
lo
n
el
 R
o
b
er
t 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(S
co
t)
 
Y
es
 
N
o
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
/ 
D
ie
d
 
fr
o
m
 w
o
u
n
d
s 
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
B
o
ck
, 
E
b
er
h
ar
d
t 
O
tt
o
 G
eo
rg
e 
v
o
n
 
H
an
o
v
er
ia
n
 
Y
es
 
 
D
ro
w
n
ed
 i
n
 
1
8
1
4
 
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
B
o
w
es
, 
B
er
n
ar
d
 
F
o
o
rd
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
Y
es
 
 
K
IA
 1
8
1
2
 
N
o
—
b
u
t 
o
n
 s
ta
ff
 i
n
 
N
o
rt
h
er
n
 B
ri
ta
in
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
B
ra
d
fo
rd
, 
T
h
o
m
as
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(E
n
g
li
sh
) 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
, 
B
ay
o
n
n
e,
 1
8
1
4
. 
N
o
—
b
u
t 
p
ro
m
o
te
d
 
A
ss
is
ta
n
t 
A
d
ju
ta
n
t 
G
en
er
al
 I
re
la
n
d
, 
1
8
0
1
. 
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 7
th
 D
iv
is
io
n
, 
A
rm
y
 
o
f 
O
cc
u
p
at
io
n
, 
1
8
1
7
-1
8
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
 i
n
 C
h
ie
f,
 B
o
m
b
ay
, 
1
8
2
5
 
B
ri
sb
an
e,
 S
ir
 
T
h
o
m
as
 
M
ac
D
o
u
g
al
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(S
co
t)
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
—
A
id
e-
d
e-
ca
m
p
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
, 
F
la
n
d
er
s 
 
Y
es
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 N
ew
 S
o
u
th
 W
al
es
, 
1
8
2
1
. 
B
u
rn
e,
 R
o
b
er
t 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
 
N
o
—
b
u
t 
co
m
m
an
d
ed
 
N
o
rt
h
er
n
 D
is
tr
ic
t 
N
o
 
U
n
k
n
o
w
n
—
p
as
se
d
 o
v
er
 f
o
r 
h
o
n
o
rs
 u
p
o
n
 c
o
n
cl
u
si
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
w
ar
. 
B
y
n
g
, 
S
ir
 J
o
h
n
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(E
n
g
li
sh
) 
Y
es
 
Y
es
—
A
id
e-
d
e-
ca
m
p
 G
en
er
al
 
V
y
se
, 
1
7
9
7
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 
S
o
u
th
er
n
 
D
is
tr
ic
t,
 I
re
la
n
d
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
 
 
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
 o
f 
N
o
rt
h
er
n
 D
is
tr
ic
t 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 L
o
n
d
o
n
d
er
ry
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
 i
n
 C
h
ie
f,
 I
re
la
n
d
 
1
8
2
8
 
M
. 
P
. 
fo
r 
P
o
o
le
, 
1
8
3
1
 
(s
u
p
p
o
rt
ed
 R
ef
o
rm
 B
il
l)
 
C
ad
o
g
an
, 
H
en
ry
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(E
n
g
li
sh
) 
Y
es
 
Y
es
—
A
id
e-
d
e-
ca
m
p
, 
W
el
li
n
g
to
n
 
K
IA
, 
1
8
1
3
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
C
am
er
o
n
, 
S
ir
 
A
la
n
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(S
co
t)
 
Y
es
 
N
o
 
N
o
—
b
u
t 
p
o
o
r 
h
ea
lt
h
 d
u
ri
n
g
 
P
en
in
su
la
 
 
 
R
et
ir
ed
 b
ec
au
se
 o
f 
h
ea
lt
h
 
C
am
p
b
el
l,
 S
ir
 
A
rc
h
ib
al
d
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(S
co
t)
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
 
 
Y
es
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
 i
n
 C
h
ie
f,
 R
an
g
o
o
n
 
E
x
p
ed
it
io
n
 
L
ie
u
te
n
an
t 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 N
ew
 
B
ru
n
sw
ic
k
 
 
3
6
8
N
a
m
e 
N
a
ti
o
n
a
li
ty
 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
W
o
u
n
d
s/
 K
IA
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
 
b
ef
o
re
 1
8
1
5
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
 
a
ft
er
 1
8
1
5
 
P
o
st
 1
8
1
5
 C
a
re
er
 
C
am
p
b
el
l,
 
A
le
x
an
d
er
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(S
co
t)
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
 
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 B
ri
ti
sh
 
fo
rc
es
 i
n
 M
au
ri
ti
u
s 
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 B
ri
ti
sh
 f
o
rc
es
 i
n
 
M
au
ri
ti
u
s 
u
n
ti
l 
1
8
1
6
. 
C
am
p
b
el
l,
 S
ir
 
Ja
m
es
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(S
co
t)
 
Y
es
 
N
o
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 G
re
n
ad
a,
 1
8
3
1
 
C
o
lb
o
rn
e,
 S
ir
 
Jo
h
n
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(E
n
g
li
sh
) 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
L
ie
u
te
n
an
t 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 G
u
er
n
se
y
, 
1
8
2
1
 
L
ie
u
te
n
an
t 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 U
p
p
er
 
C
an
ad
a,
 1
8
2
8
 
L
o
rd
 H
ig
h
 C
o
m
m
is
si
o
n
er
, 
Io
n
ia
n
 I
sl
an
d
s,
 1
8
4
3
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
 i
n
 C
h
ie
f,
 I
re
la
n
d
, 
1
8
5
5
 
C
o
le
, 
S
ir
 
G
al
b
ra
it
h
 
L
o
w
ry
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(I
ri
sh
) 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 M
au
ri
ti
u
s,
 1
8
2
3
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 C
ap
e 
C
o
lo
n
y
, 
1
8
2
8
 
C
o
ll
in
s,
 
R
ic
h
ar
d
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
/ 
K
IA
, 
S
al
am
an
ca
, 
1
8
1
2
 
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
C
o
ll
v
il
le
, 
S
ir
 
C
h
ar
le
s 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(S
co
t)
 
Y
es
 
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
 i
n
 C
h
ie
f,
 B
o
m
b
ay
, 
1
8
1
9
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 M
au
ri
ti
u
s,
 1
8
2
8
 
C
o
tt
o
n
, 
S
ir
 
S
ta
p
le
to
n
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(E
n
g
li
sh
) 
Y
es
 
N
o
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 B
ar
b
ad
o
s,
 1
8
1
7
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
 i
n
 C
h
ie
f,
 I
re
la
n
d
, 
1
8
2
2
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
 i
n
 C
h
ie
f,
 I
n
d
ia
, 
1
8
2
5
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
G
en
er
al
 o
f 
In
d
ia
 (
9
 
m
o
n
th
s)
 
C
ra
u
fu
rd
, 
C
at
li
n
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
ra
u
fu
rd
, 
R
o
b
er
t 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(S
co
t)
 
Y
es
 
 
K
IA
, 
C
u
id
ad
 
R
o
d
ri
g
o
, 
1
8
1
2
 
N
o
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
 
3
6
9
N
a
m
e 
N
a
ti
o
n
a
li
ty
 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
W
o
u
n
d
s/
 K
IA
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
 
b
ef
o
re
 1
8
1
5
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
 
a
ft
er
 1
8
1
5
 
P
o
st
 1
8
1
5
 C
a
re
er
 
D
o
n
k
in
, 
S
ir
 
R
u
fa
n
e 
S
h
aw
  
(o
ri
g
in
al
 n
am
e 
D
u
n
ca
n
) 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(E
n
g
li
sh
/S
co
t)
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
—
B
ri
g
ad
e 
M
aj
o
r 
A
id
e-
d
e-
ca
m
p
, 
G
en
er
al
 
M
u
sg
ra
v
e 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
 
N
o
—
b
u
t 
co
m
m
an
d
ed
 
E
ss
ex
 D
is
tr
ic
t,
 1
8
1
1
 
Y
es
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
 i
n
 C
h
ie
f,
 M
ad
ra
s,
 
1
8
1
5
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 D
iv
is
io
n
, 
M
ah
ra
tt
a 
W
ar
 
A
ct
in
g
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 C
ap
e 
C
o
lo
n
y
, 
1
8
2
0
 
 
D
o
u
g
la
s,
 S
ir
 
Ja
m
es
 D
aw
es
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(S
co
t)
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
—
D
ep
u
ty
 
A
ss
is
ta
n
t 
Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r 
G
en
er
al
, 
1
8
0
6
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
 
 
N
o
 
D
ep
u
ty
 Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r 
G
en
er
al
, 
S
co
tl
an
d
, 
1
8
1
5
 
D
ep
u
ty
 Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r 
G
en
er
al
, 
Ir
el
an
d
, 
1
8
2
5
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
 S
o
u
th
w
es
te
rn
 
D
is
tr
ic
t,
 I
re
la
n
d
, 
1
8
3
0
 
L
ie
u
te
n
an
t 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 G
u
er
n
se
y
, 
1
8
3
7
. 
D
ru
m
m
o
n
d
, 
G
eo
rg
e 
D
u
n
ca
n
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(S
co
t)
 
Y
es
 
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
/D
ie
d
 
o
f 
fe
v
er
, 
1
8
1
1
 
N
o
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
D
u
n
lo
p
, 
Ja
m
es
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(S
co
t)
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
—
o
n
 s
ta
ff
 
w
it
h
 
W
el
li
n
g
to
n
 
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
M
.P
. 
fo
r 
K
ir
k
cu
b
ri
g
h
t.
  
D
’U
rb
an
, 
S
ir
 
B
en
ja
m
in
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
—
In
sr
u
ct
o
r 
o
f 
o
ff
ic
er
s 
in
 
st
af
f 
d
u
ti
es
. 
 
N
o
 
Y
ea
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 A
n
ti
g
u
a,
 1
8
2
0
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 D
e
m
er
ar
a 
an
d
 
E
sq
u
ib
o
, 
1
8
2
4
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 C
ap
e 
C
o
lo
n
y
, 
1
8
3
3
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
 i
n
 C
h
ie
f,
 C
an
ad
a,
 
1
8
4
7
 
E
rs
k
in
, 
S
ir
 
W
il
li
a
m
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(S
co
t)
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
D
ie
d
 i
n
sa
n
e,
 
1
8
1
3
 
N
o
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
F
an
e,
 J
o
h
n
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(E
n
g
li
sh
) 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
 
N
o
 
 
D
ip
lo
m
at
ic
 p
o
st
s 
in
 N
ap
le
s 
an
d
 
B
er
li
n
 
F
an
e,
 H
en
ry
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(E
n
g
li
sh
) 
Y
es
 
N
o
 
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 t
ro
o
p
s 
in
 M
id
la
n
d
s 
to
 p
u
t 
d
o
w
n
 r
io
ts
, 
1
8
1
5
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
 i
n
 C
h
ie
f,
 I
n
d
ia
, 
1
8
3
5
 
F
er
g
u
so
n
, 
S
ir
 
R
o
n
al
d
 
C
ra
u
fu
rd
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(S
co
t)
 
Y
es
 
 
 
N
o
—
b
u
t 
ad
m
in
is
te
re
d
 Y
o
rk
 
D
is
tr
ic
t 
N
o
 
M
.P
. 
fo
r 
K
ir
k
ca
ld
y
—
li
b
er
al
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3
7
0
N
a
m
e 
N
a
ti
o
n
a
li
ty
 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
W
o
u
n
d
s/
 K
IA
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
 
b
ef
o
re
 1
8
1
5
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
 
a
ft
er
 1
8
1
5
 
P
o
st
 1
8
1
5
 C
a
re
er
 
G
ra
h
am
, 
S
ir
  
T
h
o
m
as
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(S
co
t)
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
—
A
id
e-
d
e-
ca
m
p
 t
o
 
G
en
er
al
 J
o
h
n
 
M
o
o
re
 
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
o
f 
D
u
m
b
ar
to
n
 C
as
tl
e 
G
ra
n
t,
 
C
o
lq
u
h
o
u
n
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(S
co
t)
 
Y
es
 
N
o
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
, 
C
ap
e 
o
f 
G
o
o
d
 
H
o
p
e,
 1
8
0
6
 
 
N
o
 
A
ss
is
te
d
 q
u
el
li
n
g
 L
u
d
d
it
e 
d
is
tu
rb
an
ce
s 
M
.P
. 
fo
r 
Q
u
ee
n
sb
o
ro
u
g
h
 
H
al
k
et
t,
 S
ir
 
C
o
li
n
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
Y
es
 
N
o
t-
k
n
o
w
n
, 
p
o
ss
ib
ly
 s
er
v
ed
 
o
n
 s
ta
ff
, 
Ir
el
an
d
, 
1
8
0
6
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
L
ie
u
te
n
an
t 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
Je
rs
ey
, 
1
8
3
0
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
 i
n
 C
h
ie
f,
 B
o
m
b
ay
, 
1
8
3
1
 
L
ie
u
te
n
an
t 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 C
h
el
se
a 
H
o
sp
it
al
, 
1
8
4
8
 
H
ay
, 
A
n
d
re
w
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(S
co
t)
 
Y
es
 
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
/K
IA
, 
1
8
1
4
 
N
o
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
H
il
l,
 S
ir
 
R
o
w
la
n
d
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
S
ec
o
n
d
 i
n
 C
o
m
m
an
d
, 
A
rm
y
 o
f 
O
cc
u
p
at
io
n
, 
1
8
1
5
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
 o
f 
th
e 
A
rm
y
, 
1
8
2
8
 
H
in
d
e,
 S
a
m
u
el
 
V
en
ab
le
s 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
Y
es
 
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
W
o
u
n
d
s 
fr
o
m
 P
en
in
su
la
 
re
n
d
er
ed
 h
im
 i
n
ca
p
ab
le
 o
f 
fu
rt
h
er
 s
er
v
ic
e 
H
in
u
b
er
, 
C
o
l.
 
A
ld
o
p
h
u
s 
H
an
o
v
er
ia
n
 
(K
in
g
’s
 
G
er
m
an
 
L
eg
io
n
) 
Y
es
 
 
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
H
o
u
st
o
u
n
, 
S
ir
 
W
il
li
a
m
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
 
Y
es
—
B
ri
g
ad
e 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
, 
M
al
ta
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 
S
o
u
th
w
es
t 
D
is
tr
ic
t 
N
o
 
L
ie
u
te
n
an
t 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 G
ib
ra
lt
ar
, 
1
8
3
1
 
H
o
w
ar
d
, 
K
en
n
et
h
 
A
le
x
an
d
er
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
L
ie
u
te
n
an
t 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 
P
o
rt
sm
o
u
th
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 S
o
u
th
w
es
t 
D
is
tr
ic
t,
 
1
8
1
4
 
M
.P
. 
H
o
u
se
 o
f 
L
o
rd
s 
(W
h
ig
) 
In
g
li
s,
 S
ir
 
W
il
li
a
m
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
Y
es
 
U
n
k
n
o
w
n
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
L
ie
u
te
n
an
t 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 K
in
sa
le
, 
1
8
2
9
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 C
o
rk
, 
1
8
3
0
 
 
3
7
1
N
a
m
e 
N
a
ti
o
n
a
li
ty
 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
W
o
u
n
d
s/
 K
IA
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
 
b
ef
o
re
 1
8
1
5
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
 
a
ft
er
 1
8
1
5
 
P
o
st
 1
8
1
5
 C
a
re
er
 
K
ea
n
e,
 S
ir
 J
o
h
n
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(I
ri
sh
) 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 S
t.
 L
u
ci
a,
 1
8
1
8
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 J
am
ai
ca
, 
1
8
2
3
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
 i
n
 C
h
ie
f,
 B
o
m
b
ay
, 
1
8
3
4
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 t
ro
o
p
s,
 A
fg
h
an
 
E
x
p
ed
it
io
n
, 
1
8
3
8
 
K
em
m
is
, 
Ja
m
es
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
Y
es
 
 
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
 S
ta
ff
 p
o
si
ti
o
n
, 
T
u
ll
am
o
re
, 
Ir
el
an
d
, 
1
8
2
0
 
K
em
p
t,
 S
ir
 
Ja
m
es
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(1
/2
 S
co
t)
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
—
m
an
y
 
st
af
f 
ap
p
o
in
tm
en
ts
 
 
N
o
—
b
el
ie
v
ed
 t
o
 
h
av
e 
cl
er
k
ed
 f
o
r 
H
o
rs
e 
G
u
ar
d
s 
Y
es
 
L
ie
u
te
n
an
t 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 
P
o
rt
sm
o
u
th
, 
1
8
1
9
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 N
o
v
a 
S
co
ti
a,
 1
8
1
9
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
G
en
er
al
, 
C
an
ad
a,
 
1
8
2
8
 
M
as
te
r 
G
en
er
al
 o
f 
O
rd
n
an
ce
, 
1
8
3
4
 
 
L
am
b
er
t,
 S
ir
 
Jo
h
n
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
 
N
o
 
 
 
L
an
g
w
er
th
, 
E
rn
es
t 
E
b
er
h
ar
d
 
K
u
n
o
 v
o
n
 
H
an
o
v
er
ia
n
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
K
IA
, 
T
al
av
er
a,
 
1
8
0
9
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
L
e 
C
o
r,
 C
ar
lo
s 
F
re
d
er
ic
 
P
o
rt
u
g
u
es
e 
Y
es
  
U
n
k
n
o
w
n
 
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
L
ei
th
, 
S
ir
 J
a
m
es
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(S
co
t)
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 e
x
p
ed
it
io
n
 t
o
 
B
ar
b
ad
o
s,
 1
8
1
5
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 L
ee
w
ar
d
 I
sl
an
d
s,
 
1
8
1
6
 
L
e 
M
ar
ch
an
t,
  
Jo
h
n
 G
as
p
ar
d
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(I
sl
e 
o
f 
G
u
er
n
se
y
) 
Y
es
 
Y
es
—
 
L
ie
u
te
n
an
t 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
o
f 
M
il
it
ar
y
 
S
ch
o
o
l,
 H
ig
h
 
W
y
co
m
b
e,
 
1
8
0
1
-1
8
0
9
 
K
IA
, 
S
al
am
an
ca
, 
1
8
1
2
 
N
o
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
L
ig
h
tb
u
rn
e,
 
S
ta
ff
o
rd
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
 
S
er
v
ed
 o
n
e 
ca
m
p
ai
g
n
 
w
it
h
 W
el
li
n
g
to
n
 
N
o
 
N
o
 r
ec
o
rd
 o
f 
fu
rt
h
er
 s
er
v
ic
e 
af
te
r 
re
ce
iv
in
g
 r
an
k
 o
f 
L
ie
u
te
n
an
t 
G
en
er
al
, 
1
8
1
3
 
L
o
n
g
, 
R
o
b
er
t 
B
al
la
rd
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(E
n
g
li
sh
) 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
C
al
le
d
 h
o
m
e,
 1
8
1
1
 
D
ec
li
n
ed
 c
o
m
m
an
d
 i
n
 S
co
tl
an
d
. 
 
3
7
2
N
a
m
e 
N
a
ti
o
n
a
li
ty
 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
W
o
u
n
d
s/
 K
IA
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
 
b
ef
o
re
 1
8
1
5
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
 
a
ft
er
 1
8
1
5
 
P
o
st
 1
8
1
5
 C
a
re
er
 
L
o
w
, 
S
ig
is
m
u
n
d
 
H
an
o
v
er
ia
n
 
Y
es
 
 
 
 
 
 
L
u
m
le
y
, 
S
ir
 
W
il
li
a
m
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(E
n
g
li
sh
) 
Y
es
 
 
In
v
al
id
ed
 h
o
m
e 
fr
o
m
 S
p
ai
n
, 
1
8
1
1
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 B
er
m
u
d
a,
 1
8
1
9
 
G
ro
o
m
 o
f 
B
ed
ch
am
b
er
 f
o
r 
Q
u
ee
n
 V
ic
to
ri
a 
M
ac
k
in
n
o
n
, 
H
en
ry
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(S
co
t)
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
—
B
ri
g
ad
e 
M
aj
o
r,
 I
re
la
n
d
 
K
IA
, 
1
8
1
2
 
N
o
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
M
ac
k
en
zi
e,
 
A
le
x
an
d
er
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(S
co
t)
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
K
IA
, 
T
al
av
er
a,
 
1
8
1
2
 
N
o
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
M
ad
d
en
, 
S
ir
 
G
eo
rg
e 
A
ll
an
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(E
n
g
li
sh
) 
Y
es
 
N
o
 
 
N
o
 
N
o
  
R
et
ir
ed
 a
ft
er
 P
en
in
su
la
 W
ar
 
M
cM
ah
o
n
, 
S
ir
 
T
h
o
m
as
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(S
co
t)
 
Y
es
 
U
n
k
n
o
w
n
 
 
U
n
k
n
o
w
n
 
Y
es
 
A
d
ju
ta
n
t 
G
en
er
al
, 
In
d
ia
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
 i
n
 C
h
ie
f,
 B
o
m
b
ay
 
M
u
rr
ay
, 
S
ir
 
G
eo
rg
e 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(S
co
t)
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
—
A
id
e-
d
e-
ca
m
p
 t
o
 a
 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
G
en
er
al
s 
 
C
h
ie
f 
o
f 
S
ta
ff
 f
o
r 
W
el
li
n
g
to
n
’s
 
P
en
in
su
la
r 
A
rm
y
 
A
d
ju
ta
n
t 
G
en
er
al
, 
Ir
el
an
d
, 
1
8
1
4
 
Y
es
 P
ro
v
is
io
n
al
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 U
p
p
er
 
C
an
ad
a,
 1
8
1
4
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
 i
n
 C
h
ie
f,
 I
re
la
n
d
, 
1
8
2
5
 
S
ec
re
ta
ry
 o
f 
S
ta
te
 f
o
r 
C
o
lo
n
ie
s,
 
1
8
2
8
 
M
.P
. 
fo
r 
P
er
th
 
M
as
te
r 
G
en
er
al
 o
f 
O
rd
n
an
ce
, 
1
8
3
4
 
M
u
rr
ay
, 
S
ir
 
Jo
h
n
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(S
co
t)
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
 
C
o
m
m
is
si
o
n
er
 i
n
 
A
d
en
 
N
o
 
D
is
m
al
 c
ar
ee
r 
af
te
r 
co
u
rt
 
m
ar
ti
al
. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
sw
al
d
, 
S
ir
 
Jo
h
n
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(S
co
t)
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
 
Y
es
—
ad
m
in
is
te
re
d
 
ca
p
tu
re
d
 I
ll
y
ri
an
 
Is
la
n
d
s,
 1
8
0
9
 
Y
o
 
W
o
u
n
d
 r
ec
ei
v
ed
 a
t 
S
an
 
S
eb
as
ti
an
 f
o
rc
ed
 h
im
 h
o
m
e,
 
1
8
1
4
 
O
’C
al
la
g
h
an
, 
S
ir
 R
o
b
er
t 
W
il
li
a
m
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(I
ri
sh
) 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 N
o
rt
h
 B
ri
ta
in
, 
1
8
2
2
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
 i
n
 C
h
ie
f,
 M
ad
ra
s 
A
rm
y
 
P
ac
k
, 
D
en
is
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(I
ri
sh
) 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
K
IA
, 
N
ew
 
O
rl
ea
n
s,
 1
8
1
5
 
N
o
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
P
ag
et
, 
S
ir
 
E
d
w
ar
d
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(E
n
g
li
sh
) 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
, 
lo
st
 
ri
g
h
t 
ar
m
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 C
ey
lo
n
, 
1
8
2
0
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
 i
n
 C
h
ie
f,
 B
u
rm
es
e 
C
am
p
ai
g
n
 
P
ay
n
e,
 S
ir
 
W
il
li
a
m
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(I
ri
sh
) 
Y
es
 
Y
es
—
se
rv
ed
 o
n
 
st
af
f,
 I
re
la
n
d
 
 
U
n
k
n
o
w
n
 
U
n
k
n
o
w
n
 
C
o
lo
n
el
 3
rd
 D
ra
g
o
o
n
s 
 
3
7
3
N
a
m
e 
N
a
ti
o
n
a
li
ty
 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
W
o
u
n
d
s/
 K
IA
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
 
b
ef
o
re
 1
8
1
5
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
 
a
ft
er
 1
8
1
5
 
P
o
st
 1
8
1
5
 C
a
re
er
 
P
ic
to
n
, 
S
ir
 
T
h
o
m
as
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(W
el
sh
) 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
, 
Q
u
at
re
 
B
ra
s/
K
IA
, 
W
at
er
lo
o
 
Y
es
—
M
il
it
ar
y
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 T
ri
n
id
ad
, 
1
7
9
7
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
P
o
n
so
n
b
y
, 
S
ir
 
F
re
d
er
ic
 
C
av
en
d
is
h
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(I
ri
sh
) 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
In
sp
ec
ti
n
g
 F
ie
ld
 O
ff
ic
er
, 
Io
n
ia
n
 
Is
la
n
d
s,
 1
8
2
4
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 M
al
ta
, 
1
8
2
6
 
P
o
w
er
, 
S
ir
 
M
an
le
y
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(E
n
g
li
sh
) 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
O
n
 s
ta
ff
, 
C
an
ad
a 
L
ie
u
te
n
an
t 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 M
al
ta
 
R
am
sa
y
, 
G
eo
rg
e 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(S
co
t)
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
-o
n
 s
ta
ff
 i
n
 
S
co
tl
an
d
, 
1
8
0
3
 
O
n
 s
ta
ff
, 
E
n
g
la
n
d
, 
1
8
0
9
 
 
 
Y
es
 
L
ie
u
te
n
an
t 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 N
o
v
a 
S
co
ti
a,
 1
8
1
6
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 C
an
ad
a,
 1
8
2
0
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
 i
n
 C
h
ie
f,
 I
n
d
ia
, 
1
8
2
9
 
R
o
b
in
so
n
, 
S
ir
 
F
re
d
er
ic
k
 
P
h
il
ip
se
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(A
m
er
ic
an
) 
Y
es
 
Y
es
—
In
sp
ec
ti
n
g
 
O
ff
ic
er
, 
B
ed
fo
rd
, 
1
7
9
6
 
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
A
ct
in
g
, 
L
ie
u
te
n
an
t 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 
U
p
p
er
 C
an
ad
a,
 1
8
1
5
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 t
ro
o
p
s,
 L
ee
w
ar
d
 
Is
la
n
d
s,
 1
8
1
6
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 T
o
b
ag
o
, 
1
8
2
1
 
R
o
ss
, 
R
o
b
er
t 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(I
ri
sh
) 
Y
es
 
U
n
k
n
o
w
n
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
, 
1
8
1
4
 
K
IA
, 
1
8
1
5
 
N
o
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
S
h
er
b
ro
o
k
e,
 S
ir
 
Jo
h
n
 C
o
ap
e 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(E
n
g
li
sh
) 
Y
es
 
Y
es
—
k
n
o
w
n
 t
o
 
h
av
e 
ab
u
se
d
 h
is
 
co
m
m
is
sa
ry
 
o
ff
ic
er
s 
(i
n
d
ic
at
es
 s
ta
ff
 
p
o
si
ti
o
n
) 
 
Y
es
—
A
p
p
o
in
te
d
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 N
o
v
a 
S
co
ti
a,
 1
8
1
1
 
Y
es
 
C
ap
ta
in
 G
en
er
al
 a
n
d
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 
C
an
ad
a,
 1
8
1
6
 
R
et
ir
ed
 b
ec
au
se
 o
f 
h
ea
lt
h
 
(s
tr
o
k
e)
 
S
il
v
er
a,
 
F
ra
n
ci
sc
o
 d
a 
P
o
rt
u
g
u
es
e 
N
A
 
 
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S
k
er
re
t,
 J
o
h
n
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
Y
es
 
 
 
N
o
—
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 a
 
B
ri
g
ad
e 
w
it
h
 
G
ra
h
am
, 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s,
 1
8
1
4
 
 
O
u
t 
o
f 
se
rv
ic
e 
N
o
t 
li
st
ed
 i
n
 1
8
2
0
 R
o
y
al
 
M
il
it
ar
y
 C
al
en
d
ar
 
 
 
3
7
4
N
a
m
e 
N
a
ti
o
n
a
li
ty
 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
W
o
u
n
d
s/
 K
IA
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
 
b
ef
o
re
 1
8
1
5
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
 
a
ft
er
 1
8
1
5
 
P
o
st
 1
8
1
5
 C
a
re
er
 
S
la
d
e,
 S
ir
 J
o
h
n
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(E
n
g
li
sh
) 
Y
es
 
Y
es
—
E
m
p
lo
y
ed
 o
n
 
st
af
f,
 E
n
g
la
n
d
, 
1
8
0
9
 
 
N
o
—
E
m
p
lo
y
ed
 o
n
e 
y
ea
r 
in
 I
re
la
n
d
 i
n
 a
 
st
af
f 
ca
p
ac
it
y
 
N
o
 
L
ac
k
lu
st
er
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 i
n
 1
8
1
2
 
se
n
t 
h
im
 h
o
m
e 
in
 r
et
ir
e
m
en
t 
S
o
m
er
se
t,
 L
o
rd
 
R
o
b
er
t 
E
d
w
ar
d
 
H
en
ry
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(E
n
g
li
sh
) 
Y
es
 
Y
es
—
A
id
e-
d
e-
ca
m
p
 t
o
 D
u
k
e 
o
f 
Y
o
rk
 
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
In
sp
ec
to
r 
o
f 
C
av
al
ry
, 
1
8
1
8
 
L
ie
u
te
n
an
t 
G
en
er
al
 o
f 
O
rd
n
an
ce
, 
1
8
2
9
 
M
. 
P
.,
 M
o
n
m
o
u
th
 
M
. 
P
.,
 G
lo
u
ce
st
er
sh
ir
e 
S
o
n
ta
g
, 
Jo
h
n
 
H
an
o
v
er
ia
n
 
Y
es
 
U
n
k
n
o
w
n
 
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
S
o
u
sa
, 
Jo
se
 
L
o
p
es
 d
e 
P
o
rt
u
g
u
es
e 
Y
es
 
N
A
 
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
S
p
en
ce
r,
 S
ir
 
B
re
n
t 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(I
ri
sh
) 
Y
es
 
Y
es
—
A
id
e-
d
e-
ca
m
p
 t
o
 K
in
g
 
G
eo
rg
e 
II
I 
S
er
v
ed
 o
n
 s
ta
ff
, 
S
u
ss
ex
 
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
R
et
ir
ed
 i
n
 1
8
1
1
 
P
as
se
d
 r
es
t 
o
f 
h
is
 l
if
e 
in
 
re
ti
re
m
en
t 
S
te
rl
in
g
, 
Ja
m
es
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(S
co
t)
 
Y
es
 
 
 
Y
es
 
N
o
 
L
ie
u
te
n
an
t 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 C
o
rk
, 
1
8
1
8
 
S
te
w
ar
t,
 
C
h
ar
le
s 
W
il
li
a
m
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(I
ri
sh
) 
Y
es
 
Y
es
—
A
id
e-
d
e-
ca
m
p
 t
o
 L
o
rd
 
C
am
d
en
 
 
Y
es
—
U
n
d
er
 
S
ec
re
ta
ry
, 
Ir
el
an
d
, 
1
8
0
3
 
U
n
d
er
 S
ec
re
ta
ry
 o
f 
W
ar
, 
1
8
0
7
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 F
o
rt
 
C
h
ar
le
s,
 J
a
m
ai
ca
 
N
o
—
D
ip
lo
m
at
ic
 C
o
rp
s 
T
ra
v
el
ed
 w
it
h
 A
ll
ie
d
 A
rm
ie
s,
 
1
8
1
3
 
S
er
v
ed
 C
o
n
g
re
ss
es
  
o
f 
V
ie
n
n
a,
 
T
ro
p
p
au
, 
L
ay
b
ac
h
, 
an
d
 V
er
o
n
a 
A
m
b
as
sa
d
o
r 
to
 R
u
ss
ia
, 
1
8
3
5
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 D
er
ry
, 
1
8
2
3
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 D
o
w
n
, 
1
8
2
4
 
L
o
rd
 L
ie
u
te
n
an
t,
 D
u
rh
am
, 
1
8
4
2
 
S
tu
b
b
s,
 G
eo
rg
e 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
Y
es
 
 
 
 
U
n
k
n
o
w
n
 
U
n
k
n
o
w
n
 
S
to
p
fo
rd
, 
E
d
w
ar
d
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
Y
es
 
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
, 
B
ay
o
n
n
e,
 1
8
1
3
 
U
n
k
n
o
w
n
 
 
C
o
lo
n
el
 o
f 
th
e 
A
fr
ic
an
 C
o
rp
s 
T
il
so
n
, 
C
h
ri
st
o
p
h
er
 
(l
at
e 
C
h
o
w
n
e)
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
—
O
n
 S
ta
ff
 
in
 P
en
in
su
la
 
 
 
 
 
T
ra
n
t,
 S
ir
 
N
ic
h
o
la
s 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(I
ri
sh
, 
o
ri
g
in
al
ly
 
D
an
is
h
) 
Y
es
 
Y
es
—
C
o
m
m
is
si
o
n
ed
 
in
 R
o
y
al
 S
ta
ff
 
C
o
rp
s,
 1
8
0
3
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
 
N
o
 
N
o
 
T
ra
n
sf
er
re
d
 t
o
 P
o
rt
u
g
u
es
e 
se
rv
ic
e,
 1
8
1
4
 
L
ef
t 
ar
m
y
 b
ec
au
se
 o
f 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 
d
if
fi
cu
lt
ie
s,
 1
8
2
5
 
 
3
7
5
N
a
m
e 
N
a
ti
o
n
a
li
ty
 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
W
o
u
n
d
s/
 K
IA
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
 
b
ef
o
re
 1
8
1
5
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
 
a
ft
er
 1
8
1
5
 
P
o
st
 1
8
1
5
 C
a
re
er
 
V
an
d
el
eu
r,
 S
ir
 
Jo
h
n
 O
rm
sb
y
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(I
ri
sh
) 
Y
es
 
Y
es
—
O
n
 s
ta
ff
 
in
 B
el
g
iu
m
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
 
N
o
 
N
o
  
C
o
lo
n
el
 1
6
th
 D
ra
g
o
o
n
s 
   
V
iv
ia
n
, 
S
ir
 
R
ic
h
ar
d
 H
u
ss
ey
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(W
al
es
) 
Y
es
 
Y
es
—
A
id
e-
d
e-
ca
m
p
 t
o
 P
ri
n
ce
 
R
eg
en
t 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
 
 
 
A
rm
y
 o
f 
O
cc
u
p
at
io
n
, 
1
8
1
5
 
Q
u
el
le
d
 d
is
tu
rb
an
ce
s,
 N
ew
 
C
as
tl
e 
o
n
 T
y
n
e,
 1
8
1
9
 a
n
d
 
G
la
sg
o
w
, 
1
8
2
0
 
In
sp
ec
to
r 
G
en
er
al
 o
f 
C
av
al
ry
 
M
.P
. 
T
ru
ro
, 
1
8
2
0
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
 i
n
 C
h
ie
f,
 S
co
tl
an
d
, 
1
8
3
1
 
 
W
al
k
er
, 
S
ir
 
G
eo
rg
e 
T
o
w
n
se
n
d
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
(E
n
g
li
sh
) 
Y
es
 
Y
es
—
Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r 
 
G
en
er
al
’s
 
D
ep
t.
, 
In
d
ia
, 
1
7
8
6
 
S
ta
ff
, 
Ir
el
an
d
, 
1
7
8
8
 
In
sp
ec
to
r,
 
F
o
re
ig
n
 C
o
rp
s,
 
1
7
9
4
 
W
o
u
n
d
ed
 
N
o
 
Y
es
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 G
re
n
ad
a,
 1
8
1
5
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
 i
n
 C
h
ie
f,
 M
ad
ra
s,
 
1
8
2
5
 
L
ie
u
te
n
an
t 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 C
h
el
se
a 
H
o
sp
it
al
, 
1
8
3
7
 
W
il
so
n
, 
S
ir
 
Jo
h
n
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
Y
es
 
Y
es
 
 
Y
es
—
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 
M
in
h
o
, 
1
8
1
1
 
Y
es
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 t
ro
o
p
s,
 C
ey
lo
n
, 
1
8
3
0
 
 
 
3
7
6
T
a
b
le
 A
. 
1
7
 
C
ar
ee
rs
 o
f 
S
en
io
r 
M
il
it
ar
y
/C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
at
o
rs
 c
. 
1
8
3
0
 
S
o
u
rc
e:
  
U
n
it
ed
 K
in
g
d
o
m
, 
T
h
e 
R
o
y
al
 M
il
it
ar
y
 C
al
en
d
ar
 o
r 
A
rm
y
 S
er
v
ic
e 
an
d
 C
o
m
m
is
si
o
n
 B
o
o
k
, 
in
 F
iv
e 
V
o
lu
m
es
 (
L
o
n
d
o
n
: 
A
. 
J.
 V
al
p
y
, 
1
8
2
0
);
 C
h
ar
le
s 
D
al
to
n
, 
T
h
e 
W
at
er
lo
o
 R
o
ll
 C
al
l 
(L
o
n
d
o
n
: 
A
rm
s 
an
d
 A
rm
o
u
r 
P
re
ss
, 
1
9
7
1
);
 J
o
h
n
 H
al
l,
 A
 H
is
to
ry
 o
f 
th
e 
P
en
in
su
la
r 
W
ar
, 
V
o
lu
m
e 
V
II
I:
 T
h
e 
B
io
g
ra
p
h
ic
al
 D
ic
ti
o
n
ar
y
 o
f 
B
ri
ti
sh
 O
ff
ic
er
s 
K
il
le
d
 a
n
d
 W
o
u
n
d
ed
, 
1
8
0
8
-1
8
1
4 
(L
o
n
d
o
n
: 
G
re
en
h
il
l 
B
o
o
k
s,
 1
9
9
8
);
 I
rv
in
g
 L
. 
H
o
m
fr
ay
, 
B
ri
ti
sh
 F
o
rc
es
 i
n
 C
an
ad
a 
D
u
ri
n
g
 t
h
e 
W
ar
 o
f 
1
8
1
2
-1
8
1
5
 
(W
el
la
n
d
: 
T
ri
b
u
n
e 
P
ri
n
t,
 1
9
0
8
 
 
N
a
m
e 
D
a
te
 E
n
te
re
d
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
R
ec
o
rd
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
/P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
p
ri
o
r 
to
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
R
a
n
k
 i
n
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
st
in
g
 i
n
 
1
8
3
0
 
L
a
te
r 
C
a
re
er
 a
n
d
 D
ea
th
 
A
rt
h
u
r,
 G
eo
rg
e,
 
(b
.)
 1
7
8
4
, 
so
n
 o
f 
Jo
h
n
 A
rt
h
u
r 
o
f 
N
o
rl
ey
 H
o
u
se
, 
P
ly
m
o
u
th
 
E
n
si
g
n
 9
1
st
 
F
t.
, 
A
u
g
. 
1
8
0
4
 
S
ic
il
ia
n
 
ex
p
ed
it
io
n
, 
1
8
0
6
 
E
g
y
p
t,
 1
8
0
7
 
(w
.)
 S
ic
il
y
, 
1
8
0
8
 
W
al
ch
er
en
, 
1
8
0
9
  
 J
am
ai
ca
, 
1
8
1
2
 
D
A
G
 1
8
0
9
 
M
il
it
ar
y
 
S
ec
re
ta
ry
, 
S
ir
 
G
eo
rg
e 
D
o
n
, 
G
o
v
. 
Je
rs
ey
 
A
ss
is
ta
n
t 
Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r 
G
en
er
al
, 
1
8
1
2
 
L
t.
 3
5
th
 F
t.
, 
Ju
n
e 
1
8
0
5
 
C
ap
t.
, 
M
ay
 
1
8
0
8
 
M
aj
. 
7
th
 W
.I
..
 
1
8
1
2
 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
 1
8
1
5
 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
 Y
o
rk
 
C
h
as
s.
 1
8
1
7
 
L
t.
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 
B
ri
ti
sh
 
H
o
n
d
u
ra
s,
 1
8
1
4
-
2
2
  
(p
ro
p
o
n
en
t 
o
f 
sl
av
e 
em
an
ci
p
at
io
n
) 
 
L
t.
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
an
d
 C
 i
n
 C
 
V
an
 D
ie
m
en
’s
 
L
an
d
, 
1
8
2
4
-3
6
 
L
t.
  
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 U
p
p
er
 C
an
ad
a,
 
1
8
3
7
 
D
ep
u
ty
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 C
an
ad
a,
 1
8
4
1
 
B
o
m
b
ay
 J
u
n
e 
1
8
4
2
-4
6
 
M
. 
G
..
 1
8
4
6
 
L
. 
G
. 
1
8
5
4
 
D
ie
d
, 
S
ep
t 
1
8
5
4
 
B
ar
n
es
, 
E
d
w
ar
d
, 
(b
) 
1
7
7
6
 n
ea
r 
B
ee
ch
-h
il
l 
P
ar
k
 
n
ea
r 
B
ar
n
et
. 
E
n
si
g
n
 
in
 
4
7
th
 
F
t.
, 
N
o
v
. 
1
7
9
2
 
P
en
in
su
la
; 
B
at
tl
es
 o
f 
V
it
to
ri
a,
 
P
y
re
n
ee
s,
 
N
iv
el
le
, 
N
iv
e,
 
an
d
 O
rt
h
es
. 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s,
 
W
at
er
lo
o
, 
1
8
1
5
 
S
er
v
ed
 o
n
 
st
af
f 
in
 
P
en
in
su
la
, 
1
8
1
2
 
C
ey
lo
n
, 
1
8
1
9
 
 
L
t.
 ,
 M
ay
 
1
7
9
3
 
C
ap
t.
 9
9
th
 F
t.
, 
1
7
9
3
 
M
aj
. 
7
9
th
 F
t.
,.
 
1
8
0
0
 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
 4
6
th
 
F
t.
 A
p
ri
l 
1
8
0
7
 
C
o
l.
 1
8
1
0
 
M
. 
G
. 
1
8
1
3
 
A
p
p
o
in
te
d
. 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
o
f 
A
n
ti
g
u
a,
 1
8
1
3
  
(r
ef
u
se
d
  
th
e 
ap
p
o
in
tm
en
t)
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
C
ey
lo
n
, 
1
8
2
4
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
C
ey
lo
n
 
G
.C
.B
.,
 F
eb
. 
1
8
3
1
 
C
 i
n
 C
, 
In
d
ia
, 
1
8
3
1
 
C
o
lo
n
el
 3
4
th
 F
t.
, 
1
8
3
4
 
M
. 
P
. 
S
u
d
b
u
ry
, 
(C
o
n
se
rv
at
iv
e)
, 
1
8
3
4
 
M
.P
. 
S
u
d
b
u
ry
, 
1
8
3
7
 
D
ie
d
,.
 P
ic
ad
il
ly
, 
1
9
 M
ar
. 
1
8
3
8
 
B
ec
k
w
it
h
, 
T
h
o
m
as
 S
id
n
ey
, 
(b
.)
 1
7
7
2
, 
so
n
 o
f 
M
aj
. 
–
G
en
. 
Jo
h
n
 B
ec
k
w
it
h
 
L
t.
 7
1
st
 F
t.
, 
1
7
9
1
 
In
d
ia
, 
S
er
in
g
ap
at
am
, 
P
o
n
d
ic
h
er
ry
, 
C
ey
lo
n
, 
C
o
p
en
h
ag
en
, 
1
8
0
1
 
H
an
o
v
er
, 
1
8
0
6
 
D
en
m
ar
k
, 
1
8
0
7
 
P
o
rt
u
g
al
, 
1
8
0
8
 
B
at
tl
e 
o
f 
V
im
er
io
 
C
o
ru
n
n
a,
 1
8
0
9
 
P
en
in
su
la
, 
1
8
0
9
-1
8
1
1
 
D
A
Q
G
. 
1
8
1
0
-
-S
p
ai
n
 
A
Q
G
 
1
8
1
2
—
S
p
ai
n
 
 
C
ap
t.
 i
n
 
A
rm
y
, 
1
7
9
4
 
C
ap
t.
 
M
an
in
g
h
am
’s
 
C
o
rp
s 
o
f 
R
if
le
m
an
, 
A
u
g
. 
1
8
0
0
 
M
aj
. 
1
8
0
2
 
M
aj
. 
M
an
in
g
h
am
’s
 
C
o
rp
s,
 A
p
ri
l 
1
8
0
2
 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
 9
5
th
 
F
t.
 1
8
0
3
 
Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r 
G
en
er
al
. 
C
an
ad
a—
1
8
1
2
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
 o
f 
R
if
le
 B
ri
g
ad
e,
 
1
8
2
9
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
B
o
m
b
ay
 
M
.G
. 
1
8
1
4
 
L
. 
G
. 
 1
8
3
0
 
D
ie
d
, 
M
ah
ab
le
sh
w
u
r 
o
f 
fe
v
er
 1
5
 
Ja
n
. 
1
8
3
1
 
 
3
7
7
N
a
m
e 
D
a
te
 E
n
te
re
d
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
R
ec
o
rd
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
/P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
p
ri
o
r 
to
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
R
a
n
k
 i
n
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
st
in
g
 i
n
 
1
8
3
0
 
L
a
te
r 
C
a
re
er
 a
n
d
 D
ea
th
 
B
en
ti
n
ck
 
W
il
li
a
m
 H
en
ry
 
C
av
en
d
is
h
, 
(b
.)
 
1
4
 S
ep
t.
 1
7
7
4
, 
so
n
 o
f 
W
il
li
am
 
H
en
ry
 B
en
ti
n
ck
, 
D
u
k
e 
o
f 
P
o
rt
la
n
d
 
E
n
si
g
n
 
C
o
ld
st
re
am
 
G
u
ar
d
s,
 1
7
9
1
 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s,
 
1
7
9
4
 
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
 
an
d
 N
o
rt
h
 I
ta
ly
  
1
7
9
9
 t
o
 1
8
0
1
 
T
re
v
v
ia
, 
N
o
v
i,
 
S
av
ig
li
an
o
, 
an
d
 
M
ar
en
g
o
  
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 
b
ri
g
ad
e 
at
 
C
o
ru
n
n
a 
C
o
m
m
an
d
 o
f 
D
iv
is
io
n
 i
n
 
W
el
li
n
g
to
n
’s
 
P
en
in
su
la
r 
A
rm
y
, 
S
en
t 
to
 
G
er
m
an
y
 t
o
 
ra
is
e 
co
n
ti
n
g
en
t 
o
f 
tr
o
o
p
s,
 1
8
0
9
 
C
 i
n
 C
, 
S
ic
il
y
 
1
8
1
1
-1
4
 
E
as
te
rn
 S
p
ai
n
 
an
d
  
It
al
y
  
S
ta
ff
 w
it
h
 
D
u
k
e 
o
f 
Y
o
rk
, 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s,
 
1
7
9
4
 
A
tt
ac
h
ed
 t
o
 
H
ea
d
q
u
ar
te
rs
 
G
en
. 
S
u
v
ar
o
v
 
(R
u
ss
ia
n
),
 
1
7
9
9
 
A
p
p
t.
 t
o
 s
ta
ff
 
o
f 
S
ir
 H
ar
ry
 
B
u
rr
ar
d
, 
P
o
rt
u
g
al
, 
1
8
0
8
 
D
ip
lo
m
at
ic
 
m
is
si
o
n
 t
o
 
S
p
an
is
h
 
Ju
n
ta
, 
1
8
0
8
 
C
ap
t.
, 
2
n
d
 
L
ig
h
t 
D
ra
g
o
o
n
 
G
u
ar
d
s,
 1
7
9
2
 
L
t.
  
C
o
lo
n
el
, 
2
4
th
 L
ig
h
t 
D
ra
g
o
o
n
s,
 
1
7
9
4
 
M
. 
G
. 
1
8
0
8
 
L
. 
G
.,
 1
8
0
9
 
M
.P
. 
fo
r 
C
am
el
fo
rd
, 
1
7
9
6
 
M
.P
. 
fo
r 
N
o
tt
in
g
h
am
sh
ir
e 
1
7
9
6
-1
8
0
3
 a
n
d
 
1
8
1
2
-1
4
, 
1
8
1
6
-
1
8
2
6
 
M
.P
. 
fo
r 
L
y
n
n
 
1
8
2
6
-2
7
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
o
f 
M
ad
ra
s,
 1
8
0
3
-
0
7
 
V
el
o
re
 M
u
ti
n
y
 
co
n
tr
o
v
er
sy
 l
ed
 
to
 r
ec
al
l 
  
C
 i
n
 C
 
(G
o
v
er
n
o
r)
 
S
ic
il
y
, 
1
8
1
1
-1
4
 
U
n
em
p
lo
y
ed
  
  
  
u
n
ti
l 
1
8
2
7
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
G
en
er
al
  
(b
y
 C
h
ar
te
r 
A
ct
) 
B
en
g
al
, 
1
8
2
7
 
In
d
ia
 1
8
3
3
-3
5
 
 
R
es
ig
n
ed
 g
o
v
er
n
o
rs
h
ip
 o
f 
In
d
ia
  
M
ar
ch
 1
8
3
5
 
M
.P
. 
fo
r 
G
la
sg
o
w
 (
li
b
er
al
) 
1
8
3
6
-
3
7
 
D
ie
d
, 
P
ar
is
 1
7
 J
u
n
e 
1
8
3
9
 
 
B
er
es
fo
rd
, 
W
il
li
a
m
 
E
n
si
g
n
, 
3
6
th
 
F
t.
, 
M
ar
ch
 
1
7
9
8
 
S
p
ai
n
 a
n
d
 
P
o
rt
u
g
al
, 
 
D
ep
u
ty
 
Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r 
G
en
er
al
  
P
o
rt
u
g
al
, 
1
8
0
9
 
L
t.
 4
6
th
 F
t.
, 
1
8
0
0
 
C
ap
t.
 7
0
th
 F
t.
, 
1
8
0
5
 
C
ap
t.
, 
8
th
 
G
ar
ri
so
n
 B
at
.,
 
1
8
0
8
 
C
ap
t.
 3
1
st
 F
t.
 
1
8
1
0
 
B
v
t.
 M
aj
. 
, 
1
8
1
2
 
L
t.
  
C
o
lo
n
el
, 
 
1
8
1
6
 
H
al
f-
p
ay
, 
3
1
st
 
F
t.
 
D
ep
u
ty
 
Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r 
G
en
er
al
 
N
o
v
a 
S
co
ti
a 
 
 
3
7
8
N
a
m
e 
D
a
te
 E
n
te
re
d
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
R
ec
o
rd
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
/P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
p
ri
o
r 
to
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
R
a
n
k
 i
n
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
st
in
g
 i
n
 
1
8
3
0
 
L
a
te
r 
C
a
re
er
 a
n
d
 D
ea
th
 
B
ri
sb
an
e,
 
C
h
ar
le
s,
 (
b
.)
 
1
7
6
9
 ?
, 
 f
o
u
rt
h
 
so
n
 o
f 
A
d
m
ir
al
 
Jo
h
n
 B
ri
sb
an
e 
 
/ 
S
tr
u
th
, 
W
il
li
a
m
 J
o
h
n
 
N
am
e 
en
te
re
d
 
o
n
 b
o
ar
d
 o
f 
th
e 
A
lc
id
e,
 
co
m
m
an
d
ed
 
b
y
 h
is
 f
at
h
er
. 
P
re
se
n
t 
at
 t
h
e 
b
at
tl
es
 o
f 
 
C
ap
e 
S
t.
 
V
in
ce
n
t,
 r
el
ie
f 
o
f 
G
ib
ra
lt
ar
, 
 
th
e 
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s 
(l
o
st
 e
y
e 
in
 
1
7
9
3
) 
M
ed
it
er
ra
n
ea
n
, 
1
7
9
3
  
C
ap
tu
re
 o
f 
D
u
tc
h
 s
h
ip
s 
in
 
S
al
d
an
h
a 
B
ay
, 
A
u
g
. 
1
7
9
6
 
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 
sl
o
o
p
, 
T
a
rl
to
n
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 
fr
ig
at
e,
 
O
is
e
a
u
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 
T
re
m
e
n
d
o
u
s,
 
1
7
9
7
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 
C
re
sc
e
n
t,
 
1
7
9
8
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 
A
re
th
u
sa
, 
1
8
0
5
-0
8
 
A
p
p
t.
 G
o
v
. 
o
f 
S
t.
 V
in
ce
n
t,
 
1
8
0
8
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
S
t.
 V
in
ce
n
t 
K
.C
.B
. 
Ja
n
. 
1
8
1
5
 
F
la
g
 r
an
k
, 
A
u
g
. 
1
8
1
9
 
D
ie
d
, 
1
8
2
9
 
C
am
p
b
el
l,
 
Ja
m
es
, 
(b
.)
 1
7
7
3
 
E
n
si
g
n
 i
n
 t
h
e 
 
1
st
 R
o
y
al
s,
 L
t.
, 
M
ar
ch
 1
7
9
4
 
C
ap
tu
re
 o
f 
M
in
o
ri
ca
 
Ir
el
an
d
, 
1
7
9
9
 
M
ad
ra
s,
 1
8
0
2
 
M
ah
ra
tt
a 
W
ar
 
B
at
tl
es
 o
f 
A
rg
au
m
, 
S
ie
g
e 
o
f 
G
aw
il
 G
h
u
r 
P
o
rt
u
g
al
, 
1
8
1
0
 
B
ri
g
ad
e 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
, 
 
P
en
in
su
la
 
1
8
1
0
-1
8
1
3
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 
G
ar
ri
so
n
 
C
ad
iz
. 
 
C
ap
t.
 4
2
n
d
 
H
ig
h
la
n
d
er
s,
. 
1
7
9
4
 
M
aj
. 
A
rg
y
le
 
F
en
c,
. 
1
7
9
9
 
C
ap
t.
 9
4
th
 F
t.
 
, 
1
8
0
2
 
M
aj
. 
9
4
th
 F
t.
, 
1
8
0
3
 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
. 
1
8
0
4
 
N
o
 a
ct
iv
e 
se
rv
ic
e 
in
 P
o
st
-
W
at
er
lo
o
 
p
er
io
d
. 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
 
G
re
n
ad
a 
 
K
.C
.B
. 
D
ec
. 
1
8
2
2
 
M
. 
G
.,
 A
u
g
u
st
 1
8
1
9
 
C
o
lo
n
el
, 
9
4
th
 F
t.
, 
A
u
g
u
st
 1
8
1
9
 
C
o
lo
n
el
, 
9
4
th
 F
t.
 1
8
3
4
 
C
o
lo
n
el
, 
7
4
th
 F
t.
 1
8
3
4
 
D
ie
d
, 
P
ar
is
 6
 M
ay
 1
8
3
5
  
C
o
ch
ra
n
e,
 
T
h
o
m
as
 J
o
h
n
, 
(b
.)
 5
 F
eb
. 
1
7
8
9
, 
so
n
 o
f 
A
d
m
ir
al
 S
ir
 
A
le
x
an
d
er
 
F
o
rr
es
te
r 
In
g
li
s 
C
o
ch
ra
n
e 
 
V
o
lu
n
te
er
 o
n
 
T
h
e
ti
s,
 1
7
9
6
 
V
ar
io
u
s 
fo
re
ig
n
 
st
at
io
n
s—
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s 
N
o
rt
h
 
A
m
er
ic
an
 
S
ta
ti
o
n
 
N
A
 
L
t.
 o
n
 J
as
o
n
, 
1
8
0
5
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
 
o
f 
th
e 
N
im
ro
d
, 
1
8
0
6
 
C
ap
t.
 o
f 
Ja
so
n
, 
1
8
0
6
 
H
.p
. 
1
8
1
0
-1
1
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 
S
u
rp
ri
se
, 
1
8
1
2
-1
8
1
5
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
  
F
o
rt
e,
 1
8
2
0
-
2
4
 
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
N
ew
fo
u
n
d
la
n
d
 
R
ea
r 
A
d
m
ir
al
, 
1
8
4
1
 
M
.P
. 
fo
r 
Ip
sw
ic
h
, 
1
8
3
9
 
2
n
d
 i
n
 C
o
m
m
an
d
 o
f 
C
h
in
a 
S
ta
ti
o
n
, 
1
8
4
2
 
C
 i
n
 C
 C
h
in
a 
S
ta
ti
o
n
, 
1
8
4
5
 
C
 i
n
 C
, 
P
o
rt
sm
o
u
th
, 
1
8
5
5
 
V
ic
e 
A
d
m
ir
al
, 
1
8
5
6
 
A
d
m
ir
al
 o
f 
F
le
et
, 
1
8
6
5
 
C
.B
. 
1
8
3
9
 
K
.C
.B
 1
8
4
7
 
G
.B
.B
. 
1
8
6
0
 
D
ie
d
, 
1
8
6
0
 
 
3
7
9
N
a
m
e 
D
a
te
 E
n
te
re
d
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
R
ec
o
rd
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
/P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
p
ri
o
r 
to
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
R
a
n
k
 i
n
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
st
in
g
 i
n
 
1
8
3
0
 
L
a
te
r 
C
a
re
er
 a
n
d
 D
ea
th
 
C
o
ch
ra
n
e,
 
W
il
li
a
m
, 
G
eo
rg
e 
1
3
 F
eb
. 
1
8
0
5
 
1
0
3
rd
 R
eg
t.
 
st
at
io
n
ed
 i
n
 
N
o
rt
h
 A
m
er
ic
a 
d
u
ri
n
g
 W
ar
 o
f 
1
8
1
2
 
U
n
k
n
o
w
n
 
1
0
3
 r
d
 F
t.
 
C
ap
t.
, 
1
8
1
3
 
M
aj
. 
1
8
1
4
 
H
.P
. 
in
 1
8
2
0
. 
 
L
t.
  
C
o
l.
  
 
1
8
2
4
 
In
sp
ec
ti
n
g
 
o
ff
ic
er
, 
M
il
it
ia
, 
N
o
v
a 
S
co
ti
a,
 
1
8
2
8
 
D
ep
u
ty
 
Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r 
G
en
er
al
, 
N
o
v
a 
S
co
ti
a 
 
N
o
v
a 
S
co
ti
a 
D
ie
d
, 
1
2
7
 P
ic
ad
il
ly
, 
L
o
n
d
o
n
, 
S
ep
te
m
b
er
, 
1
8
5
7
 
C
o
lb
o
rn
e,
 J
o
h
n
, 
(b
) 
1
6
 F
eb
. 
1
7
7
8
. 
O
n
ly
 s
o
n
 o
f 
S
am
u
el
 
C
o
lb
o
rn
e 
o
f 
L
y
n
d
h
u
rs
t,
 
H
am
p
sh
ir
e 
E
n
si
g
n
, 
2
0
th
 
F
t.
, 
Ju
ly
 1
7
9
4
 
E
g
y
p
t,
 1
8
0
1
 
M
al
ta
, 
 
S
ic
il
y
, 
 
B
at
tl
e 
o
f 
M
ai
d
a 
C
o
ru
n
n
a 
P
en
in
su
la
1
8
0
9
-
1
8
1
4
 
W
at
er
lo
o
, 
1
8
1
5
 
M
il
it
ar
y
 
S
ec
re
ta
ry
 t
o
 
S
ir
 J
o
h
n
 
M
o
o
re
 
 
L
t.
  
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
o
f 
G
u
er
n
se
y
  
L
t.
  
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
U
p
p
er
 C
an
ad
a 
H
ig
h
 C
o
m
m
is
si
o
n
er
 o
f 
Io
ni
an
 
Is
la
n
d
s,
 1
8
4
3
 
C
 i
n
 C
, 
Ir
el
an
d
, 
1
8
5
5
 
C
o
le
, 
G
al
b
ra
it
h
 
L
o
w
ry
, 
(b
.)
 
D
u
b
li
n
 1
 M
ay
 
1
7
7
2
, 
 
S
o
n
 o
f 
W
il
li
am
 
W
il
lo
u
g
h
b
y
 
C
o
le
, 
1
st
 E
ar
l 
o
f 
E
n
n
is
k
il
le
n
  
C
o
rn
et
, 
1
2
th
 
L
ig
h
t.
 
D
ra
g
o
o
n
s,
 
M
ar
. 
1
7
8
7
 
V
o
lu
n
te
er
, 
at
ta
ck
 o
n
 
M
ar
ti
n
iq
u
e,
 
1
7
9
4
 
G
u
ad
el
o
u
p
e 
an
d
 S
t.
 L
u
ci
a 
M
ai
d
a,
 J
u
ly
 
1
8
0
6
 
P
en
in
su
la
 
1
8
0
9
-1
4
 
(w
o
u
n
d
ed
) 
A
D
C
 t
o
 S
ir
 
C
h
ar
le
s 
G
re
y
’s
 s
ta
ff
 
A
d
j.
 G
en
. 
Ir
el
an
d
, 
A
D
C
 
to
 L
o
rd
 
C
ar
h
am
p
to
n
, 
1
7
9
7
 
M
il
it
ar
y
 
S
ec
re
ta
ry
, 
G
en
er
al
 
H
u
tc
h
in
so
n
, 
E
g
y
p
t,
 1
7
9
7
 
L
t.
  
5
th
 D
ra
g
. 
G
d
s,
 1
7
9
1
 
C
ap
t.
, 
7
0
th
 
F
t.
, 
1
7
9
2
 
M
aj
. 
 8
6
th
 F
t.
 
1
7
9
3
 
L
t.
  
C
o
l.
 
W
ar
d
’s
 R
eg
t.
 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
 
C
o
ld
st
re
am
 
G
d
s.
 
C
o
l.
 2
7
th
 F
t.
,.
 
1
8
0
1
 
M
. 
G
.,
 1
8
0
8
 
L
. 
G
.,
 1
8
1
3
 
M
.P
. 
Ir
is
h
 
H
o
u
se
 o
f 
C
o
m
m
o
n
s 
1
7
9
7
-
1
8
0
0
 
C
 i
n
 C
, 
M
al
ta
, 
1
8
0
5
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
M
au
ri
ti
u
s,
 1
8
2
3
-
2
8
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
C
ap
e 
C
o
lo
n
y
 
1
8
2
8
-1
8
3
3
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
o
f 
G
ra
v
es
en
d
 a
n
d
 
T
il
lb
u
ry
 1
8
1
8
-4
2
 
C
o
lo
n
el
, 
1
0
3
rd
 F
t.
 1
8
1
2
-1
4
 
C
o
lo
n
el
, 
7
0
th
 F
t.
, 
1
8
1
4
-1
6
 
C
o
lo
n
el
, 
3
4
th
 F
t.
 1
8
1
6
-2
6
 
C
o
lo
n
el
, 
2
7
th
 F
t.
 1
8
2
6
 
G
en
er
al
, 
1
8
3
0
 
D
ie
d
, 
H
ig
h
fi
el
d
 P
ar
k
, 
H
a
m
p
sh
ir
e,
 
O
ct
. 
1
8
4
2
 
C
o
tt
o
n
, 
S
ta
p
le
to
n
 (
b
.)
 
1
7
7
8
 
E
n
si
g
n
, 
1
7
9
0
 
2
3
 R
o
y
al
 
W
el
ch
 
F
u
si
li
er
s 
(w
it
h
o
u
t 
 
p
u
rc
h
as
e)
 
L
o
w
 C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s,
 
1
7
9
3
 
C
ap
e 
C
o
lo
n
y
, 
1
7
9
6
 
In
d
ia
, 
1
7
9
5
-
1
8
0
0
 
Ir
el
an
d
, 
1
8
0
3
-
1
8
0
7
? 
P
en
in
su
la
 
1
8
0
8
-1
4
 
   
1
st
 L
t.
 ,
 2
3
 
F
u
si
li
er
s,
 
1
7
9
1
 
C
ap
t.
, 
6
th
 
C
ar
b
ar
in
ie
rs
 
M
aj
. 
 5
9
th
 F
t.
, 
1
7
9
4
 
L
t.
  
C
o
lo
n
el
 
2
5
th
 L
ig
h
t 
D
ra
g
o
o
n
s,
 
1
7
9
4
 
C
o
lo
n
el
, 
1
8
0
0
 
M
. 
G
.,
 1
8
0
5
 
L
. 
G
.,
 1
8
1
2
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
o
f 
B
ar
b
ad
o
s,
 1
8
1
7
-
2
0
 
C
 i
n
 C
, 
Ir
el
an
d
, 
1
8
2
2
-2
5
 
C
 i
n
 C
, 
In
d
ia
, 
1
8
2
5
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
G
en
er
al
  
In
d
ia
  
V
is
co
u
n
t 
1
8
2
7
 
C
o
lo
n
el
, 
1
st
 L
if
e 
G
d
s.
, 
1
8
2
9
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
o
f 
S
h
ee
rn
es
s,
 1
8
2
1
-5
2
 
C
o
n
st
ab
le
 T
o
w
er
 o
f 
L
o
n
d
o
n
, 
1
8
5
3
 
F
ie
ld
 M
ar
sh
al
, 
1
8
5
5
 
D
ie
d
, 
F
eb
. 
1
8
6
5
 
C
o
n
se
rv
at
iv
e 
o
p
p
o
se
d
 C
at
h
o
li
c 
E
m
an
ci
p
at
io
n
. 
 
 
3
8
0
N
a
m
e 
D
a
te
 E
n
te
re
d
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
R
ec
o
rd
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
/P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
p
ri
o
r 
to
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
R
a
n
k
 i
n
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
st
in
g
 i
n
 
1
8
3
0
 
L
a
te
r 
C
a
re
er
 a
n
d
 D
ea
th
 
C
o
lt
h
u
rs
t,
 
Ja
m
es
 R
o
b
er
t 
1
3
 O
ct
. 
1
8
0
9
 
3
2
n
d
 R
eg
im
en
t 
at
 W
at
er
lo
o
 
U
n
k
n
o
w
n
 
L
t.
  
3
2
n
d
 R
eg
t.
  
O
ct
. 
1
8
0
9
 
S
u
b
 i
n
sp
ec
to
r 
o
f 
M
il
it
ia
 N
o
rt
h
 
A
m
er
ic
a 
S
u
b
 i
n
sp
ec
to
r 
o
f 
M
il
it
ia
 
Io
n
ia
n
 I
sl
an
d
s 
R
et
ir
ed
 o
n
 H
.p
.,
 C
ap
t.
, 
1
8
3
0
, 
B
at
ta
li
o
n
 –
M
aj
. 
, 
Ju
ly
 1
8
5
4
 
O
u
t 
o
f 
A
rm
y
 1
8
5
5
. 
C
o
lv
il
le
, 
C
h
ar
le
s,
 (
b
.)
 7
 
A
u
g
. 
1
7
7
0
 
S
o
n
 o
f 
G
en
er
al
 
Jo
h
n
 C
o
ll
b
il
le
 
o
f 
C
u
lr
o
ss
 
(S
co
t)
 
E
n
si
g
n
 2
8
th
 F
t.
 
D
ec
. 
1
7
8
1
 
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s,
 
1
7
9
1
-9
7
 
Ir
is
h
 
In
su
rr
ec
ti
o
n
, 
1
7
9
8
 
E
g
y
p
t 
1
8
0
0
-0
1
 
G
ib
ra
lt
ar
  
1
8
0
2
-0
5
 
B
er
m
u
d
a,
 1
8
0
8
 
M
ar
ti
n
iq
u
e,
 
1
8
0
9
 
P
en
in
su
la
, 
1
8
1
0
-1
1
 
V
it
to
ri
a,
 1
8
1
3
 
N
iv
el
le
 a
n
d
 
N
iv
e 
 
C
ap
t.
, 
1
3
th
 
S
o
m
er
se
ts
h
ir
e 
L
ig
h
t.
 
In
fa
n
tr
y
--
 
re
m
ai
n
ed
 
w
it
h
 r
eg
im
en
t 
1
9
 y
ea
rs
. 
M
aj
. 
, 
S
ep
te
m
b
er
 
1
7
9
5
 
B
ri
g
ad
ie
r 
G
en
er
al
, 
1
8
0
9
 
M
. 
G
.,
 1
8
1
0
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 i
n
 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
C
 i
n
 C
, 
B
o
m
b
ay
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
 
M
au
ri
ti
u
s 
 
G
en
er
al
, 
1
8
3
7
 
D
ie
d
, 
M
ar
ch
 2
7
, 
1
8
4
3
  
R
o
ss
ly
n
 H
o
u
se
, 
H
am
p
st
ea
d
 
C
o
n
y
er
s,
 
C
h
ar
le
s 
E
d
w
ar
d
 
E
n
si
g
n
 1
7
9
4
 
S
er
v
ed
 i
n
 
G
ib
ra
lt
ar
, 
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s,
 
M
in
o
rc
a,
 
Ir
el
an
d
, 
E
g
y
p
t—
st
o
rm
in
g
 o
f 
R
o
se
tt
a 
S
p
ai
n
—
B
at
tl
e 
o
f 
O
rt
h
es
 
 A
D
C
 t
o
 G
en
. 
W
au
ch
o
p
e 
S
ic
il
y
—
st
af
f 
o
ff
ic
er
 
B
ri
g
ad
e 
M
aj
. 
 
in
 S
p
ai
n
 
L
t.
 ,
. 
 
S
ep
te
m
b
er
 
1
7
9
5
, 
C
ap
t.
, 
Ju
n
e 
1
8
0
2
 
M
aj
. 
, 
F
eb
ru
ar
y
 
1
8
0
9
 
B
v
t.
 L
t.
  
C
o
lo
n
el
, 
M
ar
ch
 1
8
1
4
 
L
t.
  
C
o
lo
n
el
, 
8
2
n
d
 
R
eg
im
en
t,
 
A
p
ri
l 
1
8
2
0
 
 
In
sp
ec
ti
n
g
  
F
ie
ld
 O
ff
ic
er
 
o
f 
M
il
it
ia
  
M
ed
it
er
ra
n
ea
n
 
L
t.
  
G
en
..
  
C
o
lo
n
el
, 
9
6
th
 R
eg
im
en
t,
 1
8
5
2
 
 
3
8
1
N
a
m
e 
D
a
te
 E
n
te
re
d
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
R
ec
o
rd
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
/P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
p
ri
o
r 
to
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
R
a
n
k
 i
n
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
st
in
g
 i
n
 
1
8
3
0
 
L
a
te
r 
C
a
re
er
 a
n
d
 D
ea
th
 
C
ra
ig
, 
H
en
ry
, 
(b
.)
 1
7
8
3
?
 
E
n
si
g
n
 3
0
th
 
F
t.
, 
1
7
9
9
 
S
er
v
ed
 i
n
 
P
en
in
su
la
 
w
h
er
e 
w
o
u
n
d
ed
 
(T
al
av
er
a,
 
1
8
0
9
) 
A
D
C
 t
o
 
G
en
er
al
 
S
h
er
b
ro
o
k
e 
L
t.
 ,
 8
9
th
 F
t.
, 
1
8
0
1
 
H
.p
.,
 1
8
0
2
 
L
t.
 ,
 3
5
th
 F
t.
 
O
ct
o
b
er
, 
1
8
0
4
 
C
ap
t.
, 
S
ic
il
ia
n
 
R
eg
im
en
t,
 
1
8
0
8
 
C
ap
t.
, 
3
0
th
 
F
t.
, 
N
o
v
em
b
er
 
1
8
0
9
 
C
ap
t.
, 
1
0
2
n
d
 
an
d
 t
h
en
 1
0
0
th
 
F
t.
 1
8
1
5
 
H
.p
.,
 1
8
1
8
 
B
v
t.
 M
aj
. 
, 
1
8
2
5
 
L
t.
 C
o
lo
n
el
 
Ju
ly
 1
8
2
8
 
O
n
 s
ta
ff
 i
n
 
Ir
el
an
d
, 
P
o
rt
u
g
al
, 
an
d
 
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s 
D
ep
. 
A
d
j.
 
G
en
. 
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s 
M
ar
ri
ed
 i
n
 P
o
rt
sm
o
u
th
, 
H
am
p
sh
ir
e 
1
8
1
0
 
T
h
re
e 
ch
il
d
re
n
 i
n
 1
8
2
9
 
 
D
ar
li
n
g
, 
R
al
p
h
, 
(b
.)
 1
7
7
5
, 
so
n
 o
f 
C
h
ri
st
o
p
h
er
 
D
ar
li
n
g
, 
S
g
t.
 
M
aj
. 
af
te
rw
ar
d
s 
A
d
j.
 4
5
th
 F
t.
 
d
u
ri
n
g
 
A
m
er
ic
an
 W
ar
 
fo
r 
In
d
ep
en
d
en
ce
 
B
ro
th
er
 H
en
ry
 
C
h
ar
le
s 
D
ar
li
n
g
, 
L
t.
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
o
f 
T
o
b
ag
o
 i
n
 1
8
3
1
 
an
d
 W
il
li
a
m
 L
. 
D
ar
li
n
g
 
P
en
in
su
la
r 
an
d
 
W
at
er
lo
o
 
o
ff
ic
er
. 
A
p
p
o
in
te
d
 
en
si
g
n
 4
5
th
 F
t.
 
M
ay
 1
7
9
3
 
E
m
p
lo
y
ed
 a
t 
cu
st
o
m
 h
o
u
se
 
G
re
n
ad
a 
P
ar
ti
ci
p
at
ed
 i
n
 
G
re
n
ad
a 
In
su
rr
ec
ti
o
n
, 
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s,
 
S
u
ri
n
am
, 
1
7
9
9
 
D
an
is
h
 a
n
d
 
S
w
ed
is
h
 W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s,
 1
8
0
1
 
In
d
ia
, 
w
it
h
 6
9
st
 
F
t.
, 
6
5
th
 F
t.
  
S
p
ai
n
, 
1
8
0
8
 
W
al
ch
er
en
, 
1
8
0
9
 
  
A
d
ju
ta
n
t,
 1
5
th
 
F
t.
, 
1
7
9
6
 
M
S
 
A
b
er
cr
o
m
b
y
, 
1
7
9
6
 
M
S
. 
to
 
G
en
.G
ra
h
a
m
, 
M
o
rs
h
ea
d
, 
&
 
G
en
. 
C
u
y
le
r 
A
D
C
 t
o
 G
en
 
C
u
y
le
r 
M
il
. 
S
ec
. 
to
 
S
ir
 T
h
o
m
as
 
T
ig
g
e 
A
Q
G
 t
o
. 
H
o
m
e 
D
ep
u
ty
 
A
ss
t.
 A
d
j.
 
G
en
.,
 H
o
rs
e 
G
u
ar
d
s,
 1
8
0
6
 
D
A
G
, 
W
al
ch
er
en
, 
1
8
0
9
 
D
A
G
 H
o
rs
e 
G
d
s.
, 
1
8
1
4
 
L
t.
 ,
 4
5
th
 F
t.
 
S
ep
te
m
b
er
, 
1
7
9
5
 
T
ra
n
sf
er
re
d
 
1
5
th
 F
t.
 
A
u
g
u
st
, 
1
7
9
6
 
C
ap
t.
, 
S
ep
te
m
b
er
, 
1
7
9
6
 
M
aj
. 
, 
4
th
 
W
es
t 
In
d
ia
 
R
eg
im
en
t,
 
F
eb
ru
ar
y
, 
1
8
0
0
 
L
t.
 C
o
lo
n
el
, 
6
9
th
 F
t.
, 
Ju
ly
 
1
8
0
1
 
B
v
t.
 C
o
lo
n
el
, 
1
8
1
0
 
M
. 
G
.,
 1
8
1
3
 
L
. 
G
.,
  
1
8
2
5
 
 C
 i
n
 C
 
M
au
ri
ti
u
s,
 1
8
1
8
-
2
3
 
E
n
fo
rc
ed
 
su
p
p
re
ss
io
n
 o
f 
A
fr
ic
an
 S
la
v
e 
T
ra
d
e 
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
N
ew
 S
o
u
th
 
W
al
es
 (
a 
ri
g
id
 
d
is
ci
p
li
n
ar
ia
n
) 
 
N
o
 f
u
rt
h
er
 s
er
v
ic
e 
af
te
r 
N
ew
 
S
o
u
th
 W
al
es
  
G
en
er
al
 N
o
v
em
b
er
, 
1
8
4
1
 
H
el
d
 i
n
 s
u
cc
es
si
o
n
 t
h
e 
co
lo
n
el
cy
 
o
f 
9
0
th
, 
4
1
st
, 
an
d
 6
9
th
 F
t.
 
D
ie
d
, 
B
ru
n
sw
ic
k
 S
q
.,
 B
ri
g
h
to
n
, 
A
p
ri
l 
2
, 
1
8
5
8
. 
 
 
3
8
2
N
a
m
e 
D
a
te
 E
n
te
re
d
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
R
ec
o
rd
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
/P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
p
ri
o
r 
to
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
R
a
n
k
 i
n
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
st
in
g
 i
n
 
1
8
3
0
 
L
a
te
r 
C
a
re
er
 a
n
d
 D
ea
th
 
D
ic
k
so
n
, 
Je
rm
ia
h
, 
p
ar
en
ta
g
e 
u
n
k
n
o
w
n
 
C
o
rn
et
 2
n
d
 
D
ra
g
o
o
n
 G
d
s.
, 
1
7
9
8
 
 
A
ss
is
ta
n
t 
Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r 
G
en
er
al
 i
n
 
P
en
in
su
la
 
C
o
l.
, 
M
ay
 
1
8
2
5
 
Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r 
G
en
er
al
, 
In
d
ia
 
ap
p
o
in
tm
en
t 
b
eg
an
 1
8
2
7
 
Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r 
G
en
er
al
  
In
d
ia
 
M
. 
G
.,
 1
8
3
7
 
C
o
lo
n
el
, 
6
1
st
 F
t.
, 
1
8
4
4
 
D
ie
d
, 
M
ar
ch
. 
1
8
4
8
 
D
o
u
g
la
s,
 
H
o
w
ar
d
 (
b
.)
 
G
o
sp
o
rt
 1
7
7
6
, 
so
n
 o
f 
3
rd
 
B
ar
o
n
et
 o
f 
C
ar
r,
 
P
er
th
sh
ir
e,
 S
ir
 
C
h
ar
le
s 
D
o
u
g
la
s 
C
ad
et
, 
R
o
y
al
 
M
il
it
ar
y
 
A
ca
d
em
y
, 
Ju
n
e 
1
7
9
0
 
2
n
d
 L
t.
 R
o
y
al
 
A
rt
il
le
ry
, 
Ja
n
. 
1
7
9
4
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 
ar
ti
ll
er
y
, 
N
o
rt
h
er
n
 D
is
t.
  
H
al
if
ax
/Q
u
eb
ec
 
1
7
9
5
-1
7
9
9
 
S
er
v
ed
 w
it
h
 
R
H
A
 a
n
d
 
C
o
n
g
re
v
e 
m
o
rt
ar
 b
ri
g
ad
e,
 
1
8
0
3
-0
4
 
S
p
ai
n
, 
1
8
0
8
 
 
A
d
ju
ta
n
t 
5
th
  
B
at
. 
R
.A
.,
 
1
7
9
9
-1
8
0
1
 
A
ss
is
ta
n
t 
Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r 
G
en
er
al
, 
S
ir
 
Jo
h
n
 M
o
o
re
, 
S
p
ai
n
 1
8
0
8
 
W
al
ch
er
en
, 
1
8
0
9
 
M
il
it
ar
y
/ 
d
ip
lo
m
at
ic
 
m
is
si
o
n
 t
o
 
S
p
ai
n
, 
 
P
en
in
su
la
, 
1
8
1
2
 
C
ap
t.
/L
t.
 
R
.A
.,
 O
ct
. 
1
7
9
9
 
C
ap
t.
, 
1
8
0
4
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
an
t/
 
In
st
ru
ct
o
r 
M
il
it
ar
y
 
C
o
ll
eg
e,
 H
ig
h
 
W
y
co
m
b
e,
 
1
8
0
4
 
In
st
ru
ct
o
r 
R
o
y
al
 
M
il
it
ar
y
 
C
o
ll
eg
e,
 1
8
1
3
 
A
u
th
o
r 
 
L
t.
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
N
ew
 
B
ru
n
sw
ic
k
 
T
o
ry
 (
co
n
se
rv
at
iv
e)
  
L
o
rd
 H
ig
h
 
C
o
m
m
is
si
o
n
er
 
Io
n
ia
n
 I
sl
an
d
s,
 1
8
3
5
 
L
. 
G
. 
1
8
3
7
 
C
o
lo
n
el
 9
9
th
 F
t.
, 
1
8
4
1
 
C
o
lo
n
el
 1
5
th
 F
t.
, 
1
8
5
1
 
G
en
er
al
, 
. 
1
8
5
1
 
M
.P
. 
L
iv
er
p
o
o
l,
 1
8
4
2
 
C
h
am
p
io
n
ed
 e
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 i
n
 
m
il
it
ar
y
, 
1
8
5
5
 
A
u
th
o
r 
m
an
y
 p
u
b
li
ca
ti
o
n
s 
d
. 
1
8
6
1
 
D
o
u
g
la
s,
 J
am
es
, 
(b
.)
 1
4
 J
an
. 
1
7
8
5
 
E
ld
er
 s
o
n
 o
f 
M
aj
. 
Ja
m
es
 
S
h
o
lt
o
 D
o
u
g
la
s,
 
w
h
o
 w
as
 f
ir
st
 
co
u
si
n
 o
f 
th
e 
5
th
 
an
d
 6
th
 
M
ar
w
u
is
es
s 
o
f 
Q
u
ee
n
sb
er
ry
  
E
n
si
g
n
 i
n
 4
2
n
d
 
F
t.
  
S
o
u
th
 A
m
er
ic
a 
1
8
0
6
 
P
en
in
su
la
, 
1
8
0
8
-1
8
1
4
 
O
n
 s
ta
ff
 o
f 
\M
. 
G
. 
.J
am
es
 
D
u
ff
 
co
m
m
an
d
er
 
L
im
er
ic
k
  
D
ep
u
ty
 
A
A
Q
G
, 
S
o
u
th
 
A
m
er
ic
a,
 
1
8
0
6
 
D
A
Q
G
 S
p
ai
n
 
1
8
0
8
 
L
t.
 1
8
0
1
 a
n
d
 
jo
in
ed
 R
o
y
al
 
M
il
it
ar
y
 
C
o
ll
eg
e,
 
G
re
at
 M
ar
lo
w
 
C
ap
t.
 1
8
0
4
 
M
aj
. 
1
8
0
9
 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
 8
th
 
P
o
rt
. 
R
eg
t.
 
1
8
0
9
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
 o
f 
P
o
rt
. 
B
ri
g
. 
1
8
1
1
 
(w
o
u
n
d
ed
) 
C
o
l.
 1
8
1
9
 
D
ep
. 
Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r 
G
en
. 
1
8
1
5
-2
2
, 
S
co
tl
an
d
 
D
ep
. 
Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r 
G
en
. 
1
8
2
5
-3
0
 
Ir
el
an
d
 
M
. 
G
. 
1
8
3
0
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
 S
o
u
th
w
es
te
rn
 
D
is
tr
ic
t,
 I
re
la
n
d
 
L
t.
  
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 G
u
er
n
se
y
, 
1
8
3
7
-
4
2
 
L
. 
G
.,
 1
8
3
8
 
G
.C
.B
.,
 1
8
6
0
 
C
o
lo
n
el
. 
9
3
rd
 F
t.
, 
1
8
4
0
 
C
o
lo
n
el
 4
2
n
d
 F
t.
, 
1
8
5
0
 
G
en
er
al
, 
1
8
5
4
 
D
ie
d
, 
C
li
ft
o
n
 6
 M
ar
ch
 1
8
6
6
 
 
3
8
3
N
a
m
e 
D
a
te
 E
n
te
re
d
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
R
ec
o
rd
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
/P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
p
ri
o
r 
to
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
R
a
n
k
 i
n
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
st
in
g
 i
n
 
1
8
3
0
 
L
a
te
r 
C
a
re
er
 a
n
d
 D
ea
th
 
D
ra
k
e,
 T
h
o
m
as
 
L
t.
 1
8
0
0
 
S
er
v
ed
 i
n
 
S
p
ai
n
 a
n
d
 
P
o
rt
u
g
al
 
A
D
C
 t
o
 
G
en
er
al
 
S
p
en
ce
r 
D
ep
. 
A
ss
t.
 
Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r 
G
en
er
al
 1
8
1
2
 
2
n
d
 L
t.
 9
5
th
 
F
t.
, 
A
p
ri
l 
1
8
0
5
 
1
st
 L
t.
, 
M
ay
 
1
8
0
6
 
C
ap
t.
 
C
an
ad
ia
n
 
F
en
ci
b
le
s,
 
M
ay
 1
8
0
7
 
C
ap
t.
 9
5
th
 
1
8
0
8
 
B
v
t.
 M
aj
. 
A
p
ri
l 
1
8
1
3
 
A
Q
G
, 
Ir
el
an
d
 
 
D
ep
t.
 
Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r 
G
en
er
al
  
Ir
el
an
d
, 
1
8
3
0
 
 
E
ck
er
sl
ey
, 
N
at
h
an
ie
l 
A
d
j.
 1
st
 
D
ra
g
o
o
n
s,
 
A
u
g
. 
1
8
0
0
 
S
er
v
ed
 i
n
 
P
en
in
su
la
 
B
ri
g
ad
e 
M
aj
. 
 
to
 M
.G
. 
S
la
d
e,
 1
8
0
9
 
D
ep
t.
 A
ss
t.
 
A
d
j.
 G
en
. 
in
 
F
ra
n
ce
  
C
o
rn
et
 J
u
n
e 
1
8
0
2
 
L
t.
, 
S
ep
t.
 
1
8
0
4
 
C
ap
t.
 O
ct
. 
1
8
1
1
 
B
v
t.
 M
aj
. 
Ju
n
e 
1
8
1
7
 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
 1
8
2
7
 
S
ta
ff
 o
f 
Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r 
G
en
er
al
  
D
ep
u
ty
 
Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r 
G
en
er
al
 
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s 
 
F
ar
q
u
h
ar
so
n
, 
Ja
m
es
 
A
le
x
an
d
er
, 
(b
.)
 
1
7
7
5
, 
O
ak
le
y
, 
F
if
es
h
ir
e 
A
p
p
t.
 L
t.
 2
5
th
 
F
t.
, 
Ju
n
e 
1
7
9
4
 
2
5
th
 F
t.
 s
er
v
ed
 
M
ad
ei
ra
, 
1
8
0
7
 
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s,
 
1
8
0
9
-1
5
 
S
er
v
ed
 u
n
d
er
 
S
ir
 J
a
m
es
 L
ei
th
 
at
 t
h
e 
co
n
q
u
es
t 
o
f 
G
u
ad
al
o
u
p
e,
 
1
8
1
5
 
U
n
k
n
o
w
n
  
C
ap
t.
 J
u
n
e 
1
7
9
6
 
M
aj
. 
Ju
ly
 
1
8
0
3
 
B
v
t.
 L
t.
 C
o
l.
 
Ju
ly
 1
8
1
0
 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
 2
5
th
 
F
t.
 J
u
n
e 
1
8
1
3
 
B
v
t.
 C
o
l.
 
A
u
g
. 
1
8
1
9
 
C
iv
il
 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
o
f 
S
t.
 
M
aa
rt
en
s 
 1
8
1
3
-
1
4
, 
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
o
f 
S
t.
 
M
aa
rt
en
s 
1
8
1
5
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
 
S
t.
 L
u
ci
a 
1
8
3
0
-3
1
 
S
t.
 L
u
ci
a 
1
8
3
2
-3
4
  
M
. 
G
. 
A
rm
y
 
m
. 
R
eb
ec
ca
 (
d
au
 a
n
d
 c
o
-h
ei
r 
o
f 
S
ir
 G
eo
rg
e 
C
o
lo
q
h
o
u
n
 B
ar
o
n
 o
f 
T
u
ll
y
 C
o
lq
u
h
o
u
n
. 
D
ie
d
, 
1
8
3
4
 
F
in
d
la
y
, 
A
le
x
an
d
er
 
E
n
te
re
d
 a
rm
y
 
as
 p
ri
v
at
e.
  
E
n
si
g
n
, 
2
n
d
 
W
es
t 
In
d
ia
n
 
R
eg
t.
, 
1
8
1
4
 
C
ap
t.
, 
O
ct
.,
 
1
8
2
1
 
M
aj
. 
R
o
y
al
 
A
fr
ic
an
 C
o
rp
s,
 
1
8
2
6
 
H
.p
. 
1
8
2
9
 
 
 
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
S
ie
rr
a 
L
eo
n
e 
 
F
o
rt
 M
aj
. 
, 
F
o
rt
 G
eo
rg
e,
 
In
v
er
n
es
s,
 1
8
4
7
 
D
ie
d
, 
In
v
er
n
es
s,
 1
0
 M
ay
, 
1
8
5
1
 
 
3
8
4
N
a
m
e 
D
a
te
 E
n
te
re
d
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
R
ec
o
rd
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
/P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
p
ri
o
r 
to
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
R
a
n
k
 i
n
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
st
in
g
 i
n
 
1
8
3
0
 
L
a
te
r 
C
a
re
er
 a
n
d
 D
ea
th
 
F
it
zr
o
y
, 
C
h
ar
le
s 
A
u
g
u
st
u
s,
 (
b
.)
 
1
0
 J
u
n
e 
1
7
9
6
, 
o
n
ly
 s
o
n
 o
f 
G
en
er
al
 C
h
ar
le
s 
F
it
zr
o
y
 
A
p
p
t.
 O
ct
. 
1
8
1
2
 
L
t.
 R
o
y
al
 
H
o
rs
e 
G
d
s,
 
1
8
1
5
 
C
ap
t.
 R
o
y
al
 
H
o
rs
e 
G
d
s,
 
1
8
2
0
 
H
.p
. 
Ju
n
e 
1
8
2
5
 
A
tt
ac
h
ed
 t
o
 
st
af
f 
A
D
C
 t
o
 
V
iv
ia
n
 
H
u
ss
ey
, 
1
8
1
5
 
W
at
er
lo
o
, 
1
8
1
5
 
 
D
ep
. 
A
d
j.
 
G
en
. 
  
C
ap
e 
o
f 
G
o
o
d
 
H
o
p
e 
M
.P
. 
B
u
ry
 S
t.
 E
d
m
o
n
d
s,
 1
8
2
5
 
L
t.
 .
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
. 
P
ri
n
ce
 E
d
w
ar
d
 
Is
la
n
d
.,
 1
8
3
1
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 L
ee
w
ar
d
 I
s.
 1
8
4
1
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 .
N
ew
 S
o
u
th
 W
al
es
, 
1
8
4
6
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
G
en
er
al
, 
A
u
st
ra
li
a,
 
1
8
5
0
 
D
ie
d
, 
P
ic
ca
d
il
ly
, 
L
o
n
d
o
n
, 
1
8
5
8
 
 F
it
zr
o
y
, 
C
h
ar
le
s,
 b
. 
2
8
 
F
eb
. 
1
7
9
1
, 
so
n
 
o
f 
th
e 
D
u
k
e 
o
f 
G
ra
ft
o
n
 
E
n
si
g
n
, 
1
st
 F
t.
 
G
d
s.
, 
Ju
n
e 
1
8
0
7
 
E
d
u
ca
te
d
 a
t 
H
ar
ro
w
 a
n
d
 
G
re
at
 M
ar
lo
w
 
L
t.
an
d
 C
ap
t.
 1
st
 
F
t.
 G
d
s.
, 
S
ep
t.
 
1
8
1
2
 
B
v
t.
 M
aj
.,
 J
u
n
e 
1
8
1
5
 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
 1
8
1
9
 
M
aj
. 
5
5
th
 F
t.
 
Ju
n
e 
1
8
2
0
 
H
.p
. 
D
ep
u
ty
 A
ss
t.
 
A
d
j.
 G
en
.,
 
1
8
1
2
 
P
en
in
su
la
 
W
at
er
lo
o
, 
1
8
1
5
 
 
In
sp
ec
ti
n
g
 
F
ie
ld
 O
ff
ic
er
 
Io
n
ia
n
 I
sl
an
d
s 
S
o
ld
 o
u
t 
1
8
3
4
 
M
.P
. 
fo
r 
T
h
et
fo
rd
, 
1
8
1
8
 
M
.P
. 
fo
r 
B
u
ry
, 
1
8
3
2
 
V
ic
e 
C
h
am
b
er
la
in
 o
f 
th
e 
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
, 
1
8
3
5
 
P
.C
. 
Ju
ly
 1
8
3
5
. 
D
ie
d
, 
E
lm
 L
o
d
g
e,
 H
am
p
to
n
, 
Ju
n
e 
1
8
6
5
 
F
ra
se
r,
 J
o
h
n
 
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
in
 
K
an
d
y
ia
n
 W
ar
  
R
o
b
er
t 
B
ro
w
n
ri
g
g
’s
  
A
D
C
, 
G
o
v
. 
o
f 
C
ey
lo
n
  
1
8
1
1
-
1
8
1
8
 
C
ap
t.
 1
st
 
C
ey
lo
n
 
R
eg
im
en
t 
2
8
th
 
Ja
n
u
ar
y
 1
8
1
3
; 
B
v
t.
 M
aj
. 
. 
 
O
ct
o
b
er
 
1
8
1
8
. 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
 i
n
 
1
8
3
1
 
 
D
ep
. 
Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r 
G
en
er
al
 
 C
ey
lo
n
 
  
F
u
ll
er
to
n
, 
R
o
b
er
t,
 (
b
.)
 
1
7
7
3
, 
 S
co
t 
 
 
 
 
A
p
p
o
in
te
d
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
o
f 
S
tr
ai
ts
 
S
et
tl
em
en
ts
 
1
8
2
6
-1
8
3
0
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
S
tr
ai
ts
 
S
et
tl
em
en
ts
 
D
ie
d
, 
1
8
3
1
 
 
3
8
5
N
a
m
e 
D
a
te
 E
n
te
re
d
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
R
ec
o
rd
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
/P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
p
ri
o
r 
to
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
R
a
n
k
 i
n
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
st
in
g
 i
n
 
1
8
3
0
 
L
a
te
r 
C
a
re
er
 a
n
d
 D
ea
th
 
G
ar
d
in
er
, 
Jo
h
n
, 
(b
.)
  
1
7
7
7
 
S
o
n
 o
f 
Jo
h
n
 
G
ar
d
in
er
 3
rd
 F
t.
  
A
p
p
t.
 e
n
si
g
n
 
3
rd
 F
t.
 1
7
9
1
 
L
o
w
 C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s 
w
it
h
 L
o
rd
 
M
o
ir
a 
an
d
 
D
u
k
e 
o
f 
Y
o
rk
 
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s 
w
it
h
 
A
b
er
cr
o
m
b
y
  
S
to
rm
in
g
 o
f 
G
re
n
ad
a 
W
al
ch
er
en
 
B
ri
g
ad
e 
C
o
m
m
an
d
—
S
p
ai
n
, 
B
at
tl
es
 
o
f 
N
iv
el
le
 a
n
d
 
O
rt
h
es
 
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s-
st
af
f 
A
ss
t.
 
Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r 
G
en
er
al
 a
n
d
 
B
ri
g
ad
e 
M
aj
. 
 
A
ss
t.
 A
d
j.
 
G
en
.—
W
al
ch
er
en
 
A
ss
t.
 A
d
j.
 
G
en
. 
H
o
rs
e 
G
d
s.
  
S
er
v
ic
e 
in
 
L
o
w
 
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s 
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s,
 
1
7
9
5
 
W
al
ch
er
en
, 
1
8
0
9
 
S
p
ai
n
, 
1
8
1
3
-
1
8
1
4
 
U
n
k
n
o
w
n
 
D
ep
. 
A
d
j.
 
G
en
. 
  
Ir
el
an
d
 
D
ep
. 
A
d
j.
 G
en
.,
 H
o
rs
e 
G
u
ar
d
s,
 
1
8
3
0
-1
8
4
1
 
C
o
lo
n
el
. 
6
1
st
 F
t.
 1
8
4
0
 
C
o
lo
n
el
. 
5
0
th
 F
t.
 1
8
4
4
 
C
o
lo
n
el
. 
6
th
 F
t.
, 
1
8
4
9
 
L
. 
G
.,
 N
o
v
. 
1
8
4
1
 
K
.C
.B
. 
1
9
 J
u
ly
 1
8
3
8
 
D
ie
d
, 
E
at
o
n
 P
la
ce
, 
L
o
n
d
o
n
, 
6
 
Ju
n
e 
1
8
5
1
 
G
o
re
, 
C
h
ar
le
s 
S
te
p
h
en
, 
(b
.)
 
1
7
9
3
 
S
o
n
 o
f 
A
rt
h
u
r 
G
o
re
, 
2
n
d
 E
ar
l 
o
f 
A
rr
an
 
C
o
rn
et
 1
6
th
 L
t.
 
D
ra
g
. 
O
ct
. 
1
8
0
8
 
W
en
t 
to
 
P
en
in
su
la
 1
8
1
1
 
P
ar
ti
ci
p
at
ed
 i
n
 
st
o
rm
in
g
 o
f 
F
o
rt
 S
an
 
F
ra
n
ci
sc
o
, 
C
iu
d
ad
 
R
o
d
ri
g
o
, 
S
al
am
an
ca
, 
V
it
to
ri
a,
 
W
at
er
lo
o
 
A
D
C
 t
o
 S
ir
 
A
n
d
re
w
 
B
ar
n
ar
d
, 
 
A
D
C
 t
o
 S
ir
 
Ja
m
es
 K
em
p
t 
P
en
in
su
la
, 
N
o
rt
h
 
A
m
er
ic
a,
  
W
at
er
lo
o
 
N
o
n
e 
D
ep
. 
Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r 
G
en
. 
 
C
an
ad
a,
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
l.
 9
1
st
 F
t.
, 
A
u
g
 1
8
5
5
 
C
o
l.
 6
th
 F
t.
, 
9
 M
ar
ch
 1
8
6
1
 
G
en
. 
1
8
6
3
 
G
o
v
. 
o
f 
C
h
el
se
a 
H
o
sp
it
al
, 
1
8
6
8
 
C
.B
. 
1
8
3
8
 
K
.C
.B
. 
1
8
6
0
 
G
.C
.B
. 
1
8
6
7
 
K
.H
. 
1
8
3
6
 
D
ie
d
, 
C
h
el
se
a 
H
o
sp
it
al
, 
S
ep
t.
 
1
8
6
9
 
H
ar
ri
s,
 H
ar
ry
 
B
u
lt
ee
l 
C
o
rn
et
 1
7
th
 
D
ra
g
. 
A
u
g
 
1
7
9
9
 
 
 
L
t.
 1
8
0
1
 
L
t.
 5
7
th
 F
t.
, 
1
8
0
4
 
C
ap
t.
 7
2
n
d
 F
t.
 
1
8
0
7
 
B
v
t.
 M
aj
.,
 
1
8
1
4
 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
 1
8
1
8
 
N
o
v
a 
S
co
ti
a 
D
ep
. 
A
d
j.
 
G
en
.,
 1
8
1
8
 
N
o
v
a 
S
co
ti
a 
 
 
3
8
6
N
a
m
e 
D
a
te
 E
n
te
re
d
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
R
ec
o
rd
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
/P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
p
ri
o
r 
to
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
R
a
n
k
 i
n
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
st
in
g
 i
n
 
1
8
3
0
 
L
a
te
r 
C
a
re
er
 a
n
d
 D
ea
th
 
H
il
l,
 T
h
o
m
as
 
N
o
el
, 
(b
.)
 2
4
 
F
eb
. 
1
7
8
4
 
S
o
n
 o
f 
S
ir
 J
o
h
n
 
H
il
l,
 B
ar
o
n
 a
n
d
 
b
ro
th
er
 t
o
 L
o
rd
 
H
il
l.
 
C
o
rn
et
. 
1
0
th
 
D
ra
g
o
o
n
s 
S
ep
t.
 1
8
0
1
 
P
en
in
su
la
, 
w
it
h
 
P
o
rt
u
g
u
es
e 
A
rm
y
 
B
at
tl
e 
o
f 
B
u
sa
co
, 
si
eg
e 
o
f 
C
iu
d
ad
 
R
o
d
ri
g
o
, 
S
al
am
an
ca
, 
V
it
to
ri
a,
 s
ie
g
e 
o
f 
S
t.
 S
eb
as
ti
an
 
W
at
er
lo
o
 
A
ss
t.
 A
d
j.
 
G
en
. 
F
la
n
d
er
s 
an
d
 F
ra
n
ce
, 
1
8
1
5
? 
L
t.
, 
F
eb
. 
1
8
0
3
 
C
ap
t.
, 
F
eb
. 
1
8
0
5
 
C
ap
t.
, 
5
3
rd
 
F
t.
, 
A
p
ri
l 
1
8
0
6
 
M
aj
. 
P
o
rt
u
g
u
es
e 
A
rm
y
, 
F
eb
. 
1
8
0
9
 
B
v
t.
 L
t.
 C
o
l.
 
O
ct
. 
1
8
1
1
 
C
ap
t.
/L
t.
 C
o
l.
 
G
re
n
. 
G
d
s.
 
Ju
ly
 1
8
1
4
 
 
D
ep
. 
A
d
j.
 
G
en
. 
 
C
an
ad
a 
S
u
cc
ee
d
ed
 S
ir
 J
o
h
n
 B
ro
w
n
 
co
m
m
an
d
 o
f 
ca
v
al
ry
 d
ep
o
t 
M
ai
d
st
o
n
e,
 
D
ie
d
, 
8
 J
an
. 
1
8
3
2
, 
M
ai
d
st
o
n
e.
  
H
il
l,
 G
eo
rg
e 
F
it
zg
er
al
d
 
C
iv
il
ia
n
  
N
A
  
N
A
 
N
A
 
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
S
t.
 V
in
ce
n
t 
&
 
G
re
n
ad
in
es
 
 
H
il
li
er
, 
G
eo
rg
e 
E
n
si
g
n
 2
9
th
 F
t.
 
M
ar
. 
1
8
0
9
 
P
o
ss
ib
ly
 s
er
v
ed
 
in
 P
en
in
su
la
 
w
it
h
 2
9
th
 a
n
d
 
7
4
th
 F
t.
  
 
L
t.
 M
ay
 1
8
1
0
 
C
ap
t.
 J
u
ly
 
1
8
1
2
 
C
ap
t.
 7
4
th
 F
t.
, 
Ju
ly
 1
8
1
3
 
B
v
t.
 M
aj
. 
Ju
n
e 
1
8
1
7
 
S
er
v
ed
 i
n
 
C
an
ad
a 
as
 A
D
C
 
to
 S
ir
 P
. 
M
ai
tl
an
d
  
D
ep
t.
 
Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r 
G
en
er
al
  
Ja
m
ai
ca
  
C
o
lo
n
el
 6
2
n
d
 F
t.
 
D
ie
d
, 
B
en
g
al
 1
5
 J
u
n
e 
1
8
4
0
 
 
3
8
7
N
a
m
e 
D
a
te
 E
n
te
re
d
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
R
ec
o
rd
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
/P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
p
ri
o
r 
to
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
R
a
n
k
 i
n
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
st
in
g
 i
n
 
1
8
3
0
 
L
a
te
r 
C
a
re
er
 a
n
d
 D
ea
th
 
K
em
p
t,
 J
am
es
, 
(b
.)
 1
7
6
3
-6
4
?
 
E
d
in
b
u
rg
h
 
S
o
n
 o
f 
G
av
in
 
K
em
p
t.
 
E
n
si
g
n
 1
0
1
st
 
F
t.
 1
7
8
3
 
H
o
ll
an
d
 a
n
d
 
M
ed
it
er
ra
n
ea
n
 
1
7
9
0
s 
E
g
y
p
t.
 1
8
0
1
-0
3
 
N
ap
le
s 
an
d
 
S
ic
il
y
, 
1
8
0
5
-0
6
 
 
In
sp
ec
ti
n
g
 
F
ld
. 
O
ff
ic
er
, 
G
la
sg
o
w
, 
1
7
9
5
 
A
D
C
 t
o
 
A
b
er
cr
o
m
b
y
, 
1
7
9
9
, 
 
S
ta
ff
 H
el
y
-
H
u
tc
h
in
so
n
, 
1
8
0
1
-0
3
 
A
D
C
 D
av
id
 
D
u
n
d
as
, 
 
Q
M
G
, 
N
o
rt
h
 
A
m
er
ic
a,
 
1
8
0
7
-1
8
1
1
 
 W
el
li
n
g
to
n
’s
 
P
en
. 
A
rm
y
, 
1
8
1
1
-1
4
 
N
o
rt
h
 A
m
er
. 
1
8
1
4
 
L
t.
 1
7
8
4
, 
1
0
1
st
  
F
t.
  
H
.p
. 
1
7
8
4
-9
4
 
C
ap
t.
 a
n
d
 
M
aj
. 
1
1
3
th
 F
t.
 
1
7
9
4
 
H
.p
. 
1
7
9
6
 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
 8
1
st
 
F
t.
, 
1
8
0
5
 
C
o
l.
 1
8
0
9
 
M
.G
. 
1
8
1
1
 
 
L
t.
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
F
o
rt
 W
il
li
am
, 
1
8
1
3
 
L
t.
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
P
o
rt
sm
o
u
th
, 
1
8
1
9
 C
o
l.
 6
0
th
 
F
t.
 1
8
1
3
 
C
o
l.
 3
rd
 W
.I
. 
R
eg
t.
 1
8
1
8
 
C
o
l.
 8
1
st
 F
t.
 
1
8
1
9
 
C
o
l.
 4
0
th
 F
t.
 
1
8
2
9
  
K
C
B
 a
n
d
 G
C
B
 
1
8
1
5
 
L
t.
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
N
o
v
a 
S
co
ti
a,
 
1
8
1
9
 
M
il
it
ar
y
 
M
is
si
o
n
 i
n
 
U
p
p
er
 C
an
ad
a 
(R
id
ea
u
 C
an
al
),
 
1
8
2
8
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
L
o
w
er
 C
an
ad
a 
M
as
t.
 G
en
. 
O
rd
n
an
ce
, 
1
8
3
0
 
S
ta
y
ed
 o
u
t 
o
f 
p
o
li
ti
cs
. 
R
o
y
al
 C
o
m
m
is
si
o
n
 o
n
 M
il
it
ar
y
 
P
u
n
is
h
m
en
ts
 a
n
d
 C
iv
il
 
A
d
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n
 o
f 
A
rm
y
, 
1
8
3
3
-3
4
 
R
et
ir
ed
, 
D
ec
. 
1
8
3
4
 
M
en
ti
o
n
ed
 f
o
r 
p
o
st
s 
in
 C
an
ad
a,
 
1
8
3
5
 a
n
d
 1
8
3
7
. 
D
ie
d
, 
u
n
m
ar
ri
ed
, 
2
0
 D
ec
. 
1
8
5
4
. 
K
en
n
ed
y
, 
Jo
h
n
 
P
it
t,
 (
b
.)
 8
 M
ay
 
1
7
9
6
, 
4
th
 s
o
n
 o
f 
R
ev
. 
Jo
h
n
 P
it
t 
K
en
n
ed
y
, 
co
. 
D
o
n
eg
al
 
2
n
d
 L
t.
 R
o
y
al
 
E
n
g
in
ee
rs
, 
S
ep
t.
 1
8
1
5
 
 
S
ec
re
ta
ry
 t
o
 
S
ir
 C
h
ar
le
s 
N
ap
ie
r 
 
O
n
 H
.p
. 
M
ay
 
1
8
2
2
 
1
st
 L
t.
 R
.E
.,
 
1
8
2
5
 
 
C
ep
h
al
o
n
ia
 
D
ir
ec
to
r 
o
f 
P
u
b
li
c 
W
o
rk
s,
  
co
n
st
ru
ct
ed
 a
 
sm
al
l 
h
ar
b
o
r 
o
n
 
ea
st
er
n
 s
id
e 
o
f 
is
la
n
d
. 
S
an
ta
 
M
au
ra
. 
C
ep
h
al
o
n
ia
, 
1
8
2
2
 
S
u
b
-i
n
sp
ec
to
r 
o
f 
M
il
it
ia
, 
Io
n
ia
n
 
Is
la
n
d
s,
 1
8
2
8
 
Io
n
ia
n
 
Is
la
n
d
s 
In
sp
ec
to
r 
G
en
er
al
 N
at
io
n
al
 
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
al
 D
ep
t.
 I
re
la
n
d
, 
1
8
3
7
 
A
g
en
t 
to
 L
o
rd
 D
ev
o
n
’s
 e
st
at
es
, 
1
8
4
3
 
S
ec
. 
to
 I
ri
sh
 F
a
m
in
e 
R
el
ie
f,
 1
8
4
5
, 
 
S
ec
. 
to
 S
ir
 C
h
ar
le
s 
N
ap
ie
r,
 I
n
d
ia
, 
1
8
4
9
 
E
n
g
in
ee
r 
B
o
m
b
ay
, 
B
ar
o
d
a,
 a
n
d
 
C
en
tr
al
 I
n
d
ia
 R
ai
lw
ay
, 
1
8
5
3
 
A
u
th
o
r 
D
ie
d
, 
S
t.
 G
eo
rg
e’
s 
S
q
. 
2
8
 J
u
n
e 
1
8
7
9
. 
 
3
8
8
N
a
m
e 
D
a
te
 E
n
te
re
d
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
R
ec
o
rd
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
/P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
p
ri
o
r 
to
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
R
a
n
k
 i
n
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
st
in
g
 i
n
 
1
8
3
0
 
L
a
te
r 
C
a
re
er
 a
n
d
 D
ea
th
 
L
’E
st
ra
n
g
e,
 
G
eo
rg
e 
G
u
y
 
C
ar
lt
o
n
 
A
p
p
o
in
te
d
 L
t.
 
6
th
 F
t.
 
2
4
N
o
v
.1
7
9
8
  
S
er
v
ed
 i
n
 
S
p
ai
n
 a
n
d
 
P
o
rt
u
g
al
, 
an
d
 a
t 
th
e 
B
at
tl
e 
o
f 
A
lb
u
h
er
a 
 
 
C
ap
t.
 6
0
th
 F
t.
 
1
3
M
ar
.1
8
0
2
, 
C
ap
t.
 7
3
rd
 F
t.
 
2
6
M
ay
1
8
0
3
, 
M
aj
. 
b
v
t.
 
2
2
M
ay
1
8
0
4
, 
M
aj
.3
1
st
 F
t.
 
2
1
A
p
ri
l1
8
0
8
, 
L
t.
C
o
l.
 b
v
t.
 
3
0
M
ay
1
8
1
1
, 
L
t.
 C
o
l 
2
6
th
 
F
t.
 
1
0
D
ec
1
8
1
2
, 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
 3
1
st
 
F
t.
 b
y
 
ex
ch
an
g
e,
 
8
Ju
n
e1
8
1
5
 
 
D
ep
. 
A
d
j.
 
M
au
ri
ti
u
s,
 
1
8
2
4
 t
o
 1
8
3
1
 
M
au
ri
ti
u
s 
 
L
’E
st
ra
n
g
e 
ap
p
ea
rs
 t
o
 h
av
e 
le
ft
 
M
au
ri
ti
u
s 
so
m
et
im
e 
in
 1
8
3
1
-
1
8
3
2
 
L
o
v
e,
 J
am
es
 
F
re
d
er
ic
k
 
(b
.)
 L
o
n
d
o
n
, 
1
7
8
9
, 
so
n
 o
f 
Jo
h
n
 L
o
v
e 
E
n
si
g
n
 5
2
n
d
 F
t.
 
1
8
0
4
 
S
er
v
ed
 i
n
 
S
w
ed
en
 a
n
d
 
P
o
rt
u
g
al
, 
1
8
0
8
 
P
en
in
su
la
 
N
ew
 O
rl
ea
n
s,
 
1
8
1
5
 
(w
o
u
n
d
ed
) 
 
A
D
C
 J
o
h
n
 
L
am
b
er
t 
P
o
rt
u
g
al
, 
1
8
0
8
 
C
o
ru
n
n
a,
 
1
8
0
9
 
P
o
rt
u
g
al
, 
1
8
0
9
-1
8
1
2
 
W
at
er
lo
o
, 
1
8
1
5
 
N
ew
 B
ru
n
sw
ic
k
 
Z
an
te
 
In
sp
ec
ti
n
g
 
F
ie
ld
 O
ff
ic
er
 
o
f 
M
il
it
ia
, 
N
ew
 
B
ru
n
sw
ic
k
, 
1
8
2
5
 
R
es
id
en
t 
o
f 
Z
an
te
, 
1
8
3
5
 
7
3
rd
 F
t.
 
C
an
ad
a,
 1
8
3
8
 
G
o
v
. 
o
f 
Je
rs
ey
, 
1
8
5
2
 
In
sp
ec
ti
n
g
 
F
ld
. 
O
ff
ic
er
, 
N
ew
 
B
ru
n
sw
ic
k
, 
1
8
3
0
 
G
o
v
. 
o
f 
Je
rs
ey
 1
8
5
2
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 S
h
o
rn
cl
if
fe
 C
am
p
, 
1
8
5
6
 
In
sp
ec
to
r 
G
en
. 
o
f 
In
fa
n
tr
y
, 
1
8
5
7
 
C
o
l.
 5
7
th
 F
t.
 1
8
5
6
 
C
o
l.
 4
3
rd
 F
t.
  
1
8
6
5
 
G
en
. 
1
8
6
4
 
K
.H
. 
1
8
3
1
 
C
.B
. 
1
8
3
9
 
K
.C
.B
. 
1
8
5
6
 
G
.C
.B
. 
1
8
6
5
 
D
ie
d
, 
O
v
in
g
to
n
 S
q
. 
L
o
n
d
o
n
, 
1
3
 
Ja
n
. 
1
8
6
6
. 
L
o
w
ry
-C
o
rr
y
, 
S
o
m
er
se
t 
(b
.)
 1
1
 
Ju
ly
 1
7
7
4
 
N
o
 m
il
it
ar
y
 
se
rv
ic
e 
 
 
M
.P
. 
Ir
is
h
 
H
o
u
se
 o
f 
C
o
m
m
o
n
s 
1
7
9
7
-1
8
0
0
 
M
.P
. 
C
o
. 
T
y
ro
n
e 
1
8
0
1
-
0
2
 
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
 
Ja
m
ai
ca
  
D
ie
d
, 
1
8
4
1
 
S
o
n
 b
ec
am
e 
1
st
 L
o
rd
 o
f 
th
e 
A
d
m
ir
al
ty
  
 
3
8
9
N
a
m
e 
D
a
te
 E
n
te
re
d
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
R
ec
o
rd
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
/P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
p
ri
o
r 
to
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
R
a
n
k
 i
n
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
st
in
g
 i
n
 
1
8
3
0
 
L
a
te
r 
C
a
re
er
 a
n
d
 D
ea
th
 
 L
u
sh
in
g
to
n
, 
S
te
p
h
en
 
R
u
m
b
o
ld
, 
(b
.)
 
B
en
d
is
h
 H
o
u
se
 
B
o
tt
es
h
am
, 
C
am
b
ri
d
g
es
h
ir
e,
 
6
 M
ay
 1
7
7
6
, 
2
n
d
 
so
n
 o
f 
V
is
co
u
n
t 
o
f 
N
ew
ca
st
le
, 
b
ro
th
er
 S
ir
 
Ja
m
es
 L
aw
 
L
u
sh
in
g
to
n
, 
ca
d
et
sh
ip
, 
M
ad
ra
s 
1
7
9
6
, 
co
l.
 3
rd
 M
ad
ra
s 
L
t.
 C
av
. 
1
8
2
9
, 
G
en
. 
1
8
5
4
 
C
iv
il
ia
n
, 
F
at
h
er
 a
 
d
ir
ec
to
r 
o
f 
th
e 
E
as
t 
In
d
ia
 C
o
. 
S
er
v
ed
 i
n
 
M
ad
ra
s 
C
iv
il
 
S
er
v
ic
e,
 
as
si
st
an
t 
in
 
P
o
li
ti
ca
l,
 
M
il
it
ar
y
, 
an
d
 
S
ec
re
t 
D
ep
t.
, 
 
M
ad
ra
s,
 1
7
9
2
 
 
C
o
ll
ec
to
r 
at
 
T
in
n
ev
el
ly
, 
1
8
0
1
 
R
eg
is
tr
ar
 o
f 
S
u
d
d
ar
 a
n
d
 
F
o
u
jd
ar
ry
 
A
d
o
w
lu
t,
 
1
8
0
3
 
L
ef
t 
se
rv
ic
e,
 
1
8
0
7
 
M
.P
. 
fo
r 
R
y
e,
 
1
8
0
 7
-1
2
 
M
.P
. 
fo
r 
C
an
te
rb
u
ry
, 
1
8
1
2
-3
0
 a
n
d
 
1
8
3
5
-3
7
. 
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
M
ad
ra
s 
A
u
th
o
r 
(d
.)
 N
o
rt
o
n
 H
al
l,
 F
av
er
sh
am
, 
K
en
t 
5
 A
u
g
. 
1
8
6
8
 
L
y
o
n
, 
Ja
m
es
 
F
re
d
er
ic
k
, 
(b
) 
1
7
7
5
 (
at
 s
ea
),
 
so
n
 o
f 
C
ap
t.
 
Ja
m
es
 L
y
o
n
 8
5
th
 
F
t.
  
 
E
n
si
g
n
 2
5
th
 F
t.
  
 
S
er
v
ed
 o
n
 
R
o
y
al
 N
av
y
 
V
es
se
ls
 p
re
se
n
t 
at
 “
T
h
e 
G
lo
ri
o
u
s 
F
ir
st
 
o
f 
Ju
n
e.
” 
G
re
n
ad
a 
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 
F
o
re
ig
n
 C
o
rp
s.
 
1
7
9
9
 
E
g
y
p
t 
P
en
in
su
la
 
1
8
0
8
-1
8
1
3
 
G
er
m
an
y
, 
1
8
1
3
 
W
at
er
lo
o
 
C
am
p
ai
g
n
 
O
n
 s
ta
ff
 w
it
h
 
L
o
rd
 G
eo
rg
e 
L
en
n
o
x
, 
1
7
9
7
 
A
D
C
 t
o
 S
ir
 
C
h
ar
le
s 
S
te
u
ar
t 
 
L
t.
 A
p
ri
l,
 
1
7
9
3
, 
 
C
ap
t.
 A
p
ri
l 
1
7
9
5
 
M
aj
. 
F
eb
.,
 
1
7
9
9
 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
 1
8
1
1
 
M
.G
. 
1
8
1
4
 
L
.G
. 
1
8
3
0
 
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 
Is
la
n
d
 D
is
tr
ic
t,
 
1
8
1
7
 
C
 i
n
 C
  
an
d
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
 
W
in
d
w
ar
d
 a
n
d
 
L
ee
w
ar
d
 
Is
la
n
d
s 
B
ar
b
ad
o
s 
 
C
o
l.
 2
4
th
 F
t.
 
E
q
u
er
ry
 t
o
 D
u
k
e 
o
f 
C
am
b
ri
d
g
e 
(d
.)
 B
ri
g
h
to
n
, 
1
6
 O
ct
. 
1
8
4
2
 
M
ac
le
o
d
, 
H
en
ry
 
G
eo
rg
e 
(b
. 
?
) 
 
S
er
v
ed
 i
n
 
F
la
n
d
er
s 
an
d
 
W
at
er
lo
o
 
C
am
p
ai
g
n
 (
w
.)
  
 
C
ap
t.
 2
9
 
S
ep
te
m
b
er
 
1
8
1
3
, 
C
ap
t.
 
3
5
th
 F
t.
 
9
D
ec
em
b
er
 
1
8
1
4
, 
b
v
t.
 
M
aj
. 
2
1
 J
u
n
e 
1
8
1
5
 
A
D
C
 t
o
 D
u
k
e 
o
f 
R
ic
h
m
o
n
d
 i
n
 
C
an
ad
a 
 
D
ep
. 
A
d
j.
 
G
en
. 
1
8
2
6
-1
8
3
5
 
Ja
m
ai
ca
  
K
n
ig
h
te
d
 b
y
 W
il
li
am
 I
V
 o
n
 b
ei
n
g
 
ap
p
t.
 L
t.
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 S
t.
 
C
h
ri
st
o
p
h
er
’s
  
C
o
lo
n
el
, 
 H
.p
. 
1
8
3
8
 
D
ie
d
, 
n
ea
r 
W
in
d
so
r,
 A
u
g
u
st
 2
0
, 
1
8
4
7
 
 
3
9
0
N
a
m
e 
D
a
te
 E
n
te
re
d
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
R
ec
o
rd
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
/P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
p
ri
o
r 
to
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
R
a
n
k
 i
n
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
st
in
g
 i
n
 
1
8
3
0
 
L
a
te
r 
C
a
re
er
 a
n
d
 D
ea
th
 
M
ai
tl
an
d
, 
S
ir
 
P
er
eg
ri
n
e,
 (
b
.)
 6
 
Ju
ly
 1
7
7
7
, 
so
n
 
o
f 
T
h
o
m
as
 
M
ai
tl
an
d
 o
f 
S
h
ru
b
a 
H
al
l,
 
N
ew
 F
o
re
st
 
E
n
si
g
n
 1
st
 F
t.
 
G
d
s.
, 
Ju
n
e 
1
7
9
2
 
S
er
v
ed
 i
n
 
F
la
n
d
er
s,
 1
7
9
4
 
C
am
p
ai
g
n
ed
 
O
st
en
d
, 
1
7
9
8
 
C
o
ru
n
n
a,
 1
8
0
9
 
W
al
ch
er
en
, 
1
8
0
9
 
C
ad
iz
, 
1
8
1
2
 
N
iv
el
le
, 
N
iv
e,
 
1
8
1
3
 
W
at
er
lo
o
, 
1
8
1
5
 
B
ri
g
ad
e 
co
m
m
an
d
er
  
 
L
t.
 a
n
d
 C
ap
t.
, 
1
7
9
4
 
C
ap
t.
 a
n
d
 L
t.
 
C
o
l.
 1
8
0
3
 
B
v
t.
 C
o
l.
 
1
8
1
2
 
M
.G
.,
 1
8
1
4
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 
U
p
p
er
 C
an
ad
a,
 
1
8
1
8
-1
8
2
8
 
L
t.
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
N
o
v
a 
S
co
ti
a 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
  
in
 C
h
ie
f,
 M
ad
ra
s 
A
rm
y
, 
1
8
3
6
-3
8
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
an
d
 C
 i
n
 C
, 
C
ap
e 
o
f 
G
o
o
d
 H
o
p
e,
 1
8
4
4
-1
8
4
7
 
K
af
fi
r 
W
ar
 1
8
4
6
-4
7
 
G
en
er
al
, 
1
8
4
6
 
C
o
lo
n
el
, 
7
6
th
 a
n
d
 1
7
 t
h
 F
t.
, 
1
8
5
2
 
D
ie
d
, 
E
at
o
n
 P
la
ce
, 
W
es
t 
L
o
n
d
o
n
, 
3
0
 M
ay
 1
8
5
4
 
M
al
co
lm
, 
Jo
h
n
  
 
(b
.)
 M
ay
 1
7
6
9
 
Im
p
o
v
er
is
h
ed
 
fa
th
er
  
E
n
si
g
n
, 
E
as
t 
In
d
ia
 
C
o
m
p
an
y
 
In
d
ia
—
S
ie
g
e 
o
f 
C
o
p
o
u
le
e 
S
er
in
g
ap
at
am
  
A
d
j.
 f
o
r 
se
p
o
y
 
co
m
p
an
y
 
S
ec
. 
fo
r 
C
 i
n
 
C
 A
lu
re
d
 
C
la
rk
 a
n
d
 
G
en
. 
G
eo
rg
e,
 
L
o
rd
 H
ar
ri
s 
 
A
ss
t.
 t
o
 
re
si
d
en
t 
o
f 
H
y
d
er
ab
ad
  
E
n
v
o
y
 t
o
 
P
er
si
a 
 
P
ri
v
at
e 
se
c.
 t
o
 
G
o
v
. 
G
en
. 
 
E
n
v
o
y
 t
o
 
P
er
si
a 
1
8
1
1
 
L
t.
 1
7
9
1
 
(E
as
t 
In
d
ia
 
C
o
m
p
.)
 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
  
B
ri
g
. 
1
8
1
7
-
E
IC
 D
ec
ca
n
 
A
rm
y
 
R
es
id
ed
 i
n
 
E
n
g
la
n
d
 1
8
1
2
-
1
5
 
co
n
su
lt
at
io
n
 
w
it
h
 E
IC
 B
o
ar
d
 
an
d
 P
ar
li
a
m
en
t 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 
B
o
m
b
ay
, 
1
8
2
6
 
B
o
m
b
ay
 
M
.P
. 
1
8
3
1
, 
L
au
n
ce
st
o
n
  
S
tr
o
n
g
 T
o
ry
 a
n
d
 o
p
p
o
se
d
 t
o
 
re
fo
rm
. 
O
u
t 
o
f 
o
ff
ic
e 
1
8
3
2
 
D
ie
d
, 
M
ay
 3
0
, 
1
8
3
3
 
M
o
n
ta
g
u
e,
 
W
il
li
a
m
 
b
. 
O
ct
. 
1
7
6
8
 
fa
th
er
, 
G
eo
rg
e 
M
o
n
ta
g
u
e,
 4
th
 
D
u
k
e 
o
f 
M
an
ch
es
te
r 
 
E
n
si
g
n
 3
5
th
 F
t.
 
O
ct
. 
1
7
8
7
  
N
o
 r
ec
o
rd
 o
f 
co
m
b
at
 
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
N
o
 r
ec
o
rd
 o
f 
m
il
it
ar
y
 s
ta
ff
 
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
L
t.
 7
6
th
 F
t.
 
D
ec
. 
1
7
8
7
 
5
0
th
 F
t.
 J
an
. 
1
7
8
8
-1
7
9
0
 
7
3
rd
 F
t.
 1
7
9
3
 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
 1
7
9
4
 
1
7
9
2
 H
ig
h
 
S
te
w
ar
d
 o
f 
G
o
d
m
an
ch
es
te
r 
1
7
9
3
 L
o
rd
-l
ie
u
t.
 
H
u
n
ti
n
g
d
o
n
 C
o
. 
1
8
0
8
 G
o
v
. 
o
f 
Ja
m
ai
ca
 
G
o
v
. 
Ja
m
ai
ca
 
P
o
st
m
as
te
r 
G
en
er
al
, 
1
8
2
7
 
S
tr
o
n
g
 T
o
ry
  
D
ie
d
, 
R
o
m
e,
 M
ar
ch
 1
8
4
3
  
M
ax
w
el
l,
 
C
h
ar
le
s 
W
il
li
a
m
 
C
iv
il
ia
n
  
N
A
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
N
A
 
 
S
t.
 K
it
ts
 
N
ev
is
  
 
 
3
9
1
N
a
m
e 
D
a
te
 E
n
te
re
d
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
R
ec
o
rd
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
/P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
p
ri
o
r 
to
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
R
a
n
k
 i
n
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
st
in
g
 i
n
 
1
8
3
0
 
L
a
te
r 
C
a
re
er
 a
n
d
 D
ea
th
 
N
ap
ie
r,
 C
h
ar
le
s,
 
(b
.)
 W
h
it
eh
al
l,
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
, 
1
0
 
A
u
g
. 
1
7
8
2
, 
so
n
 
o
f 
H
o
n
. 
C
o
l.
 
G
eo
rg
e 
N
ap
ie
r,
 
b
ro
th
er
 t
o
 
G
eo
rg
e,
 H
en
ry
, 
an
d
 W
il
li
a
m
 
N
ap
ie
r.
  
C
o
m
m
is
si
o
n
ed
 
en
si
g
n
, 
3
3
rd
 F
t.
 
Ja
n
.,
 1
7
9
4
 
Ir
el
an
d
, 
1
7
9
8
 
P
en
in
su
la
, 
A
u
g
. 
1
8
0
8
 
P
.O
.W
.,
 1
8
0
9
-
1
8
1
0
 
P
en
in
su
la
, 
1
8
1
0
-1
8
1
1
 
B
er
m
u
d
a/
N
o
rt
h
 
A
m
er
ic
a,
 1
8
1
4
 
H
.p
. 
1
8
1
4
 
A
D
C
 t
o
 S
ir
 
Ja
m
es
 D
u
ff
, 
L
im
er
ic
k
 
D
is
t.
 
A
D
C
 t
o
 
G
en
er
al
 
H
en
ry
 
E
d
w
ar
d
 F
o
x
 
C
 i
n
 C
, 
Ir
el
an
d
 
C
ap
t.
 i
n
 s
ta
ff
 
co
rp
s,
 D
ec
. 
1
8
0
3
 
A
D
C
 t
o
 
R
o
b
er
t 
C
ra
u
fu
rd
 
M
aj
. 
C
ap
e 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
C
o
rp
s,
 M
ay
 
1
8
0
6
 
M
aj
. 
5
0
th
 F
t.
 
1
8
0
6
 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
 1
0
1
st
 
F
t.
, 
1
8
1
1
 
E
m
p
lo
y
ed
 i
n
 
co
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
 o
f 
M
il
it
ar
y
 C
an
al
, 
H
y
th
e,
 1
8
0
5
 
N
o
n
-r
es
id
en
t 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 
V
ir
g
in
 I
sl
an
d
s,
 
1
8
1
1
-1
8
1
3
 
R
es
id
en
t 
(c
o
m
m
is
si
o
n
er
) 
o
f 
C
ep
h
al
o
n
ia
, 
1
8
2
2
 a
ss
is
te
d
 b
y
 
Jo
h
n
 P
it
t 
K
en
n
ed
y
 
O
ff
er
ed
 r
es
id
en
t 
p
o
st
 o
n
 Z
an
te
, 
b
u
t 
d
ec
li
n
ed
 
In
sp
ec
ti
n
g
 
F
ie
ld
 O
ff
ic
er
 
Io
n
ia
n
 I
sl
an
d
s 
A
u
th
o
r,
 1
8
3
6
 e
n
te
re
d
 p
o
li
ti
cs
 
(W
h
ig
) 
M
. 
G
.,
 J
an
u
ar
y
 1
8
3
7
 
N
o
rt
h
er
n
 M
il
it
ar
y
 D
is
tr
ic
t,
 1
8
3
9
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
, 
P
o
o
n
a,
 A
p
ri
l 
1
8
4
1
  
C
o
m
m
an
d
, 
S
in
d
, 
1
8
4
2
 
C
o
n
q
u
es
t 
o
f 
S
in
d
, 
1
8
4
3
/1
8
4
4
 
L
. 
G
.,
 N
o
v
em
b
er
 1
8
4
6
 
D
ie
d
, 
A
u
g
u
st
 1
8
5
3
  
N
ic
o
la
y
, 
W
il
li
a
m
, 
(b
.)
 
1
7
7
1
, 
o
f 
an
 o
ld
 
S
ax
e-
G
o
th
a 
fa
m
il
y
 t
h
at
 
se
tt
le
d
 i
n
 
E
n
g
la
n
d
 
E
n
te
re
d
 a
s 
C
ad
et
, 
R
o
y
al
 
M
il
it
ar
y
 
A
ca
d
em
y
, 
W
o
o
lw
ic
h
, 
N
o
v
. 
1
7
8
5
 
R
o
y
al
 
A
rt
il
le
ry
, 
M
ay
 
1
7
9
0
  
S
er
v
ed
 i
n
 
In
d
ia
, 
u
n
d
er
 
L
o
rd
 
C
o
rn
w
al
li
s 
1
7
9
1
-1
7
9
3
 
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s,
 
ca
p
tu
re
 o
f 
S
t.
 
L
u
ci
a 
S
p
ai
n
 u
n
d
er
 
M
o
o
re
 
W
at
er
lo
o
 
S
u
p
er
v
is
ed
 
co
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
 
o
f 
d
ef
en
se
s 
o
n
 c
o
as
t 
o
f 
K
en
t 
an
d
 
S
u
ss
ex
 
In
te
ll
ig
en
ce
 
d
u
ti
es
 u
n
d
er
 
S
ir
 J
o
h
n
 
M
o
o
re
 
R
o
y
al
 
E
n
g
in
ee
rs
, 
L
t.
, 
A
u
g
. 
1
7
9
3
 
C
ap
t.
 A
u
g
. 
1
7
9
8
 
M
aj
. 
Q
M
G
  
C
o
rp
.,
 J
u
n
e 
1
8
0
1
 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
, 
A
p
ri
l 
1
8
0
5
 
B
v
t.
 C
o
l.
, 
Ju
n
e 
1
8
1
3
 
M
.G
. 
A
u
g
.,
 
1
8
1
9
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 
D
o
m
in
ic
a,
 S
t.
 
C
h
ri
st
o
p
h
er
, 
N
ev
is
, 
S
t.
 K
it
ts
, 
A
n
ti
g
u
a,
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
V
ir
g
in
 I
sl
an
d
s.
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
D
o
m
in
ic
a,
 S
t.
 
C
ri
st
o
p
h
er
, 
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 M
au
ri
ti
u
s,
 1
8
3
2
-1
8
4
0
 
C
.B
. 
an
d
 K
.C
.H
. 
 
L
. 
G
.,
 J
an
u
ar
y
 1
8
3
7
 
C
o
lo
n
el
, 
1
st
 W
. 
I.
 R
eg
t.
  
D
ie
d
, 
O
ri
el
 L
o
d
g
e,
 C
h
el
te
n
h
am
, 
M
ay
 3
,1
8
4
2
 
 
3
9
2
N
a
m
e 
D
a
te
 E
n
te
re
d
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
R
ec
o
rd
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
/P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
p
ri
o
r 
to
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
R
a
n
k
 i
n
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
st
in
g
 i
n
 
1
8
3
0
 
L
a
te
r 
C
a
re
er
 a
n
d
 D
ea
th
 
P
o
n
so
n
b
y
, 
F
re
d
er
ic
 
C
av
en
d
is
h
, 
(b
.)
 
6
 J
u
ly
 1
7
8
3
, 
so
n
 
o
f 
F
re
d
er
ic
 
P
o
n
so
n
b
y
, 
3
rd
 
E
ar
l 
o
f 
B
es
sb
o
ro
u
g
h
 
C
o
rn
et
 1
0
th
 
D
ra
g
o
o
n
s,
 J
an
. 
1
8
0
0
 
Ir
el
an
d
, 
S
p
ai
n
, 
1
8
0
9
 
P
en
in
su
la
r 
1
8
0
9
-1
8
1
4
 
W
at
er
lo
o
, 
1
8
1
5
 
(w
o
u
n
d
ed
) 
S
er
v
ed
 o
n
 
st
af
f 
o
f 
L
o
rd
 
L
t.
, 
Ir
el
an
d
  
S
ta
ff
 
W
el
li
n
g
to
n
’s
 
P
en
in
su
la
r 
A
rm
y
—
A
ss
t.
 
A
d
j.
 G
en
. 
 
A
D
C
 t
o
 K
in
g
 
L
t.
 1
0
th
 
D
ra
g
o
o
n
s,
  
1
8
0
0
 
C
ap
t.
 1
0
th
 
D
ra
g
o
o
n
s,
 
1
8
0
3
 
C
ap
t.
 6
0
th
 F
t.
, 
1
8
0
6
 
M
aj
. 
1
8
0
7
 
M
aj
. 
2
3
rd
 
D
ra
g
o
o
n
s,
  
1
8
0
7
 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
  
1
8
1
0
 
C
o
l.
 1
2
th
 L
t.
 
D
ra
g
o
o
n
s,
 
u
n
e 
1
8
1
1
 
H
.p
. 
A
u
g
. 
1
8
2
0
 
In
sp
ec
ti
n
g
 F
ie
ld
 
O
ff
ic
er
, 
Io
n
ia
n
 
Is
la
n
d
s,
 J
an
. 
1
8
2
4
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 M
al
ta
 
D
ec
. 
1
8
2
6
 
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
 
M
al
ta
 1
8
2
6
-
1
8
3
5
 
M
.G
. 
M
ay
 1
8
2
5
 
C
o
lo
n
el
, 
8
6
th
 F
t.
, 
D
ec
e
m
b
er
 1
8
3
5
 
C
o
lo
n
el
, 
R
o
y
al
 D
ra
g
o
o
n
s,
 M
ar
ch
. 
1
8
3
6
 
K
.C
.H
. 
an
d
 K
.C
. 
B
.,
  
1
8
3
1
 
A
u
th
o
r,
 r
ev
is
io
n
 o
f 
A
re
n
ts
ch
il
d
t’
s 
C
av
al
ry
 T
re
at
is
e,
 1
8
4
4
 
D
ie
d
, 
B
as
in
g
st
o
k
e,
 J
an
u
ar
y
 
1
1
,1
8
3
7
. 
R
ai
tt
, 
G
eo
rg
e 
E
d
w
ar
d
 
C
o
m
m
en
ce
d
 
m
il
it
ar
y
 c
ar
ee
r 
3
6
th
 F
t.
 
st
at
io
n
ed
 n
ea
r 
T
ri
ch
in
o
p
o
ly
, 
E
as
t 
In
d
ie
s 
C
ey
lo
n
, 
1
7
9
6
. 
S
er
v
ed
 w
it
h
 
G
en
er
al
 
D
o
u
g
la
s 
B
ai
rd
, 
C
ap
e 
o
f 
G
o
o
d
 
H
o
p
e 
1
8
0
3
 
A
p
p
t.
 M
aj
. 
w
it
h
 e
x
p
ed
it
io
n
 
to
 M
au
ri
ti
u
s,
 
1
8
1
0
 
Ir
el
an
d
, 
1
8
1
5
 
 
L
t.
 7
2
n
d
 F
t.
 
Ja
n
. 
1
7
9
6
 
C
ap
t.
 J
u
n
e 
1
8
0
3
 
M
aj
. 
1
8
1
3
 
H
.p
. 
A
p
ri
l 
1
8
1
8
 
 
 
D
ep
. 
A
d
j.
 
G
en
. 
 
M
ed
it
er
ra
n
ea
n
  
 
R
am
sa
y
, 
G
eo
rg
e,
 t
h
e 
E
ar
l 
o
f 
D
al
h
o
u
si
e 
(b
.)
 O
ct
. 
1
7
7
0
 
(S
co
tt
is
h
 
P
re
sb
y
te
ri
an
) 
C
o
rn
et
  
3
rd
 
D
ra
g
o
o
n
s 
Ju
ly
, 
1
7
8
8
 
G
ib
ra
lt
ar
 1
7
9
1
 
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s 
1
7
9
5
  
(w
o
u
n
d
ed
  
M
ar
ti
n
iq
u
e)
 
Ir
el
an
d
, 
1
7
9
9
 
H
ed
d
er
, 
1
7
9
8
 
E
g
y
p
t,
 1
8
0
1
 
G
ib
ra
lt
ar
, 
1
8
0
2
 
W
al
ch
er
en
, 
1
8
0
9
 
S
p
ai
n
, 
1
8
1
2
 
B
.G
. 
o
n
 s
ta
ff
 
in
 S
co
tl
an
d
, 
1
8
0
3
 
C
ap
t.
 1
7
9
1
, 
in
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
co
m
p
an
y
 
C
ap
t.
 1
7
9
1
, 
1
st
 F
t.
 
M
aj
. 
Ju
n
e 
1
7
9
2
, 
2
n
d
 F
t.
 
(p
u
rc
h
as
e)
 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
 1
7
9
4
  
B
v
t.
 C
o
l.
 
1
8
0
0
 
L
.G
. 
1
8
1
3
 
L
t.
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
N
o
v
a 
S
co
ti
a,
 
1
8
1
6
 
G
o
v
. 
C
an
ad
a,
 
1
8
2
0
 
 
C
 I
n
 C
. 
 
1
8
2
8
-1
8
3
2
 
In
d
ia
 
L
iv
ed
 a
b
ro
ad
, 
1
8
3
2
-3
3
 
R
et
u
rn
ed
 t
o
 S
co
tl
an
d
 1
8
3
4
 
D
ie
d
, 
1
8
3
8
 
  
 
3
9
3
N
a
m
e 
D
a
te
 E
n
te
re
d
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
R
ec
o
rd
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
/P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
p
ri
o
r 
to
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
R
a
n
k
 i
n
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
st
in
g
 i
n
 
1
8
3
0
 
L
a
te
r 
C
a
re
er
 a
n
d
 D
ea
th
 
R
ea
d
y
, 
Jo
h
n
, 
(b
.)
 1
7
7
7
 
E
n
si
g
n
 
6
 J
an
. 
1
7
9
6
 
 (a
ll
 
co
m
m
is
si
o
n
s 
u
n
p
u
rc
h
as
ed
) 
 
P
ay
m
as
te
r,
 1
4
th
 
F
t.
, 
S
ep
t.
 1
7
9
8
 
C
ap
t.
 6
9
th
 F
t.
 
A
u
g
. 
1
8
0
3
 
C
ap
t.
 1
4
th
 F
t.
, 
A
u
g
. 
1
8
0
3
 
C
ap
t.
 5
th
 G
ar
r.
 
B
t.
 M
ay
 1
8
0
7
 
M
aj
. 
5
th
 G
ar
r.
 
B
at
. 
A
u
g
. 
1
8
1
0
 
B
v
t.
 L
t.
 C
o
l.
 
Ju
n
e 
1
8
1
3
 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
 1
st
 
G
ar
r.
 B
at
. 
Ju
n
e 
1
8
1
3
 
M
il
. 
S
ec
. 
D
u
k
e 
o
f 
R
ic
h
m
o
n
d
, 
L
o
rd
 L
t.
 o
f 
Ir
el
an
d
 
 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
  
  
1
8
1
3
 
A
ss
t.
 A
d
j.
 G
en
 
C
an
ad
a 
 
H
.p
. 
1
st
 G
ar
r.
 
B
at
. 
 
L
t.
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
S
t.
 J
o
h
n
’s
 
Is
la
n
d
 (
P
ri
n
ce
 
E
d
w
ar
d
 
Is
la
n
d
) 
L
t.
  
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 I
sl
e 
o
f 
M
an
, 
1
8
3
2
 
M
. 
G
.,
 1
8
4
1
 
D
ie
d
. 
1
8
4
5
 
R
o
ss
, 
P
at
ri
ck
 
E
n
si
g
n
, 
C
ap
t.
 
S
h
o
rt
’s
 I
n
d
. 
C
o
. 
1
7
9
3
 
Ir
el
an
d
, 
1
7
9
4
-
9
6
 
 
A
D
C
 M
. 
G
. 
A
d
ea
n
e,
 1
7
9
4
 
T
ri
ch
in
o
p
o
ly
, 
E
as
t 
In
d
ie
s,
 
1
7
9
7
  
M
y
so
re
 
C
am
p
ai
g
n
  
M
ah
ra
tt
a 
C
am
p
ai
g
n
 
w
it
h
 
W
el
li
n
g
to
n
 
1
8
0
1
 
 
L
t.
 1
0
0
th
 F
t.
 
1
7
9
3
 
C
ap
t.
 1
0
0
th
 
F
t.
 1
7
9
4
 
 9
1
st
 F
t.
 1
7
9
5
 
2
5
th
/2
2
n
d
 L
t.
 
D
ra
g
. 
1
7
9
8
 
B
v
t.
 
M
aj
./
M
aj
. 
2
6
th
 F
t.
 –
 2
3
 
D
ra
g
o
o
n
s.
 
1
8
0
7
 a
s 
L
t.
 
C
o
l.
 1
8
0
7
 
1
0
th
 F
t.
 1
8
0
9
 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
 7
5
th
 
F
t.
 1
8
1
5
 
S
er
v
ed
 i
n
 I
o
n
ia
n
 
Is
la
n
d
s.
  
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
A
n
ti
g
u
a,
 
B
ar
b
u
d
a,
 
an
d
  
M
o
n
te
su
rt
  
  
 
 
3
9
4
N
a
m
e 
D
a
te
 E
n
te
re
d
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
R
ec
o
rd
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
/P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
p
ri
o
r 
to
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
R
a
n
k
 i
n
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
st
in
g
 i
n
 
1
8
3
0
 
L
a
te
r 
C
a
re
er
 a
n
d
 D
ea
th
 
S
ew
el
l,
 W
il
li
am
 
H
en
ry
 
C
o
rn
et
 M
ar
ch
 
1
8
0
6
 
 
 
C
o
rn
et
 1
6
th
 
D
ra
g
o
o
n
s 
 
1
8
0
6
 
L
t.
  
1
8
0
7
 
C
ap
t.
 6
0
th
 F
t.
  
 
1
8
1
2
 
B
v
t.
 M
aj
. 
 
1
8
1
4
 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
 1
8
1
7
 
H
.p
. 
 1
8
2
1
 
C
ap
t.
 4
9
th
 F
t.
  
1
8
2
8
 
M
aj
. 
3
1
st
 F
t.
  
1
8
2
9
 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
 6
th
 F
t.
  
1
8
3
9
 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
 9
4
th
 
F
t.
 M
ar
ch
 
1
8
4
1
 
 
D
ep
. 
Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r 
G
en
er
al
 F
eb
 
1
8
2
8
 t
o
 1
8
4
1
 
E
as
t 
In
d
ie
s 
C
o
m
m
an
d
an
t 
o
f 
C
en
tr
al
 D
iv
is
io
n
, 
M
ad
ra
s,
 1
8
4
9
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 M
y
so
re
 D
iv
is
io
n
 
1
8
5
1
 
C
o
lo
n
el
, 
2
6
th
 F
t.
 1
8
5
2
 
C
o
lo
n
el
, 
7
9
th
 F
t.
 1
8
5
4
 
C
.B
. 
1
9
 J
u
ly
 1
8
3
8
 
K
.C
.B
. 
2
8
 J
u
n
e 
1
8
6
1
 
G
ra
n
te
d
 d
is
ti
n
g
u
is
h
ed
 s
er
v
ic
e 
aw
ar
d
, 
A
p
ri
l 
1
8
4
8
  
D
ie
d
, 
F
lo
re
n
ce
, 
M
ar
ch
 1
3
, 
1
8
6
2
. 
S
m
it
h
 H
ar
ry
 
G
eo
rg
e 
W
ak
el
y
n
  
(b
.)
 1
7
8
7
—
o
n
e 
o
f 
th
ir
te
en
 
ch
il
d
re
n
 
F
at
h
er
 s
u
rg
eo
n
 
Jo
h
n
 S
m
it
h
  
E
n
si
g
n
, 
9
5
th
 
F
t.
, 
M
ay
 1
8
0
5
 
S
o
u
th
 A
m
er
ic
a,
 
1
8
0
7
 
C
o
rr
u
n
a,
 1
8
0
8
 
P
o
rt
u
g
al
, 
1
8
0
9
 
w
o
u
n
d
ed
 1
8
0
9
 
S
p
ai
n
—
1
8
1
0
-
1
8
1
4
 
W
as
h
in
g
to
n
 
1
8
1
4
 
N
ew
 O
rl
ea
n
s,
 
1
8
1
4
-1
5
 
W
at
er
lo
o
, 
1
8
1
5
 
A
ss
t.
 A
d
j.
 
G
en
. 
u
n
d
er
 
P
ak
en
h
am
, 
1
8
1
4
 
M
il
. 
S
ec
. 
to
 
S
ir
 J
o
h
n
 
L
am
b
er
t—
su
cc
es
so
r 
to
 
P
ak
en
h
am
 
A
ss
t.
 
Q
M
.G
en
. 
1
8
1
5
 
L
t.
 A
u
g
.,
 
1
8
0
5
 
C
ap
t.
 1
8
1
2
 
B
v
t.
 M
aj
. 
1
8
1
4
 
  
D
ep
. 
Q
M
 G
en
.,
 
Ja
m
ai
ca
, 
1
8
2
6
-
2
8
 
D
ep
. 
Q
M
 G
en
. 
C
ap
e 
C
o
lo
n
y
, 
1
8
2
8
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
an
t 
o
n
 
st
af
f 
u
n
d
er
 
D
’U
rb
an
, 
C
ap
e 
C
o
lo
n
y
, 
1
8
3
4
  
D
ep
. 
Q
M
 
G
en
. 
C
ap
e 
C
o
lo
n
y
  
B
v
t.
 C
o
l.
, 
1
8
3
7
 
A
d
ju
ta
n
t 
G
en
er
al
 ,
 I
n
d
ia
 1
8
4
0
 
A
ss
t.
 A
d
j.
 G
en
.,
 G
w
al
io
r 
C
am
p
ai
g
n
 
M
. 
G
.,
 h
o
n
o
ra
ry
 r
an
k
, 
1
8
4
5
 
C
o
lo
n
el
, 
9
5
th
 F
t.
, 
1
8
4
7
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 C
ap
e 
C
o
lo
n
y
, 
1
8
4
7
-
1
8
5
2
  
L
t.
  
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
  
P
ly
m
o
u
th
, 
1
8
5
3
 
L
. 
G
.,
 1
8
5
4
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
 o
f 
N
o
rt
h
er
n
 M
il
it
ar
y
 
D
is
tr
ic
t,
 1
8
5
4
 
D
ie
d
, 
1
8
6
0
 
 
3
9
5
N
a
m
e 
D
a
te
 E
n
te
re
d
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
R
ec
o
rd
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
/P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
p
ri
o
r 
to
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
R
a
n
k
 i
n
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
st
in
g
 i
n
 
1
8
3
0
 
L
a
te
r 
C
a
re
er
 a
n
d
 D
ea
th
 
S
m
y
th
, 
Ja
m
es
 
C
ar
m
ic
h
ae
l,
 (
b
.)
 
1
7
7
0
 
el
d
es
t 
o
f 
fi
v
e 
so
n
s 
(d
o
ct
o
r)
 
E
d
u
ca
te
d
 a
t 
R
o
y
al
 M
il
it
ar
y
 
A
ca
d
em
y
, 
W
o
o
lw
ic
h
, 
M
ar
. 
1
7
9
5
 
O
n
e 
o
f 
ch
ie
f 
en
g
in
ee
rs
, 
S
o
u
th
 A
fr
ic
a 
1
7
9
5
-1
8
0
8
 
S
p
ai
n
, 
w
it
h
 
M
o
o
re
, 
1
8
0
8
-
0
9
 
L
o
w
 C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s,
 
1
8
1
3
-1
8
1
5
 
C
h
ie
f 
en
g
in
ee
r 
at
 W
at
er
lo
o
, 
1
8
1
5
 
G
ai
n
ed
 
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
 a
s 
a 
co
lo
n
ia
l 
o
ff
ic
ia
l 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
 1
8
1
3
 
B
v
t.
 C
o
l.
 
1
8
1
5
 
M
. 
G
. 
 1
8
2
5
 
B
o
ar
d
 o
f 
O
rd
n
an
ce
, 
1
8
1
8
 
E
n
g
in
ee
r 
in
sp
ec
to
r 
L
o
w
 
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s 
&
 
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s,
 
1
8
2
3
 
E
n
g
in
ee
r 
in
sp
ec
to
r,
 N
o
rt
h
 
A
m
er
ic
a,
 
1
8
2
5
—
in
v
o
lv
ed
 
in
 R
id
ea
u
 C
an
al
 
p
ro
je
ct
 
E
n
g
in
ee
r,
 
Ir
el
an
d
, 
1
8
2
9
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
 
B
ah
am
as
 
1
8
2
9
-1
8
3
3
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 B
ri
ti
sh
 G
u
ia
n
a 
1
8
3
3
-
3
8
 
p
u
b
li
sh
ed
 e
ig
h
t 
v
o
lu
m
es
 o
n
 
m
il
it
ar
y
 e
n
g
in
ee
ri
n
g
, 
d
ef
en
se
, 
an
d
 s
la
v
er
y
 
D
ie
d
, 
1
8
3
8
 a
ft
er
 s
h
o
rt
 i
ll
n
es
s.
  
S
ta
v
el
ey
, 
W
il
li
a
m
 
ag
e 
1
4
 o
n
 f
ir
st
 
ap
p
t.
 t
o
 A
rm
y
. 
(b
.)
 2
9
 J
u
ly
 
1
7
8
4
, 
Y
o
rk
 
so
n
 o
f 
W
il
li
am
 
S
ta
v
el
ey
 o
f 
Y
o
rk
 
L
t.
 2
d
 B
at
. 
C
ai
th
n
es
s 
L
eg
io
n
, 
Ju
n
e 
1
7
9
8
 
Ir
is
h
 R
eb
el
li
o
n
 
1
7
9
8
 
S
er
v
ed
 i
n
 
ca
m
p
ai
g
n
s 
in
 
S
p
ai
n
 a
n
d
 
P
o
rt
u
g
al
, 
1
8
0
9
-
1
8
1
4
 
F
la
n
d
er
s 
W
at
er
lo
o
, 
1
8
1
5
 
D
ep
. 
A
ss
t.
 
Q
M
 G
en
er
al
, 
1
8
1
3
 
E
n
si
g
n
, 
R
o
y
al
 
S
ta
ff
 C
o
rp
s,
 
Ju
ly
 1
8
0
4
 
L
t.
 2
1
st
 F
t.
, 
A
p
ri
l 
1
8
0
8
 
C
ap
t.
 R
o
y
al
 
A
fr
ic
an
 
C
o
rp
s,
 M
ay
 
1
8
1
3
 
B
v
t.
 M
aj
. 
R
o
y
al
 
A
fr
ic
an
 
C
o
rp
s,
 D
ec
. 
1
8
1
4
 
C
ap
t.
 R
o
y
al
 
S
ta
ff
 C
o
rp
s,
 
1
8
1
5
 
B
v
t.
 L
t.
 C
o
l.
 
R
o
y
al
 S
ta
ff
 
C
o
rp
s,
 1
8
1
5
 
D
ir
ec
to
r 
o
f 
R
o
ad
s 
an
d
 
B
ri
d
g
es
, 
M
au
ri
ti
u
s.
 
D
ep
. 
Q
u
ar
te
r-
m
as
te
r 
G
en
 
.M
au
ri
ti
u
s 
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 T
ro
o
p
s 
H
o
n
g
 K
o
n
g
, 
1
8
4
7
 
C
o
l.
, 
9
4
th
 F
t.
, 
1
8
5
3
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 N
o
rt
h
er
n
 D
iv
. 
B
o
m
b
ay
 A
rm
y
, 
1
8
5
1
 
C
 i
n
 C
, 
M
ad
ra
s,
 1
8
5
3
 
M
. 
G
.,
 1
8
4
6
 
L
t.
 G
en
. 
in
 E
as
t 
In
d
ie
s,
 1
8
5
3
 
D
ie
d
 T
ip
p
ic
ad
o
o
, 
A
p
ri
l 
1
8
5
4
 
 
3
9
6
N
a
m
e 
D
a
te
 E
n
te
re
d
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
R
ec
o
rd
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
/P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
p
ri
o
r 
to
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
R
a
n
k
 i
n
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
st
in
g
 i
n
 
1
8
3
0
 
L
a
te
r 
C
a
re
er
 a
n
d
 D
ea
th
 
S
ti
rl
in
g
, 
Ja
m
es
, 
(b
.)
 1
7
9
1
, 
D
ru
m
p
el
li
er
, 
L
an
ar
k
sh
ir
e,
 5
th
 
so
n
 o
f 
A
n
d
re
w
 
S
ti
rl
in
g
 
m
. 
3
 S
ep
t.
 1
8
2
3
, 
E
ll
en
 (
1
6
),
 3
rd
 
d
au
g
h
te
r 
o
f 
Ja
m
es
 M
an
g
le
s 
M
.P
. 
fo
r 
G
u
il
fo
rd
, 
 
E
n
te
re
d
 N
av
y
, 
A
u
g
. 
1
8
0
3
  
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s 
ab
o
ar
d
, 
H
er
cu
le
s 
(7
4
) 
fl
ag
sh
ip
 o
f 
S
ir
 
Jo
h
n
 
D
u
ck
w
o
rt
h
. 
 
 
1
8
0
5
 C
ap
e 
F
in
is
te
rr
e,
 
G
lo
ry
, 
u
n
d
er
 
th
e 
co
m
m
an
d
 
o
f 
R
.A
. 
C
h
ar
le
s 
S
ti
rl
in
g
. 
 
R
iv
er
 P
la
te
, 
1
8
0
7
 
L
t.
 A
u
g
. 
1
8
0
9
 
F
la
g
 L
t.
 1
8
1
1
 
C
o
m
m
an
d
 o
f 
sl
o
o
p
 B
ra
ze
n
 
1
8
1
2
, 
m
o
u
th
 o
f 
M
is
si
ss
ip
p
i 
H
u
d
so
n
 B
ay
, 
 
N
o
rt
h
 S
ea
, 
co
as
t 
o
f 
Ir
el
an
d
, 
G
u
lf
 o
f 
M
ex
ic
o
 
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s 
st
at
io
n
, 
1
8
1
8
 
 
 
1
8
2
6
, 
fo
rm
 a
 
se
tt
le
m
en
t 
in
 
R
af
fl
es
 B
ay
, 
 
T
o
rr
es
 S
tr
ai
t.
 
E
x
p
lo
ra
ti
o
n
s 
1
8
2
7
 f
o
rm
 n
ew
 
se
tt
le
m
en
t 
W
es
te
rn
 
A
u
st
ra
li
a 
to
 
fo
re
st
al
l 
F
re
n
ch
 
d
es
ig
n
s.
 
O
ct
. 
1
8
2
8
, 
ap
p
t.
 
b
y
 S
ir
 G
eo
rg
e 
M
u
rr
ay
, 
(o
ld
 
fa
m
il
y
 f
ri
en
d
) 
to
 
co
m
m
an
d
 p
ar
ty
 
o
f 
se
tt
le
rs
. 
S
p
ri
n
g
 1
8
2
9
, 
F
re
e
m
an
tl
e 
an
d
 
P
er
th
 f
o
u
n
d
ed
  
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
 
W
es
te
rn
 
A
u
st
ra
li
a 
 
R
es
ig
n
ed
 g
o
v
t.
 1
8
3
9
 
la
ck
 o
f 
p
ro
g
re
ss
 i
n
 c
o
lo
n
y
 a
n
d
 
im
m
in
en
t 
w
ar
 w
it
h
 F
ra
n
ce
 
re
tu
rn
ed
 t
o
 a
ct
iv
e 
se
rv
ic
e.
  
1
8
4
0
-4
4
 c
o
m
m
an
d
ed
 I
n
d
u
s 
(7
8
) 
M
ed
it
er
ra
n
ea
n
 
H
o
w
e 
(1
2
0
) 
M
ed
it
er
ra
n
ea
n
. 
R
.A
. 
1
8
5
1
 
L
o
rd
 o
f 
A
d
m
ir
al
ty
, 
1
8
5
2
 
C
 i
n
 C
, 
C
h
in
a 
S
q
u
ad
ro
n
, 
1
8
5
4
-5
6
 
V
ic
e 
A
d
m
ir
al
. 
1
8
5
7
 
A
d
m
ir
al
, 
1
8
6
2
 
  
D
ie
d
 W
o
o
d
b
ri
d
g
e,
 G
u
il
fo
rd
, 
S
u
rr
ey
, 
 A
p
ri
l 
2
2
, 
1
8
6
5
 
 
 T
o
rr
en
s,
 R
o
b
er
t 
E
n
si
g
n
 1
9
th
 
D
ra
g
o
o
n
s 
S
ep
t.
 1
7
9
6
 
P
en
in
su
la
r 
C
am
p
ai
g
n
—
in
 
P
o
rt
u
g
u
es
e 
se
rv
ic
e 
1
8
1
2
-
1
3
 
F
la
n
d
er
s,
 1
8
1
4
 
W
at
er
lo
o
, 
Ju
n
e 
1
8
1
5
 
A
ss
t.
 Q
 M
. 
G
en
. 
o
n
 t
h
e 
st
af
f 
o
f 
th
e 
ar
m
y
 i
n
 S
p
ai
n
 
an
d
 P
o
rt
u
g
al
, 
2
8
S
ep
t1
8
1
3
. 
L
t.
 2
5
 J
an
 
1
8
0
1
, 
C
ap
t.
 
1
8
M
ay
1
8
0
6
, 
M
aj
.1
st
 W
.I
. 
R
eg
t.
, 
4
M
ar
.1
8
1
3
, 
B
v
t.
 L
t.
C
o
l.
 
1
4
Ju
ly
1
8
1
4
, 
L
t.
. 
C
o
l.
 a
t 
W
at
er
lo
o
—
1
st
 
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s 
R
eg
t.
—
A
ft
er
w
ar
d
s 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
 o
f 
3
8
th
  
C
o
l.
 6
5
th
 F
t.
 
1
2
A
u
g
1
8
1
9
. 
D
ep
. 
Q
M
 
G
en
. 
E
as
t 
In
d
ie
s 
 
W
al
k
er
, 
G
eo
rg
e 
W
ar
re
n
 
C
o
rn
et
 8
th
 
D
ra
g
o
o
n
s,
 
M
ay
 1
7
9
9
 
 
L
t.
 J
u
n
e 
1
8
0
1
 
C
ap
t.
 4
th
 W
.I
. 
R
eg
t.
, 
A
p
ri
l 
1
8
0
9
 
M
aj
. 
5
9
th
 F
t.
 
A
p
ri
l 
1
8
1
7
 
B
v
t.
 L
t.
 C
o
l.
 
M
ar
ch
 1
8
1
8
 
 
 
D
ep
. 
A
d
j.
 
G
en
. 
 
C
ey
lo
n
 
 
 
3
9
7
N
a
m
e 
D
a
te
 E
n
te
re
d
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
C
o
m
b
a
t 
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
ta
ff
 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 
S
er
v
ic
e 
R
ec
o
rd
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
/P
o
li
ti
ca
l 
p
ri
o
r 
to
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
R
a
n
k
 i
n
 1
8
3
0
 
C
o
lo
n
ia
l 
P
o
st
in
g
 i
n
 
1
8
3
0
 
L
a
te
r 
C
a
re
er
 a
n
d
 D
ea
th
 
W
h
it
w
o
rt
h
, 
M
at
th
ew
  
E
n
si
g
n
 4
9
th
 F
t.
 
1
7
8
7
 
S
er
v
ed
 i
n
 
B
ar
b
ad
o
s 
 
W
es
t 
In
d
ie
s—
P
o
rt
 a
u
 P
ri
n
ce
 
L
o
w
 C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s,
 
1
7
9
8
  
Ja
m
ai
ca
, 
1
8
0
1
 
E
x
p
ed
it
io
n
 t
o
 
H
an
o
v
er
, 
C
o
p
en
h
ag
en
. 
P
en
in
su
la
r 
C
am
p
ai
g
n
 
1
8
1
0
-1
8
1
4
 
A
D
C
, 
M
. 
G
. 
L
el
an
d
 
A
D
C
, 
M
. 
G
.,
 
S
o
m
er
se
t 
A
ss
t.
 A
d
j.
 
G
en
.,
 G
en
er
al
 
K
en
t,
 1
8
0
7
 
A
ss
t.
 A
d
j.
 
G
en
.,
 1
8
0
9
 
P
o
rt
u
g
al
 
A
D
C
, 
G
eo
rg
e 
II
I,
 1
8
1
0
 
D
ep
. 
A
d
j.
 
G
en
.,
 1
8
1
2
 
M
. 
G
.,
 I
re
la
n
d
 
st
af
f,
 1
8
1
4
 
A
d
ju
ta
n
t 
G
en
. 
Ir
el
an
d
 
L
t.
 4
9
th
 F
t.
 
A
u
g
. 
1
7
9
4
 
C
ap
t.
 4
9
th
 F
t.
 
O
ct
. 
1
7
9
4
 
M
aj
. 
8
5
th
 F
t.
, 
O
ct
. 
1
8
0
0
 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
 8
5
th
 
M
ar
. 
1
8
0
2
 
H
.p
. 
1
8
0
3
 
B
v
t.
 C
o
l.
 J
u
ly
 
1
8
1
0
 
M
. 
G
. 
Ju
n
e 
1
8
1
3
 
L
t.
 G
en
. 
M
ay
 
1
8
2
5
. 
1
8
2
3
-1
8
3
0
 
w
it
h
o
u
t 
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t 
C
o
l.
 2
6
th
 F
t.
 
1
8
2
7
 
C
o
l.
 1
8
th
 F
t.
 
1
8
3
2
 
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
 
L
o
w
er
 C
an
ad
a 
D
id
 n
o
t 
h
o
ld
 a
n
y
 f
u
rt
h
er
 o
ff
ic
es
. 
 
D
ie
d
, 
1
8
5
0
 
 
Y
o
u
n
g
, 
A
re
ta
s 
W
. 
 
(b
.)
1
7
7
7
 o
r 
 
1
7
7
8
? 
E
n
si
g
n
 E
ar
l 
o
f 
P
o
rt
m
o
re
’s
 
R
eg
im
en
t,
  
1
7
9
5
 
Ir
el
an
d
 
(r
eb
el
li
o
n
) 
1
7
9
8
 
E
g
y
p
t.
 1
8
0
1
 
G
ib
ra
lt
ar
 &
 
S
ic
il
y
 1
8
0
4
-0
6
 
P
en
in
su
la
r 
C
am
p
. 
1
8
0
8
-
1
8
1
1
 
G
u
ad
el
o
u
p
e 
1
8
1
5
 
A
D
C
, 
G
en
er
al
. 
H
en
ry
 F
o
x
 
L
t.
,.
 1
3
th
 F
t.
, 
N
o
v
. 
1
7
9
5
 
C
ap
t.
 
S
ep
te
m
b
er
, 
1
7
9
6
 
M
aj
. 
, 
D
ec
e
m
b
er
, 
1
8
0
7
 
L
t.
 C
o
lo
n
el
, 
Ja
n
u
ar
y
, 
3
rd
. 
W
. 
I.
 R
eg
t,
 
1
8
1
3
 
C
 i
n
 C
, 
G
re
n
ad
a,
 1
8
1
5
 
A
ct
in
g
 
G
o
v
er
n
o
r,
 
T
ri
n
id
ad
, 
1
8
2
0
, 
1
8
2
1
-2
3
 
“P
ro
te
ct
o
r 
o
f 
th
e 
S
la
v
es
,”
 
D
em
er
ar
a,
 1
8
2
6
 
L
t.
 G
o
v
er
n
o
r 
 
P
ri
n
ce
 E
d
w
ar
d
 
Is
la
n
d
 
K
n
ig
h
te
d
 J
u
ly
 1
8
3
4
 
D
ie
d
. 
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t 
H
o
u
se
, 
P
ri
n
ce
 
E
d
w
ar
d
’s
 I
s.
 D
ec
. 
1
8
3
5
 
  
A
b
b
re
v
ia
ti
o
n
s 
u
se
d
 i
n
 t
a
b
le
: 
A
D
C
- 
ai
d
e 
d
e 
ca
m
p
 
A
A
G
. 
–
 A
ss
is
ta
n
t 
A
d
ju
ta
n
t 
G
en
er
al
 
A
Q
M
. 
–
A
ss
is
ta
n
t 
Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r 
G
en
er
al
 
 
 
B
v
t.
-B
re
v
et
  
 
C
. 
B
.-
 C
o
m
p
an
io
n
 o
f 
th
e 
O
rd
er
 o
f 
th
e 
B
at
h
 
C
 i
n
 C
 –
 C
o
m
m
an
d
er
 i
n
 C
h
ie
f 
 
C
ap
t.
-C
ap
ta
in
 
C
o
l.
-C
o
lo
n
el
  
D
A
G
.-
 D
ep
u
ty
 A
d
ju
ta
n
t 
G
en
er
al
 
D
Q
G
.-
 D
ep
u
ty
 Q
u
ar
te
rm
as
te
r 
G
en
er
al
  
F
t.
 -
F
o
o
t 
K
. 
C
. 
B
. 
–
K
n
ig
h
t 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
 o
f 
th
e 
B
at
h
 
 
 
 
K
.C
.H
.-
 K
n
ig
h
t 
C
o
m
m
an
d
er
 o
f 
th
e 
H
an
o
v
er
ia
n
 O
rd
er
  
L
t.
-L
ie
u
te
n
an
t 
 
L
t.
 C
o
l.
- 
L
ie
u
te
n
an
t 
C
o
lo
n
el
  
 
L
. 
G
.-
L
ie
u
te
n
an
t 
G
en
er
al
  
 
M
aj
.-
M
aj
o
r 
M
.G
.-
 M
aj
o
r 
G
en
er
al
  
M
. 
P
.-
 M
e
m
b
er
 o
f 
P
ar
li
a
m
en
t 
R
.A
.-
R
o
y
al
 A
rt
il
le
ry
 
 
R
.H
.A
. 
–
R
o
y
al
 H
o
rs
e 
A
rt
il
le
ry
  
 
 
 
 
 
W
. 
I.
 -
W
es
t 
In
d
ia
n
  
M
.S
.-
 M
il
it
ar
y
 S
ec
re
ta
ry
 
 
 398
Table A.18  
Number of Colonial Military Administrators, Colonial Military Administrators with Staff 
Experience, and Civilian Administrators, 1815-1835. 
Source: United Kingdom, The Royal Military Calendar or Army Service Commission Book, in five volumes 
(London: A. J. Valpy, 1820); Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee, The Dictionary of National Biography (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1921-1922). 
 
Year Number of Military 
Administrators 
Army Navy Military Administrators with Staff 
Experience 
Number of Civilian 
Administrators 
1815 17 15 2 8 6 
1820 19 16 3 13 4 
1825* 18 15 2 12 7 
1830 22 20 2 16 6 
1835 16 15 2 9 8 
*Denotes that biographical information for one administrator not obtained 
 
 
 
Table A.19  
Colonial Administrative Structure and Salaries, Cape Colony 1834 
Source: Public Record Office, C. O. 325/20, Colonial Appointments. 
 
Office Name of Officer Date of Appointment Salary  £ 
Governor Major General  B. D’Urban 1833 5000 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
 
Sir I. Wylde Hnt. 
 
1 Jan. 1828 
 
2000 
Senior Puisne Judge W. Menzies Esq. 1 Jan. 1828 1500 
Puisne Judge G. Kekewich Esq. 28 July 1827 
1500 
Master of Supreme Court Clere Burton Esq. 21 April 1828 800 
Registrar of Supreme Court 
Thomas Bowles Esq. 21 Aug. 1827 400 
Secretary to Govt. Lieut. Colonel J. Bell 1 Jan. 1828 1500 
Treasurer/Acct. Genl./Registrar of Deeds 
 
J. Harvey Esq 
 
1836 
 
 
Auditor General P. G. Brink Esq. 29 Nov. 1828 700 
Judge of Police P. B. Boreherds Esq. 14 June 1827 500 
Superintendt of Police C. de Lorentz Esq. 1 Dec. 1825 600 
Attorney General A. Olliphant Esq 10 June 1827 1200 
High Sheriff J. Steuart 29 Nov. 1828 600 
President of Lombard Bank J. Marshall Esq. 7 Dec. 1816 600 
Commissioner of Stamps J. Carey Esq. 17 May 1829 500 
Post Master General R. Crozier Esq 21 Nov. 1815 400 
Port Captain J. Bance Esq. 30 Nov. 1825 300 
Civil Engineer Maj. Michell 9 June 1828 300 
Collector of Taxes 
R. Rogerson Esq. 14 June 1827 300 
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